



MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF THE  
RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT MORIER, G.C.B.  
FROM 1826 TO 1876




*R. B. D. Morier.*  
*from a drawing by Richmond*

THE LONDON MAGAZINE

MEMOIRS AND LETTERS  
OF THE RIGHT HON.  
SIR ROBERT MORIER, G.C.B.

FROM 1826 TO 1876



By his Daughter

MRS. ROSSLYN WEMYSS

*WITH PORTRAITS*

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

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# MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT MORIER

## VOLUME II

### CHAPTER XVII

#### ANGLO-AUSTRIAN COMMERCIAL TREATY

LORD RUSSELL had strongly recommended the Queen to consult Morier in regard to a number of questions connected with various matters, such as the establishment of Prince Alfred at a German university, the succession to the Duchy of Coburg, etc., on which Her Majesty's Ministers could not have any opinion, and in regard to which Lord Russell thought it very desirable that Her Majesty should have British as well as German advice.

The selection of a tutor for Prince Alfred during his stay at Bonn, as a German prince at a German university, was a subject of anxious consideration at the time, and in the summer of 1864 the Queen sent for Morier, then on a visit to England, to ask his opinion in the choice of a gentleman for this position, giving him to understand that it would be indispensably necessary that the person to be selected should possess sound Liberal opinions in regard to German politics, and be able to initiate the Prince into the questions of the day from a point of view which would approve itself to the Queen and tally with the late Prince Consort's ideas in regard to the future of Germany. The matter was somewhat complicated, from the Duke of Coburg, as was natural, seeing that Prince Alfred was his heir, having a voice in the matter. But, as Morier pointed out in a letter to General Grey (14th July 1864), the Duke, with all his admirable qualities, 'does, owing to a variety of circumstances, occupy at present an abnormal position in Germany, and his court is, to a certain extent, the centre of many persons whom it would be unfair to call political

adventurers, but who, it would be unwise not to admit, do very generally bear that character in Germany. There is, in fact, a Coburg clique, which, though it contains many very admirable elements, is yet *par excellence* a clique, and it seems to me of very vital importance to the future position of Prince Alfred that he should not begin his career as a German prince with any clique, or with his colours nailed, as it were, to one particular mast. He should mix freely and unimpeded amongst men of all colour of opinion, care being taken that his special political training should all the while be going on in the right direction. I think I am not wrong in saying that the Duke of Coburg has lost much of the influence for good which he might otherwise have had, by too exclusively surrounding himself by men of one particular class, and thereby exciting the animosity of men of higher standing.'

All was eventually settled to the satisfaction of everyone concerned, and in October Morier went over to Bonn to help to instal the Prince in his new surroundings. Besides these personal affairs of the Royal Family being added to his diplomatic duties, he had of late years been much occupied in questions commercial and economic, and been employed in drawing up reports on the Zollverein.

The Commercial Treaty Policy, which had been inaugurated by the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860, negotiated by Cobden, had led to a series of other treaties throughout Europe during the following five years, and in February 1865 he, though still only an attaché, was appointed one of the joint commissioners for the negotiation of a treaty of commerce with Austria, which, after three years, was brought to a successful issue.

'Know then,' he wrote to his father on 26th February 1865, 'that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased, or is about to be graciously pleased, to name me one of her commissioners to inquire in conjunction with an equal number of Imperial Royal and Apostolical Commissioners into the state of commercial relations between H.M.'s Empire, and H.I.R. and A.M.'s Empire. . . . I had asked to be attached to the Commission in any capacity whatever,

as secretary, pen-mender, what-not, just for the sake of the immense knowledge of *facts* and details which such an inquiry and negotiation would force upon me. It was, therefore, as you may fancy, no small matter of astonishment to find myself an actual Commissioner and Negotiator.'

This had created some jealousy.

'I had kept the matter a profound secret, and meant to do so till my official nomination arrived, never knowing what slips may occur between the Tantalus cup and the Tantalus lips, but Lord Napier let it out, and it became the nine days' wonder. The Crown Prince was very nice about it. He congratulated Alice heartily on the appointment which he said he knew I most fully deserved, adding that there was nobody for whom he had a higher esteem and felt a greater confidence in, than myself.'

Morier arrived at Vienna in March, though the Commission did not formally meet until 20th April.

To his father, dated 3rd April :—

'We have plenty of preparatory work, and it is not a bad thing that we have arrived here some time before. Of my Austrian colleagues I have as yet only made the acquaintance of Count Kinsky, who is an undoubtedly able man, and one who will work in the right direction.'

Ten days later, to the same :—

'On Saturday I dined with the Emperor [Francis Joseph], who was very gracious, as well as the Empress, with whom I had a very long talk in English, principally about the Princess Royal, after dinner. She is, without any exception, the most beautiful woman I ever saw, combining extreme beauty with extreme prettiness, and a right Imperial figure. My recollection of her was of an exceedingly pretty child. I saw her, if you remember, on her marriage, when she was fifteen, and not by any means full grown. She is now in all the glory of ripe womanhood, and anything more transcendently beautiful one could not see.'

To the same, 29th April 1865 :—

'We held our first sitting last Saturday, and I made my



maiden speech in German. It was in the conciliatory line, with a view to showing we were all pulling together towards a common object, and intended to disarm the scowling protectionist members of the Commission and make it impossible for them to cut up rough.'

Of the state of absolute chaos into which a series of national, constitutional, and financial crises had led the Austrian Government, and which did not help to make matters easy for the Commission, Morier gave the following description :—

'I can only picture the impression produced upon me by the Imperial Government by calling attention to the difference between a vertebrate animal and a mollusc. If you have ever seen diagrams of the nerve apparatus of these two species of animals, say a man and a jelly-fish, you will have perceived that, whereas the one has a nerve system, the other has not, *i.e.*, that in the one case there is a perfect organisation, all the portions of which are inter-dependent on each other, so that you can tell with the utmost precision where the prick of a pin will kill or paralyse the whole system, and know with mathematical certainty what effect, by exciting one nerve, will be produced on all other nerves. In the case of the mollusc, on the contrary, you find a lot of little independent nerve bunches, distributed apparently without any plan, and utterly unconnected with each other, and you can dig your knife here and there and everywhere, and produce either no effect or at least a merely local one. Well, Governments usually do, and certainly ought, to belong to the vertebrate class. The Austrian Government belongs to the mollusc category, and this explains the confusion and the impotence to which the Empire is reduced—a state of things, of which, though I had an inkling before I came here, I have found to be far beyond anything I could have conceived. Not only are all the departments independent of each other, but in the departments themselves there is no cohesion and no unity. Personal jealousies and animosities divide the one department from the other, and make the one do all it can to paralyse the action of the other. With a few thousand pounds from the secret service fund,

and a few decorations to give away, we could do anything we liked, but since they have discovered that honest inquiry and honest argument are the only gifts we have brought with us, our chance of effecting anything is reduced to a minimum, unless higher influences can be called into action. I should, however, leave my sketch still very incomplete did I not add two more elements of confusion, viz., the relation in which the bureaucracy finds itself placed *vis-à-vis* of the newly-created Reichsrath and the chronic disease of the mixed nationalities out of which the Empire is composed. . . . Here, as everywhere else abroad, the conflict underlying all other conflicts is that between the bourgeois and the privileged class;—now, the bourgeoisie and the manufacturing and industrial classes are identical, and whereas with us free trade was the rallying cry of the Liberals, and protection that of the privileged classes, we have here exactly the reverse, free trade being supposed to lie only in the interests of the landowners, and protection being the class cry of the Liberals who represent the middle classes.’

*Morier to Lord Russell*

‘KARLSBAD, *July 14th*, 1865.

‘. . . As regards the mere political and diplomatic part of the business’ (the commercial treaty), ‘I believe I may fairly claim to have been of use. My former knowledge of Vienna gave me advantages which the others could not have, and enabled me to get sooner at a correct knowledge of the political country we had to traverse. . . . As regards the commercial portion of our work, which in point of difficulty a thousand times exceeds the former, and on the proper conduct of which depends our success, the man you have got to look to is Mallet.<sup>1</sup> I can only explain to you to what an extent I consider that our success depends upon the latter by briefly pointing out on what, in my opinion, our chances of success depend. There is no use in hiding from ourselves that we are engaged upon a most delicate and anomalous task. To negotiate a *Tariff* treaty, without having any equivalents to offer, is so totally repugnant to

<sup>1</sup> Mallet, Sir Louis, C.B., b. 1823 d. 1890, Commissioner<sup>1</sup> for Anglo-Austrian Commercial Treaty.

all precedent, and apparently leaves unfulfilled such essential conditions to every international contract, that it is no wonder that the attempt should appear to most people an impossible one, and should excite the contempt of superficial persons. I myself, when I first went to Vienna, considered this an insuperable barrier to our success, and shared with most people in England the opinion that having in our treaty with France given away all that remained to us to give in the way of equivalents, our task was done, and that it was for France to pass on the sacred fire of Free Trade to the other nations of Europe. It was only after Mallet had explained to me his theory on the subject that I came to another conclusion.

'According to this theory the mission of England would be the following. She cannot hope, nor indeed desire, to negotiate treaties of a special kind with countries whose tariff is in a normal condition, and by the instrumentality of such treaties acquire a favoured market for her own particular products. This is the old-fashioned commercial treaty, to which the theory of equivalents strictly applies, and it is after all this kind of treaty which as yet France is offering to her neighbours. The cases in which England can step in and act in a manner beneficial to herself and the human race in general are limited to those in which a country, either by the force of circumstances, or by growing conviction, has arrived at the point at which a tariff reform appears to it desirable for its own sake. In a case of this kind, it is quite certain that amongst continental states (take the case of France for instance), such tariff reform will, at the same time, be used to extort concessions from other countries, and in all probability the course followed will be to accomplish this reform of tariff in a haphazard, unsystematic way by concessions to make, and therefore, according to the theory of Bob Lowe and others of his school, all we can do is just to sit by and come in for what is given to others. According to the theory I am expounding, on the contrary, our business should be to step in before the others, and, taking up our parable, to say to a country so circumstanced, "You are about to reform your tariff. Set to work upon it systematically, and without

for the present thinking of this, that, and the other concession you wish to get from this, that, and the other country. Compose the best tariff you can, having regard solely to the circumstances of your own production, and to foreign trade generally. Of foreign trade in this general sense we are, *par excellence*, the representatives. We are cosmopolitan rather than national traders. There is nothing we don't buy, and nothing we don't sell, for we not only bring our own produce to market, but we are at the same time the entrepôt of the trade of the world. Now, in the work of a systematic tariff reform see what advantages the co-operation of such a partner affords you. The stored-up experience of a decade of Free Trade stands at your service, our ledgers are ready for your inspection, and instead of painfully collecting your information from a thousand unreliable sources, you can obtain it direct from us at once in the most authentic and most reliable shape. All we ask in return for the assistance rendered to you is that you should at once give us the tariff you have thus autonomously reformed, and which you mean ultimately to give to the whole world. You can then with it in your hand go to others, who, unlike ourselves, have still concessions to make, and get these concessions in exchange for it."

'Austria is a country in exactly the circumstances supposed in this case, and our success depends upon our being able to get her to allow of our co-operating with her in the work of an autonomous tariff reform in the sense above indicated. It is evident, however, that this is a very delicate task. In her present helpless condition and with her utter want of persons capable of managing her commercial or financial affairs, to admit of the co-operation of strangers in what is in reality an internal affair presupposes a degree of confidence which is not easily to be found, for she cannot but see that in a co-operative labour of this kind we would be the stronger of the two. Everything, therefore, depends upon the degree of personal confidence which the English agent is capable of inspiring. He must not only convince those with whom he has to deal that he is a perfect master of his art, that he understands tariffology in all its branches far better than they do, but he must be able to make

them feel that he is, *bona fide*, working on the large and cosmopolitan principles to which he pretends, and not, after all, only compassing some petty and selfish object. Now, all that we have as yet accomplished in this direction we owe to Mallet. His marvellously lucid exposition of the theory above given, in various conversations with persons in and out of office, has, I have reason to know, produced a considerable effect, and his complete mastery of the commercial subjects, with special reference to the relation they stand in to tariff questions, has thoroughly convinced those who it was most necessary should be convinced, that he is a master workman in the craft, and that assistance from such a one is not to be lightly esteemed.

' . . . It is a very difficult undertaking, and the odds are altogether against us, but if we did succeed, it would, I think, be a success on which the Government would have good reason to congratulate themselves. It would afford a very admirable precedent for future action in spreading the gospel of Free Trade, and would place England in her proper position as the chief amongst the apostles of that creed. . . . Our negotiation in fact is but a comparatively small and unimportant episode in the most tremendous muddle a great state ever struggled in. The conjuncture of affairs which would be favourable to us depends upon a thousand combinations utterly unconnected with the work in hand, and which it is impossible, either for us or our friends in office at Vienna, to control. Hutt, on the contrary, in his heart believes that the commercial policy of the Empire (not to say the English Commission and its President) is the Alpha and Omega of the actual ministerial crisis, and naturally draws from these very incorrect premises very incorrect conclusions. I should be very sorry if he had raised hopes in England which, it is more likely than not, are doomed to disappointment.'

Mr. Hutt, Parliamentary Under Secretary of the Board of Trade, was the President of the Commission and very nearly wrecked the negotiations by a speech which he made to his constituents at this time. In it he had boasted of matters which should have been kept most secret, and had

gone so far as to imply that he had a list of the new Austrian Ministry in his pocket; whereas at that moment Count Mensdorff,<sup>1</sup> the Prime Minister, himself did not know who the new Ministers were to be. These, and other indiscretions of a like nature, drew from Morier the following letter to Mallet:—

‘Mr. Hutt, I am thankful to say, has spoken in the first person throughout, which will enable me in some form or other, in the first person likewise, to repudiate all connection with his manifesto. . . . I dare say you (sitting in England and with nerves attuned to the native British insolence, at electioneering time to boot) may not feel all this as strongly as I do here. . . . It seems to me impossible but that it should knock all our chances of success on the head.’

A very bad attack of gout and bronchitis had driven Morier to seek relief at Karlsbad, from whence the last two letters are dated, as also the following one to his father, 26th July 1865:—

‘There are a few pleasant Russians here (besides the Austrians who are my principal playmates) with whom I forgather. Amongst them Dmitri Nesselrode (the hero, or rather victim, of the *Dame aux Perles*), old Nesselrode’s only son, and Marshal Prince Bariatinsky, who lives principally in England and has got a cottage in Devonshire, several balls in various parts of his body, a very black-eyed, white-toothed Circassian wife, and a most admirable Irish water-spaniel who has a bedroom to himself and carries his lighted bedroom candlestick up to bed with him every night.’

On the termination of his cure, he joined his wife and child at Schlitz, Count Görtz’s place in Upper Hesse, and, after a round of visits, returned to Berlin at the end of August, from whence he tells his father:—

‘I have important news to give you, though I am not sure that it will be altogether agreeable to you. I have

<sup>1</sup> Mensdorff-Pouilly, Graf Alexander, b. 1813, d. 1871; Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1864-1866.

at last got my promotion, that is not yet officially, but in the shape of a private letter, and as I, of course, at once accepted, there is now only required the formality of the Queen's sanction, which formality has not yet been gone through.'

This promotion was the first Secretaryship of Legation in Japan, which Lord Russell had offered him on 9th August, and which he accepted in the following letter.

'DEAR LORD RUSSELL, . . . I cannot say that it is with a light heart that I contemplate this new field of labour. Having for twelve years devoted, not my professional time only, but my whole life, every bit of power at my disposal, either in the way of brains or spare cash, to attaining a knowledge of Germany, both political and commercial, different in kind and degree from that usually possessed by professional diplomatists, and to obtaining a personal position which should enable me when the time came to inspire confidence and to command respect in this country (in both of which endeavours, I believe, I may without exaggerated self-laudation say that I have been partially successful), I feel myself wholly incompetent to grapple with the specialities of Eastern diplomacy, whilst I am now too old to begin a course of special training in regard to them. It is, therefore, not only the personal discomfort of my new post, which is unpalatable, but the feeling that I have not got it in me to become in it a more useful public servant. However, as it now seems an absolute rule of the F. O. that the only claim to promotion shall consist in seniority, it would be madness in me, who have entered my fortieth year and have twelve years of attachéship behind me, to refuse the promotion brought to me by this rule (as I understand that all my seniors have refused the appointment), and I therefore accept the post without hesitation. As regards the alternative, between remaining a paid attaché or going as secretary to Japan, the only question in my mind is, whether it would not be better to quit the profession altogether, which it is now evident I entered when I was too old, and seek for employment in which one's abilities, such as they are, would weigh more than

one's grey hairs. With hostages given to fortune, however, in the shape of wife and child, I suppose that one Japanese sparrow in one's hand is better than the many sitting on the bushes, and so I am ready at once to face my exile, and to proceed to my post, though I hope I shall have a few weeks given me in England to see my father, who is now in his eighty-second year, and from whom I do not wish to part too suddenly.'

Ten days later the offer of Japan was changed to that of Athens, which he again accepted. Writing to Stockmar, he thus speaks of this, as he believed, turning point of his life :—

'In leaving Germany and disconnecting from all the interests with which I have so exclusively identified myself during the past twelve years of my life, it is not only the pain of parting from familiar work which pinches me, but the sense of my unfitness now for other kind of work, and I recognise the mistake I have made in letting my heart get too much into my work, and not exclusively treating it professionally with my fingers only. The fact is that from the time the late Prince [Albert] gave me to understand that it was his wish that I should fit, or endeavour to fit, myself for diplomatic work in Germany, and designated Berlin as my *Wirkungskreis*, I have given myself up so entirely to the study of Germany, with special reference to the relations between Prussia and England, and the connecting link furnished by the Crown Princess' position in Germany, that Berlin has become to me the natural atmosphere for my political lungs to play in, and I shall feel like a fish out of water elsewhere. . . . I always looked forward to the Secretaryship at Berlin as the goal of my ambition and the reward which, I confess, I think, the F.O. owes me for a large proportion of work of a special kind in connection with Germany, which they have got out of me during the last ten years. For this work I have had plenty of civil speeches and official thanks, but all the butter I have obtained for my parsnips is, that I have advanced by the regular routine and by seniority. Had it not been for the chance of my seniors having all one after the other refused Japan, I should be at the present moment, and perhaps for



some years to come, paid attaché, *comme par devant*. Well, the whole thing is now in a new groove. Attachés propose and the F.O. dispose, and I shall now go in for Oriental politics, the intrigues of Kissiritopoulos, and the latest symptoms of the dying man on the Bosphorus. . . . For better or for worse *politics* are what I live for, and, therefore, however much I love Germany, and however much all my notions and social *bien aise* are identified with Germany, nevertheless, my object will always be to remain where there is real political action going on, so that, unless I could return to the focuses of political life in Germany, Berlin or Vienna, I should ever aim at obtaining employment where there was something of political importance going on in preference to the sinecure of a post like Hanover or Stuttgart.'

'It was very sad work leaving Berlin,' he wrote to his father on 16th September, 'and turning my back upon friends of so many years' standing, and interests with which I had so intimately interwoven myself. It was especially heartbreaking saying good-bye to the Crown Prince and Princess, and it was not effected, as regards the latter, without abundant tears in which, hardened old sinner as I am, I found it very difficult not to join. My good opinion of the former has gone on increasing with every fresh knowledge I have obtained of him. He is quite one of the most honest and upright men I ever came across, and his honesty and uprightness have been put to the severest test. It is pleasant to me to know that he places the most unlimited confidence in, and has a sincere regard for me.'

From Vienna, where he had returned to resume the commercial negotiations, he wrote to Lord Russell on 20th September 1865 :—

' . . . As regards our affairs here, we are at a deadlock, because in the absence of Becke, Larisch's <sup>1</sup> right hand, who is making the tour of the money markets of Europe in search of a loan, there is not a single human being whom our good friends can trust to negotiate with us. He is to be back in a day or two, and then I trust we shall be able in a very

<sup>1</sup> Larisch, Graf, Austrian Minister of Finance

short space of time to get the preliminary work settled, and have October to get through the bulk of the tariff details ; but I cannot feel sanguine about anything connected with this country. The state of things, which I described in one of my letters last spring, was *cosmos* itself, as compared to the actual chaos. The impression produced upon me here is, as if some gigantic railway company in England, disgusted with the frauds of its directors, had requested the headmaster of Eton to recommend to them three of the best conducted boys, and trusting the latters' sense of honour and chivalrous modes of thought, had confided to them the entire management of its affairs. There is an absence of political or administrative knowledge, which is quite appalling. A pleasanter fellow than Larisch it is impossible to imagine, but you cannot talk with him five minutes, without being aware of his utter helplessness as a Minister. It makes one feel quite giddy to see the present men in their present posts.

' There will be published to-morrow an Imperial manifesto, the draft of which I have seen, and from which these people expect great success. I don't like indulging in political prophecy, otherwise I should be inclined to predict that it will meet with a complete fiasco. The purport of it is shortly this. Hungary, having refused to assume the position assigned to her in the constitutional scheme known as the Patent of February 1860, the Emperor's conscience is troubled at the illegality of this state of things, and H.I.M. considers that the work of constitution-making must be begun *de novo*, and in order that all the countries over which he rules may start fair, HE SUSPENDS THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION, and submits it afresh as a rough draft to be again discussed and voted by the Provincial Diets (some twenty in number) of the countries of which the Empire is composed. Now, though this is undoubtedly "fair" with a vengeance as regards Hungary, it can hardly be called fair as regards the "good boys" who accepted the Constitution of February, and have done their best to make it work. In fact, it is exactly reversing the former position, all the evils of which have been so loudly urged by the people now in power, and what the Hungarians

have said all along as regards themselves they may now say to the Reichsrath, *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*. The suspension of the Constitution to be announced in to-morrow's manifesto (and it is this, which, in spite of well-chosen phrases, the manifesto amounts to) is a break of legal continuity in the constitutional life of all the provinces of Austria this side of the Leitha ; and though the *substance* of constitutionalism is by way of being saved by the Diets (out of which the Reichsrath is composed) having the organic laws of the Empire again submitted to them, and only the *form* tampered with, by the Reichsrath being for the time placed out of activity, it is in reality not the case, and the reality and not the form only has been gravely jeopardised. A representative body once constituted, and with a life and traditions of its own, even if these be of short duration, is a something distinct from the constituents it represents, and this was pre-eminently the case with a Reichsrath which, though composed of delegates from the Provincial Diets, was in its very essence something individual and apart from those Diets. Though its sins of omission and commission were neither small nor few it had become the constitutional organ and the representative of constitutional freedom to the countries represented in it, and it is impossible but that its suspension will be looked upon as a grievous blow aimed at the friends of political liberty here. Moreover, the fact that the Emperor had most solemnly sworn fidelity to this Constitution will weigh with a terrible load in the balance in which this important act will be critically held, and in their eagerness to undo the work of their political rivals the present Ministry seem to have forgotten that though that work was the work of Schmerling,<sup>1</sup> it bore the trade mark of the Emperor himself, and that it is the Imperial firm which will bear the disgrace of failure. I am convinced that the right way would have been to have convoked the Reichsrath simultaneously with the Hungarian Diet, and to have endeavoured to make the two come to terms, which, with proper management, might, I think, have

<sup>1</sup> Schmerling, Anton Ritter v., b. 1805, d. 1893 ; Austrian statesman, member of Frankfurt Assembly and Minister under Archduke John's Regency ; Austrian Minister of State, 1860-1865.

been effected. At all events, if the attempt had failed, the Emperor might *then*, and as a last resource, have appealed to his latent absolute power in virtue of the principle that *salus rei publicae* is the supreme law, instead of doing so prematurely now.'

In the course of these negotiations the English Commissioners had been confidentially approached as to the possibility of the good offices of England being obtained in helping to restore to a satisfactory state the commercial relations between Austria and Italy. Those relations rested upon a chaos of treaties concluded with the various States of which Italy had been composed previous to the late events ; the result was hopeless confusion and complete stagnation of trade. As at that time there seemed little likelihood of the Emperor's recognising the kingdom of Italy, the Austrian Government hoped that the English Government might assist them to facilitate and bring about a commercial agreement between the two countries, with the ulterior view of paving the way to ultimate recognition.

'For my part,' so Morier, who had been entrusted with making these overtures, pointed out to Lord Russell on 28th October, 'I cannot conceive any work more congenial to you personally, more exactly realising the kind of work which it is the specific business of England to perform in Europe, more likely to conciliate the public opinion of the world, or more calculated to reflect credit on the British Government, than the successful attempt to bring about a *material* reconciliation between Austria and Italy, pending the *political* reconciliation, which, for a long while to come, appears so problematical. I cannot, moreover, bring myself to believe that the object is one so difficult of attainment, and with delicate handling I cannot but feel convinced that the matter might be arranged. England, and you personally, have the strongest claim to be listened to by the men in power at Florence, more especially when the advice tendered is so entirely to the advantage of the parties advised. . . . When the ground has been well sounded on both sides, the British Lion might step forward officially and appear upon the political boards as the Genius of Peace

and Goodwill, shedding from a large cornucopia the blessings of commercial amity over the rival monarchies !'

After protracted negotiations, which at one time came so near to a rupture as to cause Morier to hurry home in November to personally interview Mr. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord Clarendon (who had succeeded Lord Russell as Foreign Secretary), he was, on 17th December enabled to write to the latter :—

' I am glad that the confidence with which I ventured to speak, when in London, of our ultimate success, has not been belied by the event ; our path has been a very thorny one and surrounded by pitfalls, and there will be no short stretch of the same kind of road to go over before the Commission gets safely over the ground it has to traverse. At the present moment, however, there is, I am happy to say, perfect confidence established between the working men on both sides. The Austrian officials thoroughly understand that they will have our co-operation in the framing of a tariff, good in itself, and therefore conformable to Austrian interests, and they look forward to the assistance which a man of Mallet's calibre can afford them, as a substantial gain and as a *point d'appui* in their other treaty negotiations :—

To his father on 21st December, he announced :—

' We signed our Treaty last Saturday, after a fortnight of very severe work on Mallet's part and mine. . . . The Protocole de Clôture, containing all manner of declarations, had to be got up between 2 o'clock on Friday and 3 o'clock on Saturday, and it, as well as the Treaty, had to be copied and not one mistake made. I engaged my honour all should be ready at 3 o'clock. The last stroke of the pen was dashed off five minutes before the clock struck that hour. It was a brilliant triumph over *formal* difficulties to top the *material* triumphs we had been celebrating. Considering that I have never acted midwife to a treaty before, and knew nothing of the forms and had to trust to a few bad precedents and to the inspiration of the moment, it will be a "mussy" if some gorgeous mistake is not some-

where discovered. But I think all danger of such discovery is now past, as they have had our handiwork two days in their possession and have not telegraphed anything about it. As regards the *matter*, the triumph is complete and my journey to London was a complete success. . . . They are much pleased at home and we, Mallet and I, have had a very *splendidissime* despatch, praising us for the ability and all manner of fine things, with which we have worked out the good work. I have, in the meantime, received orders to go down to Pesth and report on Hungarian politics. It was the intention of Lord Clarendon that I should be there at the opening of the Diet by the Emperor (or rather the King), but I was still too much busied with the Treaty, and now that I am free the Diet has adjourned. I shall however go down to that capital directly after Christmas and manage to find plenty to report upon.'

As a recognition of their services in bringing these difficult negotiations to such a successful termination, both Morier and Mallet received the Companionship of the Bath; in the case of the former, a distinction which had never before been conferred on one of his official rank. In the following March they were both named Commissioners for working out the details of the treaty on which its real value depended.

During all this time he had been preparing to 'go forth into honourable exile at Athens. I shall for the next few years occupy myself exclusively with coins and inscriptions. I think of editing *Pausanias*.'

But his destination had again been changed, and on 6th January 1866 he tells his father: 'I have been transferred from Athens to Frankfort with residence as *Chargé d'affaires* at Darmstadt, which in many ways suits me better. I have a little *heimweh* for the Acropolis and the figs, but this is not shared in by the rest of my family.'

This appointment was entirely due to the Queen, so Stockmar informed him, expressing at the same time his fears that it might prove very distasteful.

'Do not run into any exaggeration,' wrote he to Morier,

' it will do you no harm to remain a year or so at Darmstadt, and you have no reason to suppose that there is any intention of interring you there.'

But learning that Morier was more resigned to his fate than he expected, he expressed a few days later his great satisfaction 'at finding that you are not over-displeased at the prospect of Darmstadt.'

## CHAPTER XVIII

## THE HUNGARIAN DIET

IN the meantime Morier had been sent to Pesth to watch the negotiations going on between the Emperor of Austria, as King of Hungary, and the Diet for the restoration of the Hungarian Constitution and his coronation as King.

'It is a peculiarity of the Hungarian Constitution,' wrote Morier on 11th February 1866, 'that although on the decease of the Crown the next heir comes at once into full *possession* of the right of sovereignty, he is restricted as to the exercise of some of these rights until he has been crowned. Previous to this ceremony a Diet, called the Coronation Diet, is convoked, and a formal negotiation is entered upon between the hereditary King<sup>1</sup> and the Parliament for the purpose of drawing up the Inaugural Diploma, a sort of formal contract defining the relations in which the Crown and the nation are to be placed towards each other.

'Until the King is crowned, the legislative power is in abeyance, as the sanctioning of a law passed by the Diet is one of the rights which can only be exercised by a crowned sovereign.

'From the above it will be clear that the period before a coronation, even in ordinary times, is one of peculiar crisis. New title-deeds have, as it were, to be drawn up for each sovereign, and a constitutional edifice to be built up *de novo*. It is clear that, according to circumstances, the one or the other of two contracting parties may have the advantage in such a case. If the Parliament is the stronger, it can refuse to crown the King until its conditions are agreed to; if the King is the stronger, he can

<sup>1</sup> Up to the time of their Coronation, the Emperor and Empress were always officially designated as the hereditary King and Queen of Hungary.



refuse to be crowned till his conditions are complied with. The suspension of the legislative authority affords the pressure necessary, sooner or later, to force the two parties to come to a compromise, and strictly speaking a term of six months is fixed within which the negotiations should come to an end.'

### MEMORANDUM ON HUNGARY

The Coronation Parliament now sitting at Pesth has a double task to perform.

First, it has to formulate under what conditions Hungary is ready to share in the common burdens and responsibilities of the Empire.

Secondly, it has in a great measure to reconstruct the edifice of the Hungarian Constitution itself.

The first of these tasks involves the solution of the question as to whether the relations between Hungary and the so-called Hereditary States are once more to be *de facto* international relations as they have undoubtedly been *de jure*, or whether there is to be established *de jure* between those two bodies the corporate union which since 1850 has existed *de facto*.

The second task involves not only the taking up of the thread of organic reform suddenly snapped by the revolution of 1848, but the disentanglement of that thread from the revolutionary legislation of that period and from the confused mass of bureaucratic enactments which supplied the place of legislation during the Bach<sup>1</sup> Administration.

Unfortunately for the lucid and systematic exposition of these two tasks, their subject-matter is in a great measure common property, for though diverging into distinct branches at the extremes the national and international relations are closely interwoven at the centre, and whenever the attempt is made to treat them separately the prior question as to where the line of demarcation is to be drawn invariably presents itself and calls for a categorical answer.

Thus when the so-called 'common affairs' are to be

<sup>1</sup> Bach, Alexander Freiherr v., Austrian Minister of State, 1848-1849; leader of the Ultramontane Reactionary Party.

treated of, the question what are to be considered common, and what are to be considered domestic affairs, has first to be answered ; and when domestic affairs are to be discussed, not only has the same question to be disposed of, but, yet more to complicate the matter, the further antecedent question has to be asked, viz., what is the *domus* to which these domestic affairs are attached—not only what are the domestic affairs of Hungary, but of what does the Hungary consist whose domestic affairs are to be treated of. Is it the kingdom proper, or is it the reintegrated kingdom, and if the latter is it the kingdom wholly or only in part reintegrated ? Is it Hungary or Hungary and Transylvania, or Hungary, Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia, or Hungary, Transylvania and Fiume without Croatia-Slavonia, or Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia with Fiume ?

Thus the international relations between the dependencies of the Hungarian Crown, the international relations between the Hungarian Crown and the Hereditary States, and the domestic relations of Hungary are all blended together into one tangled web, and the first requisite to comprehension of the action and policy of the present Diet is to seize the clue to this web.

To seek it in the legal *exposé* of the relations in question on the one hand, in the treaties and other international compacts by which in past times these relations between the various crowns which ultimately culminated in the Imperial were regulated on the other hand, in the common and statute laws of Hungary and the unwritten usages which by the statute were made of equivalent authority with that common law, would be an impossible task for a layman, and no easy one for a lawyer ; but inasmuch as by common consent these relations are now by a solemn Act of Settlement to be once for all placed upon a new and permanent basis, it is the political rather than the legal clue which is required, and for this purpose a sufficient clue will be afforded if the attempt be successfully made to draw a correct outline of these various relations as they practically existed at what may be termed the date of the Union, viz., the Pragmatic Sanction, and of the various modifications

they have experienced between that date and the present.

The merest outline of the framework will suffice, if within that framework the attempt can be successfully made—

(1) To give a correct idea of the relations which existed in practice since the Pragmatic Sanction between the countries on the two sides of the Leitha ; (2) of the political ideas underlying these practical relations ; and (3) of the principal modifications both in the facts and the principles which have more immediately led to the present conflict.

The legal regulation of the relations between Hungary and Austria is furnished by the Pragmatic Sanction, or rather that portion of the Pragmatic Sanction which was incorporated into the Hungarian Statute Book by the laws of 1723 and by the laws of 1848.

The common basis upon which, since the Emperor King's speech on the 12th of November last, the Crown and all political parties in the kingdom stand is that of the Pragmatic Sanction, but this organic law is itself the subject of different interpretation.

Since the celebrated address of M. Deák<sup>1</sup> in 1861 the *mot d'ordre* of Hungarian politicians of every shade has been to describe the union between Hungary and the Hereditary Provinces consecrated by the Pragmatic Sanction as a purely personal union, whilst, on the other hand, the attempt has been made by official writers in Austria to impress upon that Union in its strictest form the character of a real union. As these terms are respectively the watchwords of the constitutional parties in the cis- and trans-Leithan countries between whom the struggle lies, it is necessary to apprehend the points at issue.

Wheaton and other text writers on International Law following in his footsteps class under three heads the various forms under which States may be co-ordinated, viz., personal, real, and corporate, of which personal is the lowest and corporate the closest form. According to these writers,

<sup>1</sup> Deák, Franz v., b. 1803, d. 1876, eminent Hungarian statesman and patriot ; leader of the Constitutional Liberal Party in the Hungarian Diet.

personal union is the accidental union under a common ruler of two or more States whose external and internal sovereignty remain distinct, and implies the possible dissolution of this union whenever from difference of succession or other causes the accident of the common ruler is removed. The distinctive marks of a real union, on the other hand, are stated by Wheaton to be *indissolubleness* of the union and the merging of the external sovereignty of each State into one common head; the internal sovereignty of each State remaining distinct, i.e. *inter se* States forming part of a real union are sovereign as regards other States, the sovereignty is represented by a common head. Corporate union is the merging of both internal and external sovereignty into one, and it implies the existence of some common organ, expressive of the corporate existence other than the common head. The relation that existed between England and America would afford the most perfect instance of a personal union in this sense. The United States of America, since the vindication by the late war of the principle that secession is treason, would exactly answer the above description of a real union, and the case of England and Scotland would exactly answer the definition of a corporate union.

In selecting the Austrian Empire as a type of a real union, Wheaton has fallen into error. He proves how vain are the attempts of International Law to include within a few simple definitions all the phenomena exhibited by the complex growths of history. He brings the Austrian Empire within his definition by describing the dominions of the House of Austria as indissolubly united under the same sceptre, and adding to this indissolubleness the fact that the external sovereignty of each State is merged in the general sovereignty of the Empire he finds his definition exactly applicable. These dominions, however, are not indissolubly united, the Pragmatic Sanction only providing for this union so long as there shall be in existence male or female lines deriving from the three roots specified in that Act, the Emperor Charles VI. himself, his father Leopold, and his brother Joseph—the possible (though not probable) case of dissolution is specially provided for in paragraph 11 of the second article of the Pragmatic Sanction which

provides that in the event of these three lines becoming extinct, the right of election of the Hungarian Parliament should revive. On the other hand, the other condition of a real union, the merging of the separate sovereignty of the various States in the Imperial Crown as to international relations with foreign Powers is undoubtedly present. The instance adduced by M. Deák of a Resident Minister of the King of Hungary at the Ottoman Porte, side by side with an Imperial Minister in bygone days, is one of those exceptions that prove, or rather test the rule, and cannot invalidate the patent fact that since the days of the Pragmatic Sanction European International Law has known nothing of Hungary as a separate kingdom, or of its international relations separate from those of the Hereditary Provinces. The occupant for the time being of the Vienna Burg, and no other, has been in the eyes of Europe the international unit.

From the above it is clear that the union between Hungary and the Hereditary Provinces does not fit in exactly into any of the above definitions. It is, of course, not an incorporate union, nor, on the other hand, is it either a purely personal or a purely real union.

Deák and his opponents, it should be observed, ignore altogether the definition of a corporate union, and the entire controversy turns upon the term real and personal. But then in many passages Deák's (and also though in a less degree his principal opponent Lusthandl's) idea of a real union seems to be what Wheaton means by a corporate union. He specially adverts to the union between England, Scotland, and Ireland to prove the difference between the personal union he vindicates for the Austro-Hungarian crowns, and the real union which his adversaries vindicate for it, showing that in case the throne of the United Kingdom became vacant there would still in the Imperial Parliament be a common organ of union.

How then is the union effected by the Pragmatic Sanction to be defined?

The possible dissolution of the Union by the revival of the right of election on the part of the Hungarian Diet and various subtleties of the Hungarian *corpus juris* may have

kept up in the eyes of the Hungarian nation the legal fiction of separate external sovereignty, but the case is sufficient when observed from the basis of fact.

Practically it makes the whole difference whether the occupancy of two or more thrones by the same ruler is an accident which may any day be changed, or whether the joint tenure is so secure that the chances of a different occupancy are altogether inappreciable. In the one case, all manner of real ties and common institutions will invariably grow up which in the other would *ab initio* be carefully guarded against.

The former was the case of Austria. For all practical purposes the union was indissoluble and, as has been stated, the external sovereignty has *de facto* merged in the Imperial Crown, and therefore it may not unfairly be said that to vindicate for it the character of a personal union is a legal fiction. But in doing this, and in estimating the actual political situation, it must be borne in mind that to the Hungarian mind nothing has a more real existence than a legal fiction. Probably in no other nation has the sense of the indestructibility of a once acquired legal right ever obtained so absolute a hold over the individual and corporate mind. The most remarkable instance of this peculiarity is to be met with in the so-called law of 'aviticity,' according to which the title to a property was inextinguishable in the family of the original proprietor. It might be sold and many times change hands through a long course of generations; the extreme descendants of the original seller, if he could prove that it had actually belonged to his remote ancestor, could recover it. This peculiarity is to be met with in every portion of the public and private law, and has given to the Constitution its title of an avitical Constitution. It is a radical characteristic of the national mind of Hungary, and forms so important an element in the constitutional life of the country, that without the key which it affords it is impossible to appreciate the true merits of the actual conflict.

Leaving the question of law and turning to the question of fact, the political status established by the Pragmatic Sanction may be thus stated:—

1. The establishment of a joint succession in Hungary and the Hereditary Provinces.

2. The solemn recognition that this joint succession did not alter the international relation between the bodies so united, but that Hungary retained her separate political existence and was for ever to be governed by her own laws.

3. The postulate that this union had not solely dynastic objects in view, but in so far as the greater security from foreign danger and the more firm establishment of internal peace for both bodies were objects directly aimed at, the principle was formally placed on record that there were certain political objects *common* to the two parties united.

The stereotyping of this principle of a radical difference between the political existence of Hungary and Austria at the particular period of Austro-Hungarian history in which the Pragmatic Sanction falls, decided for upwards of a century the political conditions of the Austrian monarchy.

The middle of the eighteenth century is the period in which the tendency of all continental states was to consolidate the action of the Government, and to substitute the compact idea of the modern state for the loose and heterogeneous links which had hitherto kept the feudal state from falling to pieces. The necessity of effecting this change was painfully forced upon the Austrian Government by the exertions which it was forced to make during the wars of the Succession, and later by her wars with Prussia, against the compact and centralised power wielded by the French kings on the one hand, and by Frederick the Great on the other. Austria had to oppose resources in themselves perhaps not less abundant, but from want of unity and concentration infinitely less available than those of her enemies.

Hence the policy of the Vienna Burg for the whole period beginning with the commencement of the eighteenth century, and reaching down to the present day, has been to consolidate the political power of the monarchy, a task which, owing to the peculiar relation in which the sovereign of the Austrian monarchy stood as Emperor of Germany, and to many causes not now to be entered into, was infinitely more difficult than the analogous one carried out

to such complete results by the kings of France and the electors of Brandenburg.

From the action of this consolidation the kingdom of Hungary was absolutely excluded by the Pragmatic Sanction, and consequently the result of that compact was not so much to leave things as they were before, but, on the contrary, to bring about a state of things in many ways differing from what had before existed. Hungary remained where she was, but the political aspect was undergoing a daily change on the other side of the Leitha. She stood still whilst the others moved along a new path, so that instead of both parties remaining where they were, they found themselves at the end of a century farther apart than they had ever been before. In days gone by, Hungary had been one of the many units composing the Austrian monarchy. Different as was her Constitution from those of the other units, there was comparatively less difficulty for common action between them. On many occasions deputies from the Hungarian Diet attended at Prague and elsewhere and met delegations from the Diets of the other States and took common counsel on the common affairs of the monarchy, but as the life died out of those other representative bodies and the many units coalesced in the bureaucratically centralised body, known under the joint name of the Hereditary States, two distinct bodies radically differing in the conditions of their political existence gradually formed, between whom no action except through the organ of the common crown could from henceforth take place. The dualistic form, of which so much is at present talked, was established in practice from the date of the Pragmatic Sanction.

The practical difference in the mode of government of these two bodies requires to be touched upon.

A common error in treating of the Hungarian Constitution is to regard it as a *feudal* institution which has lived on into modern times. The characteristic of the Hungarian Constitution is, on the contrary, that it was not a feudal institution, and one of the most radical differences between that kingdom and the Hereditary Provinces is that the latter all went through the feudal process which has left



its indelible stamp on their institutions, whereas the former absolutely escaped it. The idea of the feudal Constitution was that of a graduated hierarchic scale in which political power was measured out in proportion to the amount of political work done, that is, to the amount of fighting, either in person or by proxy, of which the holder of the feudal fief was capable. Political *inequality*, *i.e.* aristocracy, the segregation of the political body into 'Estates,' each with its own political *locus standi*, these were its distinctive marks. Misled by the fact that only 'nobles' enjoyed political privileges in Hungary, the conclusion has been drawn that the Hungarian Constitution was in its essence an aristocratic one—whereas its distinctive marks were *equality* amongst the holders of political power, the absence of hierarchic gradation and consequently, combined with undoubted aristocratic features, the presence of a strongly democratic element. A brief survey of this Constitution will show in what the difference consisted.

The political unit in Hungary was not, as in the feudal state, the fief or *individual* noble, but the county (*comitatus*), *i.e.* a numerous body composed of all the nobles—or freemen, as it would perhaps be more correct to designate them—domiciled in the county. From the absence of reliable statistics it is difficult to state exactly what the numbers of these nobles were, but the approximate numbers of the noble population may be taken at about half a million, whilst the number of those actually enjoying votes may be taken at something like sixty thousand. The kingdom had fifty-five counties, and therefore the average county constituency would have amounted to over a thousand. But the counties differed in size to an extraordinary extent, the population of some counties exceeding half a million, of others being less than thirty thousand, so that the constituency of single counties amounted in some cases to as many as four and five thousand. Amongst these four or five thousand individuals the most perfect equality of political rights existed, the magnate owning half a county and the sandal-shod proletaire noble, the owner of a squalid hovel and a potato field, having an equal vote in the county assembly in which the entire business of the county was transacted. The

functions of this assembly, at its plenary meeting called 'Restauration,' were elective. In the first place, it was by it (not, to be observed, organised into committees or other modern devices for economising labour, and making the few do the business of the many, but noisily transacting its work after the manner of large public meetings) that the election of *all* the public officers of the county, with the one exception of the *comes supremus* or lord-lieutenant, was effected. The *comes supremus* (*Obergespann*) was the nominee of the Crown and represented the executive government. He was named for life, and was usually a local magnate. In some cases the office was hereditary. For a long period previous to 1848 the office had been more or less of a sinecure. Its sphere of action had always been a limited one, and the real power lay in the hands of the *vice comites* or deputy-lieutenants elected by the county and responsible to it. All the remaining judicial and administrative offices were likewise elective, from the district judge down to the village notary, and it should be noted that bribery and corruption played a very important part in the distribution of the votes.

The business of the county other than elective was carried on by a less numerous assembly called the Congregation, which met in regular quarter-sessions. It was composed in theory of the same persons as those who voted at the Restaurations, *i.e.* of all freemen of the county, but in practice it consisted of a limited number of persons who by analogy might be termed the resident gentry, including within that term all the administrative and judicial officers elected by the Restauration, as well as such other landed proprietors who had leisure and inclination to take part in politics. It was presided over by the *comes supremus*.

The duties of the Congregation were partly administrative, partly political. The latter were of great importance, and must be specially noted, for it was by the Congregation that the written instructions given to these deputies to the Diet were drawn up. The deputies to the Hungarian Diet did not either in law or in practice sit there as representatives of the nation in the truly Parliamentary sense, but as the delegates or plenipotentiaries of what might almost be

called sovereign bodies. The two county members had but one full power between them and therefore a joint vote, and if on any occasion the turn taken by a debate in the Diet was such as rendered the instructions with which the deputies were furnished inapplicable to the particular case, they were obliged to refer to the Congregation for fresh instructions.

To render the autonomy of the county still more complete, it had the right to dispute the legality, and therefore to prevent the execution, of any injunction coming from the central executive, the Congregation as such being the tribunal which decided upon the legality of the executive acts. Moreover, the counties had the right to communicate and concert measures *inter se*, and to enter into treaties and compacts with each other.

In the Lower Chamber (the *tabula statuum*) of the Diet, it was with the county deputies that the entire political power lay. It is true that the 110 county members were apparently balanced by the 104 representatives of the eighty-two royal towns, by the representatives of certain ecclesiastical corporations, and strangely enough by the proxies of magnates absent from the Upper House, and by those of the widows of magnates, but the 104 representatives of the towns had only *one* collective vote between them, these towns by a strange legal fiction having been raised to the order of nobility, and thus as it were representing eighty-two noblemen furnished with a corporate voice in the Diet. The ecclesiastical corporations likewise had corporate votes only, and the proxies of the magnates and magnates' widows had only a right of speech and no vote. Hence it will be seen that the Lower House, with which the real power lay, really represented the counties and them only.

Thus the picture presented by the body which has so often been described as in all essential points a counterpart of the British Parliament had in reality more resemblance with the cantonal representation in the former Swiss Diets, and bore in many respects more of the character of an International Congress than of a Representative Assembly.

The executive government of the kingdom was carried on by a lord-lieutenancy (*locumtenentia*) established at

Ofen-Pesth, consisting of a Board (*tabula regia*) the provincial members of which were the Tavernicus or Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Judex Curiaë, the supreme judge of the Court of Appeal; and this body was further complemented by a numerous staff of councillors. It communicated with the King who as a rule presided out of the county by means of the Chancellor (*Cancellarius Hungariæ*) who resided at Vienna. The original idea of this office was that of a Secretary to the King, *i.e.* a mere instrument of communication between the absent person of the Sovereign and the present organ of the Crown, viz., the King whoever and wherever he might be, and the executive established in the county. Later on, however, the Chancellor became in a more direct manner the adviser of the Crown, a Board composed of Hungarian councillors was created, over which the Chancellor presided, and thus an important branch of the executive became domiciled at Vienna.

The Board, however, remained distinct from the Aulic Council, which administered the affairs of the non-Hungarian provinces of the Austrian monarchy, and it should be specially noted that it was this latter within whose cognisance fell not only the affairs of the Hereditary Provinces, but all such affairs as being those of a sovereign ruling jointly over Hungary and the Hereditary Provinces necessarily included the joint affairs of the whole monarchy. It disposed of the finances and of the armed force of the United Monarchy, and was the adviser of the Austrian monarch in his international relations with the rest of the world. It should further be specially noted that on repeated occasions the Hungarians insisted on being represented by Hungarian councillors in this council upon the very plea that 'common affairs' were disposed of in it.

This sketch will suffice to draw out the main features of the relations existing previous to 1848 between Hungary and Austria. The person of the sovereign was common to both. This sovereign was domiciled at Vienna, which necessarily became in his eyes the capital of the United Monarchy over which he ruled. It was the administrative centre of the Hereditary States; it was at the same time the Imperial centre from which emanated the international

policy of the monarchy. As Sovereign of the Hereditary States the Prerogative of the Austrian monarch was unlimited, as King of Hungary the Prerogative was limited, absolutely limited in regard to the all-important subject of subsidies and local administration, in other respects a very high Prerogative. The king could not obtain a man or a coin in the way of direct taxation without the consent of the Diet; and whenever he wanted either he had to enter into long and troublesome negotiations with that body; he never obtained all he wanted, and never obtained even that without giving something in exchange, nor could he without the aid of the Diet alter one tittle in any law or usage established in the country. On the other hand, subsidies in men and money once voted, he was responsible to no Parliament for the way in which he used them. There was not present any of the machinery for controlling the everyday action of the prerogative which constitutional government, properly speaking, supplies. There was no responsible Ministry and no yearly budgets. The king convoked the Diet when it was absolutely necessary for him to do so. Years and years often elapsed before this necessarily occurred. When it met, the initiation of the measures came in the shape of propositions on the part of the Crown, and a record of grievances (*gravamina*) on the part of the Diet. These forms gave an opportunity of discussing all manner of subjects, but it did not give the Diet a direct influence over any matters but those strictly connected with the ancient privileges and immunities of the kingdom. In point of form, the complete separation of the kingdom of Hungary from the rest of the monarchy was maintained. The Aulic Council could not directly impose its decisions upon the Hungarian Chancery; but what the Emperor by the aid of his Imperial Council decided upon, he, as King of Hungary, and in virtue of his prerogative as such, imposed through his Hungarian Chancellor upon Hungary.

Before proceeding to the examination of the laws of '48 by which this 'status' was radically changed, a few observations on the above will be useful.

In the first place, it must be observed that it was against

the democratic phalanx which the Constitution of the country opposed to the encroachments of the prerogative, and not against the aristocratic element of the Hungarian Constitution, that the efforts of the Crown to set aside the liberties of Hungary broke. It was 'the Commons' of Hungary, voiceless in the other countries constitutive of the Austrian Monarchy, and not an aristocratic corporation such as the Estates of Bohemia or Upper Austria, that kept alive the spirit of resistance. The process by which the turbulent nobles of the Middle Ages were gradually domesticated into a Court Nobility was pretty nearly identical in all the continental states. After the Fronde had been subdued, it was no difficult task for Cardinal Mazarin to win over the individual nobles to the service of the Crown. In like manner in the Austrian Monarchy, when the corporate power of the nobility had, at the battle of the White Mountain and elsewhere, been broken, it was comparatively easy work to prove to the individual nobles that their best policy was to attach themselves to the Court. In the feudal state, as before remarked, the political unit was the fief, and when the corporate power of the belted knights who held these fiefs had been broken, there no longer existed any *body* in which the spirit of resistance could be kept alive. All which the Crown required to change its former enemies into useful and ornamental servants was the gaining over a limited number of individuals.

In Hungary, the political unit was not the individual, but the county, *i.e.* popular assembly. No amount of Court blandishments could have dealt with sixty thousand strong-willed Commoners distributed over some fifty independent communities, each of which rivalled with the other in the vehemence with which it contended for its rights and resisted every attempt to encroach upon them. Hence, however apparently triumphant the Vienna Burg came out of some of its parliamentary struggles with the Hungarian Diet, the battle had always to be begun afresh. No sooner was the Diet dissolved than the fifty-five congregations assembled, and in the never-ending meetings which, as it were, afforded the daily food of the Magyar Commoner, to whom political stimulants seem a very con-

dition of existence, the country was lashed up to increased exertion and a more vehement assertion of its rights. When the Diet once more met, the Government found itself face to face with an increased list of grievances to dispose of, couched in yet more hostile language—for, true to the avitical character of all Hungarian institutions, a grievance (*gravamen*) was a kind of national property, the title of which could not be extinguished.

Secondly, although in its political character the Hungarian Constitution possessed the strongly marked democratic element above dwelt upon, it must be noted that in its social character it bore a no less important aristocratic stamp. The half million privileged population, to the largest proportion of which the term 'Commons' seems the only applicable one, dwelt amidst some ten and a half millions of a non-privileged population who, though not unfree in the sense of Russian serfs, were with the exception of the middle classes occupying the towns, in a state of predial servitude. The *Urbarium* of Maria Theresa, which, though a provisional measure only, remained in force sufficiently long to assume the character of 'usage,' and thus to have the force of law, had greatly modified the original relation between this class and the possessors of the soil, and the presence of a large privileged class (the *proletaire nobility*) not essentially differing in their social position from the unfree peasantry tended naturally to make the political stronger than the social contrast and to take away to a great extent the 'caste' character inherent in nobility. It is clear, however, that when the day came for the enfranchisement of the immense majority of the population and for its participation in political rights, before the monopoly of the few, a radical change would come over the spirit of the Hungarian Constitution.

Thirdly, the privileged half million belonged, with the exception of a small fraction, to the Magyar race, and this is by far the most important feature of the Hungarian Constitution, and acquired a force within the second quarter of the present century which has made it into a political element of the first magnitude. From the Golden Bull of Stephen to the month of April 1848, political privilege in

Hungary was co-extensive with RACE. In bygone days, before the self-consciousness of the individual nationality had begun to make itself felt, or to exercise the power which has only quickened into life in the second quarter of the present century, the various races that inhabited the valley of the Danube lived side by side, conscious of differences local, religious, political and other, but in a less degree only of national differences. The exclusive use of Latin as the political language for a long while tended to keep these national differences in the background. The adoption, in 1825, of the Magyar language as that of the Diet and of all official transactions brought a new life, it is true, into the body politic of Hungary; but the body thus quickened into feverish existence was not the population of eleven millions inhabiting the Kingdom, but the fraction of three and a half millions who belonged to the chosen race, and this gave rise in the revolutionary years to the wildest paradoxes; whilst on the one hand the popular leaders asserted the extremest principles of democratic equality, they insisted, on the other, through the instrumentality of the language, upon the most absolute domination of the few over the many, and in the name of liberty and equality fought desperately for the supremacy of a national caste.

Lastly, it should be noted that the peculiar character of the Diet, composed as it was of the delegates from the quasi-sovereign counties, and closely bound to the unwritten instructions received from the latter, and therefore as it were the mere echoes of the county assemblies, contributed in a very essential manner to deprive the Hungarian Diet of the attributes and character of a Parliament in the English sense of the word, and which we vindicate for it by the term Imperial. The horizon of the delegate, who knew that he was accountable for his every word to his congregation, was not so much the realm as the boundary stones of his county, and thus there came to be impressed upon the political mind of the nation the somewhat narrow and provincial character, strong in negation but weak in initiation, with more of the qualities of the lawyer than the statesman.

The attempt has been made to describe the *status quo*



as it existed previous to 1848. The attempt must now be made to show in what manner this *status quo* was altered by the legislation of that year.

A short analysis of those laws will suffice for the purpose. To understand them, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that the generation or, speaking more accurately, the twenty-three years (1825-1848) which preceded the Revolution, had been years of unparalleled parliamentary life in the annals of Hungarian history. This portion of the subject is as yet little known, and not appreciated as it ought to be in the cis-Leithan countries and amongst the German constitutionalists of the Empire. During that period, whilst the rest of Europe east of the Rhine lay in a state of apparent political catalepsy, the Hungarian Diet presented to the world the spectacle of a body vigorously bent on radically reforming itself by constitutional means. All the great measures required to adapt the ancient avitical Constitution to modern requirements, the admission of the non-privileged classes to the suffrage and other political rights, the taxation of the classes hitherto exempted, the redemption of the servitude under which the land and the unprivileged peasantry groaned, the reform of the Constitution of the county by the introduction of a representative system in lieu of the plenary assemblies, the reform of the Diet itself by the substitution of a national representation for the county delegations, were the subjects with which in one form or other the Diets successively convoked between 1825 and 1847-8 were occupied.

Hence when the year '48 came, it found the old Hungarian Constitution already defunct, and the only question to be decided was who was to be its heir. As was to be foreseen from the unfortunate influence gained by Kossuth<sup>1</sup> over the passions of the multitude, revolution and not reform came in for the inheritance. With indecent haste the Diet, by an act of authority which it requires much special pleading to reconcile with the laws of the realm, cancelled the ancient usage which bound its members to the instructions of its constituents, and thus virtually

<sup>1</sup> Kossuth, Lajos, b. 1802, d. 1894, leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary Party; Dictator during the revolution in Hungary, 1848-1849.

changed its character from that of a delegated body to that of a constituent assembly. With a haste strangely contrasting with the slow procedure which the traditions of a thousand years had impressed upon its transactions, it passed a series of measures, which, though many of them were good in themselves, nevertheless in the crude form in which they were ushered into existence exhibited the revolutionary fever which dictated them, and the panic which possessed the Sovereign who sanctioned them. It was not the old notarial spirit of the Hungarian Constitution, but the breath of the doctrinaire European democracy, which filled the sails of the memorable Pressburg Diet of 1848 in its wild passage from the traditions of the past into the unknown waters of the future.

The following is a short summary of the more important laws passed :—

Law III. treats of the Executive.

1. The person of the King is inviolable.
2. In his absence from the Kingdom this inviolability is extended to the Palatine.
3. The Executive is wielded by the King, and in his absence from the Kingdom by the Palatine. For all the acts of the one or the other, however, the countersignature of a responsible Minister is required.
4. Each member of the Ministry is responsible for his official acts.
5. The seat of the Ministry is Ofen-Pesth.
6. All matters which have hitherto been within the competence of the Hungarian Chancery (Vienna) and of the Lieutenancy (Pesth), as well as all the other matters civil, ecclesiastical and military, His Majesty will henceforth exclusively exercise through the Hungarian Ministry.
8. The employment of the Hungarian outside the frontiers of the realm and the nomination of all military officers will henceforth require the countersignature of a responsible Hungarian Minister.
9. Abolishes the Robot (forced labour or rather labour rent), the tithes, and other servitudes of various kinds, in a style recalling the palmy days of the French constituent

assemblies, the indemnity to be hereafter paid to the proprietors was placed under the ægis of the nation's honour. In other words, an act of expropriation and a change of property, represented by hundreds of millions, was effected, as it were, by acclamation, without notice and without preparation.

10, 11, 12. The Ministry consists of the Minister President, who is named by the King, or in the absence of the King, by the Palatine, and who submits the names of the other Ministers to the Crown.

13. One of these Ministers shall always be in attendance on the King's person, and shall exercise his influence on all such matters as are common to the Fatherland and the Hereditary States. For the exercise of this influence, he shall be responsible to the Hungarian nation.

14. The departments of which the Ministry consists are the following :—

1. Internal Affairs.
2. Finance.
3. Public Works.
4. Agriculture.
5. Ecclesiastical and Education.
6. Justice.
7. The Defence of the Country.

29. The Ministers have seats in both Chambers.

32. Specifies the acts for which Ministers can be made responsible.

33. A simple majority in the two Chambers is required to impeach a Minister.

34. Specifies how the tribunal is to be composed by which the Ministers on arraignment are to be tried.

Law IV. enacts that there shall be Triennial Parliaments, that the Parliament shall meet each year, that it is not to be prorogued till it has voted the Budget, etc., etc., upon the approved modern European pattern.

Law V. treats of the suffrage.

1. All those who have hitherto enjoyed the suffrage are left in possession of it (viz. the entire class of nobles, whether proletaire or not).

2. Native born or naturalised subjects twenty years of age (except such as are under tutelage, or have been convicted of crime) are entitled to the suffrage who can qualify :

- (a) As possessed of real property to the value of 300 fl. (£30).
- (b) As artizans, merchants, or manufacturers. In the former case continuous employment with one apprentice.
- (c) As possessed of a fixed yearly income of 100 fl. (£10).
- (d) As doctors, surgeons, advocates, engineers, artists, professors, apothecaries, clergymen, school-masters, without reference to their income.

3. Every elector can be elected as Representative who has completed his twenty-fourth year, *and is master of the Hungarian language.*

4, 5, and 6. Divide the Kingdom (inclusive of Croatia and the military frontier) into 377 electoral districts.

The remaining paragraphs regulate the mode of procedure at elections.

Law VIII. Abolishes all exemptions from taxation.

Law XIII. Abolishes the ecclesiastical tithe without indemnity to the Church.

Law XV. Abolishes the law of aviticity.

Law XVI. Provides that a project of law shall be submitted to the next Diet by the responsible Ministry for the reconstitution of the county, but that in the meantime, and as a provisional measure only, a general assembly shall meet in each county ; that such general assembly shall be composed of the persons who have hitherto had votes in the Restaurations, *and of representatives* of all the inhabitants of the county delegated by the several parishes. To this assembly the laws now passed shall be promulgated, and it shall elect a standing committee under the presidency of the Count Supreme, and shall until the new county law has been passed exercise all the functions hitherto vested in the General Assembly.

The language to be used in these General Assemblies in

the Kinghom is exclusively the Hungarian ; in the *partes annexæ* the native language may be used.

In estimating the effect which the above laws produced upon the relations between Hungary and the rest of the Empire, it is not sufficient to note in how far they can be reconciled with the text of the Pragmatic Sanction—the point of importance is to examine what change they effected in the *de facto* relations which had grown out of the Pragmatic Sanction, and which had enabled the Austrian Empire to assume the position of an international unit in the European family. Examined from this point of view, it is not too much to say that the laws of '48 in themselves, and quite irrespectively of the excesses by which the Diet later convoked in virtue of these laws was carried away, did radically alter the relation in which Hungary had hitherto stood towards the rest of the empire.

Not only was the Real Union, which, as regards international and other 'common affairs,' had *de facto* existed, set aside, but even the principle of the Personal Union itself was attacked in its foundations. As was stated on a preceding page, the Crown and its principal adviser, the Chancellor, were previous to '48, so to speak, domiciled at Vienna, that is outside the limits of the Kingdom of Hungary—and in the person at least of the exterritorial Crown, even the extreme puritans of the Hungarian *corpus juris* admitted that a union between Hungary and the Hereditary States existed. By the laws of '48, the Crown ceased to be an absentee, and became domiciled in the Kingdom. This was effected in two ways : by the transfer of the functions of the Chancellor to the responsible Ministry domiciled at Pesth, and by the yet more radical measure of the creation of a *second Sovereign Person* in the office of the inviolable Palatine, who, when the King was absent from what the text of the laws of '48 describes as the Hungarian Fatherland, became vested with the prerogative of the Crown. The co-existence of these two persons, the one domiciled in Austria, and there exercising the prerogative of the Crown, the other domiciled in Hungary and there exercising the same functions, were the outward symbols of that which the laws of '48 sought to effect, the disintegration of the Austrian

Empire and the creation of two distinct international unities absolutely separated the one from the other.

It is true that the letter of these laws avoids proclaiming this. In the list of Ministers there is no Portfolio for Foreign Affairs, and the modest title of a Minister for Public Defence seems to withdraw the department of war from the cognisance of the responsible Ministry. But this apparent omission is supplemented by paragraphs 6, 8, and 15 of Law III., which place the military forces of Hungary under the control of the Parliament, and make the Minister responsible to Parliament for the advice given in regard to the common affairs.

The war between Hungary and Austria, which immediately succeeded the passing of these laws, was the necessary result of the laws themselves. At a moment of general weakness, the Hungarian nation violently wrenched the Crown of St. Stephen from the place it had since the Pragmatic Sanction occupied in the imperial diadem, and set it up on an independent eminence of its own. In doing so they seceded from the Empire, and if the principle be admitted that the issue of battle may be invoked to stay the process of disruption, the benefit of this plea cannot be denied to Austria in her war with Hungary.

Totally indefensible either in law or policy as was the theory afterwards set up that the Emperor of Austria had obtained a right of conquest over Hungary, the extreme lengths to which the dominant party in '48 went in treating Austria as a foreign country undoubtedly furnished arguments for this view, which the enemies of Hungary were not slow to avail themselves of.

The events which connect the year '48 with the present time must now be briefly adverted to.

By the surrender of the villages, the Kingdom was placed at the mercy of the Emperor, and after the general Constitution given to the Empire in March '49 had been cancelled, the purest form of absolute government was introduced from one end of the Empire to the other. With one stroke of the bureaucratic pen, the Constitution of Hungary and all her laws civil and criminal were erased. The counties were abolished and the country was divided into adminis-

trative circles and districts. The Austrian codex was made the law of the land, and the German language was the only medium of official communication. The principle of the Bach-Schwarzenberg administration was that just now adverted to. The Kingdom of Hungary had been conquered by the Emperor of Austria, and was to be ruled as a conquered province as utterly devoid of any rights or laws of its own, as an Indian hunting ground changed into a Territory of the Union after the extermination of the tribes that hunted there.

Probably no more gigantic task was ever attempted with less adequate instruments or a more inconceivable misapprehension of the circumstances under which it had to be performed.

The only allies upon which the Austrian Government could count in Hungary were a portion of the Magnates, whose residence at the Imperial Court and employment in the Imperial Service had given them more European views than those present at the noisy assemblies of the county, and who had no wish to see themselves banished from the influences of Western civilisation into a constitutional paradise of Scythian isolation, and the non-Magyar populations.

By the levelling and *pro tanto* democratic process of a centralised bureaucracy, the first victims of the new system were these very Magnates, whose comparative allegiance to the Austrian Crown consequently soon changed into the bitterest hostility.

By the forced introduction of German as the official language, and of German laws and administrators, the Servians, Croatsians, Roumanians and other nationalities who had sided with the Imperial Crown in its struggle with the Magyars, felt themselves as bitterly aggrieved as they had been by the attempt of the Pesth Diet to magyarise them.

Lastly, the only remaining condition which might possibly have secured some chance of success, viz., that of a superior class of German employés similar to the bureaucratic hierarchy which, under the auspices of Stein and Hardenberg, succeeded in establishing on such firm foundation

the material prosperity of the Prussian Monarchy, was entirely wanting.

The corruption which disgraced the reign of the Emperor Francis and the obstinate and successful efforts to trample out all attempts on the part of the German nationality in Austria at sharing in the higher culture which was the undoubted patrimony of their northern brethren, bitterly revenged themselves on their authors when the attempt was made to subdue by German culture the semi-barbaric provinces of the East. With a few honourable exceptions, a venal and half-educated body of German officials formed, so to speak, the corps of officers whom Baron Bach had at his disposal for commanding his administrative army. The rank and file were composed of still more venal and still less educated officials principally of Bohemian nationality, and of such Hungarian scum as could, under the general execration of their fellow citizens, be got to serve in the ranks of the Bach hussars, as the Austrian officials were contemptuously designated.

Endowed with administrative talents of a high order, Baron Bach was deficient in knowledge of character, and in his subordinates cared for nothing but the most servile obedience to his will. Utterly ignorant of anything connected with Hungary, he would nevertheless see matters beyond the Leitha by no other light than that of his preconceived administrative theory, and the natural consequence was that his underlings soon had no other care than to present to him the image of things as he desired to see them. After ten years of absolute dictatorship, Baron Bach persuaded himself that in Hungary at least, '*tout était pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes.*'

The shock which the Italian catastrophe gave to the entire Monarchy rudely dispelled this fool's paradise. The attempt to establish the unity of the Empire by means of a bureaucratic centralisation was declared by common acclamation to be a desperate failure. Baron Bach fell from his high eminence, and the task of devising means for the safety of the State was entrusted to the enlarged Council of State (*der verstärkte Reichsrath*).

The enlarged Reichsrath offers so perfect a microcosm of



the constitutional conflict which for the last five years has agitated the Austrian Empire, and the parties which have since formed themselves, and in whose hands the future of the Empire lies, are there so clearly to be discerned in their germinal and embryonic state, that it will much assist the clear comprehension of what followed to examine somewhat closely what elements this body was composed of, and to what resolutions it came.

The Reichsrath, or Imperial Council, of which the 'Verstärkter Reichsrath,' or enlarged Imperial Council, was the immediate successor, had been a creation of the Schwarzenberg-Bach administration, and the idea on which it was based was that of the purest absolutism. In the somewhat metaphysical language of the Edict which called it into life in 1850, it was to represent 'The thought of the Monarch in a state of deliberation,' and to consist of Privy Councillors named by the Sovereign for life.

In the Enlarged Reichsrath, created by the Imperial Patent of the 5th of March 1860, besides these ordinary Councillors, the Provincial Legislations of the Empire, which it was already proposed to call into life, were to furnish thirty-eight members for a period of six years. Until the statute for these Provincial Legislations could be elaborated, these thirty-eight members were to be selected by the Emperor from amongst the notables of the various kingdoms, principalities and powers of which the Empire was composed. The subjects of which this assembly was to take cognisance were :—

1. The finances of the Empire.
2. The more important acts of legislation.
3. The statutes for the Provincial Legislations about to be convoked. Its functions were to be purely consultative.

It was only with the greatest difficulty that six Hungarians were induced to take part in the deliberations of this body. Of the six first nominated by the Emperor, Counts G. Apponyi, Barkoczy and V. Mailtáh, Baron Vay, Baron Eötvös and v. Somssich, the three latter refused. Their places were filled up by Counts A. Szecsen, George Andrassy, and Bishop Korormics. When the assembly

met on the 31st of May, Count Apponyi, in the name of his Hungarian colleagues, made a formal declaration to the effect that they were there not as representatives of Hungary, but as responsible for their own personal opinions only, and that their presence in the Enlarged Reichsrath was not to be considered as in any way implying a departure from their determination to maintain the historic rights of the Hungarian nation.

Difficult as it had been to obtain the attendance of the Hungarian members, their presence in the Council when once there gave an entirely unexpected character to the deliberations of that assembly. All of them men grown to manhood in the vigorous parliamentary struggles which had at the Diet of Pressburg preceded the catastrophe of 1848, they brought parliamentary forms and parliamentary experience to bear in an assembly which, but for them, would have been helplessly deficient in either. They were consequently soon masters of the situation. By their influence, and at their instigation, the orders for the despatch of business (*Geschäftsordnung*), which had been *octroyés* by the Crown, were set aside, and the assembly determined its own method of procedure, thus settling *a priori* the question as to whether it was to be a mere body of advisers on matters of detail, or in point of fact an august Constituent Assembly. This point settled, it was easy for the Committee named to consider the financial measures laid before the assembly, to enter into the antecedent question as to what constitutional reforms were required to render any financial measures other than inoperative.

The Committee, consisting of twenty-one members, laid its report before the representatives on the 21st of September. It declared that with the system of government, as it at present existed, no prosperous future could be hoped for, that within this system no effective retrenchments could be made in the expenditure, and that such a result could only be expected from the countries of which the Empire was composed directly participating in the management of their own affairs. Thus far the report of the Committee was unanimous. On the further question as to the form in which this participation should be effected there was a radical

difference of opinion which found expression in the votes of the majority and minority of the Committee.

The vote of the majority laid the whole stress upon the recognition of the historical and political individuality of the several States of which the Empire was composed, and demanded the utmost measure of legislative and administrative autonomy compatible with the requirements of a common bond of union.

The vote of the minority laid the whole stress upon the necessity of maintaining the *unity* of the Empire, and of a strong, central government. It desired autonomy in the shape of communal self-government, but wished to see the political power absorbed by the central organs.

The vote of the majority of the Committee was endorsed by a large majority in the Reichsrath; the vote of the minority of the Committee was supported by fourteen voices only.

Thus by the common consent of all the members of a body which undoubtedly represented every shade of opinion and the manifold interests of the Empire, the continuance of absolutism was solemnly declared once for all incompatible with the safety of the State, and the first step taken towards the enfranchisement of the Empire from the traditions of the reigning House; but this common agreement touched the negative side only. An analysis of the votes given by the thirty-eight members in the Assembly will show very accurately of what elements the present parties in the Austrian Empire are composed.

Of the thirty-eight, twenty-five voted with the majority and thirteen in the minority. The majority was formed by a coalition between the Hungarians and the Federalists. The Federalists subdivide into Feudalists and Nationalists.

By historical autonomy, the Hungarians meant a *bona fide* Hungarian parliamentary system; the Feudalists understood the revival of the aristocratic privileges formerly vested in the Estates of the various provinces in which their entailed lands lay; the Nationalists sought protection against the danger of absorption into other nationalities.

The minority may be classed generally under the name

of the German Centralists, and subdivided into Bureaucratic Centralists and Constitutional Centralists.

Their vote was a protest against Hungarian separatism, aristocratic privilege, and a diminution of the power of the hitherto ruling German element. Before the bureaucratic fraction of this minority there still floated visions of a successful realisation of Joseph II.'s plan for forcing civilisation upon the semi-Eastern Empire through the agency of a more highly cultivated administrative machinery. The constitutional fraction, on the other hand, held fast to the conviction that in an Imperial Parliament alone could be found the security which had hitherto been symbolised by the Crown, and that only in such a body could the process of amalgamation required to fuse the discordant elements of which the Empire was composed be successfully carried on.

Out of these various shades of opinion were gradually built up the three solutions of the Austrian question, which for the last five years have been balancing each other, and striving with alternate success to obtain the mastery : *Centralism*, which would unite the dominions of the Crown in one Imperial Parliament ; *Dualism* (the Hungarian solution), which would establish two *bona fide* Parliaments, one on each side of the Leitha ; *Federalism*, which seeks to endow the local Diets with parliamentary attributes.

On the 29th of September the Enlarged Reichsrath was dismissed, and the Emperor, after thanking it for its services, engaged to take its recommendations into his immediate consideration.

The Diploma of the 20th of October 1860, and the Patent of the 5th of February 1861, were the instruments by which the Crown gave expression to the wishes of the nation as placed on record by the Enlarged Reichsrath.

The circumstances connected with these important decrees and with the Hungarian Diet of 1861 are so well known that but few observations will suffice to show their bearing on the present situation.

Though the Patent of February is in its form only a complement of the October Diploma, in reality the latter was inspired by the vote of the majority of the Enlarged Reichsrath, whilst the former owed its origin\* to the vote

of the minority. *Autonomy* is the keynote of the former, *unity* the key-note of the latter instrument. This key-note, however, is not so much to be sought in the definition of what are the subjects to be treated of by the common organ of the Empire, as in the form to be given to that organ itself. The October Diploma only indicated what this form was to be, leaving these details to be settled later, but these indications suffice to show that the idea present to the statesmen who framed the Diploma was that the central organ should remain, *mutatis mutandis*, the Enlarged Reichsrath, viz., a great Council with consultative functions only, and that such amount of parliamentary government as should be measured out should be restricted to the Provincial Legislations. The Patent, on the contrary, adopts the form of an Imperial Parliament with an Upper and a Lower House, and with *bona fide* legislative functions. The Lower House, though consisting of delegations from the Provincial Assemblies, is nevertheless to be a real representation of the Empire, for the local Diets are enjoined to send their delegates (whose number is fixed by the Patent) in the ratio of the population, and so as to represent the localities of which the several provinces are composed. The Emperor, moreover, reserves to himself the right of substituting for the Provincial Delegations direct elections on the part of the population.

The Diploma was a compromise painfully effected between the feudalist Minister, Count Goluchowski, and the Hungarian Ministers who had supported the policy of the Hungarian members in the Enlarged Reichsrath. The February Patent was the work of M. Schmerling, named Minister in December, and who, though not a member of the Enlarged Reichsrath, was the hope and prop of the German Centralist party, who formed the minority in that assembly.

Before estimating the effect produced in Hungary by these two decrees, it must be noted that already, previous to the month of October, the principle of restoring political and historical rights had been partially given effect to, and that on the 19th of April the Emperor had decreed the revival of the former counties and the introduction of a county administration analogous to the old forms of

the Congregation. On the 20th of October Baron Vay was named Chancellor of Hungary. On the 30th of October the Emperor nominated Supreme Counts to all the Hungarian counties. On the 1st of December a meeting of notables was called together by the Emperor's desire at Gran, under the presidency of the Primate, to decide upon the necessary measures for convoking the Diet. They resolved that the Diet could only be legally convoked on the electoral law of 1848. Hence the situation in which the Hungarian Diet met in 1861 was this: the local administration had once more got into the hands of the County Assemblies, and the Diet was legally convoked in virtue of the laws of '48. The liberty thus regained by the counties was turned to a very different account from that which the Hungarian statesmen connected with the October Diploma had hoped. The first use to which they put it was to claim the ancient right of the *comitatus* to be judge of the legality of executive measures, and, deeming the taxes illegal until voted by the Diet, they refused to pay them.

The Diploma itself, instead of being hailed with the gratitude which its author hoped to earn from it, was with one voice condemned as directly subversive of the ancient liberties of the country. The Hungarians who had been busy at Vienna, discovered that they had acted without a true knowledge of the state of the country, and found themselves in the painful position of men who from the ill success of their measures had lost their credit with the Government, on which they had hoped to exercise a pressure favourable to their country, and who on the other hand were distrusted by the country for whose interests they had been working. The Patent of February showed that their power was gone, and that the German minority under M. Schmerling was determined to fight out their battle with Hungary without their intervention.

There is a subtle difference between the Diploma and the Patent, which in justice towards these men should be noted. In the former, although in the preamble the Emperor says that he ordains this instrument as a fundamental law of the Empire, and in virtue of his autocratic power thus directly striking at the constitutional theory of the Hungarian

Chancellor, the language is so guarded as to admit of the interpretation that the change which the Emperor intended should be effected in the Empire should not, as regards Hungary, be brought about otherwise than by a constitutional arrangement between the King and the Hungarian Diet. According to the strict form of Hungarian Constitutional law, the Kingdom of Hungary could perfectly ignore the Diploma and concern itself alone with the Decree, and thus the Hungarian mediators hoped to save the necessary forms. But the temper of the public mind on both sides of the Leitha was not such as to take note of subtleties like these. In Hungary, the license of the county assemblies had produced a state of things not easily to be distinguished from anarchy, and the elections to the Diet had resulted in the return of a large proportion of the revolutionary elements of 1848. At Vienna the triumph of the Centralists had filled the young Parliament with a sense of power and with the confidence of ultimate victory.

It was not likely that under such circumstances a compromise could be effected, and in the autumn of 1861 the Hungarian Diet was dissolved.

Four years elapsed, during which M. Schmerling vainly hoped that the Hungarians would surrender at discretion. But they gave no signs of any such intention. In the meantime, power gradually slipped from the German Premier's own hands. In his attempts to steer a safe course between the Crown and the Parliament, he lost his influence on both. With his fall the system of the February Patent was condemned, and a new principle had to be set up in its stead.

The Hungarians were to be coaxed, not forced, into union, and the reconstitution of the Empire was to be attempted by means of their constitutional co-operation.

A new Diet, that now sitting, was convoked, and whilst the action of the young Parliament in the cis-Leithan half of the Empire was suspended, the parliamentary life in the trans-Leithan half was called out in all its activity.

In his speech from the throne, the Emperor-King admitted the *de jure* existence of the laws of 1848, and expressed his

intention of altering them not otherwise than by constitutional means.

Thus at three successive dates, only distant a few years from each other, the House of Austria has adopted three radically distinct principles as those by which to guide its policy towards Hungary.

In 1850 it claimed to govern the kingdom as a conquered province.

In 1861 it proclaimed the theory that the constitutional rights of Hungary had lapsed by the *de facto* break in the legal continuity of those rights, and that only so much of those rights should be revived as were deemed compatible with the welfare of the Empire.

In 1865 it had returned to the basis of the Pragmatic Sanction, and admitting the impotence of the Crown to alter any law otherwise than in concert with the legal representatives of the nation, it has left to the Hungarian Diet the initiation of the measures necessary for placing the relations between Austria and Hungary upon a new footing.

The question of form on which the main conflict turned in 1861 has been decided according to the wishes and just demands of Hungary. The two parties have now come to an understanding on the material question only. Will the Diet of 1866 display as much statesmanship in dealing with this difficult task, as the Diet of 1861 showed of legal acumen in dealing with the former?

*End of Memorandum.*

Morier often stated that this mission had been the most interesting in which he had ever been employed. Speaking of the reception by the Emperor and Empress of a congratulatory deputation from the Diet, he noted that 'though the Emperor's speech was received with the customary *Eljens*, it did not altogether produce a favourable impression. It contained an unmistakable warning not to indulge in illusory hopes. . . . On the other hand, it would be difficult to describe the impression produced by the Empress's speech. . . . Within a few hours of its delivery, I received from six or seven members of the deputation accounts which so exactly tallied with each



other that I cannot doubt that the effect produced was one and the same on all the bystanders.

'It seems that, though Her Majesty held a paper in her hand, she did not read from it, but spoke in the purest Magyar, though, strange to say, with a slight English accent, as if her words were the inspiration of the moment. Her voice trembled with emotion, and when she came to the last passage in which she invoked the blessing of the Almighty on the labours of the Diet her hands involuntarily clasped themselves as if in prayer, and she turned her eyes to Heaven as in the act of fervent devotion.

'No stronger proof could have been given of the impression produced than the abortive attempt made to reply to Her Majesty by the *Eljens* usual on such occasions. The fiery and usually vociferous Magyar was struck dumb by emotion, a strange stillness came over them, and a rather awkward pause ensued as the deputation seemed unable to tear themselves away from the spell which fascinated them at a moment when etiquette required that they should withdraw.

'One of my informants, an old man whom I have known for many years as the prosaic director of many useful enterprises, fairly broke into sobs in trying to describe this scene to me, and said that the only way he could convey the impression he had received was for me to imagine how Joan of Arc would have looked when uttering her last prayer before going into battle.

'Both speeches were delivered in Magyar, and Her Majesty is said to speak the language with remarkable purity, though, strange to say, as Deák informed me, with a slight English accent, to be accounted for by the Empress's early acquaintance with that language.'

F. Deák, the great Hungarian Liberal leader, Morier portrayed as 'essentially a representative man, and affords to his countrymen, as it were, a magic mirror in which they see their own features ennobled and enlarged to heroic proportions, and with many of the blemishes erased, for M. Deák, unlike many of the political notorieties of his country, is entirely free from all vulgar demagogic arts, is simple in his language, retired in his habits, and of the most unblemished integrity as regards his private life.

'A real and genuine Liberal, as his whole past career has proved him to be, he is still possessed to a singular degree of that specially Hungarian quality of mind which I have described as "avitical," viz. the holding fast to what has once been acquired as to something in its very nature indelible. It is the combination of this oriental immovability and the *quasi* stereotyping of impressions once received, with an apparent over-susceptibility for new ideas, an impetuous and irreflective mode of action, a wild and hyperbolical mode of expression, in which, by this strange fusion of Asiatic and South European character, I consider a key is to be found to the many problems afforded by Hungarian history, one specially required in studying the present crisis.

'I should add that M. Deák, in common with his countrymen, is extraordinarily over-sensitive in regard to public opinion—that it affords him such pain to find himself face to face even with a minority differing from himself, that it is very readily believed that he would rather modify his own opinions than run the risk of passing a measure from which any important fraction of the Diet should withhold their approval. In a conversation lately held between him and a gentleman who repeated it to me, he made a remark which appears to me so strikingly to illustrate this peculiarity and at the same time to show in what current his thoughts are running in connection with the present crisis. One of the prominent names in Hungarian history is that of a Count Sandor Károlyi, a lieutenant of the celebrated leader Rakoczy who, in the early part of the eighteenth century, just before the Pragmatic Sanction, on his own authority and against the will of his chief made peace upon very advantageous terms with the Austrians, thus securing the rights and privileges of the nation, and enabling the work of the Pragmatic Sanction with its solemn contract guaranteeing those rights to be effected. Referring to this individual M. Deák observed, "Is it not a strange thing that this man, to whom we may be said to owe our existence as a nation, should in the mouths of the people to this day be branded as a traitor, whilst Rakoczy, whose obstinacy, had it gained the day, would have destroyed us, has

remained the popular hero?" He then added, according to another version of this story which appears to have made a great impression, "Yet it would be impossible to face a deathbed with the thought that for generations to come one would live on in the traditions of the nation as a traitor to one's country."

'Such, as far as I have been able to seize them, are the outlines of the man into whose hands are committed at the present moment the destinies not of Hungary only but of the whole Empire, for according as he makes or mars, will the possibility be given or taken away of a new Pragmatic Sanction or great Act of Settlement, establishing on a more solid foundation than the old the integrity of the Austrian Monarchy. *Cæsarem portat et fortunas Cæsaris*. Will he, when the supreme moment comes, be found ready to give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's? Will he be able to see that combination is a higher law than isolation—that interdependence is more full of security than independence? Will the strong hand that in the hour of need held up the tottering pillars of Hungarian autonomy, be found to have the cunning necessary to fashion a new edifice in which these pillars, with others added to them, shall together support a free and mighty Empire undreamt of in the Parliament of the Pragmatic Sanction? These are the questions which it would be rash to attempt to answer at the present time.'

An episode in the social world of Pesth which created no little excitement at that time was thus described by Morier:—

' . . . Politics in this country have hitherto not been confined to the platform, the tribune, and the press, but have asserted their presence in every relation of life. Hungarian Society as such accepted the position which the theory of the *Schwarzenberg* *Bach* administration opened to it. It treated the Austrians as conquerors, and determined not to deny itself the vengeance which, socially speaking, a majority of conquered can inflict upon a minority of conquerors. For the last fifteen years no officer, civil or military, wearing the Austrian uniform has been allowed

to enter the Pesth Casino or to cross the threshold of a Pesth salon. No matter what may have been their rank or how close their relationship with Hungarian families, the unfortunate Imperial officials whose term of service brought them within the Hungarian frontiers found themselves, in a country famed for its hospitality and in the midst of a society equally celebrated for its brilliancy and charm, placed in a state of social quarantine, and treated as it were as social lepers, to be shunned and made to live alone in desolate places, or driven to find what comfort they could in each other's society.

'It was very generally felt that after the reception of the Emperor and Empress as honoured guests in the Hungarian capital, this state of things could not continue, and that the present would be the right moment to renew social intercourse with the neighbours on the other side of the Leitha. So inveterate, however, had the habit become, and so great was the terrorism exercised by the more fanatical portion of the female aristocracy of Pesth, that on my arrival here I found great doubts entertained as to the possibility of this desirable result being attained.

'Under these circumstances it happened, whether by accident or by preconcerted action does not seem certain, that the great ball of the carnival, yearly organised by the young men of Society, was fixed for the evening of the day in which the Emperor and Empress made their public entrance. The committee of this ball was composed of very young men of very ultra opinions, and the lady they had fixed upon to do the honours of the evening was Countess Keglevich, the daughter of Count Louis Bâtthyany, the celebrated Hungarian Minister shot by sentence of a court-martial at Pesth in 1850.

'It was clear that, thus composed, there was no chance of the Imperial suite being asked to the ball, and in that case the very first day of the Imperial sojourn would have been marked by a gross affront, as it were collectively offered by the whole of Society.

'When I went to the Casino on the evening preceding the ball I found the greatest possible state of excitement prevailing there, and I could not but be struck with the earnest-

ness, and in part also with the violence, with which the matter was discussed. Nor was the discussion confined to the invited guests ; a large number of the deputies took the matter up and treated it as a grave political question. The general impression then prevailed that the committee would have the victory ; that the dissidents would be in a minority, and finding themselves in one, would not have the courage to act up to their opinions and abstain from going to the ball.

'Next morning, however, a general meeting was convoked which was attended by some fifty or sixty members of the *élite* of Society, and after a discussion of a very violent kind which, fortunately for the peace of the town, was mainly carried on between fathers and sons, the committee by a large majority were called upon to send invitations to the Imperial suite, which they absolutely refused to do. Thereupon all the other members of the meeting respectively pledged themselves not to attend the ball or to allow their wives or daughters to attend it.

'A fresh committee was then formed, and an opposition ball, to which the whole suite of the Emperor and Empress and a portion of the garrison were to be asked, was arranged for another day.

'Thus, after nearly eighteen years of a social warfare carried on, as it were, to the knife, a social reconciliation was effected between Austrians and Hungarians which in itself would have been no unworthy result of the Imperial visit.'

At an historic ball which was given on the 3rd February at the Palace of Buda, the first since the Revolution of 1848, when their Majesties freely mingled with the crowd, the Emperor spoke very openly to Morier upon Hungarian affairs, and began by asking him what were the impressions he had received since his stay at Pesth.

'I replied,' he wrote, 'that I had been very much struck by the circumstances attending upon H.M.'s public entry—that it was impossible for any one who had witnessed that interesting ceremony, or who had mingled with the crowd that filled the streets all that day and late into the night, not to feel convinced that a radical change of *sentiment*

had come over the Hungarian nation since H.M.'s personal presence in the Hungarian capital—that the prevalent feeling appeared to me to be that of a load taken off the nation's mind, and a sense of relief at being once more able to give vent without *arrière-pensée* to the loyalty and personal attachment to the Crown which on all sides were admitted to be characteristics of the Hungarians, and that to an Englishman, whose idea of political well-being was a hearty union between the Crown and the people, a sight of this kind could not but be one which he liked to dwell upon, and the recollection of which would always be a pleasant one. H.M. then asked me what I thought of the political side of the question. I replied that I had as yet seen fewer signs than I would have wished of a desire for more intimate relations with H.M.'s cis-Leithan subjects; that it appeared to me that the sense of joy at reconciliation was exclusively that of satisfaction at the re-establishment of a cordial understanding between H.M. as King of Hungary and his Hungarian subjects, and that the very intensity of this feeling excluded the sense of solidarity between the Hungarians as a nation and the other inhabitants of the Empire; that it struck me that there was a certain narrowness in the political opinions I found prevalent amongst all parties here which prevented their seeing the bearings of the present important question, not only on the interests of the Empire, but on the interests of Europe, and that at a moment when all eyes ought to be fixed on the future, it seemed to me that the regard of the Hungarian politicians was too exclusively concentrated on the past.

'H.M. replied that my observations were perfectly just. . . . H.M. was then pleased to state that it had given him great pleasure to learn of my sojourn at Pesth, as his Hungarian subjects attached much more weight to what was said by a foreigner than to anything that might fall from the lips of their Austrian fellow-subjects.

'I said that I was here as an observer only, but that nevertheless I had never made a secret of what my own opinion on the question was—viz. that the object of paramount importance for the Hungarians, no less than for the other members of the European family, was such a

union as would not endanger the integrity of the Austrian Empire, and that if the Hungarians, by not being able to comprehend the importance of the issues placed in their hands, persisted in a line of conduct which would lead to a disruption of the Empire, they would be endangering the interests and would forfeit the sympathies of Europe. I added that, having found Liberal Hungarians taking a lively interest in the Northern States of America, I had taken the liberty to call attention to the Nemesis which had followed upon the assertion of the principle of secession, and to the terrible measures to which a mighty Empire had been forced to have recourse to preserve itself from dismemberment. I concluded by saying that, at all events, my presence here would have very thoroughly convinced the Hungarians with whom I had come in contact that not all Englishmen saw Hungarian affairs through the eyes of M. Kossuth.

‘The above is but a mere outline of a conversation which lasted a considerable time, and during which H.M.’s manner was in the highest degree cordial and friendly. After conversing for some time in French, H.M. interrupted himself and said in German, “I cannot see why we should talk together in French when it seems so much more natural that we should converse together in German”; and H.M. seemed to derive pleasure in carrying on the conversation in that language with a foreigner, not altogether out of hearing of his Hungarian magnates.

‘I thought it incumbent upon me to answer H.I.M. in the same open and unreserved spirit that he had put his questions to me, and to tell H.M. exactly what were the impressions that had been produced upon me.

‘The general impression left upon my mind by this conversation with the Emperor of Austria was, first, that H.I.M. shared the pleasurable sense produced by his personal reconciliation with his Hungarian people. Secondly, that this feeling in no way blinded him to the difficulties still to be overcome, or to the resistance or opposition which he would have to encounter in bringing the will of that nation into harmony with his own. Thirdly, that his new popularity with his trans-Leithan subjects had not for one moment

made him forget that he was a German Sovereign ruling over an Empire the majority of which does not belong to the Magyar race.'

*Morier to his Father.*

'VIENNA, *February* 10, 1866.

'... Had I not been so overworked at Pesth I should have enjoyed my stay there. It was the gayest business I ever saw, but the sitting up all night and the working all day wellnigh knocked me up, and, had I not come here for three or four days and simply ignored that there was such a thing as a Magyar Parliament sitting at Pesth, I should have shut up. The ball at the Palace at Buda was the strangest and finest thing I ever saw. The whole company in the costume of magnates and a galaxy of "mirobolant" females. But it might have been a ball of Tippoo Sahibs, it had so little European about it. The Emperor was very gracious to me and talked to me for a long while on politics. He was pleased to say that it had given him great pleasure that *I* had been sent to Pesth. I have received very high praise, both public and private, from the F. O. for my Hungarian reports.'



## CHAPTER XIX

## THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR

ON his return to Vienna Morier resumed the commercial negotiations, but, as he wrote to his father :—

‘ Our work, like every other peaceful occupation, is drooping under the miserable uncertainty of this question of War or No War.’

His Berlin friends, especially E. von Stockmar, kept him well informed of all that was going on in that capital :—

‘ In respect to the position of affairs here,’ the latter had written on 18th February, ‘ our friend Bismarck is in a desperate position. He must rise or fall. Nothing evidently has been done with France or Italy. Whether he might get France as an ally by making some very large offer, I can’t tell but don’t believe. I have my doubts whether he can get his master to fight single-handed.’ And ten days later : ‘ We are in the midst of a crisis here. War or Peace ? and if Peace, can Bismarck remain ?—He says “ No.” But I suppose he will try.’

On the 22nd March Stockmar thus summed up the situation :—

‘ Bismarck and most of his colleagues think war necessary as a means of maintaining themselves. They say that the object is not the Duchies—because there can be no doubt about them—but that the coat of Prussia has grown too small for her, that she wants aggrandisement. That the army is too large for her present resources—that, after a war (reverses are of course not thought of), either increased resources will permit to maintain it on the present footing, or at least successes will permit to reduce it ! . . . The King, at the bottom of his heart, wishes to avoid war, but to keep his ministers. There is the rub—whom is he to take ?’

And on 29th March he wrote :—

‘ I think we are on the brink of it. The chances for war are much greater than when I wrote last. Curious to say, the public at large and the army itself do not believe in war. They think it too impossible, too absurd. I am afraid they will be disagreeably roused from their slumbers.’

In Vienna, too, hopes for peace were diminishing, for Morier recorded from there on 1st April :—

‘ We are living in a state of no pleasant excitement here, not knowing from one day to another whether we shall awake the next morning in a state of war. I myself do not believe it can come to this, that in this present day *one* man, even Bismarck, can have the power to do that which all the people to be concerned in the matter are against. However, it looks very bad at present.’

And on 23rd April :—

‘ Our peaceful meditations are terribly interfered with by the threatenings of war which, to the everlasting shame of humanity, are daily increasing in intensity. I have been hoping against hope that the danger would blow over (a little energetic language from London and Paris would have at once dispelled it), but I am beginning to look upon the case as almost beyond the reach of cure. It is terrible to think how hopelessly without any just principles of international morals the present generation is, and how specially deficient in this article is the self-complacent British Public.’

The negotiations which Bismarck was endeavouring to initiate with Roggenbach and Bennigsen,<sup>1</sup> the leaders of the German Liberal party, were described by Stockmar as follows :—

‘ *May 5th.*

‘ I have no doubt that the assertions as to the negotiations with Bismarck are essentially true. I should say that

<sup>1</sup> Rudolf von Bennigsen, Prussian Liberal statesman; one of the founders of the National Verein, and leader of the National Liberal party.

Roggenbach has since knocked the whole thing on the head by his letter to the *National-Zeitung* of the 2nd inst.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, I hear that Bennigsen is now here [Berlin]. They will find it impossible to entrap him. . . . It is true that Bismarck has succeeded in gaining over, somehow or other, all the Berlin papers, except the *Volks-Zeitung*. He is trying hard to extract demonstrations for war out of the Berlin population, but he has failed as yet. On the other hand, the German Parliament exercises an immense attraction on the democratic mind, but the democratic mind is full of distrust. The prevailing opinion of the Prussian people can be thus expressed : " We should like to have the Duchies, but we should prefer peace."

' Roggenbach came on Bismarck's invitation, and I am not sure whether, on his arrival, he had not a secret hope of being able " to do some good." At any rate he went away perfectly *désillusionné*. He has told Bismarck the truth : that he may gain over some Liberal men and make renegades of them, but that he could not gain over the Liberal party ; that he was not the man to reorganise Germany by means of a Parliament. . . . The King is averse to decisive resolutions, and it is Bismarck's game not to push him vigorously, but to let him drift into war.'

And on 13th May :—

' The King and some of the Ministers still have a lurking hope of peace, of coming to an understanding with Austria at the last moment. The King's motto is " I must have the Duchies, but should like and hope to get them without war, or by a short war."

' Some people maintain that Bismarck long ago agreed with Napoleon about the cession of the Rhine Province, but waits for events to make this palatable to the King. As to annexations in Germany, the prevailing language is that none are contemplated, provided the Minor States keep neutral.'

<sup>1</sup> Repudiating the assertions of the Bismarckian press organs that he approved of the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, and was in favour of universal suffrage.

'A great War or a great Revolution, such seems to be the only alternative,' was the view taken by Faucher, the German Liberal free-trader, with whom Morier had come into contact in the course of the Anglo-Austrian commercial negotiations.

*Morier to M. Grant-Duff*

'VIENNA, 9th May 1866.

'I have read with the greatest interest the article on Austria, published in the *North British*, a copy of which Mallet brought out to me from you, for which my hearty thanks. It fulfils all the conditions I have so long urged as necessary to the treatment of foreign subjects in the British Press—viz. *objectivity*, fairness, and *charity*—and it avoids all the besetting sins of the usual British writers, nagging, school-mastering, patronising, and the taking of some ridiculous imaginary British standard as that by which to measure unbritish things. . . . You will perceive that I thoroughly disapprove of the *coup d'état* of the 20th of September. In a few words my creed as regards Austria is this. *Unity* (as distinct from bureaucratic centralisation) is the *conditio sine qua non* of the continuance of the Austrian monarchy. There are only two modes under which political unity is conceivable—either that of an absolute Government, or that of a common representative body. The "One" must be either a single person, *i.e.* an absolute ruler, or a single corporation (of course I don't mean to exclude the idea of two Houses, for all practical purposes a Parliament even with two Chambers is *one* corporation). When, therefore, in 1860 the Emperor abdicated absolute power, it was but the logical consequence of this act for him to go in for the Imperial Parliament inaugurated by the February Patent. The mistake committed was not the conception of the Imperial Parliament, but the attempt to *octroyer* it on Hungary, and the setting up of the theory of *Rechtsverwirkung* as regards the Hungarian Constitution in order so to *octroyer* it. The *Reichsrath*, however, once in existence, and the Imperial parliamentary Constitution it involved once sworn to by the Emperor, it was the most fatal mistake

to destroy this Constitution by a *coup d'état* upon the irresistibly absurd plea that constitutional good faith required this sacrifice in order that constitutional etiquette should not be neglected *vis-à-vis* of Hungary. It was dishonest, and, what is far worse, it was *unnecessary*—that is, *unnecessary* if the object of the Ministry was what it pretended to be—a *constitutional* reconciliation between the *cis* and *trans* Leithan dominions of the Crown with a view to constitutional co-operation. My opinion is that if the Ministry had *bona-fide* wished for this constitutional reconciliation they would have followed the plan indicated by the Reichsrath in the spring session of 1865. That body, following the impulse given by Kaiserfeldt and the autonomists, had rebelled against Schmerling and the theory of *Rechtsverwirkung*, and proposed direct negotiations between the Reichsrath and the Hungarian Diet for the purpose of arriving at some understanding respecting common affairs. It was clearly the policy of the Crown to adopt this idea and to facilitate by every means in its power the negotiations thus proposed. Had they led to nothing, there would have then been a far stronger case of *salus rei publicæ* to justify the illegal use of the Prerogative. But the object was not what it pretended to be. The object was to get rid of parliamentary control. The motive power to the *coup d'état* of September was the intolerable grating on Imperial and *hofrätbliche* nerves of free speech in the capital of the Empire. If the curs are to yelp, let them yelp far away, in the farmyard amidst the cackling of geese and the grunting of swine, not in the Imperial ante-chamber, and within hearing of august ears, and so the seventeen Diets were once more started into life and allowed to indulge in their polyglot prattle, to abuse each other, and to prove to white-cravatted and gibus-wearing mankind that it was impossible to combine such uncombinable things, and thus gradually lead up to the one dominating idea of Austrian statesmen, the *reductio ad absurdum* of constitutional forms. The metropolis was freed from the nuisance, the Affen-theater was shut up (looking very dreary with its closed shutters in the moonlight, alongside of the votive torso, intended to be a church commemorative of the Emperor's escape from

assassination, but which the gratitude of thirty-six millions of inhabitants during sixteen years has not succeeded in raising higher than the first floor), and the bureaux took up the thread of their placid existence, chuckling over their success, and only lamenting that the circumstances did not allow them to boast openly, like a brilliant Bismarck, of their no less effectual victory over the Liberal *canaille*.'

'June 9th.

'I was interrupted here exactly a month ago, and the constant wear and tear of a negotiation having for its object the confederation of mankind, carried on amidst the rattling of drums and the rolling of artillery, has prevented my resuming this labour of love. I have made a vow, however, to send this off by our next messenger, and therefore I must content myself by giving you, in a few hundred lines, my verdict on the actual situation, and jotting down a few aphorisms of which I desire to ease myself.

'There never was a situation in which it is more absolutely necessary to bear in mind Bastiat's dictum of the difference between *les choses que l'on voit et les choses que l'on ne voit pas*. If we judged of the present complication merely by the ostensible facts, we could not for one moment hesitate on which side to range ourselves or which party should be followed by our well wishes—on the one hand, we should see a rampant and profligate Government bent on territorial aggrandisement with the primary object of crushing liberty at home, and debauching public opinion by the prestige of military success to be identified with the political prestige of a reactionary pseudo-aristocratic clique; on the other side, a Government atoning for the error of its ways by arming in the defence of law and justice, and ready to spend the men it has and the money it has not got (at the certain risk of material ruin) rather than allow the triumph of might over right, and the violation of every principle of political morality—on the one side Bismarck, one of the most sinister of figures that has ever been painted on the canvas of history; on the other side Mensdorff, one

of the few really honest, straightforward Ministers whom Austria has ever produced.

‘ If, on the other hand, we turn from the *dramatis personæ* actually filling up the scene and consider the plot of the piece, we shall see that as in some rampageously composed “tragedy of errors” the actors have all changed parts and are strutting on the stage, each with the other’s mask on. As soon as the first shot is fired, Austria will, with all her might and main, be endeavouring to do what she succeeded under Schwartzenberg in 1850 in doing, viz. preventing the crystallisation of Germany into a united political body; and if she is victorious, her endeavours will be to secure Silesia as an equivalent for Venice. Prussia, no matter whether Bismarck remains in or is turned out, will have to fight to get rid of the presence of Austria in Germany.

‘ Now, I have not the slightest hesitation, even at this tremendous moment, in recording it as my fullest belief that the victory of Austria and the discomfiture of Prussia would be the greatest misfortune that could happen to Europe and *Austria*—and that, *vice versa*, the victory of Prussia, ending with the expulsion of Austria out of Germany, would be the greatest boon that could be given to Europe and *Austria*. It was a boon, I fondly hoped, might be given by the natural course of events, and the ripening of political history in Prussia. If it does come out of this war, it will have been bought at a most fearful price, and all manner of horrors may come in its wake—but Austria out of Italy and out of Germany will yet be a tremendous bit of work done—and, by a surgical operation of the most titanic dimensions, the congenital malformation of Europe will have been to a great degree remedied. If, on the other hand, Austria succeeds in remaining the victor, the malformation will remain, *plus* the fearful physical exhaustion caused by the unsuccessful operation. In Austria there are elements enough for internal reform and the work of founding a real great monarchy, if the whole energies of the country are once forced in this one direction. Hitherto the main cause of her ruin has been the unnatural attempt to exercise a sort of indirect universal dominion from the Eider to Brindisi, but the old imperial purple cannot afford

to continue to be sewn on to the new government of Italian and German progress, and the sooner the rent takes place the better.'

Diplomatic relations between Austria and Prussia were broken off on 12th June, and on the 15th Prussian armies entered Saxony and Hanover.

Added to the stress of his public duties Morier, detained in Vienna, had the anxiety of being separated from, and without means of communication with, his wife and child, who were at Schlitz in Upper Hesse, and in the middle of the warlike operations which were being carried on between the Federal and the Prussian armies.

*Morier to his Father*

'VIENNA, June 20th, 1866.

'I entirely concur in your wish to see Bismarck hung, but I do not, I must confess, understand your feeling about Louis Napoleon. Nothing can be fairer or more loyal than his manifesto. It contains the perfect diagnosis of the disease Europe is suffering from, as distinct from the mere ephemeral symptoms of Bismarckism and the like. The disease I had for a long while insisted on is describable only by the term "congenital malformation." His distinct warning to Austria that, happen what may, he would not allow his work in Italy to be destroyed, ought surely to stop the mouths of those who are for ever talking of his enigmatical utterances. That, if there should result from this war great territorial changes such as to alter very gravely the relative strength of the military monarchies of Europe, France should expect some corresponding advantages, is so absurdly *fair* that it is inconceivable to me that even that dullest of corniferi, John Bull, should shake his foolish head at it. As regards this war, the heart-breaking part of it is that its aims, as regards the anti-Austrian portion of it, are so thoroughly legitimate, whilst the means used are so thoroughly damnable. The presence of Austria in Germany and Italy is the fatal bar in the way of progress, first for Austria, second for Germany, third for Italy. I am myself convinced this might have been



effected by peaceful means and by the mere natural course of liberal development. Bismarck has determined it otherwise. He has had recourse to a brutal surgical operation to effect that which, I am convinced, might have been done by diet and steady training. The patient will very likely die under the operation. But heartily as I hate the operation, I must wish for its success. A signal victory on the part of Austria in the present struggle would throw Europe back three generations.'

*Morier to Lady Salisbury*

'VIENNA, June 24th, 1866.

'You may well imagine how painfully interested I am in this war. All the problems with which I have occupied myself for ten years are tumbling on to violent solution, and all the friends in whose political career I have got interested are inextricably involved in the plot of a drama of which they cannot control the action. The despairing feature of the matter for me is the violent conflict between my brain and my heart, my heart being all of it with these people, and my brain altogether with the other side. I dare say it will seem inexplicable to you, that knowing Bismarck as I do, any portion of me, still less my brain, should be in the camp which he has stamped out of the reluctant, peace-loving Prussian earth to carry out his policy of violence and wrong. This will appear all the more inexplicable when you reflect that I have been here during the last twelve months and have had every opportunity of convincing myself of the perfect loyalty and honesty of Mensdorff's policy. I have no hesitation in saying that for the last six months, the last three weeks excepted, *i.e.* up to the proposal for the Conference, the Austrian Government were resolutely bent on peace, and were fairly dragged into war by a series of provocations unparalleled in their insolence, and by a series of treacherous acts and underground intrigues which have not their like in history; moreover, in the actual phase of the Schleswig-Holstein quarrel, which called forth the war, the Austrians had the right entirely on their side—they were (in flagrant opposition to their

policy in Italy) defending that which ought to be the living principle of modern international law, viz. that no political unit should be disposed of otherwise than with the consent of the individuals which compose it (the principle we trampled under foot in the London Protocol, reaping our reward). Well, notwithstanding all this, I am profoundly convinced that the complete victory of Austria in this war, and the recovery of her prestige in Italy and Germany, would be the greatest misfortune that could happen to Europe generally, and to Germany, Italy, and *Austria* in particular. I have given to the study of German and Austrian politics the best portion of my thoughts for the last ten years, and I have long since come to the conclusion that the only chance for Austria is to withdraw from Italy and *from Germany*. As regards Italy this is now generally recognised in England (Kinglake and a few fancy politicians excepted); as regards Germany, not a soul in England appears to have seized the truth, which is that the present political and material ruin of Austria is owing wholly to the attempt made by her during the last fifty years to carry on under altered circumstances the dream of the Holy Roman Empire, viz. political dominion from the Eider to Brindisi. Her *entire debt* can be traced to the attempt to maintain her position and that of her satellites in Italy, and to prevent the consolidation of a strong power in Northern Germany (take only as instances the immense loans contracted for the Italian wars in 1848-9 and 1859, and for the gigantic military force collected in 1850 to restore the old Frankfort Diet and prevent the formation of a strong North German Centifugal Confederacy). *Her total failure to arrive*, in spite of repeated attempts on the most contradictory principles, *at anything approaching to a political organisation for home use* can be as distinctly traced to her obstinate clinging to the idea of political solidarity with Germany. Thus, whilst every nerve ought to have been strained to consolidate the Empire, her whole energies have been frittered away in the contrary direction, a centrifugal instead of centripetal force being set in operation. The folly of this policy is abundantly manifest to any one who has at all considered what practical result would flow

from its entire success—for this result never could be other than that which it has hitherto been, viz. purely negative. Austria can prevent the consolidation of Germany, but she can never realise what some of the most influential wirepullers here dream, viz. the consolidation of a great Austro-German Empire. The days of Empires *à la Charlemagne* are over, and to suppose that the Hapsburg dynasty can attempt such a creation is so intolerably absurd that, had I not had the opportunity of convincing myself of the very real manner in which this idea has influenced the policy of this country, I would not even advert to it. Austria in a word is not *soluble* in Germany, and every attempt on her part at amalgamation must result in a friction of forces destructive of strength and power. The utmost she can realise is the maintenance of a *status quo* which is intolerable, and which hits no one harder than it does herself. If instead of looking upon it as her mission to maintain the Pope at Rome and her own influence in Italy, and to prevent the consolidation of Germany, she realised the great work she has to perform, viz. the Austrianising of Austria, the consolidation, that is, of a great Eastern Middle European State, the component parts of which, owing to the impossibility of development according to nationality, have the most real interest in a common centre such as that afforded by the Hapsburg dynasty and the traditions of the Austrian monarchy, she would not only settle down to the work evidently cut out for her, but she would enable others to do so likewise, and thus contribute her share to the establishment of that natural balance of European power which the treaties of Vienna so effectually prevented.

‘I have especially dwelt on the case of Austria because, in urging the absolute necessity of the consolidation of Germany *minus* Austria, I have been accused of recklessly throwing over this great Empire, and told that it won’t do to settle, however satisfactorily, one great part of Europe, if this is done at the cost of the utter unsettlement of another equally important portion of Europe. My answer is given above, viz. that the principal gainer in such a redistribution of forces will be Austria, and that quite irrespectively of what may happen in Germany, the cutting

asunder of the nexus which binds her to the latter will be a clear advantage to herself.

'As regards the case of Germany and the position of Prussia, that which people fail to see in England is that the real political force at work in Europe is *consolidation*, and that nationality is only the unconscious and poetical expression of this force. Englishmen understand the Italian question because they have a dim apprehension of this *nationality* poetry; they, however, totally miss the fact that the real political necessity consists in the *consolidation* on the framework of nationality, and that this necessity for consolidation is just as irrepressible in Germany as in Italy. They talk of German dreams and Italian statesmen, etc. Now this work of consolidation cannot take place otherwise than through and with Prussia, for the simple reason (Prussia's enormous superiority in every political element apart) that Prussia is what Austria is not, *i.e.* soluble in Germany. Break the artificial barriers between her and her neighbours and Prussia ceases to exist and in her stead Germany rises up; hence, however condemnable the springs which set in motion the actions of Prussian statesmen, any increase of power and any success of Prussia remains a clear gain to Germany; however pure and just the actions of Austrian statesmen, any success of Austria's in Germany is a dead loss to Germany, and a fresh incision in the arteries from which Austria is bleeding to death. The one thing for which, therefore, above all other things, I conceive Bismarck ought to be execrated, is his having by the impress of his own detestable individuality on the political canvas now unrolling before Europe so utterly disfigured the true outlines of the picture, that not only public opinion, but the judgment of wise and thoughtful men is almost sure to go wrong. I say this quite deliberately, knowing that if Bismarck succeeds the world will clap its hands and say he was the only man who knew how to bring about what the world, which always worships success, will say was a consummation it always desired. Whereas that which will be really proved is that Prussia was so strong and so really the heart and head and lungs of Germany, that she could, by her mere natural develop-

ment *with*, instead of *against*, the liberal and national forces of Germany, have effected what required to be done by peaceful means and without bloodshed. If, on the other hand, Austria succeeds and Prussia is crushed, the world will clap its hands and say Prussia was a parvenu snob that required putting down, and German unity an absurd Utopia.

‘My own impression is that the Italians (if, as is rumoured this morning, they have been fools enough to cross the Mincio and run their heads up against the walls of the Quadrilateral!), will get a most tremendous licking—but that Benedek in the North will either get the worst of it or fight a fearfully bloody and undecisive battle.’

To illustrate the hopeless condition into which Austria had fallen, and the confusion brought about during the war by the red-tape methods of the bureaucracy, Morier often cited the following instances which had come under his own personal observation, and for the truth of which he could vouch. Shells, which were the one thing in the universe on which what little hope Austria still retained was concentrated, were manufactured at a place called Wiener Neustadt, forty miles from Vienna. The fuses required for these shells were dependent for their manufacture on a certain minimum quantity of silk. This silk was exhausted, and the head of the manufactory telegraphed to Vienna to the Ministry of War for more silk. The department replied that the regulation required that silk, like all other materials for the army, should be acquired by tender only—that until the tenders could be tested and lowest tender decided upon some fortnight or three weeks must elapse—and that, therefore, until that date the making of fuses would have to be suspended! The Wiener Neustadt manufacturer in despair rushed up to Vienna, tearing his hair, and went to a general, high in office, to prove to him that without the silk the army, in the matter of shells, would have to starve. The general saw the point, but said the altering the decision of the department would be either impossible, or the work of many

days, but, seeing the necessity of the case, out of his own pocket gave the manufacturer thirty florins to go and buy silk at a haberdasher's.

The second story was equally characteristic. A great engineer and ironmaster in Styria, a friend of his, who had been working the Free Trade campaign with energy, knowing that there was not a single gun in Austria of sufficient calibre to confront iron-plated vessels, and that Pola and all the other Austrian ports would be at the mercy of the Italian fleet, went straight to the Emperor, represented the case to him, and convinced him that he could, within a month, produce the guns required. The Emperor who, as Morier said, was the most conscientious employé in the Empire, took the matter up warmly and himself ordered that it should not be treated in the ordinary manner (*i.e.* remain eighteen months in the bureaux), but reported upon directly to himself by the chief of the Artillery Commission. This was done. The said chief at once pronounced the plan as the very best that could be devised, and ordered that his report should be sent at once to the Emperor; but on its way it was seized by the bureaux, and when the ironmaster had his second audience of the Emperor it was not to be got. It remained lost for three weeks. At last it was recovered, and at the end of two months the necessary order was given, and Morier's friend went to the finance department triumphantly to get the necessary order for the Imperial manufactory to be placed at his disposition.

'He has this minute returned,' wrote Morier at the time, 'tearing his hair and cursing as I have never heard a patriot curse. The finance department say the order is not sufficiently explicit, and they do not know whether or not it is intended that money should be paid on account or not. The usual correspondence must take place, but they cannot hope for an answer under three weeks.'

*Morier to Lady Salisbury*

VIENNA, July 7th, 1866.

'... At the time I last wrote I maintained my confidence (in the teeth of every military authority here, Austrian,

French, Russian and English) that the Prussians would get the best of it as against the Austrians, but I did not calculate on the gigantic successes of the last ten days, or on the entire discomfiture and rout of the finest army Austria ever collected, infinitely better, according to the statement of the best authorities, than the army beaten at Magenta and Solferino. All the interest now centres in the use Bismarck will make of a victory so complete. I heartily wish so splendid an instrument for the amelioration of the destinies of mankind were in other and better hands, though I do not believe, so indissolubly linked is the development of Prussia with the cause of human progress, that even he can do much lasting mischief. . . .

‘Do not for one moment forget that the army which has obtained these incredible successes is not (except in the matter of its commissioned and non-commissioned officers) a *professional* army, but an army of *citizens*, literally and practically that which the edict of 1813, which created it, officially termed it, “the Prussian People in Arms.” The rank and file now triumphantly marching upon Vienna are gentlemen, merchants, shopkeepers, manufacturers, farmers and peasant proprietors; they have left their occupations in the most thriving country in Europe, occupations in which they were realising the largest profits ever known, to accomplish the great work for which, for two generations, they have cheerfully borne the most tremendous burden ever placed on the shoulders of a nation, viz. *universal* military service. They went to the war unwillingly, being intelligent enough thoroughly to appreciate the artificially unfavourable circumstances under which Bismarck’s policy had forced them to play out their trump card, but the war once begun they had gone into it heart and soul, with the determination to do the work and do it thoroughly and quickly, that they may disband and get back to their civil avocations, to their farms, their counting-houses, and their cotton mills; but the work must be done so thoroughly as to remove all fear of another such operation being required; therefore, till it be thus thoroughly done, they will remain in arms and fight night and day for the objects the Prussian and North German people desire as keenly as

Manchester—Permanent Peace, based, as alone it can be based, upon an organic reconstruction of Europe. That this is not to be attained by the acquisition of a kingdom or two by Prussia (as the Prussian Junkers and, until lately, Bismarck vainly hoped), they are fully convinced, and hence the reform of the German Confederation remains the great question to be solved, and, in spite of the late victories, it is on the solution of this question that statesmen must expend their best thoughts.

‘This brings me to the question contained in the notes and queries enclosed in your letter.

‘Question 1. Does this idea of German Unity involve the taking from Austria of her German Provinces?

‘Most certainly *not*. I believe that a strong Austrian Empire is quite as necessary to the welfare of Europe as a strong Germany, and without its German Provinces that Empire loses its *raison d’être*. The German race, even in its least developed type, is as superior to the semi-barbarous Magyars and the debased Slav and Roumanian races, as the Englishman to the New Zealander. The fact which is never sufficiently considered in regard to the German element in Austria is, that the German population is not restricted to the pure German Provinces (*viz.* Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Salzburg, etc., which are, ethnologically speaking, the only German Provinces), but is diffused and permeates throughout the entire Empire, and that it is the *only race thus diffused*; there is no town and scarcely a borough throughout the Empire (the Italian Provinces alone excepted), in which you will not find that the industrial class is either German or of German origin. In the larger towns, such as Pesth, Prague, etc., the entire bourgeoisie is German. Hence for Austria to attempt to fulfil her mission (the expression, I fear, has too much of the conventicle about it, but I have not time to think of a less objectionable one) without her German Provinces as the fulcrum on which to rest her lever, would be to attempt an impossible task. That the German element understood that the consolidation of the Austrian Empire by means of parliamentary centralisation was their appointed work, and that they were ready to back up the



dynasty to the very utmost of their strength in carrying out this work was plainly evidenced by the attitude taken up by the Reichsrath as long as it was allowed to exist. The knocking of this institution on the head was one of those astounding blunders which form the milestones along the course of Austrian history.

‘ The mistake into which the German Liberals in Austria fell was the supposing they could do *both* things, viz. consolidate the Austrian Empire by means of a central Parliament in which the German element by its greater power and intelligence should preponderate, *and* at the same time form part of a consolidated Germany. The foolish dream they dreamt was that they could sit and legislate for Austria in the central Parliament at Vienna, and then, when the session was up, go to Frankfort and sit in a German Parliament and legislate for Germany. The less foolish said in their hearts “ We will consolidate Austria, but keep Germany as it is ; we will have parliamentary influence in Austria and diplomatic influence in Germany ; we shall be strong and they shall be weak ”—and this latter view met with every encouragement for the wirepullers. The foreign, and more especially the German policy of Austria has for the last ten years been really in the hands, not of the Foreign Minister *pro tem.* who has but, as it were, had the tactical management of it, but in those of a small knot of individuals firmly rooted in the Vienna Foreign Office, Meysenbug, Biegeleben, and Max Gagern—all three of them *non-Austrian* Germans—*converts* to the Catholic religion and political renegades from the North—all of them violent ultramontanes, and hating Prussia with the bitter hatred of men who know her power, and knew what would be the result to ultramontanism in Germany of her winning the great race for the supremacy of Germany. (This life-and-death struggle between ultramontanism and enlightenment in Germany, which forms one of the most important sides to every political question, has, of course, been wholly ignored by our diplomacy and our public press.) Hence the weakening and maiming of Prussian influence on religious no less than political grounds, and the maintenance of Venetia as of a citadel from whence the lost influence in

Italy for religious as well as dynastic purposes could, on the death of Napoleon III., be recovered, afford the key to the policy of Austria as placed in my hands by a very thorough knowledge of the trio in question (another great misfortune resulting from the fact of these wirepullers not being Austrian is their entire ignorance of Austria and their total incapacity to realise Austria's *Austrian* mission).

'The argument with which I am always met when I assert Austria's *Austrian* mission as one to be mainly fulfilled by the German element in Austria, and at the same time urge that in order to fulfil it she must leave Germany alone and not interfere with Germany's German mission, is that if Austria is cut off from political communion with Germany, the taproot through which she has to draw the necessary German nourishment for her Austrian mission will be severed, and the eight millions of Germans in Austria die of atrophy. Plausible as this argument sounds, it will not bear being closely looked at. The political connection such as it at present exists is no taproot conveying nourishment, but only a miserable bit of red tape, connecting the Austrian with all the small German cabinets for purposes of intrigue. The sort of connection which is required is to be obtained in a far different manner, by breaking down the barriers which prevent a free exchange and free co-operation between Austria and Germany. Five years of Free Trade and its necessary consequences, the flow of German capital and German immigration into Austria, would do more towards the solidarity between these two bodies which the Austrian Germans desire than one hundred years of Austrian Presidency at the Frankfort Diet. But these very German Austrians, who cry so loudly for political union with Germany, are the Protectionists who have steadily opposed all breaking down of the barriers which close up Austrian trade. They made, it is true, one attempt to enter the Zollverein, but accompanied by the simultaneous attempt to force back the Zollverein to a protective system it had abandoned.

'I have thus incoherently put down some of my reasons for answering Question 1 in the negative. They may be summed up in the following article of faith :

‘ I believe strongly, and my belief is founded on a very careful study of the Austrian monarchy on both sides of the Leitha, that the agglomeration of States under the House of Hapsburg is not a mere matter of chance, but that there is a real necessity for union into one great political body of the so-called Hereditary Dominions and of the Hungarian Kingdom and its annexes, with the southern portion of this monarchy resting on the Adriatic ; and I believe that the only chance of an organic union between these two bodies depends on the development of the German element, which in unequal degrees is common to both, and whose fountain-head lies in the German Provinces. Unless the Austrian Empire can remain intact (the utterly insoluble Italian element alone being removed), I am totally unable to see what is to become of the mosaic work of nationalities which fills up the space enclosed by the frontiers of the Empire, and I see before me nothing but hopeless chaos and confusion, and nothing to help us out of it. Twenty years of peace, disarmament, free trade, and good government would, I am convinced, lift up Austria to a higher pinnacle than she ever occupied.

‘ Question 2. If yes, what chance is there of this (viz. excision of the German Provinces out of Austria) being realised ?

‘ If I had to answer this question a fortnight ago, I should have said there is no chance, and no fear of this consummation. There is, or at least was, no kind of wish or desire in the north of Germany to detach one square yard from the Austrian Empire, and I have seen but few signs of a wish on the part of the Austrian Germans to detach themselves. But within the last week I have heard the statement, “ Would to God Prussia would only annex us,” repeated by men of such weight and with a bitter earnestness so real, that I can conceive with fresh disasters and catastrophes a strong movement arising for self-annexation to the colossus of the north. It should be noted, however, that this strange ejaculation proceeded from Bohemian and Moravian Germans, *i.e.* from Germans whose nationality has been very much jeopardised by the late federalistic policy of

Count Belcredi, and who fear, and not without reason, that they may be made hewers of wood and drawers of water to the revived Czech nationality. There may be a little of this feeling in the two Archduchies of Austria, but I fancy none of it in the pure-to-the-backbone German Provinces higher up—Tyrol, Salzburg, etc. Here, the more the Austrian armies are defeated, the fiercer will the hatred to the Protestant north glow. In these provinces alone can there be said to be a spirit of *Austrian* patriotism. Its saint and hero was Andreas Hofer, whose grandson has now enrolled a body of volunteers. The danger on this side which threatens is of another kind, and consists in the covetousness of Bavaria. The prevalent idea, of course, is that Bavaria is heart and soul with Austria, and seeks her safety under the pinions of the double-headed eagle. But to those who know *le dessous des cartes*, it is no secret that Bavaria has for a long time speculated on Austria's decrepitude, and counted on her finger-ends what are the articles in the sick man's inheritance which she would like to have for her own use. Read by this light, her conduct during the last two months will be seen in its true colours, and a very vile conduct it has been. I do heartily wish she could be made to pay the larger part of Austria's war expenses.

'To sum up my answer to Question 2, I should say that, having been painfully conscious since my last sojourn in Austria of the utter rottenness of the Empire both in a political and material point of view, the phenomena which I have had occasion to note during the last fortnight give rise to the fear that a general dissolution and falling to pieces is not amongst the improbabilities of the situation, and that in that case there would very probably be on the part of the German population in Bohemia and Moravia a desire to annex themselves to Prussia, partly as a harbour of refuge from the daily-increasing bitterness of the national strife going on between Slavs and Germans in those two provinces, partly to exchange the intolerable state to which they are reduced by over-taxation and the worst of administrations for the paradise of well-ordered finances and the best economical administration in the world. On the other

hand, that should this collapse take place, there is, on the upper Danube, a Power which has set its heart on the acquisition of the purely German Provinces.

‘Question 3. If no, the result is German Duality, not German Unity.

‘Bavaria, Baden, etc., will never join with Prussia. They cannot stand alone. Must they not be dependent on Austria? The difficulty about Bavaria and the Southern States has always been the stumbling-block in the way of every project of reform that had for its object a change from the international character of the present Confederation to a centralised Confederacy, which, as regards foreign states, should represent a political unit, the plan now proposed by Bismarck and forced upon him by the national party and by the difficulties of his situation, and to which I doubt his being in his heart converted.

‘Before tackling this difficulty I can narrow its limits. Baden would undoubtedly join a North German Confederacy under Prussia at once. The Grand Duke and his late Minister, Roggenbach, have been the soul of the national movement for the last six years, and, though they have had a hard fight with the ultramontane party in the Grand Duchy itself, the victory is sufficiently secured to render all idea of Baden coalescing with the South instead of the North, if once the North had caked into shape, impossible. I think that the strong Protestant and radical element in Würtemberg, the moment the full force of attraction which such a body as a centralised North Germany would exercise came to be felt, would necessarily draw in the same direction. There therefore only remains Bavaria, and Bavaria is a very real difficulty; for there it is not the Government or the dynasty only but the population itself which is separatist. The Bavarians are a type apart, and a strongly marked one, with a kind of history of their own, uncommonly well-to-do, with an undoubted kind of beery healthiness about them, and a misty kind of notion of a Bavarian future, having worked out for themselves a sort of political freedom, and put themselves in a satisfactory position towards their rulers. Then Bavaria is of a most unfortunate size; it is by itself too small to live, and, on the other hand, it is too

big to die. The country and the people are provoking and unsatisfactory: they are bigoted Catholics. It is impossible in a rough sketch like this, to give all the nice shades necessary to show why a person intimately acquainted with Germany and Austria would at once state that a coalescing between Bavaria and Austria is an impossibility. I can best describe my meaning by saying that Bavaria feels itself in regard to Austria as the granulating flesh does to the dead particles sloughing off. But, after all, this will perhaps not make the matter clear, and it is best to grapple with the difficulty by the front; but to do so I must be elementary and pedantic. Granted that the present, or rather late, international confederation of states, known as the German Confederation, had ceased to exist, it must be replaced either by one or more monarchies, or by one or more confederacies. The case of the monarchies is plain enough, so and so many pages are torn out of the Almanach de Gotha, and so and so many square miles are incorporated into some previously existing collection of square miles.

'The case of the confederacy is different. If the object were to obtain an international confederation, that is a confederation the several members of which enjoyed their full rights both of *external* and *internal* sovereignty, limited only by certain international arrangements, then the old Diet with a few reforms and the elimination of much dirty matter that has adhered to its machinery during its discreditable and unprofitable fifty years' existence would do as well as anything else; but by the defeat of Austria this form of confederation (the *Staatenbund* in Germany), which was the form she had spent some 60,000 men within the last fortnight to maintain, is once for all put out of the question, and if a confederacy, and not a monarchy, is to be started into existence, some modifications of the other and opposite form of confederacy (in Germany, the *Bundesstaat*) will have to be adopted. This form may be described in a few words as a centralised confederacy, the members of which, while retaining their *internal* sovereignty, surrender their *external* sovereignty to some central organ. It presupposes a central executive and a double representation

one representative body representing the confederated community in its entirety (a Lower House), the other representing the several states (an Upper House).

'The most perfect type of the *Bundesstaat* is, of course, the United States, in which all these features are at once plainly discernible. Another specimen, and one well worth considering and looking at closely in connection with the present question, is Switzerland, which, in our own time, has gone through, and with perfect success, the process now taking place in Germany, viz., change from the *Staatenbund* or 'International Confederation' to the *Bundesstaat* or centralised confederacy. Now, I think it will appear abundantly clear to you that (except under circumstances at present utterly unforeseen) Bavaria could neither be torn out of the Almanach de Gotha and annexed to the Crown of Austria, nor be united with Austria by the bands of a centralised confederacy. Such a confederacy could not exist between two states only, and Bavaria could not sit in an Austrian Parliament otherwise than as a province of Austria.

'The way in which the national party (or rather that portion of it represented by the Grand Duke of Baden and Roggenbach, with which, *N.B.*, the Crown Prince of Prussia heartily sympathised) got out of the difficulty was the following: Had their efforts to bring about the change peaceably succeeded, the idea was that the confederacy should, in the first instance, have been formed by voluntary association between the confederacy thus formed *and Austria*, and any other states that would not join it; the old international relations of the Confederation of 1815 would have continued to exist—these international relations, be it remembered, being of a defensive nature only. My friends calculated that in the first instance Northern Germany and Baden would have coalesced in the manner proposed. The body thus formed would then have stood *vis-à-vis* of the German dominions of Austria, of Bavaria, and maybe of Würtemberg, in the relation of mutual insurance, which formed the essence of the old Confederation. It was calculated, however, that the attractive force which the northern confederacy would exercise would sooner or

later draw Bavaria into it, and this view had the precedent afforded by the *Zollverein* to corroborate it. My answer, therefore, to Question 3 is: That unity, *i.e.* the coalition of the whole of Germany minus Austria (if attained through the medium of a centralised confederacy) is not impossible, and is the most desirable issue. Secondly, that if this unity be not attained the probable result will be not dualism but a trias, consisting of a Northern Union, a Southern Union, and Austria (a modification of Beust's exquisitely absurd trias, consisting of No. 1, Austria; No. 2, Prussia; No. 3, everything, no matter how geographically or ethnologically situated, that was neither the one nor the other!), between which some kind of defensive nexus shall be established. The partisans of this idea *before* the war were Bismarck, Bavaria, and the Emperor Napoleon; its opponents were Austria and the national party in Germany!!

. . . . .  
'I have written against time, and I see some involved sentences and parentheses to make one's hair stand on end. . . . I am painfully aware of the unorthodoxy of my views, and there is something appalling when I think of it in sending this letter to Arlington Street. I can never forget after allowing myself the last night I was at Hatfield, *en tête-à-tête* with Lord Salisbury, to run on and describe my notions of a German future, with a body created worthy of the soul of which Goethe, Schiller, and Kant were but the scintillations, his Lordship interrupting me and saying, "But, Mr. Morier, this is revolution!"'



## CHAPTER XX

## DARMSTADT

MORIER took up his new post at Frankfort the day before the Diet left that Imperial city never to return.

Though there for a short time only, it proved long enough for him to be able to join in taking steps to stop the Prussians levying blackmail on the Jews of that city—Frankfort having been treated with an untold degree of harshness,<sup>1</sup> with a view of terrifying the other free cities of Germany into acquiescence in the conditions of the new Constitution.<sup>2</sup> These measures were unimportant enough in themselves, but sufficiently delicate to earn for him the public, as well as private, approval of Lord Stanley, who had become Foreign Secretary on the fall of the Russell Cabinet in July.

This latter appointment had raised Morier's hopes as to the future conduct of foreign affairs.

'If a Tory Ministry comes in,' he had written shortly before, 'and Lord Stanley does not go to the Foreign Office, I look forward with the utmost dread to the kind of figure which we are likely to cut at the Congress which must follow this war, especially if Austria is victorious. What with Disraeli's Judæo-Semitic solution of cosmic problems, Lord Malmesbury's tasteless Europe-as-it-was-fifty-years-ago platitudes, and Bob Lowe's *tout-est-pour-le-mieux-dans-le-meilleur-des-mondes* cynicism, I foresee a vista of un-wisdom, terrible to contemplate. I do not credit the Whigs with much wisdom in foreign politics, but the tremendous scalding they got in 1864 has at least taught them to keep as much as possible in the background, and to feel that the least said, the soonest mended.'

<sup>1</sup> See J. Ward's *Reminiscences of a Diplomatist*, 1840-1870, p. 241.

<sup>2</sup> North German Confederation

He had known Lord Stanley for several years, and had always entertained a very high opinion of his abilities :—

‘ Though knowing nothing of Lord Stanley’s views on foreign politics, I have carefully read all he has said on other subjects, and I am quite convinced that he is the only one of our statesmen (not excepting Gladstone, who, though an undoubted thinker, is essentially *doctrinaire*), who combines the power of thought with the power of action, and who knows, and that thoroughly, the time in which we live.’

And again :—

‘ The one desideratum at present is a Foreign Minister who can treat foreign politics *objectively*. Lord Stanley is the only statesman we have got, or indeed whom we have ever had, who can treat any political matter objectively, *a fortiori*, foreign politics ; therefore he, and he only, can do for England what England wants.’

They, however, by no means agreed on all subjects, and Morier strongly dissented from Lord Stanley’s dictum<sup>1</sup> that ‘ Whoever may administer affairs, it is *opinion* that governs. Opinion is the stream, and politicians, with all respect to them, are the straws that float upon it.’

Morier’s view was that ‘ opinion must become *incarnate* before it can be effectual for good. *The word must become flesh*. Lord Stanley’s error is the separating the politician, that is the executor of opinion, from the thinker, that is the creator of opinion. Now he, individually, is a thinker, or opinion creator, quite as much as a politician, and no *politician* at the present day is worth sixpence who is not a thinker, and for him to go on looking at himself as a straw on the surface of the waters, instead of an apostle with a creed and a following, is a radical mistake.’

Notwithstanding these occasional divergences of opinion, Morier, from the first, was on the most friendly and intimate terms with his new chief, and soon resumed the habit of private and confidential correspondence with which, in

<sup>1</sup> Lord Stanley’s speech at Kin’s Lynn, 10th October 1864.

Lord Russell's time, he had been wont to supplement his official information. The following letter, giving a summary of the situation after the war, was dated from Darmstadt, where he had been transferred with the rank of acting *chargé d'affaires*, from Frankfort, when that post had been abolished.

In reply to Lord Stanley's expressing 'his belief that Bismarck would have annexed the Southern States also, but for the conviction that by attempting to do so he would bring France and Russia on his hands,' Morier wrote on 10th August 1866 :—

'I am not quite certain whether your theory that Bismarck would have *now* annexed the South as well as the North, if France and Russia would have let him, is correct ; and as this is a point which is just now of most interest in connection with the German question, I will venture to give you the reasons for my doubts. I must preface, however, that I am without present information regarding Bismarck's intentions, having for several months past been cut off from all my Berlin sources of information, and that I can only tell you of what has gone before. But as what I shall state is based upon a knowledge of a portion from the secret history of Germany, which fortunate accidents have placed in my possession, and which is not accessible to the general public, it may possibly not be uninteresting to you.

'To the *Times* and the other representatives of British parochialism, who for the first time awoke six weeks ago to the fact that there was a German question, Bismarck appears a creative genius, who alone knows what Germany wants, and who alone is able to give her what she wants. Having systematically ignored all that has been going on for the last eighteen years, these prophets prefer believing in the miraculous, and attributing phenomena which are but, as it were, the natural bursting of slowly ripened pods, to the sudden inspiration of a semi-dæmonic hero. This is the way in which, in Homeric times, men viewed historical events, and in which, in post-Homeric times, housemaids view them.

' The truth is, that probably in regard to no living man is your dictum, that statesmen are but the straws in the current of opinion, so applicable as it is to this man Bismarck, and the point of interest is to ascertain what is the particular current upon which he is at the present moment floating.

' The three currents which for the last eighteen years (that is since '48) have, unnoted by diplomatists, been striving for the mastery in Germany, are the "great German" current, the "small German" current, and the "great Prussian" current; Great Germandom, small Germandom, and Great Prussiandom, to use Teutonic barbarisms, which may serve as a sort of *memoria technica*. The object common to each of these parties, or more properly speaking, to each of these doctrines, was political consolidation. *Omnium consensu*, it was admitted that the Confederation of the year 1815 had broken down, and had found itself unable to do the things it ought to have done, and only capable of doing the things it ought not to have done, and that there was no health in it. As a defensive association, which was its primary object, it had proved worthless, whilst in preventing internal reforms in the smaller states, it had shown a lamentable activity.

' Great Germandom sought to effect the desired consolidation within the limits of the Confederation of 1815, *i.e.* it endeavoured to find a form which, whilst it strengthened the Federal executive and created a Federal legislature, should embrace Austria for her German provinces, as well as Prussia, within the political framework to be constructed.

' Great Germandom lies so completely prostrate, that it would be a waste of time to point out its defects in detail. But the vice of its base may as well be noted. Consolidation necessarily implies centralisation. Centralisation implies a centre, *i.e.* one point to the exclusion of every other point, equidistant from every portion of the circumference of the circle of which it is the centre.

' A consolidated Great Germany meant a centralised Germany, with Austria and Prussia equipotent in it, that is a circle with two centres, which is the geometrical *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine.

' It was the attempt to make a living bird of the double-headed eagle of Austrian heraldry, which is the ornithological *reductio ad absurdum*. Now, hopelessly vicious as I have always contended that the doctrine must appear to any mind trained to political logic, it is not unimportant to note that it had an extraordinary hold on many large-minded and unprejudiced men, who earnestly sought to get at the true solution of the problem.

' Small Germandom was the doctrine of the national, advanced, and Liberal party all over the North and West of Germany. It had also strong roots in the South, Austria of course excepted. It was the doctrine of all political thinkers, for it possessed perfect clearness, both as to the means, and to the end. Great Germandom saw the end, but the recollection of the Holy Roman Empire made a hopeless confusion as to the means. The end was a centralised confederacy with the external rights of sovereignty merged into one head, the internal rights alone remaining intact. To such a confederacy there could be but one head. That head could be none other but Prussia, for Prussia was the only *bona fide German* great power. Hence political exclusion of Austria from the new confederacy, but the maximum of international intimacy with the Austria, thus excluded, were the two cardinal points of the doctrine.

' Great Prussiandom was the doctrine of the Hohenzollern dynasty, of the Prussian Junkers, of the Prussian army, that is of the corporation of officers, which is a distinct caste apart, and of the statesmen in Prussia, whose Messiah is Frederick the Great. It aimed at the gradual absorption by conquest, or other means, legitimate or illegitimate, of as much of Germany as could be thoroughly digested and germanised and *no more* !!! Silesia, nefariously conquered from Austria, but in less than two centuries almost more Prussian than Brandenburg, being always pointed out as the proof of the correctness of the method, and it is undoubtedly a remarkable fact that Silesia was the only province that, from the commencement, went in heartily for the present war, and that never had a misgiving as to the result.

' Now the point I want to arrive at is this. I have the

firmest possible conviction that at any time since 1860, *i.e.* since the collapse of the power of Austria in Italy, the union of Germany, according to the doctrine of small Germanism, was within easy grasp of Prussia, that is of King William's Government, but that that Government consciously and wittingly refused to grasp it, because with all the glories of an Imperial crown looming in the distance, "Great Prussian" thoughts directed the steps of the men who really managed the affairs of that state. I will now adduce my proofs.

'It is generally supposed that the idea of the *Bundesstaat mit Preussischer Spitze* or centralised confederacy under the hegemony of Prussia, was the monopoly of the National Verein and the democratic clubs. Whereas (and now comes my bit of secret history) it was no less the idea of a knot of the most enlightened Governments, indeed of the only enlightened Government in non-Austrian and non-Prussian Germany, who wished to force the idea into respectable society by bringing it before the Frankfort Diet, *all which efforts failed, owing to the want of Prussian support.* The plan for a centralised confederacy with Prussia at its head and a national Parliament, including all Germany, except Austria, *exactly identical with that which*, to the astonishment of everybody, Bismarck went to the country with, immediately before he declared war to Austria, was drawn up in the month of September 1860, by the Grand Duke of Baden, and Roggenbach, who shortly afterwards became his Minister, or rather by Roggenbach and the Grand Duke. It was in the winter of 1860-1861 communicated to the Grand Duke of Weimar, the Duke of Coburg, and the Duke of Brunswick, all of whom warmly adhered to it. The object was jointly to bring this scheme forward *at the Diet*, and thus make the national plan the subject of official and diplomatic discussion. The political agitation, it was calculated, would by this means have been on the one hand intensified, whilst on the other a definite and legitimate object would have been afforded to the agitation. The idea was to begin the work by a voluntary association of this kind, for as many states as chose to join *it within the Confederation.* Now there is not the slightest

doubt, that had this motion been brought forward at the Diet by the above-named Governments supported by Prussia, the Governments of Hanover, Saxony, the Hesses, and Oldenburg, and all the small fry, north of the Main, however much hating it, would have been forced by public opinion of their populations to go in for the scheme, and we should have been in 1861, where we are now, minus a bloody war, minus the political depravity by which this war has been brought about, and that which it must necessarily engender, and minus French intervention, for it would then have been a purely internal German question. To realise this situation, you must call to mind that Austria was as completely prostrate then as she is now, and that all the Governments which had till then leant upon her were in a state of panic, it having required the accumulations of six years of debt-making to bring her up again to the scratch, after her Italian defeats. It was calculated, and as the present experience is amply proving, rightly calculated, that were a north-western centrifised confederation of this kind once formed, Bavaria and Würtemberg would soon sue to join it as they could not have remained out long in the cold. The scheme broke down from the resistance of Prussia, not the plain-spoken open resistance or refusal, for, for a while the Berlin Cabinet coquetted with the idea, but from the refusal to actively co-operate or give that support to the plan which could alone secure success. The negotiation was repeatedly taken up and broken off with the Berlin Cabinet, till at last the reforming Governments gave up the plan in despair. Free and voluntary co-operation with the moral force applied by the national desire for unity and political emancipation, such was the programme of the four Governments acting in unison with the national and Liberal party in Prussia. Acquisition of territory for Prussia by means of blood and iron was *ipsissimis verbis* M. de Bismarck's reply.

'Now, Roggenbach being one of my oldest and most intimate friends, and the Grand Duke of Baden and the Duke of Coburg having invariably shown me much kindness and treated me to their perfect confidence in all these matters, I was enabled to follow this through all the details, conver-

sations, private correspondence with the king and his ministers, etc. ; and as I have before stated to you, the result was the inveteracy with which Great Prussian ideas were excluded (as a very characteristic instance, I will only mention the black and white flag).

‘ Well, when the war was imminent, Bismarck, whose whole scheme up till then had been solely directed towards the acquisition of territory, beginning with the Elbe Duchies, was forced to accept the programme of small Germandom, and sent for Roggenbach and Bennigsen, the two leaders of the national party, and launched the programme with the national Parliament. He has had unexpected successes, and has made peace on the programme of great Prussianism, and there is no longer a question of a German, but only of a North German Parliament, and this Parliament is not, as he before said, to settle what shall become of the several parts, even of Northern Germany, but merely to register conquests.’

Bismarck’s triumph was as complete as was the defeat of German Liberalism.

‘ What is a man to do ? ’ wrote Stockmar on 21st December 1866, ‘ this is a *ferrea ætas*, and Bismarck in the ascendant. He will establish his *Nord-Deutsches Bund* as a great machine for pumping men and money out of the rest of Germany, and paving the way towards the *Einheits Staat*. The procedure is disgusting to look at, because it is all based upon mankind being a *servum pecus*. But, if he achieves his end, he will have prepared a better state of things, as Richelieu did for France, and we may then hope for a reaction of those feelings and elements in human nature, which are not exclusively contemptible. I am like the peasant in the fable, who stands on the bank of the river and waits for it to flow past.’

The era of ‘ Blood and Iron ’ now opening up, the fever of armaments which appeared to have seized hold of all nations, the crushing burthens necessarily entailed thereby, filled Morier with gloomy forebodings as to the effect such a state of affairs was likely to have on the



future of European civilisation, forebodings which were shared by many thinking men.

At Karlsbad, where he had gone in the autumn to seek relief from constant gout attacks, he met Count Benedetti, French Ambassador at Berlin, whom he found preoccupied by similar apprehensions. Both diplomatists, with the hope of in some degree stemming the prevailing current, had apparently simultaneously conceived the same idea, viz., that the coming Paris Exhibition of 1867 could not be more advantageously turned to account than by calling a European Congress, with the object of consecrating the principle of international co-operation, more especially with a view to the revision of tariffs and other measures likely to give a strong impulse to this principle; the Emperor Napoleon, on account of his well-known humanitarian tendencies and interest in social reform, appearing to them fitted as none other to take the initiative in calling such a Congress.

On leaving Karlsbad, Benedetti asked Morier to embody his views in a memorandum, which the latter on his return to Darmstadt accordingly did, begging him, however, to consider his opinions as purely personal. 'Ce n'est pas comme agent diplomatique que j'ai profité de votre permission de vous écrire, mais comme Européen. Je n'ai pas la moindre idée quelles sont les opinions de mon gouvernement sur ces questions, et celles que j'ai essayé d'exprimer appartiennent absolument à ma très humble individualité comme disciple de Cobden et croyant zélé de l'église internationale.' <sup>1</sup>

*Memorandum drawn up by Morier for Benedetti*

'Recent political events in Europe and the altered condition of both Germany and Italy which have been the result, serve to render possible that which has hitherto been unattainable, viz., a durable peace between the Great Powers, and a common effort in the cause of progress and civilisation. There is, however, too much distrust in the immediate future, and the rivalries, traditions, and prejudices of the past have still too strong a hold on the govern-

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Benedetti, 12th Dec. 1866.

ments and populations of Europe for the accomplishment, at the present moment, of the one great aim and end of such a peace, viz., a general reduction of armaments.

' So long as an aggregate force of 4,000,000 armed men is maintained in the countries of Europe, diverted as they must be, in the prime of their life, from all productive industry, and constituting as they do such an intolerable weight on the vital forces of society, no real progress can be made in raising the mass of the people from a state of material degradation incompatible with moral improvement and political intelligence, and fruitful in disorders and dangers.

' It is thus that, involved in a vicious circle in which cause and effect are eternally reacting on each other, the governments of Europe are keeping alive and developing the seeds of the very evils which they desire by their display of force to repress—war abroad and anarchy at home.

' But if the time has not yet arrived for dealing directly with this primary and paramount question, it is only the more necessary to economise in other directions the forces of society, and to stimulate and strengthen the operation of all the agencies which tend to remove the causes which obstruct this great consummation.

' Among these agencies, there is none more powerful or attended by less political danger than "Free Trade."

' When all the barriers which now oppose the natural intercourse of nations, and which are in themselves a source of incalculable loss and waste, have been removed, when co-operation shall have been substituted for competition, and international dependence for national independence; when each nation sees in the prosperity of others the strongest security for its own, and when, by the diffusion of equal justice and material well-being in the internal economy of the nations, the present dangers to order and authority have been obviated, it may be hoped that the vast armaments which now rob peace of its most valued fruits, may be reduced, and the forces which they contain, instead of being devoted to waste and destruction, be directed into channels of profitable labour and useful industry.

'The right of "free labour" being now, in principle, secured generally throughout Europe, and even in America, the next great right to be asserted is the right to free exchange of the products of labour. Free exchange is, moreover, the great social work of the present generation. It is a significant and instructive fact, that among the great countries of Europe, that which, under the direction of an aristocratic dynasty possessed of the soil and of the power of law-making, had carried to the highest point the spirit and practice of monopoly (evidenced in her protective tariff, her navigation laws, and her colonial system) should have been that in which by a natural reaction the principles of free exchange should have been first practically applied; and it is a remarkable proof of the harmony which exists in the interests of nations, that a reform, dictated and enforced by an exclusive regard to the claims of internal policy, should have at the same time laid the foundations of a new system of foreign relations, of which peace and international justice are the inevitable fulfilment.

'Although these consequences were always present to the minds of the great apostles of the commercial reforms which found expression in the Anti-Corn Law League, they entered so little into the calculations of the English Government which gave them effect, that no effort was attempted to extend their operations beyond the limits of the British Empire, and it was only the natural consequence of the manner in which these reforms were introduced, that they should have found no echo in other countries, and produced little impression on their policy.

'It was reserved for France to give to this reform a European character.

'By the treaty with England of 1860, Free Trade became one of the great principles represented by the Empire, and received an impulse which England alone was powerless to give it, and by the subsequent treaties with other Powers, this movement has extended to almost every country in Europe.

'The time has, however, now arrived, when it may be asked whether further and bolder steps may not be taken in the same direction. The vast and powerful interests in France

opposed to commercial freedom rendered it indispensable in 1860 to touch with an indulgent hand the edifice of protection; and what France was not prepared herself to concede, she could hardly impose on other countries less advanced in intelligence, and less powerful in industrial development.

‘The experience of the last six years has more than justified the enlightened provisions of the Imperial Government, and given to their policy the sanction of undeniable success.

‘The rapid and solid progress of industry and trade in France attested by the large increase in the consumption of raw produce, and in the exportation of manufactured goods, have placed beyond a doubt the ability of the empire to support free competition with all the world, and proved that freedom, and not monopoly, is the only sound foundation of commercial prosperity.

‘In 1867, France has summoned the nations of the world to assemble in Paris to compare the products of their several industries in a universal exhibition, and to record their progress in the arts of peace.

‘It would be a happy and most appropriate event were she, at the same time, to invite them to a congress to confer upon the means of removing the artificial and mischievous obstructions to the free exchange of these products, interposed by their respective laws, and to frame a general European compact of co-operation in this great cause.

‘Such a scheme can no longer be regarded as visionary. At a time when the physical barriers of time and space are every year yielding to the genius of science and the energy of enterprise, when the constant and increasing intercourse of nations is creating in every direction community of feelings and *solidarité* of interests, the artificial obstacles of protective tariffs cannot long withstand the irresistible force of modern progress. To facilitate exchanges by improved communications on the one hand, and to impede them on the other by protective duties, is a contradiction at which the enlightened sense of Europe is beginning to revolt. It only requires the genius of a great nation, and

the prestige and influence of a government such as that which now exists in France, to give a practical expression to this great European want, and to consolidate and complete the work which she has so brilliantly commenced.

‘It may remain to suggest in a practical form the nature of the programme which might be submitted to such a congress.

‘*Firstly* : France might propose to reduce all her protective duties to a maximum of ten per cent., and, at the expiration of ten years, to abolish them absolutely on condition of reciprocity. The control of the duties fixed within this maximum to be delegated to an international commission.

‘*Secondly* : She might make similar proposals with respect to restrictions on navigation, by applying her recent navigation law (as is already provided by the law itself) at once, and engaging to remove all the remaining protective restrictions at the end of ten years, also on condition of reciprocity.

‘*Thirdly* : She might at the same time submit to the congress proposals for an assimilation of laws on various other questions affecting international trade, such as copyright, patent, trade-mark laws; railroads, telegraphs, weights and measures, shipping laws, etc., which, if not attended with immediate results, might prepare the way for ultimate agreement and diffuse mutual information.

‘It is believed that such an appeal would not be barren in great results.

‘In most countries, from ignorance or division, the consumer is powerless to assert his rights. Monopoly, both in France and England, has only been destroyed by the aid of powerful producing classes whose interests were opposed to the protective system. In England the manufacturers assisted the consumers in liberating the trade in corn. In France the wine-growers supported the Government in emancipating manufacturers.

‘In a great international argument the interests which in each particular country are opposed to this movement

would be confronted with similar interests in other countries which would neutralise and destroy them, for it must be remembered that the same classes who desire to exclude the product of other countries are always anxious to export their own, and thus, while the forces of freedom would be, as they always are, united, the forces of monopoly would be divided and opposed.

‘It cannot be doubted that in such a conflict success would be on the side of progress and of reason.’

National Economy and Social Reform had ever been subjects of Morier’s most earnest study, profoundly convinced as he was that the only basis of a nation’s safety, strength, and prosperity was in the well-being of the working-classes. This was the reason which led him, when consulted by the Crown Prince and Princess as to the selection of a tutor for their son, the present Emperor William, warmly to advocate the choice of Dr. Hintzpeter, with whom, as tutor in the family of Count Görtz, he had been acquainted for many years, and whom he knew to be imbued with the same strong opinions on these subjects as he was himself.

This suggestion at first met with some opposition, even from Stockmar, who as a rule shared Morier’s views.

‘I have seen your friend Hintzpeter,’ he wrote on 12th February 1866, ‘and talked to him for three hours. He is a very superior man, but I have my doubts whether he is the right man. I am afraid he wants Gemüth, and is a hard Spartan idealist. And as to his ideals I am afraid they are somewhat unpractical. He says that a king is doomed to live a solitary life, a life entirely devoted to duty, and among the conclusions drawn from this proposition are the following: That he is not to be brought up with other boys; that he is not to have drawing or music lessons, because that sort of thing does not belong to kingcraft, because a king has no time for these things, because he has no time to be a dilettante.’

And a few days later he proceeded:—

‘Your friend Hintzpeter has unfolded his ideals in two  
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memoranda. I am afraid he is crotchety. In one of them he maintains that a boy ought not to go to the Zoological Gardens to see an elephant unless he should already know that elephants don't lay eggs. Then he makes the feeling of *Erlösungsbedürftigkeit* the foundation of all moral education. He says a boy ought never to see the model of a weaver's loom, that would be perfectly barbarous, he ought to see the weaver at his loom in his torn jacket, and beginning his work with the ejaculation: "God speed it!" Now this is confounding two obviously different things: if you want to study weavers then you must see the torn jacket and hear the exclamation, but that has nothing to do with the mechanism of the loom. It may be advisable to combine the two, but that combination is a question of convenience, not of principle. I see a tendency to push things, true in themselves, to an extreme until they become paradoxical.'

Morier's advice ultimately prevailed, and Dr. Hintzpeter became the Prince's tutor. The part which he played many years later in inspiring much of the social legislation in Germany is well known. He eventually retired to Bielefeld, where Morier paid him many a visit, for their firm friendship endured to the end.

Now that Morier was for the first time in an independent position, he was soon to have proof of Bismarck's virulent animosity against him.

For many years past Bismarck had done everything in his power to get Morier out of Germany; on former occasions by endeavouring in a variety of ways to make his position so disagreeable at Berlin as to render it untenable, on this occasion by a direct attack at headquarters. In his desire to rid himself, once for all, of a man who enjoyed to so high a degree the friendship and confidence of the Crown Prince, and whose freely admitted opinions on the subject of Right over Right, of the gospel of Blood and Iron, and of *jus gladii*, differed so totally from his own, Bismarck had had recourse to the unprecedented step of denouncing him to Her Majesty's Government as an anti-Prussian agitator, on the strength of anonymous letters!!! In the early part of

1867 Stockmar warned Morier of an intrigue which had been set on foot, viz., that he had been accused in Berlin by his Prussian colleague, M. de X—, of anti-Prussian language and intrigues, and moreover that anonymous letters to the same effect had been received at the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which led to Bismarck making a formal complaint to the English Ambassador, Lord Napier, with a view to his recall.

This intrigue, however, was foiled by the British Ambassador declaring that Morier had no orders to work in that sense, that he had seen no symptoms of his having done so, that he was a valuable public servant, and that therefore, unless distinct allegations were made, he (Lord Napier) could do nothing, not even give an answer. The reply was that no such allegation *could* be made.<sup>1</sup>

It was not long before Morier had in his hands proof that the plot which had been hatched against him was the work of his Prussian colleague, and that the anonymous communications were nothing more than unsigned despatches. M. de X— himself furnished the clue by telling a friend of Morier's, in the hopes of throwing the latter off the scent, that he was the most unfortunate of men, as he had left Frankfort with the unmerited reputation of being a spy and a common informer; and that now, though quite innocent, he would get the same reputation at Darmstadt, for he had just received a despatch from Count Bismarck reprimanding him for *not* having denounced Morier as an anti-Prussian agitator, and for allowing the information to reach the ears of his Government through other than official channels. The information, the despatch went on to say, was however so conclusive that the Prussian Government had on the strength of it already denounced Morier to Her Majesty's Government.

'Now,' added M. de X—, 'when Mr. Morier hears that he has been denounced to his Government, what other conclusion can he come to than that it is I that have denounced him?'

M. de X—'s character was such, however, that these

<sup>1</sup> Stockmar to Morier, 4th February 1867.



suspensions could not appear otherwise than justifiable, for, as Morier wrote :—

‘ Until the breaking out of the war, he was Prussian Minister Resident at Frankfort, and accompanied the Prussian army to that unfortunate city, and there employed his time in handing over individual Frankforters to the vengeance of the military authorities, getting, for instance, an extra set of soldiers quartered on Mr. Mumm, the champagne merchant, because Mrs. Mumm had, on a public occasion, after the breaking out of the war, presented a nosegay tied with black and yellow ribbons to the Austrian general in command, and the like ! Since his appointment here, he has been employed, not only as a spy upon the unfortunate Darmstadters, but upon the *Prussian* officials in these parts, the highest not excepted, Prince Waldemar of Holstein, the Prussian military governor of Mayence, having told me that he and Baron Patow, the civil governor of Frankfort (neither of them belonging to the political *nuance* of the present Government), had had bitterly to complain of M. de X——’s secret reports to Berlin upon them and their administration.’

This persistent persecution on the part of Bismarck, Morier explained in the following manner :—

‘ I shall not, I think, be doing Count Bismarck an injustice if I affirm that politics present themselves to him less in the abstract than in the concrete, in other words, very much unconnected with principles, and very much identified with persons. Indeed, his strength (and I will venture to say his weakness) consists in his being the exaggerated embodiment of a natural, and in some respects a desirable, realistic reaction to the idealism of his countrymen. This has given to his whole method of political action a strong, not to say virulent personal bias. The political arena is to him, in a very literal sense, a prize-ring, in which the bigger man knocks down the lesser man and pockets the stakes, and not a lecture room in which the statesman’s *ἔργον* is, after the fashion of the Socratic midwife, to deliver mankind of political truth. Hence a complete disbelief in any one’s

acting upon any moral principle in politics, or indeed upon any other than personal motive.

' A passage I lately came across, with reference to the first Napoleon, seems to me exactly applicable to him : "Cet homme qui unissait, par un rare assemblage, un esprit très fin à une volonté très forte et qui bravait les difficultés en les comprenant, comprit tout en effet, excepté une seule chose, le scrupule en matière de morale. . . ." ; then referring to men with moral principles : " Il les brutalisa et il les joua, mais il ne les comprit jamais."

' Now the natural result of ignoring principles as the levers to political action is to supply the deficient motive power by personal intrigue, and hence personal intrigue has played a part in Bismarck's political career, which to a person versed only in English politics would appear, as performed in the nineteenth century, perfectly incredible, and naturally enough, wherever he has encountered opposition, that opposition has appeared to him the result of intrigue. In his eyes the *dramatis personæ* who occupy the political stage are composed of two classes, and two only ; his friends and clients, and his enemies and their clients. As a rule, whenever he sees a man of any power, either intrinsically or from the accident of his position and the like, he endeavours to cajole or force him into the first category, and he has thus succeeded scores of times in converting enemies into active tools ; indeed, a more motley crew than the agents of his victories, recruited as they are from every shade of political opinion and from every layer of society, from the King to Lassalle, it would be difficult to find. When, on the other hand, he fails of success, he leaves no effort untried to crush those whom he cannot seduce, and nothing can exceed the virulence or the perseverance of his animosity.

' Now the persons who have most persistently opposed and balked him, and whose conversion into subservient tools he has the most passionately desired, are the Crown Prince and the Crown Princess. That this opposition, dating from the first attempts made by Bismarck to destroy the Prussian Constitution, should have been based upon the

very simple principle that the existing Constitution being a solemn contract entered into between the dynasty and the nation, the Heir Apparent was in a special manner bound to respect it, was a consideration which never entered Bismarck's head. It could be a personal matter only. The Crown Prince must be acting under the influence of the Crown Princess, the Crown Princess under that of the Queen, the Queen under that of Lord Palmerston or Lord John Russell. There must be a secret agent somewhere, or how could the whole thing work? that secret agent could be none other than I. In proportion as the resistance increased the miserable intrigues were redoubled, and to describe all their ins and outs would fill many pages. I only wish to say enough to give a general idea of the policy which culminated against all good national manners in a calumnious statement on the part of one friendly government in reference to the diplomatic agent of another friendly government. The object of Bismarck has been, and is, to isolate the Crown Prince from all persons not immediately under his (Bismarck's) influence. He knows that the Prince is a man of unsanguine temperament, and that this isolation acts upon him in a depressing manner, and he believes that he can depress him into submission. Being eyeless in the matter of principles, he is simply ignorant of the fact that he has to do with a very high-minded man who acts on principle and from conviction, and who would continue thus to act if he stood quite alone in the universe.'

Morier, at the time, fully realised that the motive of this denunciation was Bismarck's fear of his possible return to Berlin at some future period. Bismarck knew how much the Crown Prince and Crown Princess desired to see him thus return, and by establishing an artificial grievance against him, he furnished himself with an antecedent to which he would be able to refer, as a reason for objecting to his presence in the Prussian capital, should the revolving years ever land him there.

How correct these anticipations turned out to be was proved in 1884, when, on Lord Ampthill's death, Bismarck immediately entered a protest against Morier's succeeding



*R.B.D. Moxier.*  
*from a drawing by Richmond.*

LONDON EDWARD ARNOLD



him as Ambassador, on the plea of his well-known '*anti-German tendencies*'!

Morier was appointed to Darmstadt at a most critical time, when the Grand Duchy was still half in and half out of the North German Confederation, and when it consequently was the theatre of every kind of intrigue between Prussia, Austria, and France; with a Minister, Baron Dalwigk, at the head of affairs, who was as violently Austrian and French in his policy as Prince and Princess Louis of Hesse (Princess Alice) were violently Prussian in their sympathies.

He had arrived there, not as an obscure individual, but under the popular impression that he was a marked political personage, intended to play a part. Bismarck had given out that Morier was hostile to him and would intrigue against him; better informed people thought he was Prussian in his heart and would intrigue against Austria and France.

Placed from the first in a most difficult position, and one in which, without great care, he might easily have compromised Her Majesty's Government, he left Darmstadt after five years, without his name having been once before the public, without one hint of his ever having been engaged in making politics, on the best of terms with the Princess on the one hand, with Baron Dalwigk on the other, a result only achieved by the greatest self-restraint and tact, and by having, at the cost of considerable financial sacrifices, been able to take up an entirely independent social attitude.

*Morier to Lord Stanley*

*'November 18th, 1867.*

'Conformably to what I conceive to be your desire, I have from the first commencement of my residence at Darmstadt abstained from every form of political activity, and have on no occasion, either with Baron Dalwigk or any of my diplomatic colleagues, broached a political subject, or given expression to a political opinion. I have not thought it necessary, however, to push this teetotalism so far as to refuse to listen to statements volunteered to me, and as Baron Dalwigk thought proper, after dining with

me yesterday, to be particularly communicative, I will give you the benefit of what he evidently meant to be important disclosures. I may preface what I am about to relate that some slight interest attaches to his statements from the fact of his being a very intimate friend of Beust, and at the same time a *persona grata* in French Imperialist and governmental circles, and from his having just returned from Paris where he spent a fortnight, during the stay there of the Emperor of Austria and of Beust. He has consequently returned to the little capital, of which he is the presiding genius, with the prestige of a man who has been admitted to the European green-room and seen the actors rehearsing their parts and, to carry on the simile, his deportment is not unlike that of an Eton schoolboy who has been for the first time behind the scenes of a provincial theatre, and is elated beyond all self-constraint by this feat, and does not cease from mysteriously hinting at all the wonderful sights he saw there. After telling me that he has had private audiences of long duration, first with the Emperor and then with the Empress of the French, and that he had lived, as it were, in Beust's pocket, clearly hinting that he had been called upon for his advice on all the important topics of the day, he made the somewhat startling disclosure that Napoleon had proposed an immediate offensive war to be waged by Austria and France conjointly against Prussia, with the well-defined object of obtaining the left bank of the Rhine for France and of annexing the southern states of Germany to Austria. That Beust and the Emperor Francis Joseph had given a categorical refusal, saying that so long as there were eight millions of Germans in the Austrian Empire, the sword of Austria would never be drawn in a cause involving the disruption of Germany. Dalwigk thereupon went on to rhapsodise about Beust as the man who held in his hand the fate of Europe, and to whom the maintenance of peace was owing, etc., etc. I therefore asked him to tell me whether he believed, on the very accurate data which he seemed to have brought back with him, that European war was impending or not. He replied that he could give me the most accurate information, that there was to be a war, and a most tremendous

one, but that it would only take place three years hence. I asked him what made him fix that particular date, that, for my own part, looking at the matter purely from the economical point of view, I did not believe that the material forces of Europe could stand the strain of three more years of uncertainty, and that even the producing and commercial classes would prefer a war from which they could hope to see matters settled one way or the other to an indefinite prolongation of the present all-devouring armed peace. He replied that three years to a day was the time which would be required for the reorganisation of the Austrian army, by which date, however, it would be fully reorganised and equipped and able to take the field. I did not solicit his attention to the absurd contradiction between this statement, which amounted to saying that Austria was the country that had made up its mind to go to war as soon as ever it could get ready for it, and his former statement that Beust was *par excellence* the angel of peace and meant to preserve it. But I asked him what cause for war there would be three years hence, if Austria, fully armed, were still as determined, as she is now that she is unarmed, not to become a party to a war for the dismemberment of Germany. He gave me to understand that there was a perfect *entente* between Austria and France on the Oriental and Polish questions, and that it would be in Poland that the flame would burst out. The chain of thought seemed to be this: Prussia and Russia are the allies whose strength must be broken. If we tackle Prussia on her German side she is invulnerable, and Austria could not with decency do so. But if we attack Russia on the Polish question we are certain to see Prussia acting with her, we shall in reality be attacking the latter on a question on which the non-Prussian portion of Germany is not on her side, and which will unite all the suffrages of Liberal Europe against her. I do not mean to say that this was *ipsissimis verbis* what Dalwigk said, but the general tendency of his argument singularly coincides with the train of thought evolved in a late remarkable article in the *Débats*, in which the fear was expressed that if France in Italy and elsewhere took up with the reactionary policy and became unfaithful to the



principles of the Revolution of '89, Prussia would be installed as the champion of these ideas of progress, and that, therefore, the only hope of combating her was to attack her on her reactionary side, that is in connection with her Russian proclivities, and with the weapons of liberalism, etc.'

## CHAPTER XXI

DARMSTADT—*continued*

As Commissioner for the Anglo-Austrian Commercial Treaty, Morier had spent most of the summer of 1867 in Vienna, 'fighting hard to force on the execution of a treaty for which *both* the contracting parties entertain a supreme contempt. To know that if successful, no one will thank you, and if unsuccessful, every one will abuse you and lay the fault at your door, is work which makes one ten years older and, at all events for the time, takes the spring out of one.'

Writing to his father from Vienna on 8th August he announces himself as 'so thoroughly driven mad and cross that I have neither time nor heart to write. However, one gets used to every form of human misery, and so I have gradually got used to telegraphing every other day to Alice that I am coming, and on the alternate days that I am not coming, and also to getting the most splendid successes for the F.O., and after they have been perfectly apathetic for ten weeks, seeing them flare up and determined on fighting, when the fight is over, the victory won, and their only business is to sit down and enjoy the fruits. Such is bureaucracy—always running after the shadow and missing the substance.'

On 8th September he was able to write from Darmstadt :—

'The Protocol was signed last Sunday at 1 P.M., and so has ended this eventful history and the double negotiation required, first to get the things out of the Austrian Government, and secondly to get them into H.M. Government!'

Congratulating him on his success, Lord Stanley wrote on 24th September :—

'The amount of labour you have thrown into the business

has been enormous, and I can well sympathise with your feeling of satisfaction in looking back upon it. I hope it may be to you only a beginning of many diplomatic victories.'

On his return to Darmstadt, he again resumed his main occupation, viz., to furnish Lord Stanley with reports on the political reconstitution of Germany.

*Morier to Lord Stanley*

*'March 31st, 1868.*

'I imagine that from my condemnation of the annexations made by Prussia in 1866, and from my evident leanings towards the Little German programme, you consider me hopelessly wedded to federalist, as opposed to centralised, ideas. But this is by no means the case. I entirely agree with you in believing that the great spring-tide of the nineteenth century is moving irresistibly forward towards huge centralised, social agglomerations. It is a great organic change going on throughout human society, and perceivable quite as much in the development of domestic into manufacturing industry as in the unity movement in Italy and Germany. It was the conviction that this was a law that must assert itself, as regards the latter, and the further conviction (drawn from a very careful examination of the forces at work under the mere surface of daily politics), that a crisis would come in connection with the Schleswig-Holstein question, which made me years and years ago endeavour, as far as my humble means would allow, to impress upon people at home the necessity of disentangling ourselves from a position in which, if we remained, we should sooner or later have to confront a convulsion of nature with two regiments of Life Guards.

'Hence it is not a reluctance on my part to admit this truth which affects my judgment as regards the present state of Germany, but merely a question of what are the best means to reach the certain goal. Given the ultimate objects to be the smelting of the sovereign states formerly composing the German Confederation into a united German Monarchy, is this process likely to be best effected by means

of a strongly centralised confederacy (as transition stage), or by the piecemeal sewing on of one rag after the other of the imperial purple to the military coat-tails of Prussia? Or, to put the question in a yet more abstract form, is the process of fusion, which must necessarily take place, more likely to be effected thoroughly and healthily by means of a national body in which the units are, *ab initio*, solved into one mass, each of them knowing that the sacrifice it brings is made to the whole body, and not to another unit, or by the bureaucratic assimilation of one unit upon the arbitrary pattern of another unit, against the will of the unit so assimilated, and with the sense on its part that it is sacrificing its individuality to another individuality, and not to the national commonwealth?

‘Let us for one moment suppose that England was surrounded by a dozen larger and smaller Scotlands, and that four-fifths of these Scotchmen desired to become, not Englishmen but Great Britons, and that there was the same desire on the part of a large number of Englishmen. Would not the right policy on the part of the English Government (England under the hypothesis being far more than equal in size and strength to all the Scotlands, and it being *subauditum* that the English Crown should have the sovereignty over the Great Britain to be created)—would not, I say, the right policy for England be to inaugurate the work of absorption through the instrumentality of an Imperial Parliament in which Scotchmen and Englishmen should meet *de jure* on a par, and from whose common legislation should emanate the laws in restraint of the individual independence hitherto enjoyed by all? Would not such a body be the only one that could be trusted to know exactly what attributes required to be centralised, and what amount of autonomy could be safely kept? Surely such a policy would be more likely to assure the desired end than the watching for an opportunity to annex two or three of these Scotlands by the sword, and then proceeding to garrison the several Edinburghs and Glasgows with English militiamen, to govern by a central board in London, to replace Scotch magistrates by Middlesex stipendiaries, etc., etc. One thing, however, in such a case might be predicted with

tolerable certainty, viz., that an English Government under such circumstances would have tried one plan *or* the other, and would not have attempted to annex two or three of these Scotlands while trying the experiment of a common Parliament with three or four of them, leaving the rest out in the cold.

'Well, these were the ideas, derived, I admit, wholly *a priori*, which in 1866 made me consider that a very fatal error had been committed by the annexations and the restriction of the common Parliament to North Germany.

'After two years, I go to Berlin determined to form my judgment wholly *a posteriori* and solely upon the data I can collect. What do I find? I find that every step taken by the Parliament has been a success, and every step taken in connection with annexation a failure. What is the central difficulty with which all parties and all politicians are hopelessly grappling? It is the fatal contradiction and the hopeless incompatibility between the German Confederation with a united German Monarchy—military despotism required to keep a firm hold upon the conquered territories—and the stream of Liberal legislation flowing in from the common Parliament.

'I appeal to Bismarck as my best witness. Here is a man who, not later than 1865, boasted that he would not only do away with parliamentary institutions in Prussia, but that within ten years every state in Europe would follow his example. I see him now building all his hopes and planting his feet firmly on his torso of a North German Parliament, as affording the only terra firma in the quagmire of German politics. I see him, the champion hitherto of Great Prussian ideas, fighting single-handed against the assimilating mania of his colleagues, and doing all he can to save what can be saved of the autonomy so recklessly and purposely destroyed, doing his best in fact to disannex.

'What do I see outside the radius of the North German Confederation? (I do not count Darmstadt, which is within the radius, and whose unanimous desire to enter wholly into the North German Confederation is in a great measure to be accounted for by the great material disadvantages which the Grand Duchy suffers from in conse-

quence of its separation into halves.) I see a daily-growing estrangement from Prussia, or I should rather call it an increasing fear and hatred, owing solely to the attitude which, almost in spite of itself, the Prussian Government is obliged to take up towards its new acquisitions.

'It is these facts which have confirmed my original opinion and not any love for federalism.'

*Memorandum on North German Confederation*<sup>1</sup>

'The North German Confederation is a compromise between the ideas of Great Prussianism and Little Germanism, which I endeavoured in a former letter to analyse, but it is not an organic compromise resulting from an internal necessity, but a mechanical compromise resulting from external and partly personal accidents. It is consequently an essentially artificial creation, conceived, executed, and kept alive by Bismarck. The annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse and Nassau was part of the Great Prussian programme, the federal union between the Prussia so enlarged and the remaining states north of the Main (the alliance between the dog and its fleas, as it has mockingly been called) was part of the 'Little German' programme.

'Speaking generally, the power Bismarck had at his back for carrying out the first of these two systems was the feudal or, as it calls itself, the Conservative party. The right of conquest, the *jus gladii*, are corollaries of the Divine Right. *Debellatio* and its attendant *vae victis* are attributes of an anointed King. That which he had at his back for the second part of the programme was the national *i.e.* the *Liberal* party. The two systems are clearly antagonistic—the one appeals for its sanction to the right of force, the other to free contract. When it came to the practical work of construction, with which set of tools would Bismarck work? It was clear that in the long run he could not use both indiscriminately. The clay out of which he had to model his new political pagoda was essentially the same wherever situated. Nationalists and particularists were distributed in pretty nearly the same pro-

<sup>1</sup> Written by Morier and annotated by E. v. Stockmar.

portions, whether domiciled in Hanover or Saxony, in Cassel or Thuringia. It was the merest accident that the one set came within the action of the law of conquest, and the other did not. Would he then treat the allies as conquered, or the conquered as allies? Would he rule with a feudal machinery and by brute force, or with a liberal machinery, and on the principle of co-operation and voluntary association? Would the centre of gravity be thrown in Prussia, and the confederates treated as vassals, or would the federal be the true centre, and Prussia recede to the position of the first among equals?

'The feudal party, with whom, be it remembered, Bismarck was still identified, hoped and strove for the former alternative. They calculated that the military successes of 1866 would produce a strong conservative reaction in Prussia, and give them a majority in the Chamber which would enable them to remodel the Prussian Constitution as they pleased, and establish them permanently in the possession of political power. Prussia, enlarged by her new provinces to twenty-five millions of inhabitants as compared with the half-dozen millions who compose the remaining states of the Confederacy, would have it all her own way, and the common Parliament would sink into a mere machine for registering the will of Prussia; but the will of Prussia on the above hypothesis would be the will of the Junker clique holding rule in Prussia. As a preliminary step to the realisation of this programme, the assimilation and Prussianising of the newly-acquired provinces was to be carried on in hot haste and *à outrance*. This calculation, however, proved fallacious, for it did not correctly estimate the effect upon existing parties in Prussia by the new elements which the annexed provinces introduced into the State. The estimate of conservative reaction, brought about by the military successes, was, as regards the old provinces, not far wrong, but the result was exactly the reverse in Hanover and the other annexed provinces. Here the only party that heartily set its shoulder to the wheel with the desire that the new state of things should succeed, was the national party, and hence the new provinces brought large reinforcements to the national and liberal cause. These at once

coalesced with the Prussian Nationals, for indeed they were old brothers in arms, the leaders having for years previously been associated together in the ranks of the National Verein. They had common views and common aspirations, and they enjoyed, moreover, the advantage of a common discipline. On the other hand, such conservative elements as were returned by the annexed provinces added no strength to the Prussian feudal party, but the contrary. The annexed feudals for years previous to annexation had been making common cause with the indigenous feudals against the national party, and had looked to Prussian Junkers for their support against even modified amalgamation; from them they derived their arguments for Guelphic Divine Right, for specific Hanoverianism, Casselism, and the like, and naturally enough they now turned upon their former colleagues with the bitterness of men who had been betrayed and sold into captivity by their own familiar friends.

'Hence in the Prussian Parliament, and very much more in the North German Parliament, though the specific Prussian feudal phalanx was larger than it had ever been before, it remained a minority unaided and unstrengthened by the analogous fractions from the other states and provinces. They sat under the blight of their negative particularist cynical creed, powerful to pull down, impotent to build up or co-operate for productive purposes. Opposed to them stood a majority, a *bona-fide* amalgamation and union of various shades of the Liberal party, cemented by the one common national idea, *i.e.* an organic body self-existent and independent of geographical accidents with a definite programme and positive aims; a conscious German national body as distinct from a Prussian or a Hanoverian or a Reuss body.

'These, then, were the facts with which Bismarck saw he had to deal, on the meeting of the North German Parliament. Still the head of the feudal party surrounded by the feudal Cabinet which had assisted him in bearing the brunt of his anti-parliamentary campaign, he yet saw that his only chance of attaining to *positive* results was by means of the national liberal party, and that his feudal tools were



useless.<sup>1</sup> The times had changed, and he had to a certain extent changed with them, whereas the rest of his party had remained unchanged. He had had a foretaste of where his feudal friends were leading him by the *tabula rasa* which Eulenburg, the Minister of the Interior, and Lippe, the Minister of Justice, made in the annexed provinces during the interregnum which elapsed between the act of annexation and the meeting of the North German Parliament. Pitilessly plying mattock and pick-axe, these Ministers had proceeded with the work of Prussianising and of assimilation, as if Hanover, Cassel and Nassau had been territories conquered from Red Indians or Maoris. Bismarck had come to the rescue, though not before irreparable mischief had been done, and already at this stage of the proceedings he took up an attitude which placed him on a quasi-friendly footing with the national leaders in Hanover, etc., and noted a marked difference between his standing-ground and that of his colleagues.

‘He would at this time have gladly got rid of the latter, and substituted for them more willing instruments of his policy. But, in the first place, the King was deaf to all remonstrances, and made it a point of honour to stick to the men who had stood by him in his contest with his Parliament; and, secondly, there was the difficulty of finding substitutes. For it must not be supposed that Bismarck had gone over into the national liberal camp. It was the national portion of the party’s programme which so far tallied with his own programme as to enable him to foresee the chance of arriving at some definite result by a compromise between the two; but with the general doctrines of the party he had as little sympathy as, I believe in his heart, he has with those of his feudal friends, any deep conviction being foreign to his nature.

‘The final result of the constituent Parliament is a Constitution arrived at by a compromise, Bismarck’s programme and that of the national liberals each giving

<sup>1</sup> Bismarck, with characteristic caution, always leaves a hole open for all sorts of eventualities. One of his cards was the nationality humbug which he wanted for the South of Germany, and of the prestige abroad. This card, of course, could not be played without the *National-Liberalen*.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

way on many essential points ; but one other result is clear, viz., that the legislative centre is henceforth in the North German and not in the Prussian Parliament, and that in this Parliament it is not the feudal minority but the national majority that has the upper hand. So strong, however, is still the prestige of the Prussian Crown, or rather of the *de facto* wielder of its power, that this majority, except so far as it can come to terms with Bismarck, feels itself impotent. On the other hand, Bismarck feels he cannot get out of the negative into the positive without their help. Thus it becomes clear that the future will be determined by the relation that may grow up between these two powers.<sup>1</sup>

' I must now examine the no less important question of the executive. Where in the future is to be the *ποῦ στῶ* of the administrative lever ? In the Crown of Prussia, or in the Presidency of the Confederation ?

' To answer this question you must allow me to examine the machinery of the North German Constitution. I can best describe it as the exact reverse of the Horatian *Mulier formosa superne desinens in atrum piscem*. The legs and standing apparatus of the Constitution are, as it might be, those of a beautiful Germania, whereas the head and shoulders are the veriest political monstrosity. In other words, the parliamentary basis of the Constitution is all that can be desired. The North German Reichstag, as far as it extends geographically, is a thoroughly national German representative body ; but when we get to the remaining branches of the legislature, and to the executive, viz., to the Federal Council and the Presidency, we find ourselves face to face with something the exact nature of which it is not easy to appreciate. According to the programme of Little Germany, the Representative Assembly elected directly from the whole nation has to be supplemented by an Upper House in which the sovereigns, and perhaps the more important of the mediatised princes,

<sup>1</sup> There is a third possibility : progress on the neutral ground of ' material development,' and a series of shallow compromises in other respects. Will they coalesce into really harmonious action, and move on irresistibly together along the path of national development and progress, or will they paralyse one another, and merely succeed in arriving at a minimum of stability ?

would have sat as representing the territorial individualities composing the Confederation, and the apex of the pyramid has to consist of an hereditary constitutional Emperor, surrounded by responsible Ministers.

'The only portion of this programme which was imported *tel quel*, into the Constitution of the North German Confederation, was the Representative Assembly. For the Upper House had been substituted the Federal Council, a body copied from the *plenum* of the old Frankfort Diet, and consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the Governments composing the Confederation, with a graduated scale of votes according to the supposed specific weight of the Government represented, Prussia with seventeen, Saxony with four, etc.<sup>1</sup>

'In lieu of the hereditary Emperor, equipped with the prerogatives of a Crown, and wielding a mighty executive, the King of Prussia assumes his place in the new Constitution as *President* (not in the American sense of the word, but literally as *primus inter pares*) of the Confederation. It is true that in this capacity he is invested with many important attributes of sovereignty, such as the right of declaring war and making peace, of concluding treaties, etc., and that in his independent position as Supreme Head of the Confederate Armies he has at his disposal an immense volume of physical force, but these attributes do not flow naturally from his office, but are, as it were, extraneous to it, and added on from without. Viewed in his organic relation to the Constitution of the North German Confederation, he is but the chairman of a permanent International Board.

'Lastly, for the responsible Ministry is substituted the Federal Chancellorship. Here again we are met by an abnormal phenomenon, the Chancellorship being suspended, as it were, meteor-like in the North German cosmos, without any very marked connection with, and in apparently no very distinct relation to, any of the surrounding bodies.

<sup>1</sup> It would be wiser to point out the clever dodge which consists in strictly adhering to the distribution of votes, as in the Plenum, and yet producing a Great Prussian result by giving Prussia seventeen votes out of the forty-three, these seventeen votes being composed of the former votes of Prussia plus those of the annexed states.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

It is true that the Chancellor is named by the King of Prussia in the latter's capacity of President of the Confederation, but then the executive is by way of being, in part at least, exercised conjointly by the Presidency and the Federal Council, so that he cannot be looked upon in the ordinary sense of the term as a Minister of King William, still less can he be regarded as the executive organ of the Federal Council, or of that body plus the Presidency, for he is himself, *ex officio*, President of the Federal Council, and exercises as such a preponderating influence over its councils.<sup>1</sup> His relation to the Parliament is not less independent. It is true that after a severe contest in the constituent Reichstag for the principle of a responsible Ministry, it was agreed by way of a compromise that the Chancellor, by counter-signing all ordinances and laws promulgated by the President of the Confederation, should thereby assume the responsibility for them, but it was *expressly understood* that this only meant the moral responsibility, and that the Chancellor was in no wise to be considered amenable or responsible to the Parliament for his acts, and still less to sink into an organ for carrying out the will of a parliamentary majority.<sup>2</sup>

Gazing hard at the amorphous political mass, the one feature that comes out prominently is the disharmonious union between the *national* foundation and the *international* superstructure of the new federal edifice, and with conditions so little calculated to result in vigorous action, or indeed in anything but mutual friction. We naturally ask where is the moving spring, where is the *cheville ouvrière*, which keeps the machinery moving?

'The answer to this question supplies us at the same time with the means of understanding the practical working of the machinery, which I have hitherto considered from its theoretical side only.

'The motive power we seek resides, of course, in the

<sup>1</sup> The position of the Chancellor can only be understood if you conceive it as one analogous to that of the former *Præsidential Gesandte* at the Bund.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

<sup>2</sup> It was expressly understood, but this was a super-foetation, because the Constitution, though establishing a nominal responsibility, attaches no sort of legal effect to it.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

Chancellor ; not, however, in the office, but in the individual Bismarck who at present fills the office. The various functions of the federal organs remained in the text of the Federal Constitution more or less in blank ; but it was left to the author of the original scheme to define and establish what, in practice, these functions should be. To appreciate, therefore, correctly what space Bismarck fills up personally in the scheme of the North German Confederation, it is necessary that we should examine these functions in their correct development after eighteen months of wear and tear. And first, as regards the Federal Council. That body, as we have seen, is partly legislative, partly executive. Its sanction is required to every law that comes up from the Reichstag. It may reject a law or return it in an amended form for the consideration of the Reichstag, and in so far it is invested with the duties of an *Upper House*.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, it is in so far credited with the duties which in a constitutional body fall to the executive, that it prepares and initiates all the bills which the Presidency submits to the Legislature. For this purpose it is portioned off into seven standing committees : (1) For the army and fortification ; (2) for the navy ; (3) for the customs and taxes ; (4) for commerce ; (5) for railways, posts, and telegraph ; (6) for justice ; (7) for finance. The business of these committees is to prepare all legislative matter in regard to the several branches which they represent. Some of them, moreover, have direct executive functions, as the committee for accounts, which has to fix the quarterly contribution to be taken from the customs ;<sup>2</sup> and the committee on commercial matters, which has a voice in the nomination of consuls, etc.<sup>3</sup> The customs duties are levied by the individual states whose revenue officers quarterly send an account to the supreme board of the Einzelstaat, which transmits it in a more *übersichtliche* form to the federal Rechnungsausschuss, which again fixes (*i.e.* establishes,

<sup>1</sup> There are two legislative 'Factors': Reichstag and Bundesrath—the Bundespräsidium having no separate veto distinct from the Bundesrath, I should not compare the latter to an Upper House.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

<sup>2</sup> This, as noted in Schultz, I have never understood.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

<sup>3</sup> See Schultz, p. 448, Art. 39 of the Constitution.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

preliminarily) the amount due, according to those accounts, by the individual state to the federal treasury on account of customs duties received. 'The characteristic feature of these committees is that Prussia as the presiding State is represented in each, and that the King of Prussia, as Supreme Head of the Federal Army, nominates the members of the committees for the army and navy.

'Before proceeding further, I must again call attention to the fact that the Federal Council consists of *diplomatic representatives*—Ministers plenipotentiary of all creeping things under the sun turned into legislators. To realise all that this implies let us consider the diplomatic nature; its love of form, its blindness to a substance, its international susceptibility, its casuistry, its special pleading, its trick of finding always fifty sides to a question, its tentative procedure, its timid dependence upon instructions from home.<sup>1</sup>

'To intensify the picture let us more particularly consider the caricatured species of diplomatist raised in the small German Courts, and then let us call to mind the reiterated failures which one after the other every attempt at union in Germany by means of such international apparatus has met with, from Frederick the Great's *Fürsten Bund* to the Three Kings' Alliance in 1850. Having well pondered over these things in our hearts, let us not refuse our admiration to the Eolus-like mastery which Bismarck has obtained over this temple of the winds. It is true that he has taken care to secure for himself a very powerful leverage upon the body which it is his business to move. In the first place, he presides personally over the Assembly when it sits *in pleno*,

<sup>1</sup> All this is to a great extent as the song says :

'Im allgemeinen wahr,  
Aber hier nicht anwendbar.'

In the first place, according to Art. 7 of the Constitution 'nicht instruirte Stimmen werden nicht gezählt.' This, added to the natural preponderance of Prussia and of Bismarck, secures a brisk undiplomatic manner of proceeding. The consequence has been that a great many of the states are not represented by any of their diplomatists properly speaking. Prussia, Saxony, all the Saxon duchies, several others are represented by Ministers of State, and in fact at the rate at which the deliberations of the Bundesrath proceed, no diplomatist, none but a State Minister, is equal to the responsibility.—(E. v. Stockmar.)

wielding in his hand the seventeen votes which, out of the entire number of forty-three, fall to the share of Prussia. Secondly, he is present either in the body, or in the spirit, in all the committees, that is, either he himself or one of his well-trained subordinates is, *ex officio*, member of each committee. Lastly, he has a *deus ex machina* always at hand in the shape of his Reichstag majority with which to frighten the recalcitrant diplomatists into submission, but even all these advantages taken together would not suffice for the task without his personal prestige. I am sorry I cannot take you into the workshop and invite you to view the master and his apprentices at their task. The Federal Council, after the fashion of diplomatic congresses, works underground and away from the light of day, and none but members are admitted into the presence of that august conclave. Scanty protocols are kept of the results of the proceedings which occasionally see the light, but there is no record of the manner of proceeding. The members are supposed to act under instructions from their respective Governments, but I was assured on good authority that Bismarck pooh-poohs this system and insists on questions being settled off-hand, and with little beyond *pro forma* reference. Hence the work is *bona fide* got through at the green table. Under these circumstances, to those acquainted with the personal prestige of Bismarck, his complete mastery of the situation in the Federal Council is no matter of surprise. Nor, to do him justice, is the prestige due merely to the energy with which he has carried out his policy of blood and iron. He is among his federal compeers *facile princeps*, not merely in the higher branches of statesmanship, but as a skilful workman in the details of administration. His power of work is immense, and the rapidity of his execution marvellous. Certain it is that no law and no measure comes out of the Federal Council in any other shape than that which the Chancellor desires. What means he uses to attain his ends, how often the thumbscrew and the boot are used, is not known to the public. If the victims wince, their moans do not penetrate into the public thoroughfare. A congress of roaches presided over by a very big pike would be perhaps a correct image of the sort of personal

preponderance exercised by the Chancellor in the Federal Council.

' This much to elucidate the room personally taken up by Bismarck in the legislative apparatus.

' Still more remarkable is the position he has cut out for himself in the administration of the North German Confederation. Under the modest title of the Federal Chancellor's Office (*Bundes Kanzlei Amt*) he has created an official body responsible to himself alone, which to all intents and purposes constitutes a Ministry bidding fair, like Joseph's lean kine, to swallow up their well-fed rivals, the present advisers of the Prussian Crown. This department consists of a board, or college as it is styled in German official phraseology, composed of councillors presided over by a president or chairman, into whose hands, for the immediate use of the Chancellor, are collected the various threads of the vast federal administration, which the centralisation of the seven Departments of War, Customs, Post Office, etc., etc., above enumerated, has called into existence. It is divided into sections corresponding more or less with these departments, at the head of each of which is one of the councillors constituting the board, with a staff of subordinate officials, etc. The vast bureaucratic body, distributed all over the Confederation for the purpose of administering the common Federal Constitution, is placed in direct communication with, and subordinated to, this department, so that what in appearance and looked at functionally is but a roomful of clerks to carry on the business of the Chancellor's office assumes upon closer inspection the rudimentary outlines of a vast Imperial state machinery.<sup>1</sup> I must add that Bismarck has selected for this department the best men in the service of the Prussian State, and has thus got together a body which, in point of ability and administrative talent, completely throws into the shade his colleagues in the Prussian Cabinet.

' It was this gradual absorption into the Chancellor's office of all the more important functions of the Confederacy,

<sup>1</sup> It is not to be overlooked that in most respects the Norddeutscher Bund does not administer directly through its own officials, but indirectly through the individual State Governments, i.e. their officials.—(E. Stockmar.)



Prussia included, and the conflict of jurisdictions thereby beginning to loom in the distance which appeared to me during my stay at Berlin to be more than anything else occupying the minds of the initiated. It was more particularly at the Ministry of War that the feeling of rebellion against the Chancellor was growing rampant, and no wonder, when we consider what share that mighty department with its reorganisation of the army and its preparation for the campaign of 1866 had in the present exaltation of Prussia. As the latest instance of the cavalier manner in which Bismarck treated this department, availing himself for that purpose of his double character as Prussian Premier and Federal Chancellor, I was informed that he had caused various drafts of measures for the organisation of the federal army to be drawn up at the War Office, to be afterwards worked up in the War Department of his own Chancellor's office, and then proposed to the Reichstag in the shape of bills emanating from the Federal Chancery ! thus turning the Prussian War Ministry into a kind of assistant clerkship to the Chancellor's office. When we call to mind what I stated in the earlier part of this letter, to the effect that the powerful and well-disciplined feudal party was gradually rallying round those colleagues of Bismarck in the Prussian Cabinet who are the most opposed to his general policy, and whose removal it is well known that he would compass, could he but get the King's consent, and when we add to these elements of discord the growing jealousies of rival bureaucratic hierarchies, we shall see that there are not wanting elements of schism in the new fabric of North German consolidation. There remains, moreover, one more dangerous symptom to be noted, which has come to the surface since I left Berlin, in the course of the debate upon the Hanoverian Provincial Funds. It is that the specific Prussian particularism which is beginning to raise its head against the policy of the national liberal party and of the federal Chancellor is not confined to the feudal party, but is beginning to ferment amongst some not unimportant fractions of the Prussian Liberal party, the old Prussian leaven being apparently stronger than doctrine and principle. In a word, the dog is

beginning to fancy that the fleas have the best of the bargain.

'I have endeavoured in the preceding pages to show how, contrary to what might have been expected from the Great-Prussian auspices under which the war of 1866 was carried on, the legislative and executive functions have in the new body gravitated away from Prussia proper, towards the federal centre, a result brought about mainly by the following causes. The intrinsic vitality of the national forces as compared with those opposed to them, the recognition by Bismarck of this fact, and lastly, the accident of the latter's Wolseyan lust for power: for the more we penetrate into the intricacies of the North German Constitution, the more we become convinced that its whole framework is built up with reference to the exceptional and extraordinary position of the Chancellor, to the facilities afforded to him for balancing the Reichstag against the Federal Council, and the Federal Council against the Reichstag, and thus being omnipotent in both, and to the concentration into his own hands of the vast administrative power vested in the Federal Chancellor department. Indeed, when we look at this side of his position, the only historical analogy we can find is that of the *Maires de Palais* under the Merovingian dynasty.

'At first sight these results from the national point of view appear satisfactory enough, but our satisfaction is damped by the consideration of the artificial nature of the system so suddenly called into life, and of the dangers which arise therefrom. The Government of Northern Germany is daily tending to become as much of a personal Government as that of France, but the person who governs is not invested with the attributes of sovereignty, and cannot, therefore, however much he may wish it, dispense with the support of party ties. He is drifting away from his own party, but I see little prospect of a real identification with the opposite party. No man can be a *bona-fide* leader of a great Liberal party without faith in Liberal principles, and not one mustard seed of such faith exists in Count Bismarck's nature. With a keen appreciation of what may be termed the *mechanical* forces of politics, he has no sense

wherewith to appreciate the *vital* forces of society. Contrary to a high authority, he seems to think that man political can live by bread alone ; and thus whilst within the merely material sphere we see him pushing forward with a vigour unknown before all manner of reforms, the more ideal aims of politics remain unattended to, or even trodden under foot. To us who live outside the Northern Confederation and cannot appreciate in detail the difficulties of the situation, this contrast and antagonism between the real progress effected by the national liberal party in many important subjects, and the virulence of the reactionary elements in other branches of public life, appear yet more incomprehensible and monstrous than to those actually partaking in the conflict. In the only Prussian departments left untouched by the Federal Constitution, viz., the Home Office and the Ministry for Public Worship and *Education*, the old arbitrary, persecuting spirit of the feudal reactionary party flourishes as much as it ever did in the days of the parliamentary struggle, and this at a moment when several most important organic laws are anxiously waited for. The new state of things has given the Prussian penny postage and cheap telegraphs, but has left him as amenable as ever to a suspicious and omnipresent police for his political opinions. The strongest instance of these crying contradictions is afforded by the fact of the State prosecution instituted with the connivance of Bismarck against Twesten, for a speech made by him in the Prussian Parliament a year before the war. Twesten is the most important leader of the Prussian national liberal party, and no man contributed more in the constituent Reichstag to the success of the compromise between Bismarck's programme and that of the national liberals, than he did. Yet at the very time that he was thus employed, the public prosecutor, in flagrant violation of the Prussian Constitution, was pleading before the Prussian tribunals to inflict upon him a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. It is by such arrogant disregard for the higher feelings of the nation that Prussia is daily losing more and more her attractive force for the rest of Germany, and rendering almost impossible the task of proselytising,

which her friends outside the Confederation had so warmly taken up. The German nation is stirred to its inmost depths by two sentiments, the desire for unity and the desire for free institutions. In the north it is the lust of power that predominates, in the south it is the love of liberty that is the stronger passion. Before the imagination of the somewhat democratic south, the North German Confederation looms out like some huge ironclad from which no sounds are heard but the tramp of men at drill, or the swinging upon their pivots of monster guns. This is, perhaps, a morbid and one-sided view, but certain it is that at present no echoes cross the Main of those joyous and jubilant sounds, which we might expect to hear amid a people born into a new life of national greatness and glory.

‘Before concluding, I cannot sufficiently lay stress upon the fact that the political mass is still in a state of fusion, and that any day may change the actual configuration of affairs and reverse the relations and conditions at present existing. So that what may be true of to-day may not be true of to-morrow. I believe, however, that the above sketch as far as it goes is a tolerably correct one at the actual moment. At all events, I have drawn it after careful inquiry from good sources of information.’

*End of Memorandum.*

On 12th May the Crown Prince of Prussia passed through Darmstadt on his way back from Italy, where he had been to attend the marriage of the Prince of Naples (afterwards King Humbert), and desired Morier to accompany him as far as Frankfort in order to have half an hour’s undisturbed conversation with him.

‘The Crown Prince was very much pleased with the reception he had met with in Italy. He said its heartiness was perfectly spontaneous, and that from the moment he crossed the frontier to the moment he left, there had been no slackening of its enthusiastic cordiality. Everything he had seen and heard had convinced him that the feeling of hearty good-will for, and of confidence in North Germany, was universal in the Peninsula. He seemed to think that despite the dangers and difficulties with which the Italians

were beset, their determination to grapple with these difficulties, and the earnest spirit with which they sought to get at the roots of the evils of which they suffered, would ultimately make them triumph. I asked him whether there were any signs of their awakening to the fact that their only chance of salvation was a prolonged armed peace, and their only hope a laying aside of their visions of reasserting their military prestige; to which he replied very decidedly that all the persons he had talked to had admitted that fully, and that even the King had been brought round, though very reluctantly, to admit that peace was a desideratum. He gave me a humorous description of a conversation he had with King Victor Emmanuel on the subject of the Emperor Napoleon's warlike proclivities, in which the King had confessed that all he cared for was hard fighting, and that if he could only get hard knocks and plenty of them, he did not so much care about the security of his crown, for if the worst came to the worst and he lost, that *he could always turn pirate*.

'The Crown Prince did not bring back a favourable opinion of the heir to the said Crown, whom he described as being lamentably neglected and deficient on the score of education, and as painfully conscious of these deficiencies. On the other hand, he had not words enough to extol the merits of the bride, whose natural gifts had been developed to the utmost by a perfect education. He seemed to think that something might be hoped from the influence the princess might obtain over her husband. He had had what he described as two *most interesting* conversations with Prince Napoleon.<sup>1</sup> The latter during his stay last winter at Berlin had carefully avoided ever touching upon a political topic, but on the present occasion (at Turin) he called upon the Crown Prince for the avowed purpose of talking politics with him. He described himself as heart and soul in the camp of those who desired peace, and as the uncompromising enemy of the party whose daily occupation it was to urge the Emperor to war. He looked upon a war

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon, Prince Joseph Charles Paul (nick-named Prince Plon-Plon), b. 1822, d. 1891, son of King Jerome Bonaparte, m. 1859, Clotilde, daughter of King Victor Emmanuel.

between France and Germany as the most terrible calamity that could befall Europe. It would lead to torrents of blood being shed without resolving any question, or, whatever were its issue, leaving anything behind it but a legacy of future wars, and would be equivalent to the destruction of a century's progress and civilisation. He appeared to consider the danger of war as very real. Marshal Niel exercised an immense influence over the vacillating mind of his cousin (Louis Napoleon), and although he describes the latter as desiring peace, he (Prince Napoleon) did not seem to consider it at all unlikely that the counsels of those who desired war would not at length prevail. He (P. N.) knew Niel very intimately, and had had a long conversation with him on his return from Germany. He (Niel) desired ardently a war with Germany, and felt no doubt as to the result. He argues that from the knowledge which was possessed at the War Office they knew for certain that on the first cannon-shot there would be a general rising in Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein. Prince Napoleon had remarked to him that on a cannon-shot being fired the Prussians would not require more than a battalion of Landwehr in Hanover, instead of the *corps d'armée* they had now, and that the Hanoverians now in the Prussian army would fight with just the same intensity against Napoleon III. as the Hanoverians in the English army had fought against Napoleon I.

'The conversation between the Crown Prince and Prince Napoleon appears to have ended by their entering into a kind of covenant, each for his part to do his utmost, one on the right, the other on the left bank of the Rhine. I particularly asked the Crown Prince whether it was now his opinion that the King and Bismarck, and especially the latter, were honestly desirous of avoiding war, and he answered most emphatically that both the King and Bismarck were most keenly anxious for peace, and would do all in their power to preserve it. This reply is especially worthy of notice, for upon my putting the same question to the Crown Prince when I saw him in Berlin in January he by no means spoke so unreservedly as regards Bismarck's peaceful inclinations. It has been all along my own con-

viction, based upon reliable data gathered from different quarters, that about the only thing Bismarck thoroughly dreads is a passage of arms with France, and that he will avoid it if he possibly can. As the Crown Prince is, although slow in coming to his conclusions, usually right in the conclusions he arrives at, I think it important to note his present emphatic declaration that Bismarck means peace.'

In spite of the continuance of his work at Vienna in connection with the treaty negotiations, and of frequent absences from his post caused by visits to England and Berlin, Morier found Darmstadt more and more uncongenial. He had only accepted the appointment under the impression that it would prove transitory, but as time wore on and he saw no signs of his being moved he began to realise the sacrifice which he had been called upon to make. Without any real political work to do, cut off from all chances of distinguishing himself, his principal function consisted, as he bitterly complained to Jowett, in attending and certifying the births of princes and princesses. Placed, moreover, at Darmstadt on the pay of a secretary of legation, with all the expenses of a *chef de mission*, the financial stress caused by constant royal entertaining forced upon him by his position proved a burden heavier than he was able to bear. He acutely felt the load of debt which had thus been put upon him, and the necessity of having in a great measure to sacrifice his children's prospects. His health, too, never very good, now completely gave way under the strain of climate and disappointment, 'long wearying body-and-soul-withering gout attacks, weeks of bed and a few days up, and then relapse, and a week in and then out again, and so on *ad infinitum*.'

To his father he wrote :—

' You have, thank God, on the whole, enjoyed such good health through life, that I can quite understand your not being able to realise what it is to have, at forty-two years of age, when in the prime of one's mental vigour, to look the fact in the face that one is a hopeless invalid for the rest of one's life, and that an alternation between weeks

of bed and weeks of crippled semi-exertion is the prospect before one.'

He was therefore passionately desirous of a change of post, and in May 1868, hearing that the secretaryship of the Embassy at Vienna might become vacant, he applied for it, pointing out to Lord Stanley that during the large portion of his diplomatic career he had been employed in the Austrian Empire, of which the four consecutive years on the Austrian Tariff Commission had given him a professional knowledge of commercial and industrial facts in connection with the Austrian Empire, with special reference to the trade with England, which no other person, whether Englishman or Austrian, had ever been placed in a position to obtain; also, that when he was attached to the Embassy at Vienna from 1853 to 1858 he was engaged in making journeys in, and reporting on, the military frontier on the Slav provinces of the Empire and the contiguous Turkish provinces, a country daily occupying more and more attention in connection with the Eastern policy, and had learned something of the Slav language for the purpose; lastly, that he had resided four months at Pesth to report on the state of affairs in Hungary and the rest of the Empire, to say nothing of the personal acquaintance he had thereby made with all the leading political men now playing a foremost part in the affairs of that country.

'Hence out of the fifteen years I have served in diplomacy,' he wrote to Lord Stanley, 'I have been employed nine, either wholly or in part, in Austria, and that under circumstances which have compelled me to acquire an amount of knowledge in regard to that Empire, which I do not believe any foreign diplomatist has had similar opportunities of doing. With my morbid craving for professional activity, you will believe and understand how desirous I am, in the present extraordinary crisis for better or for worse in the affairs of that country, to be employed there. If the post of secretary at Vienna becomes vacant I would humbly beg you to give some consideration to these exceptional qualifications.'



This application met with no more success than did the intervention of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess who had interceded on his behalf.

'I was never sanguine of the result,' wrote he to Stockmar, referring to this, 'and can therefore honestly say that I am not disappointed; but though we all know in the abstract that we must die, it can never be pleasant to be told by the doctor that this is to happen in forty-five minutes' time. It is just this *a posteriori* certainty about my fate, as compared with what was before a mere inductive certainty, which I confess somewhat depresses me. I now see that after fourteen years of very hard and conscientious work, I have before me the seventeen seniors, just exactly as if I had done nothing all the time but clerk's work of the most ungrammatical kind. But the worst part of the lesson is the other, viz., that whereas in every other profession thorough conscientious labour at mastering a subject is almost sure, sooner or later, to bring its own reward, in mine it is fatal to advancement. I have often been taunted by old hands in the Service for being such a fool as to write about those damned Germans as if I really cared about them! How wisely they spoke! . . . My only chance now lies in giving up all connection with Arminius and his countrymen, and making my way as quickly as possible out of the Teutoburger Wald.'

Seeing no prospect of any change for the better, and feeling that his life during its best years was being absolutely and completely wasted, he reluctantly made up his mind that there was no alternative for him but to leave the public service and devote his energies and talents to some other employment. 'You only want a little pruning and a little more sustained connection, to be a very eloquent and able writer,' Jowett had often told him; and a literary career, with the ultimate view of entering Parliament, now became the goal of his ambition.

It was at this period, while this determination was strong in his mind, that the course of his ideas was entirely altered by Lord Stanley's intimating to him the possibility of his succeeding Mr. Hammond, then Permanent Under-Secretary

for Foreign Affairs, when the latter retired. Such a prospect opened up vistas of being able to assist in that reform of the Foreign Office which for so long had appeared to him a desideratum of the first magnitude. No one more than he was aware 'to what an extent the diplomatic service, or at least all that was healthy within it, was demoralised and paralysed by the total absence of anything like intelligent interest, or even intelligent guidance, on the part of the Foreign Office.'

He had himself felt so acutely their total lack of sympathy in all his aims and ideals, and their non-appreciation of his most strenuous labours; he had 'at times suffered so from the morbid irritation which those only can understand who, past the prime of life, have to submit silently to the humours of a *pur sang* British bureaucrat,' that he looked forward with eagerness to the day when he might help 'to be able to bring the digestive organs of the Foreign Office into a healthier relation with the diplomatic feeding organs,' as he expressed it, and to break down 'the specific Foreign Office traditions which stick like some incurable cutaneous disease to the walls of Downing Street.'

This hope led him to give up all thoughts of leaving diplomacy, and sent him back to Darmstadt resolved to endure, as best he could, a life of dull routine amidst the petty intrigues of a petty German capital, and the constant strain caused by ill-health and financial embarrassment.

## CHAPTER XXII

## LITERARY WORK AND DIPLOMATIC REFORM

DEBARRED by force of circumstances from any serious professional work, Morier now threw all his energy into literary efforts, and the next two years were marked by the production of the greater part of his more important writings: an article on the 'Reconstruction of Germany,' published anonymously in the *North British Review* of March 1869, attracted much interest at the time, whilst a Blue-book report on 'Co-operation as applied to Credit in connection with the Schultze Delitzsch Credit Bank,' became a classic on the subject. Another classic work was his 'Essay on Agrarian Legislation in Prussia,' in the Cobden Club Series, which, as he wrote later to Jowett—

'undoubtedly initiated that historical study of agrarian facts so powerfully taken up by Maine, and which has had a very considerable, though not altogether good, influence on Irish land legislation. Here, however, I should wish to put in, parenthetically, a good word for one of my greatest and most constant objects, that of obtaining an international light on all subjects of common interest to the units of the civilised world. Solely by my thorough study of Stein's legislation, I was able to point out, when I wrote the essay in 1869, that the two rocks to be avoided in legislating for Ireland were double ownership and a recognition of the marketable value of the good-will of a farm—that is tenant-right independently of improvements. It is on these two rocks that Gladstone's legislation has been wrecked. Thirdly, I insisted on peasant proprietorship as a *tertium quid*, and did all I could to urge the enforcement of Bright's clauses when they were so shamefully allowed to atrophise.'

When engaged on this essay, he wrote to Mallet :—

‘ The one pleasant thing I have got out of my work is the having thoroughly cleared up my ideas as to what requires to be done in England in regard to land, viz., agitation *à outrance* for a simple system of land registration, and the transfer of land by public registration, instead of our simply awful present private system of land conveyancing (England, as you know, is the country of Free Trade, I suppose exchanges in the commodity called land are not to be reckoned *trade*), and the absolute doing away of entails and settlements. It is a great mercy to a mind constituted like mine to find that at least *on one subject* all my tendencies and sympathies, my brain and my heart, can go arm-in-arm, rollicking forward like a band of Bacchanals. For I am conservative, as you know, in my heart, and I believe to carry this legislation would be the most conservative thing that could be done in England. Secondly, I am a political economist, but there are many points on which I am beginning to feel myself at war with received political economical dogmas, but on this I have political economy on my side. For the free exchange in land ought to be the other side of the dogma of free exchange in moveables. Lastly, I am a Radical, and on this question I should have all the Radicals on my side.’

One of the results of his work, during the commercial negotiations in Austria, had been to create in him a great desire to effect far-reaching administrative reforms as regards England’s commercial policy, and to imbue him with strong opinions as to the lines on which that policy should be carried out.

‘ For the last three years and under two administrations I have been engaged on work immediately connected with the commercial policy of the British Empire, and my thoughts have in consequence been almost without intermission occupied with the first principles that ought to guide that policy, and with the practical details connected with the working of our present international apparatus in regard to questions of commercial policy. Certain definite

views have, as the results of this meditation and observation, strongly impressed themselves on my mind, and views thus arrived at, viz., by the conscientious and exclusive concentration of an individual human intelligence on a given subject, are always worthy of being taken into consideration.

' First view. That a fatal hindrance in the way of our having a commercial policy at all, or its prospering if we had one, lies in the organic malformation of the administrative instruments which should give effect to that policy.

' As our administrative machinery is at present constituted, no international commercial step can be taken otherwise than through the Foreign Office *and* the Board of Trade. Thus there is permanently established a *dualism* (I will not call it an *antagonism*) which theory and practice have long since established, as regards all branches of administration, to be absolutely fatal both to a fruit-bringing initiative, and to an efficient executive.

' Second view. That this dualism should cease by the amalgamation of the function of the Board of Trade and of the Foreign Office in one strong commercial department *in the Foreign Office*, the body and soul now separate uniting as it were in one intelligent and conscious being, and the Foreign Minister becoming in fact, as he is now only in theory, responsible before Parliament and the country for the commercial policy of the Empire.

' I feel convinced that all which I urge would be at once admitted by "The Powers that be," by which I mean public opinion, bureaucrats, and statesmen, if unfortunately these same powers were not one and all under the blight of the economical fallacy that Free Trade implies having no commercial policy, or rather the purely *negative* policy of letting things be until Providence and common sense (neither of which has as yet shown much inclination to stir in the matter) will be pleased to interfere and bring other nations besides ourselves to acknowledge the saving truth of the Gospel according to Free Trade. For this fallacy none are more responsible than the politico-economists themselves, and more particularly old M'Culloch, who with his dying breath in the last edition of his dictionary raved against the French treaty in the style of a papal encyclical.

This fallacy has, as far as I am aware, never been properly exposed, and as my whole case turns upon it, I must point out its true features.

‘The two gouty legs on which it has hobbled into notice : first, a scientific misconception of the nature of international exchanges. Second, an historical muddle-headedness in regard to the nature of commercial treaties.

‘As regards the first of these, old M’Culloch will, I hope, turn round in his grave, when I say that the upshot of his argument against the French treaty amounts to an endorsement of the mercantile theory of the great central economical fallacy of the eighteenth century, *that exchanges can be permanently effected between goods and money*; for, except upon this theory, it cannot be even argued that anything has been done towards increased exchanges between two countries (both of which have hitherto been girt about by a prohibitive or protectionist tariff) by the removal *from one only* of its prohibitive or protectionist girdle.

‘The fallacy becomes at once transparent if we take an extreme case and eliminate the phenomenon of money, which we all know does not touch the vitals of the question of exchange.

‘Suppose there were only two countries in the world—A and B—each with a prohibitive system. Of course no exchange could take place between them. A becomes, however, suddenly bitten with the desire of importing from B, and B equally desirous of exporting to A. A thereupon opens its ports, B, which only cares about exporting, keeping its ports closed. To the astonishment of A and B, who have not read Adam Smith, and who are friends of M’Culloch, exchanges remain just as impossible as before, because B, not wishing to make a present of its produce to A, and A, on account of the prohibitive system maintained by B, being unable to export its produce to B, A has no means of paying for its imports from B.

‘The M’Cullochs and Do-nothings can preach till they are black in the face that the Government of A need not trouble itself about the producers who can look after their own interests, that it need therefore look only to the interests of the consumers, and that having opened up every

access to the markets of the latter, its work is done, and it may put its hands into its pockets, unless B can be got to open up its ports, not one hundredweight of its produce will find its way to the consumers of A. And this brings us to my great doctrine, which I cannot find has yet been preached, that it is in the interests of the *British consumer*, which requires that every effort should be made by the British Government to break down the protectionist tariffs of the world. So little are these elementary principles of political economy present to the mind of men, even those most in the habit of dealing with economic questions, that Gladstone himself said to me à propos of our Austrian treaty, that he did not see what particular good England would derive from a treaty with Austria analogous to the treaty with France, quite forgetting that the invaluable products of Austria were just as much excluded from the British market by *her* tariff as if the protectionist barricades were erected along our own shores.

' To conclude (as I never can help doing) with a metaphor.

' International exchanges are just as impossible by a mere one-sided adoption of Free Trade as the circulation of the blood would be impossible by a system of veins alone, or of arteries alone. Unless the venous blood is being constantly exchanged for the arterial blood, and the arterial blood for the venous, and the valves *into* and *out* of *each* of the *two* auricles of the heart are perpetually opening, no circulation can take place ; and *one* *ligature* suffices at once to stop the circulation whether it be applied to the great trunk vein or to the pulmonary artery. In the same way, importations into a country are just as effectually prevented by the ligature of a prohibitive tariff applied to the country *from* which exports are derived, as by the ligature of a prohibitive system applied to the country *into* which it is desired to import.

' Of course the hypothetical case of A and B is an extreme one, but the principle which rules it, rules all similar cases in however modified a form.

The soi-disant economist Do-nothings, spell-bound by the word *treaty*, have transferred the legitimate horror they have of the *old-fashioned treaty of commerce*, of which the

Methuen treaty is the type, to the *modern treaty* of commerce, of which Cobden's treaty is the type, which is very much like confounding black with white, or light with darkness. The essential characteristic of the old treaty of commerce was to establish commercial monopolies between the contracting parties against the rest of the world. The essential characteristic of the modern treaty of commerce is to remove restrictions on trade for the benefit of all, and by the most favoured nation clause, which is the key-stone of the modern treaty, to cut through the vital nerve of commercial monopoly. The modern commercial treaty belongs to the same family as the anti-slave trade treaty, and the free navigation of rivers treaty, and constitutes one of the few landmarks in the progress of an international as distinct from a mere national or parochial civilisation which the age has to show.

'However much we may wish politically to slip away from international intimacy with European countries, and to secede eastwards, making of Queen Victoria a sort of Queen of Sheba, we cannot help international commercial relations daily growing up with an increasingly rampant growth.'

Morier's aim was to establish a commercial department in the Foreign Office, of which Mallet—of whose great capacity, knowledge, and experience, he had the highest admiration—should be the head.

Convinced Free-Trader as Morier was, and 'disciple of Cobden,' as he was proud to call himself, it was not of the latter's early policy of isolation, but of his later treaty policy as initiated by the French treaty of 1860 that he was the strenuous advocate. To the, as they called themselves, more orthodox school of Free-Traders who denounced all commercial treaties as heresies, and of which Mr. Robert Lowe,<sup>1</sup> then Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the most brilliant expounder, he was a confirmed opponent. He considered their tenets as fallacies, and that in demonstrating the fact that exports are limited by imports, and disregarding the other side, viz., that imports are limited

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Lord Sherbrooke



by exports, they were preaching half truths only. To refute their arguments, he wrote a series of letters addressed to the *Manchester Examiner*, afterwards reprinted in pamphlet form under the title of 'Commercial Treaties, Free Trade, and Internationalism: Four Letters by a Disciple of Richard Cobden.' The authorship remained undisclosed, not even such an intimate friend as Mallet being aware of the fact.

That the Chancellor of the Exchequer's policy was utterly opposed to the true spirit of Cobdenism was an opinion strongly held by Morier and Mallet, who, though sound Liberals, were at one in their appreciation of Mr. Gladstone's administration. 'Seriously, I am nearly desperate,' wrote Mallet to Morier on 24th March 1870. 'The utter contempt with which this Government treats all international questions, the evident determination of Lowe to strangle out Cobden's work, Bright's collapse, Forster's fiasco, and Gladstone's entire absence of control and sagacity point to one result. It is now, I firmly believe, inevitable, the entire ruin of our international policy, and the loss of all our European prestige.

'There is not a man in either House who has the dimmest perception of the urgent wants of our day.

'I have one consolation, that the day of reckoning is coming for this Ministry, who have, in my opinion, covered themselves with ridicule and blundered in everything they have done, and never even pretended to have any policy on any subject except Ireland; and here, what is the result? Instead of pacification, we are gagging the Press and suppressing trial by jury. It would have been far wiser and more manly to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, as better men have done before them. They have no foreign policy, no colonial policy, no financial policy, no commercial policy or worse than none. No Poor Law policy, except the increase of rates. No church policy, no education policy. The whole thing is utter, hopeless chaos, without a single man at the helm or even on the look-out, and we are drifting steadily on to the rocks.

'I assure you, I go about like a man in a dream, and sometimes wonder whether I am mad, so completely isolated am I in all political speculations.'

In contrast with this opinion of Mallet's is Lord Morley's account of Gladstone's view ; for in his life of Gladstone,<sup>1</sup> we find written :—

‘Of this Cabinet Mr. Gladstone always spoke as one of the best instruments for government that ever were constructed. Nearly everybody in it was a man of talent, character and force, and showed high capacity for public business. In one or two cases, conformably to the old Greek saying, office showed the man ; showed that mere cleverness, apart from judgment and discretion, is only too possible, and that good intention only makes failure and incapacity in carrying the intention out so much the more mortifying. The achievements of this Cabinet as a whole, as we shall see, are a great chapter in the history of reform and the prudent management of national affairs. It forms one of the best vindications of the Cabinet system, and of the powers of the Minister who created, guided, controlled and inspired it.’

Of Gladstone, Morier had long ago formed the opinion, that he was ‘hopelessly deficient both in critical power and judgment. Impulsiveness, excessive susceptibility to the emotion of the hour, he possesses in an exaggerated degree. Many-sided, if you will, but then it is by a perpetual succession of one-sidednesses.’

Every succeeding visit that Morier paid to England only made him feel more and more out of sympathy with the parochialism and insularity of British party politics, and served to confirm ‘the feeling that there is a hopeless gulf between a cosmopolitan politician and an English politician, and that there was no chance of my finding access to the innermost soul of my countrymen, who seemed to me like so many web-footed fowls that shall be nameless, knowing nothing and caring for nothing beyond the common on which they grazed.’

He openly confessed to being so constituted that ‘merely touching on political or social subjects with ordinary Tories gives me a feeling as though the skin of my back were shooting out into porcupine quills, with the case not much better when I converse with a Whig.’

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. page 255.

Mallet and he had always done their best to prevent the Cobden Club, in which they were much interested, from degenerating into a mere party association, and to make every one who sympathised with Cobden's work as a Free Trader welcome, whatever their political opinion. In February 1870 a rumour reached Morier at Darmstadt that it was proposed to elect Bismarck a member.

*Morier to Mallet*

'DARMSTADT, February 21st, 1870.

'I am totally at a loss to understand on what principle of "unnatural selection" you propose to elect Bismarck, of all God's creatures under the sun, a member of the Cobden Club. In the name of common-sense let me ask, what is the *raison d'être* of this club? I joined it under the impression that the object of the association was to collect together all such persons as were considered likely to illustrate by their faith and works the particular principles which Cobden had fought for all his life. Now, of these principles, most undoubtedly, the main or pivotable one was that the international relations of mankind should be ruled by mutual love and good-will, arbitration, and the interchange of cotton goods and other good offices, and not by the *ultima ratio* of the stronger biceps and the newest breechloader. Whatever good Bismarck may have wrought in his generation to himself, his country and mankind, it is certain that he represents, *par excellence*, the exactly contrary view, and that, to such an extent, that when our great-grandchildren have to get up the history of the nineteenth century, they will to a certainty find Cobden labelled as the representative of the one doctrine—exchange of cotton goods and Christian love internationalism—and Bismarck as the representative of the opposite doctrine—exchange of hard knocks and blood and iron internationalism.

'On what principle are we therefore to elect him? Is it perchance that we wish to give a glorious example of the tiger lying down with the lamb? But in that case let me observe that the offer must come from the tiger, and that he should previously be made to furnish very substantial

guarantees of good behaviour. For the lamb to make the offer to the tiger would only prove that it had precociously arrived at the mature silliness of a full grown sheep. If you persist therefore in electing Bismarck, I must request that my name may be first withdrawn from the committee, should it still be on it. I would rather not be included in the horse laughter with which Bismarck will greet the eccentric invitation. As regards Delbrück<sup>1</sup> and Camphausen,<sup>2</sup> I should say the former was eligible. He is on the whole a Free Trader, and was associated with the Prussian treaty with France, the first-born of a series of commercial conventions brought into the world by the procreative force of the Anglo-French treaty. Camphausen has not yet sufficiently shown what his principles are to make him eligible. It seems to me strangely undignified to go sending round begging letters to everybody and anybody. If the club were what it should be, viz., a *bona fide* representative of Cobdenite opinions, so that everybody who joined it thereby, as it were, underwent the baptism of the Gospel according to St. Cobden, and pledged himself for life to live according to the light of the gospel, it would be an altogether different matter, and we might seek to make converts, even at the risk of making ourselves ridiculous. But inasmuch as not even the English members, perhaps half a dozen excepted, have anything whatever Cobdenic about them, membership implies nothing and involves nothing. Now our object should be to remedy this state of things and not to intensify it by these wholesale elections. I am writing in a great hurry, and may have expressed myself more strongly than I should have done if I had more leisure. But them's my sentiments.'

This brilliant idea was afterwards found to have emanated from the brain of Mr. T. B. Potter, the secretary of the club, who, not content with wishing to enrol Bismarck as a member, one day disembarked at Rome with a port-manteau full of Free Trade tracts, bent on converting

<sup>1</sup> Delbrück, Martin Friedrich Rudolf: Prussian Liberal statesman, Free Trader, negotiator of commercial Zollverein treaties. Minister of State, 1868-1876.

<sup>2</sup> Camphausen, Ludolf: Prussian Liberal statesman, Minister of Finance, 1869-1878.

the Pope, Pio Nono, to Cobdenism, and enlisting him also as member of the club.

Another work undertaken by Morier at this time was the translation into English of the *Life of Baron Stockmar* by his son, a task which he looked upon as a labour of love, but which eventually the stress of the events of the years 1870 and 1871 obliged him to abandon. It was subsequently carried out by his old friend, Professor Max Müller.

The appointment of Layard, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as Minister in Madrid, and the subject of diplomatic reform on which a committee of the House of Commons was then sitting, were questions causing much agitation amongst those interested at the time, and a letter from Arthur Russell, then M.P. for Tavistock, asking Morier for his views on these matters drew forth the following reply :—

‘DARMSTADT, February 1870.

‘In nothing is the *mieux* more *l’ennemi du bien* than in letter-writing. I have been trying to throw my thoughts on the diplomatic service into a fine ‘together-hanging’ picture all in correct perspective, with the lights properly distributed and the different degrees of prominence accurately apportioned amongst my figures, and the result is that I have spent several mornings smoking many pipes and balancing myself on an American chair, yet committing nothing to paper. I will therefore change my tactics and just put down *durcheinander* whatever comes uppermost, and when three sheets are full, send them off and begin another lot. I will put down my reflections in the shape of imaginary questions and replies by and to an intelligent Committee man.

*Committee man* : Do you consider that the appointment of Mr. Layard to Madrid involved an injustice to the diplomatic service, and if so, in what did that injustice consist ?

‘*Der Dicke* : <sup>1</sup> It was undoubtedly felt and resented by the diplomatic service as an injustice, and I myself consider that it was one, though in the numerous letters published

<sup>1</sup> Morier’s sobriquet amongst his friends.

at the time of the appointment and addressed to the newspapers by mortified diplomatists, the real seat of the injustice was, as far as I am aware, never pointed out. After publishing a number of individual moans and groans with a corresponding number of sharp retorts from persons who approved of the appointment, the *Times* printed a short letter, signed "Fair Play," in that large round type with which the public is informed that the oracle has at last spoken and that further discussion is idle. The oracle on this occasion was of the true British type. It left the abstract merits of the question absolutely untouched, and pulled out a precedent. In the early part of this century certain Under-Secretaries had been named envoys, *ergo* it was right that Mr. Layard having been an Under-Secretary should be named an envoy. "Fair Play," as appears from his own statement, is a very old gentleman. Like all persons of his age, he has a clear recollection of what took place fifty years ago, and a very hazy one of what took place ten years ago. The want of justice of which the diplomatic service complains consists in this, that by no act of their own or of the office which they serve, the "status" of the diplomatic service as it existed at the time referred to by "Fair Play," was by an Act of the House of Commons changed, and that the members of the profession having adapted themselves to this change and cut their cloth to the parliamentary pattern supplied to them, the executive, without warning given and without consulting Parliament, reverted, in the case of Mr. Layard, to the old system described by "Fair Play."

'After ten years of a strict seniority system, conscientiously applied by the F.O., in obedience to the recommendations of the committee of 1860, the rule is capriciously departed from, not with any public object in view, but to suit the personal convenience of the Cabinet. Layard is not appointed *because* he is fit for the post, which he undoubtedly is, but *in spite* of his being fit for it. He and Ayrton can't hit it off, and Ayrton, being the greater bully of the two, is made Chief Commissioner of Works, the diplomatic service paying the *pots cassés*. This (*N.B.*) is done, not by the F.O., which everybody knows was

violently opposed to the measure, but by the Premier. The F.O. therefore still considers itself bound by the seniority system imposed upon it by the House of Commons. The matter is not made a bit more just to the profession if it is argued or laid down that Layard was appointed to Madrid because of his fitness for the place, for the following expanding rule would then be established, viz., that the fittest persons for particular posts are to be freely selected out of all Her Majesty's subjects, *except from among H.M. diplomatic servants*. If the fittest person happened to belong to that class and to be at the head of the list for promotion, he might be taken, but if he happened to be second or third in the list, then the next fittest person is to be selected out of H.M. non-diplomatic subjects, *quod est absurdum*.

'The injustice, therefore, which we consider we have a right to complain of, consists in this: whereas, before 1860, we entered the profession at our own risk and peril as regards the chances of advancement, the recommendations of the committee of 1860, though not amounting to a legislative enactment, still partook sufficiently of the character of such a measure to place us morally in the position of "covenanted" servants of the Crown. Rightly or wrongly, we have been led to believe that we held our places in virtue of a contract with the State, in a word, that we were leaseholders, not tenants at will. The parties to the contract were the House of Commons and the Service, not the executive and the Service, and we consider an arbitrary departure from the conditions of the contract made in virtue of a supposed (but really non-existing) full powers granted by the House of Commons to its pet Premier without the award of compensation as a very real injustice. This is the moral side of the question, but there is a material side to it. By giving to the diplomatic service the distinctive character of a profession, the committee of 1860 made it a matter of investment upon the same kind of rules as govern an insurance office. It created vested interests. As long as there was no rule about promotion, there were no elements of calculation; as soon as the rule of seniority was set up, those elements were there, and with them the vested interests came into

being. This especially applies to the case of marriages. I believe many men married who would not have married if they had not felt themselves sure within ten years or so of their marriage to be secretaries of Embassy, and within twenty years or so to be Ministers.

'The following may be considered a fair average picture. In the first ten years of his professional life a diplomatist cost his father from £300 to £400 a year. Probably at from thirty-five to forty he will come into possession of his fortune, whatever that may be, probably for a man who remains in the career, from £800 to £1000 a year. With this, and a first secretaryship of Legation, he will (having the certainty within a certain number of years of deriving much more from his profession) marry, *i.e.* he would marry on from £1200 to £1500 a year; and, *with a prospective margin before him*, he would be justified in doing so. What I mean is this, he would, except at St. Petersburg, perhaps, be able to live on £1500 a year as long as he had no children or only very little ones, but he could not provide for extraordinary expenses, such as the break-up of his establishment on change of post, etc., *except by borrowing*. He looks forward to the time when he is secretary of Embassy (when his income has got up to £2000 a year, and under favourable circumstances of chargé d'affaireship to £2000 or £3000 a year), to pay the borrowed money back. If he can't manage it, then he will be able to manage it when he becomes Minister, *i.e.* he will then live on his official income and pay the debts he has contracted out of his private income. This, I strongly suspect, is the natural course of things in nine cases out of ten in married diplomatists. I should very much doubt if amongst the present married secretaries of Legation any could be found who had not at least £2000 or £3000 of debt which they considered themselves certain to be able to pay off before their death by merely living on sufficiently long to step into their predecessor's shoes. You will at once realise in what way a sudden departure from the seniority system affects the material interests of this class of persons. Layard's appointment probably seriously affected the pecuniary status of some half-dozen of Her Majesty's most loyal subjects.



'It cannot therefore be denied that a material injustice was done to the service by the appointment in question.

'I have looked at the question hitherto wholly from the standpoint of the profession. But in my code of morals this is a wholly wrong way to look at it. The profession exists for the good of the country, not for the good of the individuals who compose it. If, therefore, Layard's appointment had been made for the good of the country, and *was* for that good, I should heartily approve of it. There are only one hundred and twenty-three of us altogether. If the good of the country required it, I should see no harm in our all being put into a *noyade* and sunk off the Isle of Dogs. But Layard's appointment was notoriously not for the good of the country. It was for the good of Mr. Ayrton. Therefore the shape of the public account is as follows :—

'A Minister of Public Works possessing all the qualities which most unfit him for the post : credit side.

'Demoralisation of all the best elements in diplomacy, and proportional diminution of their public efficiency : debit side.

'*Committee man* : Do you consider that the changes effected by the committee of 1860 were advantageous to the diplomatic service, and useful to the country ?

'*Der Dicke* : Whether or not the individuals composing the service were or were not benefited by the changes seems to be a matter of little interest. As a matter of fact, the dull and plodding, and the poco-curantes were pleased and satisfied—they felt themselves secure of the future. The serious and ambitious men of the profession felt themselves *pro tanto* discouraged, and in a proportional degree the salt of the profession lost its savour. As the former category was necessarily in a numerical majority, the changes of 1860 may be said to have pleased the profession. But again I repeat : this is not the standpoint from which to treat the subject ; not whether the individuals composing a profession are more or less pleased, but whether the corporation as such is in a better or worse condition to do the public work required of it, is the question to be decided. Judged by this standard I have no hesitation in condemning,

root and branch, the changes of 1860. In talking of the changes of 1860, however, I must be understood to mean *die ganze Richtung*, which culminated in the recommendations of that committee, and received parliamentary sanction thereby. That *Richtung* can be described as inspired by a pseudo-humanitarianism, which, occupying itself with the imaginary "*griefs*" of the members of the profession, altogether lost sight of the objects of the profession, and treated diplomacy as if it were a *Selbstzweck*. The logical carrying-out of its own *Standpunkt* would, however, have clearly led to such absurdities, that it recoiled before its consequences, and so it did not even realise its own pet objects.

'The peculiarity of the diplomatic profession is the number and importance of the places with a maximum of responsibility as compared with the number of the subordinate places. Out of one hundred and twenty individuals thirty-one are ambassadors, envoys, or *chargés d'affaires*, *i.e.* people permanently entrusted with the representation of the political and commercial interests of Great Britain. *Cæsarem portant et fortunas Cæsaris.* Twenty-seven are secretaries of Embassy or Legation, *i.e.* persons very liable to be entrusted for a longer or a shorter space of time with the representation. It is like an army, two-thirds of which would be composed of general officers, either actually operating on their own account in an enemy's country, or liable at any moment to be called upon to do so. To establish for a body of this kind the same sort of rules which you find yourself obliged to apply to bodies of men in which about one in ten thousand can possibly get up to a position of first-rate responsibility, is simply absurd. The only possible way of appointing the proper persons to the proper posts is to heap responsibility of the heaviest kind on the Secretary of State, and to give him the largest possible number of persons from amongst whom to choose, plus an educational test which I will not refer to at present. Now what was done by the committee of 1860 was to reduce the responsibility of the Secretary of State to a minimum, as well as enormously to diminish the area from which selection could be made.

' As long as the system of unpaid attachéships flourished, there was no limit to the number appointed. They became attachés knowing that the State did not in any way covenant with them to become anything more. Little by little, however, they began to be paid (itself an anomaly, as they did not hold a commission), they got a claim to advancement, and so little by little the *pli* of advancement by seniority took place. Now the committee, instead of seeing that this was a serious abuse, consecrated and recognised the custom. The fatal thing they did, however, was to create the rule that after four years the attaché should be paid. By this desperate mistake the number of attachés was strictly limited to the number of third secretaries, for which Parliament granted money, so that an ambassador or envoy must die or be pensioned before one unpaid attaché can be appointed! See how that acts. You know well enough that the number of good men for this sort of work is exceptionally unequal. One year there may be five or six first-rate men. Under the old system they could all have been appointed. The periods for which they would have served would have differed, but as there was no rule as to the number of years for which they should remain unpaid, they could all go into the profession. Now, *there being no vacancy*, they are sent about their business. (I know numberless cases.) Next year there is one vacancy which must be filled up, and very probably there is no good candidate and *der erste beste* is appointed. The only system (one which I shall explain at greater length later) is absolute liberty to the Secretary of State to appoint *any number of unpaid attachés* without any kind of entrance examination being required, and a very high standard of examination previous to emerging from the unpaid attaché to the secretary with a commission.'

Morier was called upon to give evidence before the committee, and for this purpose proceeded to England in June, where he found himself when the Franco-German War broke out in July.

## CHAPTER XXIII

## THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

SINCE the commencement of 1870 an uneasy feeling had begun to prevail that the long-feared conflict between France and Prussia could not be far distant. In Germany it was realised, that unless the sacrifices of 1866 were to be wasted, the work of unification must be proceeded with, and that north and south must coalesce. That this unification would lead to war with France was held to be almost a certainty.

Though the secret mission of Lothar Bucher to Madrid to prepare the Hohenzollern candidature was still shrouded in mystery, the appointment of the Duc de Gramont, well known for his strong anti-Prussian sentiments, as French Foreign Minister, and the violent tone adopted in the French Chamber during the debate on the St. Gothard Tunnel Convention, proved that on both sides of the Rhine national feeling was being wrought up to a dangerous degree, and that either side was only awaiting a favourable opportunity to have recourse to the final appeal to arms.<sup>1</sup>

The spring of this year found Morier once more at Carlsbad, where he was constantly in the society of the Crown Prince of Prussia, who was also there taking the waters, and when, shortly afterwards, Morier was laid up with a violent attack of gout, the Crown Prince used to come and sit almost daily by his bedside and discuss with him, not only the great questions affecting his own future and that of Germany, but also his anxieties.

<sup>1</sup> 'Prévost-Paradol told me in 1867: "la guerre entre la France et la Prusse est inévitable, elle ne durera pas longtemps, cela sera un duel. Si nous sommes vainqueurs nous prendrons le Rhin, si la Prusse est victorieuse vous prendrez l'Alsace; et là M. de Bismarck trouvera des députés qui seront aussi prêts à le soutenir qu'ils soutiennent maintenant le Gouvernement Impérial."—Dr. Brandis to Morier, 28th October 1870.

This led Morier to send the following warning to Lord Clarendon, then Foreign Secretary :—

‘CARISBAD, April 25th, 1870.

‘I learn on unexceptionable authority that Bismarck is occupying himself with the thought of proclaiming the German Empire, and investing his Royal Master with the Imperial diadem, and that confidential *pourparlers* have been exchanged on the subject with Bavaria within the last fortnight. The immediate cause of this sudden train of thought, which I should mention was already in motion as far back as last December, is the *impasse* face to face with which the Northern Chancellor feels he will be placed next year at the meeting of the second triennial Parliament of the North German Confederation. You will remember that when the present North German Constitution was voted a compromise was arrived at between the majority of the constituent Parliament and the Federal Chancellor, to the effect that the military budget in men and money was to remain fixed at one per cent. of the population, and 125 thalers per man, until the year 1871, when the rights of the Parliament to vote the supplies for the army should revive. It was, however, expressly stipulated that the one per cent. of the population and the 125 thalers should continue to be paid until a different quota had been fixed upon by a law, *i.e.* until the Parliament and the executive were of one mind as to the proposed alteration. As it lies altogether within the power of Prussia by her preponderating influence in the Federal Council to negative any vote the Parliament may come to in regard to the army estimates, it stands to reason that she can go on indefinitely levying the present quota of men and the present taxes for their maintenance. Now two things are certain to happen : first that there will be an overwhelming majority for considerable reductions, as throughout Germany there is the unanimous feeling that the country is being ruined by the present excessive military expenditure. Secondly, that no power, human or divine, will make the King give up one man or one thaler.

‘Bismarck, therefore, sees before him the prospect of a conflict of first-rate magnitude hopelessly embarrassing to

his foreign policy, and certain to jeopardise all the results as yet attained by his highly artificial internal machinery, and he is beating about for some *deus ex machina* who shall show him the way out of his difficulties.

‘My own impression is that he will find the proposed plan wholly unrealisable, and that he will not adventure himself upon it. No more unpropitious moment for such a plan could be conceived. The anti-Prussian stream is running higher at the present moment in South Germany than I have ever known it since 1866, and it is exactly on this very question of militarism that the feeling runs so high. To proclaim the Empire as the means of greatly reducing the military establishment is an idea just conceivable, but to proclaim it with the object of keeping up the military establishments which are crushing the nation back would be a *non sequitur*, which with all her strength Prussia would be unable to attempt.

‘April 27th.

‘Since writing the above I have again seen my informant who tells me that Bismarck has for the moment given up ventilating the idea of the Empire. I, nevertheless, send what I have written as it is always useful to be acquainted with even the temporary tenants of so important a brain as Bismarck’s.’

Lord Clarendon, in acknowledging this letter on 4th May, told Morier that, in reply to a statement of Benedetti’s,<sup>1</sup> assurances had been given by the King that there was no truth in the report that the two Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse Darmstadt were about to enter the Confederation, and therefore he considered that the whole project had been suspended, but not abandoned.

‘May 1870.

‘Since writing the letter, which you were so good as to reply to on the 4th inst., I have had the opportunity of ratifying the information I sent you in regard to Bismarck’s intended Cæsarian operations, and thus corrected, it is in perfect harmony with the declaration made by Benedetti to the King, which you inform me of.

<sup>1</sup> The French Ambassador.

' It was from the Crown Prince of Prussia (who is, or rather was, taking the waters here), that I derived the information contained in my first letter. Nothing could be more distinct than the statement, viz., " Bismarck is occupying himself with the idea of proclaiming the German Empire." He, the Crown Prince, did not know, however, whether the subject had yet been broached to the King (I), he did know that it had been ventilated at Munich. He, himself, had no direct communication with Bismarck, except one of the Chancellor's brusque sallies in a railway carriage returning from a royal *chasse* at Christmas, when Bismarck had suddenly observed to him things were getting into a pass from which nothing but a decisive line of action will extricate them. It is time to take up the idea of the *Empire*.

' Now in German political parlance " the German Empire " and " the Empire " have ever since 1866 meant the union of *non-Austrian* Germany, *i.e.* of the two so-called halves, north and south of the Main, under an Imperial Crown. It was impossible, therefore, for me to guess that anything else was meant, and I reported to you accordingly.

' Some days after I sent my letter, Usedom arrived at Carlsbad straight from Carlsruhe, and gave me the details of a conversation he had had with the Grand Duke of Baden upon the latter's return from Berlin (this visit fell in the second half of April). Bismarck had told the Duke that action of some kind, a move forward, had become matter of absolute necessity, a new Parliament would have to be convoked for '71, and something must be done to show that the whole thing had not gone to sleep. The plan with which he was occupying himself was the proclamation of the German Empire (*N.B.* not the *North German Empire*, but *with the territorial limits of the present North German Confederation*). I spoke the matter over with the Crown Prince who was not aware of this strange reservation. Some days later, however, he received information from Berlin to the effect that Bismarck had had confidential *pourparlers* with the leaders of the National Liberal party, and had broken his plan to them. They insisted on the entrance of Hesse and Baden into the Confederation as a consideration *sine qua non* of the declaration

of the Empire. This, Bismarck declared, was impossible (which exactly tallies with Benedetti's statement to the King), and therefore the whole project fell into the water.'

On Lord Clarendon's death which occurred two months later,<sup>1</sup> he was succeeded as Foreign Secretary by Lord Granville, who, on assuming the seals of office,<sup>2</sup> was informed by Mr. Hammond, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that never during his long experience had he known 'so great a lull in foreign affairs,' and 'that the aspect of Europe was unusually peaceful.'<sup>3</sup> A few days later the war broke out.

Morier, then in England, had hurriedly to return to his post, and on 15th July, the night before his departure, was dining with the Prince of Wales at Marlborough House. Amongst the guests were the Duke of Cambridge and Mr. Delane, the editor of the *Times*.

'During dinner the telegram from Paris announcing the declaration given by the Government in the Corps Législatif was received by Mr. Delane. I was formally *interpellé* and called upon to give my opinion on the "situation," and so I took up a parable and said: "The war could have been prevented if for twenty-four hours the British people could have been furnished with a backbone—it is too late now. France and Germany will have to fight it out alone, it will be the most horrible war the world has ever seen, and it will end by France being thoroughly and completely beaten." The Duke of Cambridge asked what would be the use of a backbone without an army, which we had not got. I ventured to observe that this was an instrument which Germany possessed in great perfection, but that this was not my meaning. What I meant was that there were certain moves on the political chessboard which necessarily led to check-mate, and that good players did not go on playing after these were executed. There was one thing known positively to every one who had to do with European politics during

<sup>1</sup> June 27th.

<sup>2</sup> 6th July.

<sup>3</sup> Statement by Lord Granville in the House of Lords, 11th July (Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, cciii. 3).



the last fifteen years, which was that Louis Napoleon would *never face* a coalition between England and Germany, consequently all that would have been necessary would have been to indicate the move. But for such a coalition, even *in posse*, a backbone was necessary, as mere dolls filled out with bran are not taken into account.'

On 16th July, accompanied by his wife, Morier left London for Darmstadt, everywhere passing through scenes of indescribable confusion heralding the approaching struggle. At the Cologne railway station they were confronted by mountains of heaped-up luggage, the property of French people who, surprised by the declaration of war whilst travelling in Germany, had hurriedly fled over the frontier, leaving their possessions behind them.

Their children were at Schlitz, where their parents, during their visit to England, had left them under the charge of Countess Görtz.

#### *Morier to his Father*

'DARMSTADT, July 20th, 1870, 4 A.M.

'The clouds have thickened to pitchy darkness, the thunder will soon roar and then the terrible bolt will fall—where? It is an anxious time, as you may well conceive. We have had to come to a decision to-day as to the children, and after taking the advice of two old friends of mine, Prussian generals who know perfectly well what is going on, we have determined to fetch them from Schlitz and have them with us. There is little doubt that the Prussians are not yet ready and that a great portion of Germany will be occupied, ourselves amongst the rest, before the decisive battle is fought, which will be somewhere in the interior of Germany. Now all military authorities say that in an open town like Darmstadt and with an official residence, we are safe. A distant country place like Schlitz is *less safe*, and we would run the almost certain risk of being altogether cut off from them, and this would break our hearts. Would to God there had been time to get them to England under your care, but that is out of the question now. Alice is going to-morrow to fetch them, but it is altogether problematical whether the lines of railway will

be open on her return, and in that case she will have to post all the way, a two days' journey at the least. I shall be several days without the possibility of hearing anything about them. I could not go myself as I am obliged to remain at my post. I have been writing all through the night to get an extra messenger off at five this morning, who is to find his way as best he can and return after a two days' stay in London. He is not a messenger, but a partner of our consul at Frankfort, who goes to England to fetch gold, as the panic is so great that no bills are negotiable even at Frankfort. I have asked him to bring me out my balance at Willis' in sovereigns. I have been unable to draw a sixpence since three days ago, and I may at any moment have to bolt with Alice and the children, and unless I have a sum ready at hand in gold I may be put into a terrible fix. All my colleagues here are providing themselves in the same way. My head is spinning as I have written despatches for ten consecutive hours, having been on my feet all day at Frankfort and hardly know what I write.'

And a week later :—

'I am worked off my legs. The French subjects here have been put under my protection, in addition to all the trouble the Britishers give me, and I have the Princess (Alice) besides to attend to, and all sorts of anxieties of the Queen about her other relations, Princess Leiningen, etc., and all the political work just now most interesting.

'The great anxiety I was in when last I wrote is no longer on me. At that time we had nothing between us and the French, and were every day expecting invasion. It is perfectly inconceivable to me that the French did nothing. Why, if even they required additional time to prepare, they ought to have sent in some 30,000 men who would have been absolutely unopposed, and who could have torn up the railways, blown up the bridges, and made the concentration of German troops impossible. Now we have got some 500,000 troops on the right bank of the Rhine between us and the French and we feel perfectly safe. If the Germans are beaten, which I do not believe,

the army will fall back slowly upon us, and there will be no difficulty, I think, in ascertaining beforehand whether there is any chance of actual fighting in the streets, the only thing I really fear, as in a mere occupation we are quite safe in virtue of my official position.'

In Germany enthusiasm for the war was universal. Even the most moderate and liberal-minded hailed it as conducive to German Unity and the good of the country.

'And now this war,' wrote Stockmar to Morier on 19th July, 'blessed and happy war for Germany though it may in the end turn out to be—comes and upsets our equanimity.' Whilst Roggenbach gave as his opinion, 'that with regard to the present war, I hope it will prove a great benefit for the German nation and their unity. . . . The whole Hohenzollern plan was entered into by the King with such *légèreté* and *insouciance*, by Bismarck with his accustomed astuteness and the firm resolution to outdo his antagonists by the temerity of his lies.

'The actual general view of the whole affair as it appears in the newspapers is quite false. Real truth would not be useful at the present moment.'

No sooner had war been declared, than a feeling against England, growing daily in bitterness and intensity, arose as if by magic all over Germany. This was caused by the belief that the British Government was hostile, and by statements that had obtained currency in regard to the material assistance derived by the French from the store-houses of Great Britain. It was generally said that the French expedition to the Baltic would have been impossible but for the contracts entered into with Newcastle firms for the coaling of the French navy, that the well-known want of horses in the French artillery was being mainly supplied by purchases in England and Ireland, and that contracts upon a gigantic scale had been entered into at Birmingham and elsewhere for the ammunition required for the chasse-pot rifle.

On 31st July Morier noted :—

'I have met by such arguments as I could supply the burning reproaches addressed to me by old friends whose

sympathy and love for England have hitherto stood the many tests to which of late years they have been exposed. I have represented the international difficulties in the way of defining contraband of war, and the national impediments which, in a self-governed country like England, rendered impossible the kind of local surveillance by which alone the attempts of a belligerent to provide himself with weapons and ammunition of English manufacture could be effectually prevented. I have pointed out that in a country in which Free Trade has become a cardinal point of the national faith it was next to impossible for the executive to tamper with the unfettered circulation of commodities. I have urged that the British manufacturer had no political sympathies, and that his object was to make a profit on his merchandise, and that he was ready with perfect impartiality to sell his engines of destruction alike to German and to Frenchman.

‘I have been met by the counter arguments that whenever our personal interests required it we found easy methods of doing that which we now professed our inability to do. When the fear of cattle disease was before our eyes, an order in council sufficed to throw Free Trade principles to the winds, and enactments, unsurpassed in their severity by the police regulations of the most despotic Governments on the Continent, restrained in every part of the United Kingdom the liberty of buying and selling. To prevent the purchase of arms by isolated Fenians we could keep a strict watch over obscure gunsmiths, and intercept the smallest parcels containing weapons or ammunition. The Queen’s Proclamation declares sailcloth contraband, but it is powerless to declare that contraband which increases a hundredfold the locomotive power of ships of war. Lastly, is it not mockery, say my German friends, to talk of impartiality when the one belligerent is in command of the sea, and can draw his supplies from England with the same ease as from his own arsenals, and the other is driven to the shelter of his forts? Free trade is, doubtless, a civilising principle, but to apply it to the instruments of slaughter is an insult to humanity.

‘That such and similar arguments should seem conclusive

in the eyes of men wrought to a pitch of the highest excitement, and whose nervous organisation is strained to the utmost by the incessant toil of preparing in some way or other for the struggle on which their national existence depends, is not to be wondered at.

'We might conclude, therefore, that when once the excitement is over, the feeling of animosity against England might subside, and that no lasting traces would remain of the anger now kindled. I cannot, however, but express the fear that this may not prove to be the case.

'The present war is one without a parallel in the history of civilised nations. In the midst of profound peace an entire people has been suddenly called from its daily avocations to take a personal part in a struggle which promises to be the bloodiest and most deadly on record. Owing to the Prussian system of universal military service, which has now for four years been established throughout the whole of the Northern Confederation, there is not a household of the thirty millions who constitute the Confederation, some one or more members of which, in whatever rank of life, have not been called out to serve before the enemy, whilst the remaining members are slaving night and day to prepare for the reception of the wounded, and lavishing the hard-earned savings of many years to alleviate the great desolation which in a few days will cover the land.

'Persons thus circumstanced discuss questions of international law in a very different spirit from that in which such questions are treated by the scientific public of a country whose wars are done by contract, and with the aid of mercenary troops. The most powerful and convincing arguments of the best text writers are as nothing to the palpable facts which appeal to the imagination of the masses, and are brooded over by small family groups in every homestead throughout the length and breadth of the land. The copper capsule of a chassepot cartridge engraved with the trade-mark of a Birmingham firm—should such, which God forbid, chance to be extracted in a German hospital—might, in the present temper of men's minds, raise a storm of national vindictiveness in the German people which it may take generations to allay.

'There is, however, another cause for the growing estrangement of the Germans towards ourselves, far more subtle in its nature, and far more difficult for persons standing outside the circle of national emotion correctly to understand.

'It is undeniable that the present war has assumed in the popular imagination the character of a continuation of the war of liberation waged against the first Napoleon. Intervening events have been obliterated from the popular memory, and the legends of their childhood have become, to the generation called upon to withstand the national foe, instinct with life, and clothed with the reality of flesh and blood.

'It is as if the heroic portion of the national history, which was fast receding into the realm of myth, had been bodily transplanted into the present, thick with the poetry and romance which an intervening generation had weaved around it.

'Now, in the Napoleonic legend, Germany had not stood alone in her struggle for existence against Imperial France : England had stood by her side, and in the German Pantheon the name of Wellington became indissolubly associated with that of Blücher. It is the great gap in the actual picture caused by England's neutrality which is so keenly affecting the imagination of the educated rank and file of the North German army, and causing such shrill and, to English ears, such discordant utterances on the part of those that are left behind. It is as if some old and trusted companion in arms had forsaken them in the hour of their great need, and the present bitterness is in exact proportion to the vividness with which former services are remembered.

'A grievance of this kind, if such it may be called, is essentially of the nature of a sentimental grievance, and at a moment less terrible in its earnestness than the present might perhaps justify a smile. It is the peculiarity of the German race, however, that the sentiment of the great crises of the national life shapes itself into solid political fact ; it is to the German what glory is to the Frenchman, and should not therefore be kept out of sight in political speculations for the future.'

These and other arguments Morier strongly urged upon H.M. Government, realising, as he did, after an experience of twenty years' residence in Germany, what an unfortunate effect this export of arms would have on Anglo-German relations.

The subject led to heated controversy, and to the exchange of notes between the two Governments.

Taking advantage of a lull in what he called ' the persecution ' inflicted upon him by French and British subjects, Morier made a short excursion on 31st July across the Rhine to look at the armies gathered on the left bank, and pushed on to Speyer where the Crown Prince's headquarters were established.

*Morier to his Father*

*' August 3rd, 1870.*

' I managed last Monday to run over incognito to Speyer, to the headquarters of the Crown Prince to wish him a hearty " God speed you " before he crossed the frontier. It was, as you may imagine, a most interesting meeting. We had a three hours' conversation within the shadow of the old cathedral in which Rudolph of Hapsburg lies buried, and talked of all that was to be, and the hopes and fears of Germany. I never saw anything more worthy of admiration than his whole bearing. Calm and sad at the prospect of the possible butcheries it was his fate to inaugurate, hating the war as war, yet feeling the justice of his cause, the defence of Germany, and the assertion of her right to rule her own destinies, without the shade of anything like vain-gloriousness, perfectly prepared to meet with reverses, yet perfectly confident as to the ultimate result, and prepared to endure to the end. . . . '

' H.R.H. began by giving me a description of the reception he had met with in Bavaria and Würtemberg which had altogether surpassed his most sanguine expectations. Wherever he appeared, dense masses of the population had flocked to welcome him, and the welcome had been of a kind which left no doubt of the depth of the national feeling from which it proceeded. He could not have been received more

heartily in the old province of Prussia. It was evident that H.R.H. had been deeply moved by the experiences of the few preceding days. With an emotion I never saw him display before, he closed his description of his progress through the south with the words : " The union of Germany is effected, and it is the people of Germany by whom it has been effected. . . . I cannot express to you how great I consider the debt which we have in consequence incurred towards the German people, or how solemn I consider is the obligation we are under, to pay back the service rendered to us. . . ." The " we " in the above means, on the one hand, Prussia, and on the other, the sovereigns of Germany. In other words, what the Prince meant to express was, that by the attitude of the German people in this great hour of national need, Prussia had incurred a debt to Germany, and the sovereigns had incurred one to the people. A *United* Germany, and above all a *Free* Germany, was the debt for the payment of which to the uttermost farthing, he wished me to feel that he solemnly pledged his word. " I shall let no occasion pass without using every endeavour in my power to secure these objects." "

It was on this occasion that in the course of conversation with the Crown Prince and the Duke of Coburg, Morier first became aware of the impression universally current in political circles in Germany, that the backwardness displayed by England in pronouncing herself at the present crisis was attributed to Lord Granville's personal sympathies for the French court, and his absence of sympathy for Germany.

The Duke of Coburg observed to Morier that it was the greatest misfortune that Lord Clarendon should have died at the time he did, and should have been succeeded by a statesman of the most Napoleonic views, known to be in constant correspondence with the Emperor and the Empress Eugénie, that the rest of the Cabinet, with Mr. Gladstone at their head, all decidedly leant to the side of Germany, but that their action was paralysed by Lord Granville's strong bias in the contrary direction.

Morier at once asked the Duke upon whose authority he



made so extraordinary a statement, and he replied that it was from Bismarck's own lips that he had learned the fact he had just related to him.

As Morier remarked :

' This made the matter somewhat less inexplicable, as it was a constant trait in Bismarck's character to attribute any opposition he might meet with to personal motives, and to look for *midi à quatorze heures* ! '

He combated these views as strongly as he could, and proved to the best of his ability the groundlessness of these charges, and the fact that Lord Granville had never shown anything but the most scrupulous desire to maintain absolute neutrality. He also pointed out that it argued complete ignorance of England generally, and of Lord Granville's character as a public man, to suppose that any personal relation could interfere with his treatment of a public question.

The Crown Prince entirely corroborated what the Duke of Coburg had said in regard to Bismarck's utterances, adding that the Crown Princess had expressed exactly the same sentiments as Morier.

### *Morier to his Father*

' August 8th, 1870.

' . . . The last fortnight, or rather three weeks, have been a time of exceeding anxiety and of incessant toil. Thanks to the glorious successes of the Crown Prince's army, we are once more enabled to breathe freely. . . . It now seems inconceivable that there should have been a time of such anxiety, but in reality the inconceivable thing is that we should have got off as we did. It is a matter of the most absolute puzzle to all the highest military authorities that the French should have omitted to make a *razzia* into the provinces of the left bank of the Rhine and a push on to these countries if only to destroy railway viaducts, etc., and to render the concentration of the German troops impossible for weeks and weeks. Had they done so, there would have been actually nothing to stop

them, and the day of the declaration of war they had 70,000 men on the frontier ready for anything.

‘For the last twelve days, hour after hour, the endless trains bearing men and ammunition have defiled past our windows, night and day. For the last three days the return cargoes, in the shape of trains filled with wounded and prisoners, have gone up in the contrary direction. A ghastly kind of commerce. The French have placed Turcos all along their advance guard, thinking the sight of these wild beasts and their outlandish yells would frighten the Teutons! The poor devils have paid dearly for this fantastic piece of French ignorance. It is universally said that, having given way to their savage propensities of shamming to be dead, and then using their knives on the wounded, the Bavarians, who are a thick-skulled, beer-filled race, who do not understand this kind of practical joking, make short work of them and just bayonet them wherever they can find them. We have had several trains of them pass here who were taken prisoners at Weissenburg. . . .’

‘. . . The intensity of the national fury in Germany has been awakened (there was no fury before the fighting began, but a calm resolute feeling of determination to fight it out to the last with hardly any perceptible animosity against the French nation as such, though great bitterness against the Emperor) by the atrocities committed by the Turcos. Of all the inconceivable follies committed by the Emperor, that of putting these African savages in the vanguard of his army under the belief he would scare the Germans, was the greatest. They have paid dearly for it, as no quarter is now granted to them, and they are shot and bayoneted like vermin wherever they are found, but the shock caused throughout Germany by the accounts (probably exaggerated, but I fear there is no doubt with a terrible residuum of truth in them) of the horrors committed by them on the wounded in the lines at Weissenburg, is something of which one has no idea, and will materially affect the whole course of the war and the conditions of peace—for with one voice the whole nation is demanding vengeance, and this demand will, I fear, take the form of a demand for French

territory for Alsace and Lorraine, the very worst fault that victorious Germany could commit.'

*Morier to Mallet*

'DARMSTADT, August 9th, 1870.

'I have been intending to write to you, but the mass of things I wished to say, combined with the mass of things I have to do, plus the feverish state of excitement in which we have been living, have rendered all private correspondence impossible.

'We are living in the wake of such tremendous events that one hardly has the breath to discuss them. It is clear to me from all I see of the English papers that as usual we are wholly unable to see the real *portée* of the gigantic crisis in the world's affairs being at present fought out on the bloody plains the other side of the mountains which we see from our drawing-room windows. We go on pottering over the question as to who it was suggested the Draft treaty<sup>1</sup> and such like pettifogging questions now wholly irrelevant. We seem to be quite ignorant that the war is being fought out between *Germany* and France—not between Bismarck and Napoleon, and we are apparently unable to think of anything except Belgium and ourselves. The idea seems to be that after an indecisive battle Napoleon and Bismarck will shake hands, and that the former will take Belgium and the latter Holland, and that we shall then with 25,000 men step in and fight them both! A nice look-out! Oh, the fools, the fools! Can they not see that Germany *must* beat France, that forty millions of Teutons sending forth the whole of their *citizen* manhood must beat an army of Pretorian guards? Can they for one moment believe that *Germany* (mind you, not Bismarck and not Prussia) would trample on the public conscience of Europe by giving away Belgium to the foe they had conquered. Do they not see that it is Germany that is with its best blood defending the integrity of Belgium whilst we are making speeches at the Mansion House? Can they not for one moment realise what the real issues at stake are?

<sup>1</sup> Bismarck-Benedetti Draft Treaty, 1866, published by *Times*, 25th July 1870.

France draws the sword to assert her political preponderance over Europe. Germany draws the sword to assert her national existence. But the result will be that the preponderance of Germany over Europe for centuries to come will take the place of French preponderance. We sit by like a bloated Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing our hands at the roaring trade we are driving in cartridges and ammunition. We are heaping up to ourselves the undying hatred of this German race that will henceforth rule the world, because we cannot muster up courage to prevent a few cursed Brummagem manufacturers from driving their unholy trade.'

*Morier to Stockmar*

'DARMSTADT, *August 21st*, 1870.

'I have to thank you for three letters, all of them most grateful to my feelings. You will know without my telling you, how heart and soul I am with Germany at this great turning-point, not of her history only but of that of mankind. What untold heights of civilisation may not the world attain to with a German Empire preponderant over the destinies of Europe—if only there is as much wisdom in the upper stories of the building as there has been valour and self-sacrifice in the lower. I confess, however, that I have all along feared rather the possible consequences of victory than the probability of defeat. I was firmly convinced that the German armies would overwhelm the French army, and I confess myself rather surprised at their not having done so more completely than they appear to have done. We know too little as yet of what was really effected during the course of the week to judge of the results, but my belief is that after three days, or rather two days, with a day's interval of an unparalleled butchery, the French army has been forced to give up its attempt to break through Prince Frederick Charles's army (which it was trying to do to reach Verdun) and has fallen back beaten, but not *routed*, into Metz. Of course it cannot remain there, as it cannot have the necessary food. It will, therefore, have again to try and cut its way out, and I see a fearful amount of slaughter yet in store for us. I had hoped that one

great battle would have settled everything, as at Königgrätz. As it is, the French army is fighting magnificently, and proving that it is the soundest portion of the nation.

'What I meant by saying that I have feared the possible result of victory, is that I have all along feared the demand for Alsace and Lorraine (I beg your pardon, Elsass and Lothringen). It was an immense relief to me that *unaußgefordert* you did not think this desirable. Of course, I do not mean that I object to a *Grenz Regulirung*, but the taking two large provinces, the inhabitants of which are more Gallic than the Gauls, because being Germans they can be more obstinately French than the French themselves, is something I do not like as the *début* of a German Empire in the nineteenth century. This is the sentimental side of the question, but the practical side is this: a hostile occupation of this kind means more or less the continuance of armed peace and the impossibility of disarmament. The sight I would have liked to see would have been the German citizen army sheathing its bloody sword, lifting the old King on to the shield, as in the days of Hermann, proclaiming him Emperor, and showing the world that what they have been fighting for is the right to constitute themselves into a United Germany, and the privilege of living at peace with their neighbours.

'I need not say that I am most heartily ashamed of the so-called British Lion. Poor beast, his sympathies and his instincts have been right enough, and he did in his foolish, clumsy sort of way recognise that it was his duty to fight for Belgium against somebody—he couldn't quite make out whom. But then, his keeper!! Was there ever such bungling, such incapacity, such absolute imbecility. . . . However, I don't like to talk about it. On the other hand the *Gehässigkeit*, with which Bismarck and his organs tried to pick a quarrel in regard to contraband and ammunitions, shows the anxiety he and his party felt lest there should have been any appearance of cordiality between England and Prussia at the commencement of the war. His object, I presume, was that when the day for imposing peace on France came, there should be so general a feeling of hatred in Germany against us, that nothing we might say should

be listened to. The idea generally prevalent in England was, that his object was to have his hands free to dispose of Belgium as a set-off against Alsace and Lorraine. I have, of course, done my best to show that the war being a German and not a Bismarckian war, the peace would be a German, not a Bismarckian peace, and that the *Rechtsgefühl* of the German nation never would consent to the dismemberment of innocent countries like Belgium and Holland. But these kinds of arguments, which to people who really know the underneath of things, are absolutely convincing, fall like rain off a duck's back on ordinary politicians. Bismarck is Bismarck, and people have not forgotten Schleswig-Holstein and Frankfort. A not uninteresting side of the present war is the double nemesis which it has wrought : first, on that huge imposture, the Napoleonic system ; and, secondly, on Bismarck. For it is undoubtedly true that his great *coup de théâtre* with the secret treaties has done him, and through him, Prussia, and through Prussia, Germany, more harm than it did France. It seemed somehow quite natural that a French sovereign should go in for that sort of thing, but it was a great shock to public confidence that a German statesman should have been the other conspirator. For some reason or other, people thought they had a right to expect a higher tone of morality on the right bank of the Rhine than on the left, and a general feeling of not believing in anything, or in anybody, has taken hold of men's minds. In my opinion, Bismarck would have done much better not to have made his revelations till he had beaten the French, and then to have brought them out as *pièces justificatives* for a peace such as you and I desire. The attack made by Gramont, and the *naïveté* of Rouher's speech in the Senate, in which it was confessed that France had for four years been preparing for war, had so glaringly put France in the wrong and Germany in the right, that nothing more was wanted to enlist all Europe on the side of Germany. There was a splendid simplicity of outline. The naked *Hochmuth* (arrogance) on the one side, the magnificent anger of United Germany on the other. All this was exchanged for the miserable pettifogging criticisms and weighings of the balance between the

rival statements of two diplomatic fishwives. It was a huge mistake—one of course not visible to the eyes of the German combatants, who had other things to attend to—but very palpable to the sense of Germany's disinterested friends like myself and my English pupils.'

On 2nd September, when the war had lasted little more than a month, Morier summed up his impressions in the following memorandum, which clearly shows the genesis of the demand for Alsace-Lorraine :

'A month has now elapsed since the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia crossed the French frontier at Weissenburg. The uninterrupted successes which have attended the arms of Germany have brought the troops under H.R.H.'s command within a short distance of the French capital, and the German nation feels itself on the eve of accomplishing that march upon Paris which, with a singular unanimity, it demanded of its military chiefs as the reply to the Duc de Gramont's appeal to the wisdom of the German people. The moment, therefore, appears opportune to review the phases which public opinion has traversed during this short but eventful period.

'Whatever anticipation of coming events may have existed in the Foreign and War Offices at Berlin, it is certain that the war came wholly unexpectedly upon the mass of the German people. The unexampled rapidity with which the German armies were mobilised, the perfect secrecy with which they were concentrated on the left bank of the Rhine, the countless masses with which the irruption into France was effected, have led in some quarters to a belief that though France appeared to be the aggressor, it was in fact Germany who had prepared for the invasion, and had got ready to pour across the French frontier.

'It is within my personal knowledge that such was not the case. It is true that the last four years have been spent in giving to the North German Confederation the military institutions which have been in force in Prussia for upwards of half a century, and that great exertions have been made by the southern States of Germany to assimilate their armies to that of the north. But no extraordinary pre-

parations beyond this marked the summer of the present year. On the 16th of July, the day upon which the mobilisation of the North German army was decreed, the military force of Germany was on a peace footing, and until that day not one man of the reserves had been ordered to join the ranks, excepting in the Prussian Rhine Province, where the men were called to their standards by public proclamation. The usual two days were allowed to each man to set his house in order before joining his regiment. Without any apparent hurry, but with a rapidity which proved the perfection to which the military mechanism of the Prussianised north had reached, the work of mobilisation was completed. I can certify that as regards the Hessian division, three days sufficed to place it, the whole of it—infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, pontoons, and military train—on a war footing. The order for mobilisation was given on the 16th, and on the 24th the division had commenced its march to the Palatinate. In 1866 it was considered a great feat performed by one captain, and that an Englishman, that he got his squadron in marching order within six weeks.

‘Now it is important to note that the mobilisation was performed in the ordinary manner, that is, at the headquarters of the several regiments. I have been told on good authority that for twenty-four hours the question was mooted at Berlin of sending the regiments at once to the frontier on their peace establishment, and complementing there, but that the risk, or as it then appeared, the certainty of invasion, was considered preferable to the disorder which such a course would have involved. Consequently, a full week elapsed after the declaration of war, which, as it will be remembered, took place on Monday the 18th, before the movement of concentration commenced, and upwards of a fortnight before it was concluded. The line of railway between Darmstadt and Heidelberg was one of the principal lines by which this concentration was effected. I can personally bear witness to the fact that it was only on Monday the 25th that the passenger traffic was stopped, and that the military trains began to run.

‘The very highest Prussian military authority state that during this fortnight seventy-five thousand French troops



were marched upon the German frontier, and that there was absolutely nothing to prevent a force, even inferior, from overrunning the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, and a great portion of southern Germany on the right bank of the Rhine. A mere *vazzia* on a large scale, which would have had for its object to destroy railways and magazines on the two banks of the Rhine, and which would have been effected with perfect impunity, would have rendered the concentration of the German army on the left bank of the Rhine impossible, and would have given the French army at least six weeks for that further preparation of which it stood in such earnest need.

‘I think it necessary to call attention to these circumstances which are within my own personal cognizance in order to bring out clearly an important fact, which the extraordinary brilliancy of the German success is not unlikely to cast into the shade, viz., that the fortnight which preceded actual hostilities was for western and southern Germany a fortnight, I will not say of panic, because this would convey an inaccurate idea of the attitude of the population, which was one of patriotic resolution to suffer the worst that could happen in the confident hope that all would come right at last, but of deep consternation and intense anxiety at the prospect of immediate invasion and a hostile occupation. Having lived through this fortnight amidst the people subjected to these painful emotions, I have retained a lively recollection of this extraordinary phase of the conflict. During this same period it is certain that the idea of being invaded never once entered into the calculations or disturbed the repose of our neighbours across the border. From the reports which reached me at the time, I have every reason to believe that in exact proportion of the feeling of consternation and depression which existed on this side of the frontier was the feeling of exultation and high spirits which prevailed on the other side of the frontier.

‘Now the point upon which it is desirable to lay stress is, that the feeling of consternation in western Germany, and of confidence in eastern France, did not have its origin in mere national temperament, but was based upon military

considerations, easily understandable by the public. An imposing French army resting upon two fortresses supposed to be impregnable, overshadowed an open country from which they were divided by a river, which, before the concentration of German troops had been effected, they could cross at any point they liked. It is this peculiar character of a river frontier which became so conspicuous to a people who believed they were on the point of being invaded. The strategical conditions of the two countries were instinctively felt, by those for whom these military matters had suddenly become a matter of such personal interest, to be altogether in favour of a French offensive with a German defensive so far back in the interior of the country as under the most favourable circumstances to leave a huge portion of Germany, for a time at least, in the power of the enemy.

‘It was at this period that for the first time I heard whispered the ominous words of Alsace-Lorraine, not indeed as now by sensational newspaper writers, but by earnest men well versed in military questions and the history of the past, and on whom lay the responsibility of providing for the terrible emergency which seemed at hand. See, they said, what price we are paying for our internal dissensions in times past, when these German lands were first torn from us, and for the rivalries between Austria and Prussia, which prevented us from recovering them at the settling day with France in 1815. How different would be our position now with a line of mountains, the only effectual barrier between unneighbourly neighbours, between us and the French, instead of a river, that easiest of frontiers to invade. I am convinced that the men who thus spoke little thought that, within a few short weeks, Germany would be in a position to claim this frontier, or that they were actuated by other considerations than those of the pressing danger which threatened them. The strategical thesis which they maintained, that a mountain barrier is fitted for defence, a river boundary for offence, is a self-evident one; but it is astonishing how the appreciation of this self-evidence became quickened in the minds of persons hourly expecting to see columns of the enemy reach their doors.

'A mountain barrier can only be passed at a few limited points, all known beforehand, and which a comparatively small force suffices to watch. Impassable, except at these points, by an invading force, it is easily traversed by the spies of the defenders who, from the very nature of the circumstances, are acquainted with the country, and have friends and connections across the border. The defenders therefore have the means of knowing both where and when they will be attacked.

'A river frontier presents the converse phenomena. The moment war is declared, a few patrols suffice to make a river an inscrutable screen behind which the invader can hide his operations, and can select, unknown to the invaded, the exact point at which to effect an entrance.

'Such are the considerations which have been occupying men's minds in south and western Germany, and it cannot be denied that they have a legitimate basis. The cry for annexation is now waxing louder every day, and that it will become irresistible, even if it has not already done so, is my present conviction.

'I am convinced the attempt to reannex the old German frontier lands would be on the part of Germany an impolitic act, and I believe that the feeling of lasting bitterness which the cession of French soil will cause in France, and the damage done to the cause of liberty in Germany by having for some years to rule over an unfree people, will counterbalance the advantages afforded by increased security.

'It would be unfair, however, to ignore the fact that the demand for the Vosges frontiers is based on a perfectly justifiable sense of insecurity, and that it is put forward by a people who have very recently been impressed with a sense of this insecurity.

'The military strength of Germany lies in her reserves. Until these have been mobilised, she is not ready to fight. But a certain time is required for this mobilisation. It makes the whole difference to her whether she can effect this mobilisation leisurely and, as it were, behind ramparts, or whether she has to do so with an open frontier and under the fire of the enemy.'

At the beginning of September Mr. Cartwright, an old friend of Morier's, paid him a visit on his way back to England from Switzerland.

'I went with him last Sunday to Offenburg,' he wrote to his father,<sup>1</sup> 'a town on the Heidelberg-Basle railway, a little higher up the river than Strasburg, on the opposite bank, and about eight miles from the water. Our object was to see what we could of the bombardment. Cartwright had happened two nights before to see the burning of the arsenal, which he described as pyrotechnically the most beautiful sight conceivable. I suppose from sulphur and such like things accumulated in the laboratory, there were many-coloured flames ascending in sheets with a fearful bombardment going on. The journey was an interesting one, and as the only bit of the actual war which I have had an opportunity of witnessing, I am glad I went. We arrived about sunset at Appenweiler, where the railway branches off to Kehl, and we could there see rising up against the horizon, with no other structures visible, the beautiful cathedral—everything still on a calm Sunday evening, except that every second or third minute an ominous booming was heard, though nothing could be seen. There was something indescribably tragical in this feeling of beauty and tranquillity, with the knowledge one possessed of what that booming meant, and what scenes of carnage and desolation would be visible to one were one only standing on the top of that spire, which seemed up to the knees in shady groves, and surrounded as far as eye could see by a fertile country teeming with peaceful homesteads. (Let me note that the train stopped for some time, and that I was able to get away from the surroundings of the rail and to receive my impressions undisturbed.) We got to Offenburg about nine o'clock. The inn was full of unfortunate Strasburgers who had succeeded in escaping from the town, and who were being most kindly and sympathetically treated by their enemies. Many were their heartrending stories. They had been kept in utter ignorance of what was going on in France, and believed that

<sup>1</sup> 3rd September.

every day the conquering French would come to their deliverance. A father and daughter were going to try and slip in again, and the daughter sewed all her petticoats with newspapers of every kind to let the inhabitants know the hopelessness of the situation, and thus get them to make one more frantic effort to induce Ulrich to capitulate.

'After very great difficulties we succeeded in getting a small *Einspanner* to take us to the nearest point which could be reached. It was a very dark night, and after an hour and a half's drive, we got to a village where the driver said he must put up, as the patrols between this and the next village would stop us.

'We then went on foot about half a mile to the top of a rise in the road (it is very flat all about). The firing had increased since nightfall, but was not lively. We must have been about three miles off. The batteries were hid from our sight by the lay of the ground, but the great flashes were reflected upon the clouds like sheet-lightning. After standing for half an hour watching and listening, the horizon began to get red in the direction of Strasburg, and it was clear that fire had broken out. Shortly after, fire burst out in another quarter of the town, and the two fires made the whole horizon lurid and ghastly, the cannonade getting more brisk. Then all of a sudden there was heard musketry fire and the discharge of volleys, so we knew that a sortie was being made. Then after a while all was still again, and the fires diminishing, then the booming of the huge guns at distant intervals. It was very weird. We were standing there in a dark night on a lonely road, and all this was going on far off *beyond* the darkness in a spectre-like and shadowy sort of way. Then we returned to the village inn where the horse was baiting, and sat in the *Gastzimmer* and drank a bottle of wine. It was like a Dutch picture—a Teniers or the like; the room, though it was one o'clock in the morning, crammed with guests, great varieties of groups, their faces lit up by the tallow candles on the tables round which they were sitting. In one corner a group of fugitives from Strasburg, woe-stricken, at another, peasants from the Oberland, who had come down in their holiday clothes to see their great fortress pounded

by Fatherland cannon, as if to some great fête. At another table, two priests playing at cards with two cunning-looking bettermost peasants and so on. Then back to Offenburg in the dark night with the burning fortress in the background, and ever and anon the booming of the big guns, and then at five A.M. back per train to Darmstadt.'

Pro-German as his sympathies were, and ever had been, they were destined to be put to a severe test, for a small German capital like Darmstadt was certainly not favourable to them.

'Very much the reverse,' he wrote, 'one ought not to see a great historical drama through the medium of a *Kleinstadt*. The inhabitants have become intolerable.'

The fact of Morier's having accompanied the French Minister<sup>1</sup> to the railway station on the declaration of war had caused much offence.

'Nothing could have behaved worse than the people here did,' so Morier wrote to Stockmar, 'with regard to the Astorgs: they were our only friends in the Corps Diplomatique and truly nice people. There were threats that they would be insulted. The railway station was the chronic seat of hundreds of the noisiest dregs of the population. The appearance of his carriage would have been the certain signal for an unpleasant scene, hooting and the like. So I took him and his wife down in my carriage; nobody knew who they were, and they went away quietly and comfortably.'

The Darmstadt Hilfs-Verein (Society of Aid to the Wounded) had debated for three days whether he should be allowed to visit the French wounded at their hospital, because he had the official protection of French subjects, and they thought to show their patriotism by making themselves disagreeable.

At the very commencement of the war, Morier and his wife had resolved to set up an English hospital, which they hoped to be able to do with the help of their friends in

<sup>1</sup> Count Astorg.

England, a hope which was not disappointed. But just as it was about to be opened, through a miserable intrigue led by a Court Chaplain and directed partly against the English and partly against the Catholic Sisters who were to have administered it, the proprietor of the house which had been taken for the purpose, put in his veto and caused the local Court, on a point of law, to lay an embargo on the stores at a moment when no hair-mattresses or refrigerators could be got for love or money, and the wounded were dying for want of them. The original plan thus fell through, but all the stores were transferred to the Catholic Sisters, and Morier and his wife worked their hospital for them.

'You may easily believe,' he wrote to Lady Derby, whose munificence had greatly furthered their plans, 'that my horror of war has not been diminished by the sights which I have daily witnessed for the last month. Hardly a day has passed that Alice and I have not been in attendance on the Sisters' hospital, which, thanks to your subscription and that of other friends, we have been able to keep in first-rate working condition, and to make far the best hospital here. Alice has been very courageous, and has assisted in dressing the most ghastly wounds you can imagine. But oh! for that smell of decomposing humanity which does not leave your nose and mouth day or night. Poor fellows, there they all lay together, such good friends and companions, Bavarians, Prussians, Hessians, Frenchmen—when one batch is half healed another batch taking their place, only the very bad cases remaining on our hands. . . .

'The children are well, but it is ghastly to see them playing all day at being killed, wounded, and made prisoners, at having balls extracted from their legs and their arms amputated. *Que voulez-vous?* They see and hear of nothing else.'

Ardently as Morier had espoused the cause of Germany, the chauvinism engendered by the war soon began to jar upon him and make him feel out of touch with even his closest friends such as Stockmar.

'I do not share and cannot understand,' he wrote to the

latter on 21st August, 'your excessive bloodthirstiness and violence against the French as such. The great organic fault of the European economy has been the preponderance they have been allowed to acquire in Europe. . . . When they are reduced to that which they ought to be, a great nation living at peace with its neighbours, I think even you will admit that they have a part to play in the varied civilisation of Europe. They can furnish an element which the pure Teuton cannot—lightness, grace, form. Surely a world wholly peopled by Germans and Englishmen would not be so perfect a world as one in which Frenchmen had a place. . . . The fact is that it is impossible for a belligerent and a neutral, however sympathetic the latter may be, to argue on a common basis. When I find the man who for some fifteen years has been to me the ideal of a *Vernunftsmensch* talking about his enemies in the same kind of way that it must be supposed that the *État-major* of Joshua talked, round the walls of Jericho, of the children of Canaan, I realise the fact that war brings out certain hidden sides of man which are doomed to remain latent in the non-belligerent.'

All these disagreeable experiences were so many reasons for his longing to leave Darmstadt; when therefore the post of Rome, which he had long coveted, became vacant, and was offered to him, he accepted it with the greatest joy.<sup>1</sup>

The Queen, however, had expressed her desire that the appointment should not be immediate, as she wished to retain his services a little longer in Germany: 'but,' he wrote, 'the mere thought of leaving this place fills me with indescribable pleasure, and I pray night and day for the maintenance of the Pope's temporal and spiritual power.'

In answer to a letter from Stockmar congratulating him on his new post, Morier replied, on 25th September:

'It may seem strange to you that I should be glad to leave Germany, and go and take up my abode amidst a Latin race. My joy, however, is mixed with no little bitterness. I have worked hard and conscientiously at an "idea" for the last fifteen, I might almost say twenty,

<sup>1</sup> 7th September 1870.



years. It was the political and heart-union of England and Germany. . . . It is the feeling of total and irremediable impotency to do any good—the sense that, for any good I have done, the last fifteen years might as well be wiped out of my life, which makes me yearn to leave a theatre in which I can only witness faults committed without the power to prevent them. Only a few days ago, Usedom mentioned my name before an illustrious Prussian diplomatist. The latter started with horror, and said, “You don’t mean to say you have intercourse with that man, *Er ist ja der Feind Preussens.*” The fact is, my dear fellow, that I have come to believe as the first article of my faith that there is no *good* to be done in this world at the present time except by rascals. There may be moments in history where “the good” can work on its own hook and force a road for itself, but there are whole epochs like the present in which good can only be wrought by the “*verneinende Kraft*” *die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft*. If I had only recognised this truth twenty years ago, I might have educated myself into a scoundrel and have done some good in my generation. It is too late now, and I must make up my mind to go to my grave a useless fool who never succeeded in learning the rudimentary principle of his craft, that of lying for the good of his country.’

## CHAPTER XXIV

## ALSACE-LORRAINE

ABOUT this time a letter from Dr. Faucher, the Prussian Free-Trader with whom Morier, since Vienna days, had kept up relations, helped to confirm a suspicion which had already taken possession of his mind. This was that Alsace-Lorraine had always been the prize aimed at by Germany, and that, should the neutral Powers at the end of the war attempt to prevent her from enforcing this condition of peace, she would feel herself liberated from the duty of respecting the neutrality of Belgium, and a barter with France would ensue, which would cede to the latter the French-speaking provinces of Namur, Liège, and Hainault in exchange for Alsace-Lorraine.

This project, according to Dr. Faucher, had been much discussed in 'various circles' at Berlin, before the commencement of hostilities.

Much shocked at this revelation, Morier replied as follows :—

'DARMSTADT, *September 19th, 1870.*

'DEAR DR. FAUCHER,—I am very much obliged to you for your letter. It gives me the key to a riddle which I had been trying to solve, and it turns out that this key is the very one I had hit upon for myself. I always felt that the virulent and systematic attacks made from the very commencement of the war upon England by the Mamelukes of the Prussian officials, as well as by the so-called Liberal Press, combined with the cajoleries bestowed upon Russia, had some hidden political object in view, and I always strongly suspected that Belgium *y était bien pour quelque chose*, and that the object was so to irritate public opinion in Germany against England that, when the time came, those who might be honest enough to think twice

before they would connive at the international murder of an independent State, might, out of mere blind passion against us, be induced to commit a crime which in cold blood they might have shrunk from. It is extremely interesting to me to learn that this very project was "amply discussed at Berlin in various circles (official and Liberal-National I presume) before the commencement of hostilities," and that this great national war for the unity of Germany, the victorious upshot of which was, we are told, to secure a new era of peace and international justice, was deliberately entered upon on the basis of the *Projets de Traité*, and that at the very time that Europe was called upon by the organs of the self-same "circles" to believe that project was the sole work of Napoleon. The annexation of Belgium to France and Alsace-Lorraine to Germany is undoubtedly a much more equitable arrangement than that proposed by the *Projet*—as the latter gave territory to France in return for the mere right conceded to Germany of constituting herself as she pleased. The *Projet* of the Berlin circles gives territory both to Germany and France upon the most approved methods of the Vienna Congress, and this so-called magnificent war for national purposes will turn out to have been a vulgar eighteenth-century war for territorial acquisitions.

'The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine up to the Meuse, which you informed me was the Government plan, the restoration of Napoleon III., and the annexation of Belgium to France as the *Morgengabe* made by the new Fatherland to the Napoleoniden, will be a highly instructive and very interesting historical tableau. Whether it will conduce to that millennium of peace and disarmament which infatuated idealists like myself have prophesied would be the result of German unity, is a question I am not ready at present to answer.

'As regards the part England might be called upon to play in this shuffle of territorial cards, I shall certainly not venture to prophesy. I know Germany believes that we have ceased to count for anything as a military power, and that we care for nothing but cotton and other textile fabrics. I am not absolutely certain, however, that if the

fire-eaters of the National-Zeitung are quite determined to pick a quarrel with us in the hope of adding naval successes over England to their military successes over France, they may not be gratified. At all events, this annexation of Belgium to France would be their best card to play. There is a very odd feeling in England about Belgium, and people have somehow got it into their heads that it is a *point d'honneur* with us not to allow the annexation, and there are persons in England, and even influential persons, who still have old-fashioned ideas about England's honour and such-like fancies. I prophesy nothing; as before stated, I only mention to you as an old friend that if the "circles" at Berlin, those choice spirits of the new *gr-r-r-r-r-ande* nation, really wish for a naval war, there is just a chance, may be a very remote one, but still a chance for them. Of course, where one can command the services of a million of bayonets, war is a minor consideration. As a mere matter of literary criticism, however, I would venture to ask the "circles" at Berlin how, if the hostility of the neutral Powers is sufficiently powerful to prevent the annexation *pure et simple* of Alsace and Lorraine, that hostility will be disarmed by the additional *Kunststück* of the annexation of Belgium. Are the 100,000 French prisoners now in Germany to be the allies in whose company you mean to attack hostile neutrals? *Tout cela, mon cher ami, c'est de la blague*, and the best advice I can give to the "circles" of Berlin is to follow the example set to them by the virgins of Germany, viz., to cast aside French fashions and clothe themselves in a little German simplicity and honesty. I have for the last twenty years worked too hard and too unremittingly at giving my countrymen a high idea of Germany, and at convincing them of the advantages to Europe of a united Germany, to allow myself to be discouraged now that public opinion in England has waked up to share my views. But I must honestly confess that the chauvinism of the Berlin "circles" is a greater hindrance in my path than any I have met with in the hitherto deficient appreciation of my countrymen.'

Morier had been asked to visit Strasburg and Metz to help the Society for the Sick and Wounded at the former

place, and the *Daily News* Society for the Distressed Peasants at the latter, a mission which he gladly undertook, as he was desirous of ascertaining in a discreet manner the feeling of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine towards annexation.

Wishing to form an absolutely independent judgment on the subject, he had, before leaving Darmstadt, gone to Mayence to visit an acquaintance, Dr. J., whom he knew to have a perfect knowledge of Alsace, and who had many relations there.

' Dr. J., an advocate of considerable standing, belonging to that highly cultivated portion of the middle class which constitutes the strength and power of Germany, is a thoroughly honest man, a strong Liberal, the intimate friend of Schultze-Delitzsch, through whom I became acquainted with him, and a mainstay of the great co-operative movement in Germany. He is, however, a strong annexationist, and on my urging the objections I felt to the proposed annexation on the plea of their disharmony with Liberal ideas, he, fully admitting the strength of my argument, nevertheless urged that there were moments in the lives of nations as of individuals, in which feeling would have its way, riding roughshod over every dogma, and that the present was such a one, that no foreigner could understand the feeling, for no foreigner could realise what a thorn in the side of Germany the robbery of Alsace had remained, how it had become the symbol of her weakness and shame, how raw the wound still was.

' Since the days when he was a boy at the Gymnasium, he had never been able to cross the bridge at Kehl without feeling his cheeks glow with shame. The Strasburg Minster was what the French had taken from Germany, the ruined Heidelberg Schloss was what they had left to Germany. That at the moment of her national triumph Germany should forego the opportunity of wiping out this disgrace, and not bring back the lost sheep to her fold, was to expect the superhuman of her, and that at a time when, by the universal mourning for killed and mangled sons and brothers and husbands, the nation had had its humanity

brought very much home to it, and was not in a mood for the superhuman or the transcendental.

' This argumentation adds to the value of the witness's testimony, because it represents truly the feeling prevalent among the class to which he belongs, a feeling which cannot be described as one of vindictiveness against actually living Frenchmen, or as a strong sentiment in regard to the utility of Alsace for strategic purposes, but rather one having its root in a vivid historical consciousness natural in men whose political education has been made rather in the study of the past than in a participation in the work of the present.

' I asked Dr. J. whether during the many years he had known Alsace, he had observed any symptoms of a desire to break with France and to drift towards Germany, and whether he believed that at the present moment there was a German body in the country, *i.e.* any body of persons more or less organised, having for their programme separation from France and political consolidation with Germany. He stated in reply that for many years past there had been amongst the Protestants of Alsace a natural feeling of sympathy with the Protestants of Germany, and an exchange of friendly intercourse between them, but that he could not say that this feeling ever appeared to him to be shaping itself into a political party, having for its object union with Germany. On the contrary, it had always struck him that the *national* feeling was French in an exaggerated degree.

' The Alsatians had been detached from Germany at a period when she was nationally at her lowest ebb, and had become identified with France when the latter was at the zenith of her glory, and this, long before the feeling of nationality had acquired any political force.

' The Allemannic tribe to which the Alsatians belonged surpassed all other German tribes in the tenacity with which they clung to their ancient customs and habits, and to their traditional ways of thought. The consequence was that in their inner life, in their domestic customs, their language, their dress even, the Alsatian peasantry retained more of the Germany of the seventeenth century than any part of Germany proper. An important point to note was that they had not been touched by the great literary movement

of the end of the last and the beginning of the present century. The language in habitual use, even in the higher classes, showed this amply by the employment of coarse terms, which, since the days of Herder, Schiller, and Goethe, had in Germany been wholly banished. The annexation to France had given them abundantly that which all Germans had been for centuries yearning after, the feeling of forming part of a great nation, and the sense of political ponderation.

‘ Thus, socially and ethically, the Alsatians had remained Germans, and Germans of a very marked and pronounced type, a kindly, honest, domestic race, and contributing to the French army some of its best troops, speaking a somewhat coarse and homely language, but quite capable with proper care of a higher order of cultivation. On the other hand, *politically* and nationally, they were thoroughly French. In a word, they were Germans as members of the family, Frenchmen as members of the nation. When an Alsatian came to Germany, he made the most of his French nationality, and thrust it even offensively on the Germans at home; if, on the other hand, he met a German in non-Alsatian France, he always gravitated towards him as towards a countryman, and, as it were, *à l’abri* of his own fellow-subjects. In Alsatia he always talked of Frenchmen as *Wälsche*.

‘ As illustrating what he wished to describe, Dr. J. told me of an old aunt of his, nearly eighty, an Alsatian of a highly-respectable bourgeois family, who, though born in Paris and married to a non-Alsatian, had never given up German as her mother tongue, though not one of her children had ever learnt a word of it. She often came to visit him at Mayence, and rendered herself perfectly insupportable by perpetually boasting of the superiority of France over Germany, and by everlasting *dénigrement* of everything German. Yet, when abusing the ways and conduct of her sons, the culminating term of abuse always was that they were thorough Frenchmen.

‘ I asked Dr. J. whether with this Allemannic territory it would not take many generations to make them forget their French citizenship. He admitted that they were not the kind of people that could easily adapt themselves to a

new system, but believed that the identity of language, manners, and character would hasten the process of political assimilation. He could not but believe, moreover, that the incredibly warm welcome that was being prepared for them from one end of Germany to another, could remain without its effect, because it was a perfectly genuine outburst of national sentiment.

‘In every town and village, subscriptions were being made for the distressed inhabitants of Strasburg and the parts of Alsace that had suffered from the war. It was not with the pride of a conqueror, but with the feeling of ancient kinship that the Germans would enter this portion of France.

‘Lastly, though convinced that there at present existed no annexationist party in the country, and that no such party would arise, he had no manner of doubt that when the annexation was a *fait accompli*, many, at present terrorised by the priest party, and who dreaded to speak their minds for fear of possibly again coming under the action of a government using the priests as its tools, would openly express their satisfaction at coming under a *régime* which would secure them the certainty of religious toleration, practically as well as theoretically.’

Morier started off on 1st October in glorious autumn weather, taking Carlsruhe on the way, where he found the Grand Duke of Baden, with whom he had a long and interesting conversation.

The Grand Duke told him that ‘he had, during the period that he spent with his army in Alsace, given himself the greatest trouble to ascertain the feeling of the population in regard to Germany, and whether a party desirous of consolidation with Germany existed in that country, and he had come to the conclusion that not only no annexationist party existed, but that the strongest possible national French feeling pervaded the whole population. He had, however, no difficulty in understanding how the idea had sprung up of the existence of an annexationist party. For a long time past, party spirit had run high in Alsace, religious differences lying at the root of political dissensions.



The meeting of the General Council had intensified the passions of the Ultramontane party to an untold degree. The natural *point d'appui* for the Protestants in Alsace were their Protestant brethren in Germany, especially in the Grand Duchy of Baden, where the same war to the knife was going on between the two parties. The natural weapon for the fanatical Ultramontane was to accuse their religious and political opponents of want of loyalty and of unnational feeling. When the declaration of war, coinciding as it did with the declaration of infallibility, broke over France, it intensified the party strife to yet a higher degree. The Ultramontane priesthood, mad with triumph, knew no bounds in the expression of their hostility against the Protestant inhabitants, it being known that the war was thoroughly unpopular amongst the Protestant population, on account of the friendly intercourse existing between the co-religionists on the two banks of the Rhine; the Government in Paris, always in league with the priesthood, used the latter to lash up the war spirit, and to denounce all those who did not heartily declare themselves for war as traitors to their country. "*Protestant et Prussien*" became synonymous terms, and for the period which elapsed between the certainty of war and the commencement of hostilities, a reign of terror existed in all the mixed districts. To make matters worse, the priesthood, or at least the more fanatical portion of the priesthood, used not only the Government influence in their crusade against the Protestants, but likewise the passions of the socialist elements. For in a portion at least of Alsace (that portion which the Grand Duke had made himself acquainted with) the Protestants belonged almost exclusively to the better-off middle classes, whilst the Catholics constituted the lower class. Hence the Protestants found themselves between a cross-fire, denounced by the clergy, and to a great extent by the public functionaries, as "suspects," and eyed by the socialists as future booty. To quote an expression which the Grand Duke had heard used more than once, the Protestants felt convinced that the first French victory would be the signal for a new St. Bartholomew.

'Under these circumstances there is not the least doubt

that the success of the German arms was earnestly desired by the Protestant Alsatians.

‘ But this success they regarded only as that which would be certain to bring about the overthrow of a system which to them meant living in terror of their lives and being given up to the tender mercies of their political opponents. Political strife had assumed such proportions that even a national disaster seemed preferable to a reign of terrorism within. The feelings of the Protestants did not cease to be French, only the distinction between Catholic and Protestant had for the time and from sheer panic got to over-rule the distinction between French and German.

‘ That the war should assume the proportions it did, that there could ever be a question of a cession of French territory, never once seems to have entered into their calculations. When, by the fall of the Napoleonic system, the priest party lost its support, all they wished for appeared to have been gained, there was nothing more to paralyse the national French feeling which naturally once more came to the surface. In a word, socially and religiously, the Alsatian Protestants are German, *nationally* they are French. The accident of the Ultramontane crusade coinciding with the breaking out of war threw them for a while politically on the side of Germany, but this was an accidental and ephemeral phenomenon merely.

‘ The Grand Duke told me that nothing could have been more friendly and amicable than the intercourse he had with the Alsatians with whom he had had to deal, and that nothing could be more open than the way they had spoken to him, but that there was a fibre which could not be touched without painful vibration, viz., that of their French nationality, and it was consequently one which he carefully avoided from meddling with. It was just those Protestants who, by their character, were the most respectable and most staunch in their religious opinions, who were at the same time most loyal in their feeling to France.

‘ The Grand Duke, on my asking him whether the stories of horrors perpetrated by the peasants of Alsace on the German troops were true, said they were unfortunately most true, but that *without one single exception* they had

been perpetrated by the Catholic peasantry in the parts known to be under the influence of fanatical priests. Nothing could have been better behaved or more easy to be dealt with than the Protestant districts.

'The Grand Duke then told me that he had all along disapproved on principle of the idea of any territorial acquisition, and that all he had seen and heard during the three or four weeks he spent in Alsace, had more than ever convinced him that the annexation, besides being wrong in principle, would be wrong in policy on account of the immense difficulties there would be to reconciling the inhabitants to their new country. He added, however, that the feeling about annexation was so universal in Germany that it would be idle to attempt to stem it.'

From Carlsruhe, Morier proceeded to Strasburg, travelling in the train with a Baden officer of high rank who had, since the beginning of the war, been quartered in various villages in Alsace, and who corroborated all that the Grand Duke had said on the subject. He, too, was convinced that the inhabitants wished to remain Frenchmen, but he drew an immense difference between the attitude of the Protestant and that of the Catholic population.

'The Catholic villages were for the most part abandoned, the wells not indeed poisoned, as some people had alleged, but filled up with rubbish and in many cases with filth, the pumps broken, the wine-casks staved in, such food as could not be carried away or destroyed, rendered unfit for use. To all these acts of savage destruction he had reason to believe the population had been directly incited by the priests. In the Protestant villages on the other hand, the population remained, and at once put itself, by means of its *mairies* and *conseils municipaux*, into official relations with the officers of the conquering army, thus enabling the work of requisition, etc., to be done in the way least onerous to the inhabitants. I asked him whether he thought this was the result of sympathy for the conquerors, and he said "No," that it was just the result of superior civilisation and general reasonableness, and of the absence of the temper of fanaticism. There was nothing cringing

in the attitude of the Protestant communes, or anything to lead to the conclusion that they considered the German troops in another light than that of enemies.

'Amongst the higher and more educated classes he found the same fear as that described to me by the Grand Duke, of the possible consequences which signal successes, had they been obtained by French arms, might have had, but the feeling did not go beyond this. The hope that the Napoleonic system, which without exception *all* the Protestants looked upon as actively hostile to them, would receive a death-blow from military reverses, was the furthest point to which sympathy with German arms went. The idea that these reverses could lead to their being detached from France never seems to have been entertained.'

Morier considered the evidence of this officer especially important, since he was himself a Roman Catholic, though of the Liberal school.

In many other conversations which he had with every kind of officer, non-commissioned officer and private, he never once heard the opinion expressed that the Alsatian population seemed pleased with their enforced German guests, or desirous of seeing the temporary turned into a permanent occupation.

Arrived at Strasburg, Morier visited the hospitals on behalf of the Society for the Sick and Wounded, and paid special attention to that of the '*Diaconessen*' (the Protestant Sisters of Charity). As these institutions represented the centre of *active* Protestantism throughout Germany, he felt pretty sure that the same would be the case in Alsace. He calculated therefore that, if he could get at the 'climate of opinion' prevailing in these regions, he would have a fair test of the amount of Germanism to be found in the higher classes of the Protestant population.

'I was fortunate enough to meet the director, evidently the *cheville ouvrière* of the institution, and to have a long conversation with him. He was a *pur sang* citizen of Strasburg, belonging to the higher bourgeoisie, speaking French and German with equal facility, but neither with a

pure accent ; a busy, stout man, who perspired a good deal and was very voluble. It was clear he was held in high esteem in the congregation, and that his word carried weight ; he soon allowed me to infer that he was a wealthy man and gave of his own without stint. He knew all the pasteurs, not of Strasburg only, but far and wide. I should think they often dined with him. He certainly prided himself on being a man of business, and having so managed the funds of the hospital that they had had everything more abundantly and of a better kind than any other hospital, and yet more cheaply. When I succeeded in getting him away from the details of the hospital management, the first channel into which his eloquence burst forth was a virulent abuse of everything connected with the Imperial *régime*. The Government in Paris was at the back of every fanatical priest and every socialist agitator. He spent a long time in detailing the proofs, which certainly seemed convincing enough, by which a supposed international socialist, who had a few months ago been agitating at Mulhouse, was ascertained to have been an agent of the Paris police, the object having been to terrorise the wealthier classes in the manufacturing towns of Alsace, who were known to be unfriendly to the existing *régime*.

' From the whole tenor of this man's conversation, it was clear to me that he had himself for some considerable time been living under a modified system of terrorism, and that the priests and employé classes, as well as the lower orders, had all joined in denouncing the Protestants, and especially the wealthier Protestant bourgeoisie, as traitors and Prussians in disguise. He was perpetually on the *qui vive* to defend himself against the charge of German sympathies. He had a mass of phrases and *tourneures de phrases* in store which had evidently been doing constant duty in the way of repelling any insinuations of the kind. " Sir, I am a patriotic Frenchman ; can any one ever accuse me of an unpatriotic word or deed ? Sir, all of us Protestant Alsations are patriotic Frenchmen : where has France more patriotic, more devoted, or braver sons than the Protestant Alsations to be found in all her regiments ? What province of France yields anything to be compared with the

educated, self-respecting, steady class of non-commissioned officer furnished by our Protestant village communities? But, sir, patriotism does not consist in blindly obeying every order of a despotic government bent on purely dynastic purposes. Patriotism does not consist in approving an unjust war whose only result, if successful, would be to rivet the chains which already hang on us so heavily, and to deliver us over to a cruel fanaticised priesthood, who have been making capital by the insane cry of war to the knife against Protestant Germany. Is a man to be esteemed a Prussian because he wishes to live at peace with Prussians? "

' When, after exhausting his store of national sentiments, I got him to talk of his wishes for the future, and of the apparent prospect of Alsace being separated from France unless very unforeseen events happen, I suspect that the strongest feeling of the man and the class he represents came out in the phrase with which he prefaced his observations: " Monsieur, *avant tout nous sommes Alsaciens*. It is our local life, the right of administering our own affairs, which is what we care most about. It is the systematic crushing out of our autonomous communal life (*Gemeindeleben*) which has made us hate the Napoleonic system with such bitter hatred. We are proud of being Alsatians; we love Alsace as such. Now, to cut us up into ribands, and give one to Baden, another to Bavaria, a third to Würtemberg, would be the worst fate that could befall us. The next worse thing would be to be incorporated into Prussia and *Borussified*. If we are to be detached from France and annexed to Germany, it must be as a compact Alsato-Lorraine unit. The only true and wise piece of statesmanship, however, would be to declare us a neutral independent State, and to place our neutrality under the protection of a European guarantee. We have all the stuff to make an independent State, and such a result would fill us with gratitude to Germany."

' My next visit was to the gentleman who had the charge and direction of the stores of the *Société Internationale pour les blessés*, and who, I was told, was a very wealthy man of considerable influence.

'I approached the subject carefully and incidentally, and soon became conscious, notwithstanding great caution on his part and very guarded language, of the fact that his sympathies were altogether on the side of Germany. There was that, however, in his accent and manner which made me doubt his being an Alsatian, and I consequently, after my interview with him, took pains to ascertain his antecedents, and found that he was by birth a Frankforter who had married early a rich young lady of Strasburg, and had in virtue thereof become a Strasburg citizen. It was quite natural, therefore, that he should return to his *anciens amours*.

'The two next prominent persons I spoke to were the principal banker of the town and the President of the *Société Internationale*. They belonged to a higher class than my friend at the Deaconesses, and represented, I should think, the *élite* of the Strasburg bourgeoisie, being evidently men who associated habitually with the higher employés, such as the prefect, the governor of the town, and the like. They were both Protestants, and both indignantly denied the existence of any party, or shadow of a party, in Alsace favourable to annexation. They repeated many of the statements which had already been made to me, to the effect of the terrorism of the Catholic party, and of the imputation under which the Protestants lay of Prussian sympathies. But there could be no mistake respecting the perfect genuineness of their French feeling. I remarked the higher I got into the social scale the more marked grew the symptoms of assimilation. Both these gentlemen, though speaking German, spoke French from preference, and it was clear to me it was their habitual language. One of them, the President of the *Société Internationale*, spoke it perfectly like a Frenchman; his manner also, though quiet and dignified, was French. In spite of their French sympathies, however, they all had the strong Alsatianism I have before alluded to. They clearly looked upon themselves as something apart from France, and had been struggling to maintain this local life intact against the centralisation of Paris, though their natural feeling and their loyalty were given to France.

' One and all they looked upon the game as played out, and in this it seemed to me especially to show their German, as distinct from their French nature, viz., in being able to look at facts in the face. It is true that the facts they had been looking at for the last seven weeks were of a very terribly real kind.

' These conversations were all held in rooms or houses bearing the visible marks of the bombardment. Here a shattered looking-glass, there a ceiling or a wall ripped up from one end to the other. The taking of the town had been to them the end, and a sort of cowed resignation seemed their natural attitude.

' The shopkeepers and people in the streets to whom I spoke were, for the most part, too depressed to enter into conversation, and seemed suspicious of strangers. One old ironmonger, who seemed rather French than Alsatian, in reply to my inquiry as to what the citizens said about the new *régime* said: "Voyez-vous, Monsieur, personne ne veut le dire, chacun veut attendre que son voisin se prononce."

' The appearance of the population generally produced a singularly painful effect. All elasticity seemed taken out of them. There was a callous look about them as of men to whom the fear of death, night and day, had become a sort of second nature, and in whom the feeling of hope had long ceased to play a part.

' In the lowest classes, however, there was not wanting a fierce spirit of reckless revenge. I myself witnessed the following scene. Turning into a narrow street leading up to the cathedral, I was suddenly confronted by a crowd of Prussian Landwehr men coming towards me. In their midst was a hand-cart, like those used in the market for carrying vegetables, pushed along by two of their number. In this cart, half lying, half sitting, half crouching, was huddled a man in the dress of an *ouvrier*, tied round with cords from head to foot. I shall not easily forget his look—as white as a sheet, with long black hair that hung wildly about his head; his expression was a terrible combination of ferocity and of an agony of fear. On inquiry I found that hardly two minutes before in the adjoining "*place*,"



he had stabbed a Prussian artilleryman to death. Within an hour afterwards I learnt he was shot.

‘On this ghastly scene the townspeople looked listlessly, like men used to horrors. I spoke to several of the groups. There did not appear to be any feeling of sympathy for the murdered artilleryman, but there was the strongest feeling of indignation against the murderer, on the ground of the possible vengeance in the shape of war contributions which such acts might bring upon the town. Four or five such cases have occurred since the capitulation.’

A few weeks previously, Morier had been appealed to to try and discover the whereabouts of a young Irish lady who had been *en pension* with a pasteur’s family in a village named B——, close to Strasburg. News had reached her relations that the village had been burnt, and they had lost all trace of her. He was enabled to discover her through the intervention of the Grand Duke of Baden whose troops had been besieging Strasburg, and now, finding himself in the vicinity of B——, he bethought himself of paying the pasteur a visit and obtaining the views of a country parson, whose name he had heard spoken of with much respect by many of the Protestant magnates whom he had seen at Strasburg, as a man of weight and prominence in the Protestant community.

‘It was a beautiful still autumn afternoon when I drove out from Strasburg, contrasting strangely with the burnt and blackened villages through which my road led me. B—— had itself suffered but little, a long straggling dirty village. Near the church, in a side street, stood the parsonage, neat, clean, almost hidden by the orchard that surrounded it, and smothered in trellis vines. Everywhere flowers, the whole air perfumed with them. Under the fruit trees in front of the house sat, knitting, the pasteur’s two daughters and the Irish young lady—the former singularly good-looking and perfect types of German comeliness, pink and white with bright blue eyes and fair hair, quiet mannered, neither shy nor forward—giving me a most hearty reception when they knew who I was, and that I had come to enquire after Miss Mary. Miss Mary,

I regret to say, was in no way worthy, as regards looks, of all the trouble that had been taken about her—square, dumpy, coarse featured, with untidy hair, and a brogue that tore the skin from inside your ears.

‘I expressed my desire to see the father, that I might from his own lips learn all the dangers his Irish charge had gone through. They feared I should not be able to see him, he was confined to his bed by a wound from a shell which had burst in the streets accidentally, after Strasburg had surrendered. The mother was called in, a homely woman, busy on household matters, with soapsuds about her uncovered arms. She said the father would certainly see me, and took me upstairs, through a kitchen and a store-room filled with apples and pears and rows of preserved fruits. A thoroughly comfortable bedroom, two large walnut family beds with gigantic eiderdowns, one of which he inhabited. The room was hung with prints, all of them thoroughly good, old masters chiefly, book-shelves with sterling books, German classics, and the best modern publications, both in the bedroom and adjoining sitting-room, which also contained the family piano.

‘Pasteur M—— himself is an old man with long grey hair nearly white; venerable is clearly the adjective to be applied to him. He received me very heartily and with a certain old-fashioned dignity. He speaks the purest German, but the sentences are long, carefully composed, and have all a touch of pulpit rhetoric. He talked at length, as a pious pastor should, of the horrors of war, and described every incident of the siege and of all his anxieties about Miss Mary. It had clearly been a great event in the quiet history of the parsonage when, in the middle of the bombardment, an A.D.C. of the Grand Duke of Baden had appeared to make enquiries respecting this uninteresting young lady.

‘Having patiently listened to all the personal adventures of the family down to the moment when, all being over, he had gone forth to Strasburg to see after his sorely-tried friends and had been struck down by the explosion of the treacherous shell, and after the best Sunday coat, torn by the said fragments of shell, had been duly exhibited to me,

I succeeded in getting him on to the topic on which I desired information, his own feelings and those of his parishioners in regard to annexation. And here, I must admit, for the first time, I heard language altogether different from the profession of loyalty to France to which I had been exclusively listening at Strasburg. Up to now all the Protestants I had talked to appeared to have a set of cut and dried phrases at their disposal, which had evidently been in constant use to repel the insinuations of want of loyalty, of German sympathies and the like. One felt that the persons who used them had been long carrying on a defensive warfare against opponents who claimed to be better Frenchmen than they were. There was nothing of the kind in the carefully composed antithetic sentences of my long-haired parson. He was perfectly logical, and did not shrink from allowing his logic to take him to the end of the journey. Germanism was identified with Protestantism. Latinism was identified with Catholicism. Protestantism was identical with morality and all those higher instincts which made man a rational creature, capable of becoming a useful member of society. Catholicism was identified with immorality in every form. It made men slaves, and cruel slaves; it changed them into the mere tools of any political despot that would only condescend to admit the spiritual despotism of the arch-despot of Rome. It had been the will of God that Alsace should be sorely tried in this respect. The Protestant Alsatians, though treated with contumely by Louvois, and having to stand their ground against the gigantic resources of the most centralised and most powerful of the Latin races, had maintained it, and remained true to the faith and to the higher moral instincts of their race. It was by keeping alive in their flocks the simple German family life and purity that they had resisted the encroachments of the Catholic and Latin impurity, and kept alive the faith of the fathers.

'But the struggle was a desperate one, and another fifty years would have extinguished all hope of successfully carrying it on. Then the God of Battles arose in his wrath and gave victory to the Germans, and smote down with

one blow the Roman Anti-Christ and the Anti-Christ's friend at the Tuileries, and the Anti-Christ's chosen people, the Latin race.

'He then gave me in great detail the diagnosis, so to say, of the work of demoralisation going on wherever the French system was. The hideous corruption, both as to money matters and positive vice of the employés from Paris, civil and military, who were sent down to fatten in the provinces. The impossibility for any youth or maiden from the country going into any of the larger towns for service without being wholly contaminated. The corruption of all the higher educational seminaries, especially the cynical immorality of the higher girls' schools. The impossibility with the system of central supervision to establish higher seminaries wholly in their own hands, and without the intrigues and chicaneries of employés who all played into the hands of their enemies, the priests.

'There was one subject on which the worthy man was most especially sore. The Alsatian youths had always been of a warlike disposition; they loved being soldiers. Alsace had consequently become the recruiting-ground for the whole of France, and it was here that in the peaceful country communes the Jew *entremetteur*, whose business it was to buy substitutes for wealthy conscripts, plied his lucrative trade. He gave me a graphic account of the scenes of debauchery that were the result, and of the far more lasting evil caused by the return of the raw lads to their parishes as Frenchified soldiers, with all the worst vices of the garrison town.

'He then went on to draw a picture of all the advantages which union with Germany would bring with it, if Prussia were wise enough to know how to win the hearts of the inhabitants. As was to be expected, the idea of local autonomy and perfect ecclesiastical independence were those on which he laid a principle stress. Alsace, and whatever of Lorraine were added to Alsace, must be treated as an autonomous State, forming part of the new German Empire or Confederation. The local liberties must be enlarged, the right of self government in the *Gemeinde* must be fostered and allowed its natural developments.

Above all, Prussia must carefully avoid the attempt to introduce that hateful "union" between Reformed and Lutherans. My friend was a staunch Lutheran, and so apparently are most of the Alsatian Protestants.

'The sun was setting and it was time to go; the young lady with the bright eyes brought wine and fruit, Miss Mary brogued out a torrent of thanks, the old man gave me an apostolic kind of farewell, and I took my departure.

'The long-haired "pasteur," his busy wife, his comely daughters, the comfort but simplicity of his dwelling-house, which is architecturally not much different from the peasants' houses that surround it, the homely occupations of the inhabitants who cook and wash and do all the household work like their humbler neighbours, combined with the highest degree of culture, for there was no topic of modern interest in literature and science with which the venerable man did not appear familiar, and music of the best kind was apparently one of the principal occupations of the household; all this together made up an idyll of the very purest German type, more perfect in its kind than even I, with my long acquaintance with Germany, had yet come across. It enabled me to realise what had been told me by Germans well acquainted with Alsace, viz., that it was in many respects more German than any part of Germany. What they meant to express appears to me to be this: that it remains a bit of old-fashioned Germanism, such as we read about in the works at the end of the eighteenth and the commencement of the nineteenth century. Whilst absolutely resisting, as in these simple Protestant communities, every attempt at Frenchifying, it has at the same time been withdrawn from the influences at work in assimilating the Germans of Germany.

'From what I saw of the lower orders, I should say they were coarser, more rough and brutal than the corresponding classes in Germany. The language also is coarser, more full of strong and drastic words, with a great tendency to calling a spade a spade. So also in the class to which the pasteur of B—— and his household belong; the charm of simplicity and culture is to be found in a way which in Germany would be considered old-fashioned. One has

only to remember enough of Goethe's life to recollect his love-adventure with Friederike, the daughter of an Alsatian pasteur in a village only a few miles from Strasburg. He falls in love with her partly because he can't help it, and partly because he wants thoroughly to realise to his own individual self the *Vicar of Wakefield*, which he is just then reading, and violently impressed by. The three hours I spent at B—— were for me the being bodily transplanted into the atmosphere, moral and intellectual, by which Goethe was surrounded when he wrote the account of his intercourse with Friederike's family; down to the smallest details the local colouring was the same.

'In estimating the political and moral conditions of annexation, these strongly marked German features of the social and family life of the inhabitants must not be lost sight of.

'As regards the political value of my pasteur's opinions, it would be important to know how far they were shared by others. I asked him distinctly whether there existed such a thing as a distinct German party in the country, sharing his views, and ready to go in enthusiastically for annexation. He could not say there was, but then he pertinently remarked, "How could there be? The war was wholly unexpected, the victories were wholly unexpected. Who ever dreamt three months ago of the possibility of a dissociation from France, and how could a party be formed for what would have appeared a wholly chimerical object? What I maintain is, that union with Germany is the only logical conclusion in a war to the death between Germanism and Protestantism on the one hand, and Latinism and Catholicism on the other. All of us Protestants have been for years fighting in this war, and we are bound to accept the results. Of course, there are numbers who are unable to see the inevitableness of the conclusion, who would be glad to derive all the benefits of connection with France with all the benefits derived from the overthrow of Latinism; but those who like myself have sounded the wound to its depth know that there is no middle course possible; if we are not to rot beyond hope of recovery, we must be dissevered once for all from all contact with the

decomposing Latin race, and unite our destinies with our healthy countrymen."

'It is easy to be seen that all the pasteur's views present themselves through theological and moral media. An overwhelming sense of French immorality seemed the nightmare under which he was for ever labouring. The prospects of the whole country being at once rid of the French civil and military employés, and the pest atmosphere, which, in his opinion, they carried about with them, seemed to fill him with an unspeakable joy and a somewhat unchristian-like exultation. He stated one fact which partly explained the fierce and internecine nature of the struggle between Protestants and Catholics. Hardly anywhere are the two confessions separated into two distinct territorial parishes. In the vast majority of cases two ecclesiastical parishes, using *the same church*, co-exist in the same commune, whose inhabitants' non-ecclesiastical affairs constitute one corporation. By arrangements made by Louvois, the Catholics have in every case, even where the Protestants constitute the vast majority, an exclusive right to the use of the whole church, including the choir, the Protestants being restricted to the use of the nave. That a violent Ultramontane agitation like that of the last few years, introduced into the very heart of communities made up of mixed elements, should have led to the present state of embitterment is not to be wondered at. It is, of course, very much worse than the pitting of one community against another. According to the pasteur, in Lower Alsatia (*i.e.* the North, Upper and Lower being derived from the course of the Rhine), the Protestants constitute one-third of the population; in Upper Alsatia their numbers were much less.

'There are, of course, plenty of purely Catholic villages, and many villages in which the Protestants are in the ascendant and have the management of the affairs of the commune in their hands, but I could not hear of purely Protestant communities.

'On the whole I am inclined to take the evidence of the pasteur of B—— as a somewhat isolated case. He is clearly a far more thoroughgoing man than one usually meets with in ordinary life, and I should think exercised

great influence on the persons he came in contact with. There is no doubt that his whole way of thinking is more logical than that of those who wish to see France beaten, and yet cease not from declaiming their love for France. Whether he was only boldly stating what others thought but dared not say, is what I cannot tell. He remains the *only* person I met with in Alsace who strongly advocated annexation. At the same time he was the only man who seemed to me possessed of a strong, clear principle, which had a distinct end in view and worked to that end. If there were many such men as he in Alsace, and if they have real authority over their flocks, it cannot be doubted that Germany would have a strong ally in the country if she knew how to fit her policy to the elevated moral tone and the high moral ideals which such a body would require as a condition of alliance.'

After his visit to the village of B—— he proceeded to Bischweiler, a small town not far from Strasburg. Once clear of the radius within which the siege operations had taken place, he was struck by the perfectly normal appearance of the country. The agricultural operations being carried on, and the children in the village going to and from school, made it difficult for him to realise that only an hour or two's slow driving separated him from the scenes of desolation which he had just left behind.

'The fact which most struck me was the extreme difficulty of realising that one was in France and not on the other side of the Rhine.

'In Strasburg the French look of the shops, and the French names side by side with the German names, and the French cut of the clothes of all the employé class, made one realise the French atmosphere of the place, in spite of the German spoken by the lower classes and the horrible German-French spoken by the middle classes. In the country this French varnish or superficial coating entirely disappears. In their speech, their manners, their dress, the style of their houses, you feel you are amongst a genuine German peasantry, over which no breath of Gallicism has passed.'



Of the Alsatian dialect, often erroneously described as a bastard patois, half-French, half-German, he said: 'It is a dialect of the most unmistakable home-made German, without a touch of the bastard about it. The dialect it most reminded me of was that of the canton of Berne in Switzerland. It is every inch of it German, but archaic German with many undiluted phrases, and coarse, but very drastic expressions.'

'With such of the people as I talked to in the road, the one predominant idea was a desire that the war should cease, and that they should be able to sell their hops and tobacco before the winter set in.

'The town of Bischweiler, owing to the train from Nancy to Germany having halted there for the night (the trains dare not travel after dark for fear of rails being taken up and the like), was perfectly full, and not a room was to be obtained at any of the hotels. I was obliged to take refuge in the filthiest of wayside public-houses, and to occupy a room which had just been vacated by twelve Pomeranian Landwehr. My host belonged to the better class of peasant, owned a few fields, and did a thriving business in his wayside inn, selling oats and beer to the carriers who plied between Hagenau and Strasburg. He was a shrewd, jovial, money-making man, not differing a hair's-breadth from the corresponding class of man in the Schwarzwald or Odenwald. I ordered a bottle of wine, which I asked him to assist me in drinking, and I sat with him in the kitchen, which was very preferable to the room just evacuated by the Pomeranians.

"What we want, sir," says my host, "is peace. If this war goes on but a short time longer, there'll be nothing left of us but the bones—our fat has gone long since—our flesh is going now" (he was a remarkably portly man, with a double chin, and the reddest of faces, so that the simile was not appropriate). "They are slicing at us from both ends of the loaf. The Prussians levy enormous war contributions on the town, which have to be paid out of the strong-box of the commune—two thirds of the factory hands are out of work, they have to be maintained out of the same fund, and who fills the strong-box? Why, of course, we,

the tax-payers, and a nice state we are in to pay taxes, with troops daily quartered on us, whom we must give food and drink and cigars to, and straw to lie upon. Peace, sir, that's what we want at any and every price." "But," says I, "peace *now* means annexation to Germany." "Well, and what if it does, whoever we belong to we shall have to pay taxes. Never mind the conditions. Peace, I say, peace, peace. The Wälsche (French) have been thrashed with all their fine armies on their legs, how can they hope for victory with all those fine armies prisoners in Germany? It's no use going on fighting, it's only ruin. We in Elsass see this and know this. We know a cow when we see it, but the Wälsche don't. Believe my words—you are going on to Nancy—I came from there yesterday; they all believe in victories and all manner of nonsense—they are all for going on fighting to the last man, and all that kind of tomfoolery—those fellows there inside France (*die d'rinnen in Frankreich*)!"

'What struck me most in my host's conversation, for a man in his condition, was the consciousness of a fact I had all along noted, that the Alsatians did look at things differently from other Frenchmen; in a word, that he knew a cow when he saw it. There was also something very characteristic in the kind of contempt with which he spoke of the people "there inside in France," as if they were altogether a different set, and as if France was something distinct from Alsace.

'Next day I left for Nancy via Saverne and Lunéville. Saverne is still perfectly German, Lunéville is perfectly French. Landing from the one station to the other is like crossing from Dover to Calais. You find yourself suddenly not only amongst another people, but one which seems to have been constructed upon the exactly contrary principles of that which you have just left. In this sudden transition it is almost impossible not to feel that you are crossing from Germany into France, instead of going from one part of France to another.'

After Nancy, Morier visited the camp round Metz and went over the great battlefields, and talked to many of the

inhabitants of the villages, who were all purely French, and of whose feelings about annexation there was no manner of doubt.

'I abstained however from cross-questioning them, as it would have looked like insult, and besides the poor creatures had other thoughts in their minds, the all-absorbing care as to whether the morrow would bring relief from the miseries of to-day.'

Morier was back at Darmstadt on 16th October, after a most interesting tour which had considerably modified his original views. Starting with a strong feeling against annexation as an injustice against the annexed population, and as likely to injure Germany by forcing militarism upon her—views which he had strongly urged upon the Crown Prince in his interview with him at Speyer in July, and which his conversation with the Grand Duke of Baden had only served to strengthen, he returned, no convert to annexation, it is true, but surprised at finding Alsace such a purely German province.

'Nothing could be more striking in this respect than the contrast between the terms upon which the occupying troops appeared to be on in the German portions of Alsace and the French portions of Lorraine. In the one case, community, language, manners, and habits placed the quartered troops at once on a footing of intimacy with their unwilling hosts. You would see civilians and soldiers of an evening sitting together in groups, and laughing and talking, or even quarrelling, the women of the village being always the most forward in these discussions, and the most vociferous. In the French part the two populations were always to be seen in separate groups, and holding aloof from each other.'

Thoroughly realising that Alsace was at the time practically annexed, and that Germany would now fight for its retention as obstinately as for keeping any of her own territory, while on the other hand she did not cling with the same violence to Lorraine and Metz, Morier strongly

urged upon Her Majesty's Government that if the neutrals could, before the bombardment of Paris, recognise this fact and persuade the French to give up Alsace and Strasburg, and the Germans to give up Lorraine and Metz, a basis of mediation might possibly be found.

## CHAPTER XXV

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR—*continued*

THE attitude assumed by the British Government, and indeed by the British nation, before and since the outbreak of the war, had filled Morier's soul with despair. As an Englishman and a patriot he was overwhelmed with humiliation at the part England had played during this momentous crisis in the world's history; as a diplomatist, he mourned the golden opportunities so recklessly thrown away.

'Of course it is no more than was to be expected, but it is this which makes the bitterness a thousandfold more bitter. To be able to predict with mathematical certainty that one's country will, at a given moment, do the wrong thing in the wrong way, is a positivism for which one would gladly exchange a little uncertainty. To feel that England is for the future but as a bit of wet blotting-paper amongst the nations, does upset one's serenity and makes one almost wish to be a Maori or a Turco, both of whom have some kind of individuality and self-assertion left. There never was anything so simple as the work cut out for the Ministry. All that was required was that it should do that which it was plain it had to do, quickly and *sans phrase*. A short treaty of one paragraph ought to have been concluded with Belgium on Saturday, 16th July, the day on which war had become a certainty. "The Queen of Great Britain, as one of the guarantors of the independence of Belgium, engages, in the event of the Belgian neutrality being invaded, to assist her in repelling such invasion by all the forces at Her Majesty's command by land and sea."

'This treaty should have been published on 18th July, the day the French declared war to Germany. Had this been done our position would have been a splendid one.

At the moment of his supreme need every Belgian would have felt that he had a very present help in trouble, and England would have left her mark in the crisis without doing a bit more than she was pledged to do by treaty, and when the negotiations for peace began she would have had a right to speak and to be heard. Instead of that, what do we do? During the first ten days of the war, when the national mind in Germany, in France, in Belgium, is like fused metal at white heat, and receptive of impressions never afterwards to be erased, we do or appear (which is every bit as bad) to do nothing. No one knows what our neutrality is intended to mean, and every one interprets it in a sense unfavourable to himself. France sneers and says, "Those English won't fight, of course they will envy us our victories and they will show their usual perfidy, but we will requite them with hatred, and the French Eagles once at Berlin, the revenge for Waterloo will not be far distant." Belgium trembles. Germany, slow to anger, but of very great wrath when angry, remembering the old alliance during the earlier portion of the drama of which the last act is to be played out, listening keenly to the stories wafted across the Channel of what is said by the Prince of Wales, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army and English society, believes that England is heart and soul (though she dare not say it) with her enemy.

'In the meantime, the Ministry is going about asking here and asking there what public opinion wishes. I heard how Gladstone went about on the steamer of the Cobden Club, collecting opinions from individual members like a monkey asking for ha'pence, asking this one if he really believed England would be ready to go to war, that one whether he considered England's honour engaged in Belgium, etc., etc., In the same way, during those previous days when the effect could have been produced, she went about asking first this Government, then that, whether they still meant to defend Belgium, and whether England might be allowed to send some regiments to Antwerp, all this time clothing herself as regards her parliamentary utterance with a cloud of meaningless words, and then at the last, when the fate of the campaign is settled and every one has

ceased to care one sixpence what she means to do, coming out with this monstrously absurd treaty, in which, with an ingenuity worthy of a better cause, she endeavours to make each belligerent believe that she is really only distrustful of the other, and in which she engages not to use her fleet, which is the only help any one cares about, and to employ her army only, which frightens Continentals about as much as an old horse-pistol of the last century! The hatred of France, the contemptuous pity of Germany, these will be our plenipotentiaries at the congress which is to settle the fate of Europe for the next century—and all this owing to the one deep-seated vice of our political system, viz., the idea that it is the duty of a Constitutional Government to be an *echo* and not a voice.'

To his old chief, Lord Russell, the veteran statesman to whom he always looked up with respect and affection, he thus vented his feelings.

*Morier to Earl Russell*

'November 7th, 1870.

'I have often during the last few months been on the point of inditing a letter to you, more especially on reading your speech<sup>1</sup> in the House of Lords in August, which, for a few minutes, made me almost forget the humiliation of being an Englishman, but it is difficult when one has not been born a Jeremiah to attune one's pen to nothing but wailing and lamentation. And yet I defy any Englishman of moderate intelligence and ordinary power of judgment, who has been behind the international *coulisses* during the last six months, however boisterously hopeful his natural temperament may be, to do ought but tear his beard, strew ashes on his head and gnash his teeth.

'In a word, the heartbreaking conclusion I have come to is that modern England, as represented by the Reform

<sup>1</sup> Strongly advocating the observance of our guarantee to defend the independence of Belgium: 'The main thing is how we can best assure Belgium, assure Europe, and assure the whole world that . . . the great name which we have acquired by the constant observation of truth and justice will not be departed from, and that we shall be in the future what we have been in the past.'

Parliament and incarnated in the person of Mr. Gladstone, has lost the sense of her Imperial position and become denuded of the instinct of dealing with her peers, and what is worse is the conviction that the evil is past all cure—so thoroughly rotten is the partnership now established between the so-called Executive (11) and so-called public opinion, that all hope of finding out who are our rulers has vanished. The leaders of the people sitting in Whitehall and Downing Street call to the leaders of the people sitting in editorial chairs in Printing House Square and the back slums of the Strand for ideas wherewith to be inspired; the gentlemen of the scissors and glue pot return the compliment and assure the former of their highest consideration; each suggests to the other what he believes that he thinks that the other would think of suggesting. It is impossible to tell which is the voice and which is the echo. Is the leader in the *Daily Telegraph* the vulgarised reverberation of what Mr. Gladstone has told Mr. Levi,<sup>1</sup> or is Mr. Gladstone's speech at the Soapboilers' Superannuation Society a classicised version of the instructions Mr. Levi has given in the morning to Mr. Gladstone? Who can tell—no one can tell—neither Mr. Levi nor Mr. Gladstone; they are both of them burning incense to an unknown God—they none of them dare to have an opinion of their own—like the blind men who with the aid of walking-sticks tap their way along Regent Street, the height of their ambition is to avoid breaking their heads against the lamp-post. There is no longer present to the minds of statesmen that grand old ideal what *England* expects of them; but only—what will such and such a coterie of wirepullers say? Hence the loss of all dignity, self-respect, sense of personal responsibility, and everything which ought to inspire foreign nations with respect, and a certain awe for the government of a great people has absolutely disappeared.

'Never since the world began had a nation such a chance of doing a stroke of policy and of becoming on the largest scale the *εὐεργέτης* of the human race at absolutely no cost, and simply by recollecting for twenty-four hours the duty it owed to others and to itself, as we had this summer.

<sup>1</sup> Now Lord Burnham.



If ever there was a political proposition capable of absolute proof, it was that Napoleon III. would never face a war against England *and* Germany combined. It is now well known that the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature was followed at Paris by a moment of complete indecision in which for twenty-four hours the peace party were entirely in the ascendant. One straw would have turned the scale—one whisper to the effect that we would not remain passive and would not tolerate a European war, after having ourselves removed the only colourable pretext for one, would have sufficed to make war impossible—but the word remained unwhispered; not even at that supreme moment could we recollect that there was a time when we belonged to the *dramatis personæ* on the stage who could intervene in the action of the piece, and that it lay in our power to resume this part and to stop the most horrible tragedy the world has ever seen—but no! we were content to do chorus *off* the stage and to range ourselves amongst the wheezing, broken-kneed old greybeards, whose utmost feat consists in giving metrical expression to some miserable platitudes respecting the blessings of peace, whilst the burden of their song is a long wail of *ὦ πόποι! ὦ πόποι!*

These sentiments were shared by all those whose duty it was to represent England abroad and who had her honour at heart. 'Well, we must veil our proud tops,' Sir James Hudson, the great diplomatist, had written to Morier from Carlsbad; <sup>1</sup> 'people ask me here, "Are you an Englishman?" with a sort of pitying condescension.' Whilst Mr. Lytton,<sup>2</sup> then first secretary at Vienna, never ceased inveighing against the 'hen-hearted and pin-headed Cabinet,' which rendered all ideas of a consecutive foreign policy an impossibility.

The direct result of the British Cabinet's weakness and ambiguity was not long in showing itself. In October 1870 Prince Gortschakoff, in a circular note to the Powers, announced that Russia no longer considered herself bound by the clauses of the Treaty of Paris neutralising the Black Sea, at the same time telling the other representatives at

<sup>1</sup> 2nd August.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Lord Lytton.

St. Petersburg that he expected protests from England and Austria; also that these protests would lead to discussion which would lead to—nothing, or rather to the submission of the Western Powers;<sup>1</sup> an opinion entirely borne out by subsequent events.

On his return from Alsace, Morier was laid up with a very bad gout attack in consequence of his hard work and the exposure he had undergone during the last few days of his tour, but though confined to his bed his toils never ceased,—indeed they increased greatly. He had, since Mr. Odo Russell's appointment as Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, been constantly called upon for opinions and memoranda on every conceivable subject connected with Germany; so great indeed was the latter's reliance on his knowledge and experience that when sent on his mission to the German headquarters at Versailles, his first idea had been to go round by Darmstadt in order to consult Morier,<sup>2</sup> but this plan proving impossible he implored him in a telegram to 'Write, advise, hint, counsel, lead me, if you think you can do so safely.'

Morier was constantly being appealed to by every sort of person for information and assistance, on one occasion by Laurence Oliphant, then *Times* correspondent, who had been treated with much contumely as a spy by the German authorities until matters were explained.

Added to all this was the enormous labour of paying the *solde de captivité* to all the French prisoners in the Grand Duchy of Hesse, necessitating as it did calculations, personal interviews, etc., and correspondence with the Tours Government with reference to five or six thousand men.

Amongst other projects started at this time was one formed by the Crown Princess, strongly backed by Queen Augusta and the Grand Duchess of Baden, for the rapid provisioning of Paris after its capitulation. Morier was chosen as the medium through which the British Government was privately approached in the hopes of the matter being taken up by the neutral Powers. The plan was that

<sup>1</sup> Lytton to Morier, 14th November 1870.

<sup>2</sup> O. Russell to Morier, 13th November 1870.

provisions were to be collected in Belgium and in English harbours, there to remain until required, but it led to no result except that of rousing Bismarck's extreme indignation.

Throughout the war Queen Augusta's kindness and humanity never flagged, and Morier, who often had occasion to invoke her help on behalf of the French officers interned in various German towns, never did so in vain.

Those on parole in Darmstadt lived almost exclusively in Morier's house; 'an exceedingly charming set of people,' he wrote, 'so that of all odd results in the world I have now obtained as a consequence of the war, without leaving Darmstadt, a real insight into French character, habits of thought, etc., and have learnt to appreciate the French and to understand the secret of their influence as I never did before.'

He had no less than six of his French cousins fighting in the army, and his father was constantly begging him to discover the whereabouts of those who had been taken prisoners. In spite of the warm affection that he had for all his relations, and the high esteem in which he held the French *gentlemen*, his sentiments never changed, though his feelings were much divided.

### *Morier to Lady Derby*

'DARMSTADT, January 5th.

'It was an exceedingly great pleasure getting a letter once more, and a greater pleasure to learn that you again took an interest in the outer world, and it is very flattering to my vanity that this reviving interest should take the form of calling upon me for a letter "on the situation."

'My only difficulty is the latitude of the order, which reminds me of what the Grand Duke of Weimar told a friend of mine whom he commissioned to get a librarian for him. This gentleman was not merely to speak learnedly on all topics, but was to be specially gifted with the art of bringing "the phenomena of the past into organic union with the probabilities of the future!"

'Now this is very much what I should like to attempt to

do, having on various previous occasions made you the victim of this kind of speculation, but I must confess that my forecasts as to the future are, to a great extent, paralysed by the altogether disproportionate part which mere *senti-ment* pure and simple is playing in this war—mind, I don't say sentimentality but sentiment, *i.e.* the legitimate action of the brain and the intellect.

' If I could eliminate (to speak like the Weimar librarian would, had he been found), the psychological result produced not only on the bystanders but on the principals by the horrors which have resulted from the action and reaction on each other of individual French cruelty and corporate German brutality, I should have little hesitation even now, and though matters have gone very differently from the way I wished them to go, in declaring the general results of this war as beneficial.

' The true *raison d'être* of the war may, I think, be defined as follows: It was undertaken by France to maintain her claim to an exceptional and privileged position in Europe, in virtue of which exceptional and privileged position no continental nation was allowed the right of bettering its position without leave asked of and tribute paid to France in the shape of territorial extension and "improved frontiers." Of course this is *abstraction faite* of such details as the personality of Louis Napoleon, the Empress Eugénie, Gramont, Bismarck, and all the parties, great and small, who helped to manufacture the lucifer matches which actually fired the train. There is, I know, nothing English people hate so much as being asked to consider these general laws, when their feelings are strongly worked upon by the dramatic incidents of a political situation; but for my part, it seems to me of the very first importance that at a season like the present, when, thanks to the omnipresence of newspaper reporters, the horrors of war are microscopically laid out before us on our breakfast-tables with the toast and the muffins, and our *feelings* are, therefore, exclusively appealed to, we should force our reason and brain tissue to assert themselves, and to keep in view what the real issues at stake are.

' I have chanced lately, in connection with a work on which

I am at present occupied, to examine in great detail many of the more important diplomatic transactions of Europe between 1815 and 1848, and I have had access in doing so to a great many documents hitherto unknown. What has most struck me in this examination has been to find the number of times Europe has been on the brink of just such a war as that at present raging, and always for precisely the same cause, viz., the *international* necessities of France leaving no alternative to her rulers than to appeal to *national* sentiment in connection with an *external* question. Again and again, with a monotony absolutely wearying the same pretensions are put forward, the same phrases about the mission, the glory, the honour of France, the necessity of *her* being satisfied, are made the grounds for solid reclamations, and the *point de départ* for serious political action logically culminating in war. And be it well noted, it is always the Radical opposition, *i.e.* the political ancestors of Messrs. Gambetta, Jules Favre and Co., who push the Government in this direction, and for whose sake this national and so-called patriotic *mise-en-scène* is being perpetually renewed. It is absolutely the same who the Minister is, whether a Polignac, a Sebastiani, a Thiers, or even a Guizot. Side by side with the public fanfares and blowing of trumpets, there is almost continually a game of secret intrigue going on, by which one or more of the great Powers are being tampered with, with a view to the remodelling of the map of Europe and the acquisition for France of Belgium or the Rhine frontier. The Bismarck-Benedetti draft treaty is but the reproduction of endless such drafts, apparently kept in store for the purpose of being produced whenever the least opening presented itself.

‘If we inquire why it was that forty years went by without France kicking over the traces, we find she was prevented doing so by a general coalition of Europe against her—partly acknowledged, partly tacit. Austria, Prussia and Russia are really coalesced against her, the recollections of the first fifteen years of the century having become a sort of *idée fixe* on their side, and leading them to act instinctively as one whenever any danger threatened from Paris. It is the part of England in the matter which is so important

and so worth studying. She does not stand with the three Northern Powers, as they are called, on a great many points, she and France go together; as long as France restricts her action to legitimate objects (as in the creation of the Belgian kingdom in 1831) we go heartily with her and stand together as the representatives of Western Progress versus Eastern Reaction, *but the moment she shows the cloven foot* and attempts to assert her claim to a privileged position we at once throw our weight on the side of the Northern Powers, and make her feel that (to use the language of Trafalgar Square, which I presume will soon be the recognised political phraseology of England) "we wouldn't stand any of that humbug." It is most interesting to watch the kind of clock-work regularity with which the process goes on. During the Belgian negotiations we step in some five or six times this way—so that England becomes the regulator by which the expansive force of France is utilised beneficially and productively, but always kept in check whenever it threatens to become destructive. Hence I venture on what I believe to be a sound generalisation. The peace of Europe was maintained for nearly forty years by a *cordon sanitaire* being traced round France, three-fourths of which was of iron rigidity, the remaining fourth being elastic and so fashioned that she could take all the air and exercise required for the good of her health. The Northern Powers treated France like an incurable and dangerous maniac; we treated her like a person on the whole sane, but subject to dangerous hallucinations, and reserved to ourselves the power of falling back upon the handcuffs and strait waistcoats kept in store by the Northern Powers.

' This satisfactory system was first broken into by the Crimean war, the only perfectly useless modern war that has been waged, useless, that is, from the point of view of public utility. Every other modern war has had a permanent result, has brought about a distinct organic change—the American war, the abolishing of slavery; the Italian war, the consolidation of Italy; the Prusso-Austrian war, the elimination of Austria out of Germany, preparatory to the constitution of the German unit; the

present war, the constitution of the unit. The Crimean war had as its result the neutralisation of the Black Sea, which, by the time you receive this letter, will have been deneutralised again. The only party benefited by it was France, for it broke up the *cordon sanitaire*, gave Louis Napoleon a *position sociale* at St. Petersburg, and by destroying our military prestige thoroughly disgusted the British public from all intervention in European politics; moreover, by the halo of military comradeship, it threw us out of our *rôle* as moderator and changed us into an ally.

'Simultaneously with the break up of the *cordon sanitaire*, partly as the result of the forces set free by the general thaw which followed, began in earnest that process of national consolidation which Lord Derby has on so many occasions alluded to as one of those necessary laws which would assert themselves, whether people liked it or not.

'The two great masses to be consolidated were Italy and Germany. By ingeniously acting as *accoucheur* in the case of Italy, Napoleon satisfied French vanity and secured the regulation fee, increased territory and a regulated frontier. But how about Germany? There was the rub. Would she pay tribute? I believe myself that a very small tribute *just to save the principle* would have sufficed. *But the principle must be saved*, this was the point on which, unconsciously perhaps to themselves, there was the most complete unanimity of opinion amongst all Frenchmen. Nothing can be more absolutely false than the pretension put forward by the members of the old opposition, now the rulers of France, to the effect that they did not share this feeling, and that they asked nothing better than that Germany should constitute herself as she pleased. I have got a distinct recollection of the debates in the Corps Législatif after the events of 1866, and I feel quite certain that the phrase that Sadowa was a victory obtained over France came from the bench on which M. Jules Favre and his friends sat. What Thiers thought on the subject everybody knows. Between 1866 and 1870 I spoke to numberless Frenchmen. I never heard a different opinion. That the north and south of Germany should unite without the consent of France and without an equivalent to France

was simply a thing that could not be. In this respect the most moderate and the most *exalté* thought precisely alike. I pointed out this danger to Lord Clarendon in a letter written in April last, in which I said things had got to that pass in Germany that the work of union must be proceeded with *coûte que coûte* or the work of 1866 fall to pieces, but that every one felt that to proceed with the work of unification meant war with France. On the one hand, France said: If Prussia gives but her little finger to Baden, that is war with us; on the other, it was becoming impossible for Prussia to continue turning a deaf ear to the solicitations of Baden to be admitted into the North German Confederation without abdicating her position in Germany and definitely breaking with the national party.

‘I was able to speak thus from very positive information which I had obtained respecting *pourparlers* that had been going between Bismarck and the leaders of the national party, in which he frankly told them that to concede their most moderate wishes was to declare war to France. The North German Parliament of 1867 would die a natural death in the summer (1870), the new elections would take place in the autumn, the demand that the national question should with the new Parliament advance a step was universal; but there France stood, like the angel with the fiery sword at the gates of Paradise, barring the entrance of the German nation into its Imperial palace. *Messieurs, l'entrée est interdite!* Bismarck was being driven up into a corner, and he was by no means a safe man to drive into a corner. I therefore strongly urged Lord Clarendon to look out for a catastrophe. That the actual catastrophe did not break out in connection with the German question matters little. I did not expect it would. I could only *constater* that the clouds were being so rapidly charged with electricity that danger was at hand, but then you know Mr. Hammond said that never was the sky so clear or free from the signs of storm! Well, the crash comes. What is the *rôle* of the moderator? With the most extraordinary unanimity Parliament and public opinion wash their hands of the whole business. Complete, entire and absolute neutrality and standing aloof as from a matter



which in no wise concerns us—with the illogical rider that at all events Belgium must be defended—is the attitude we deliberately take up, declaring to continental Europe at the most solemn crisis of her history that we have henceforth no interests in common with her. Thy people are not my people, nor my people thy people; the thread of silver sea makes us safe, as safe as the eight-feet parapet round a Spanish bull-ring; we have first-rate places and the best of opera glasses, let us look on then at the great tauromachia—deeply interested in the sight and keenly sympathising now with the matadors, now with the bull, —*but as spectators.*

‘Whether the policy of the *cordon sanitaire* might have been successfully revived *ad hoc*, is a question which is now being discussed with much acerbity. I feel strongly on the subject and therefore know that I may be wrong, but I have thought so all along. I had very authentic information of what happened at Paris during the week ending Saturday, 16th July. After the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature, there were twenty-four, if not forty-eight, hours in which the peace party were altogether in the ascendant, and in which the war party considered themselves as beaten. One straw would have sufficed to turn the balance definitively—one word whispered into the Emperor’s ear by us, which no one else need have heard, and which would have been buried with him, would have perfectly sufficed to stop the war. It was just such a case as had happened over and over again during the system of the *cordon sanitaire*. Twenty years ago that word would have been whispered as a matter of course, no matter what Ministry had been in power, it would have been forwarded mechanically from the Foreign Office as a mere matter of routine. Now mind, I am not at all blaming Lord Granville for not sending it. This is just to me the heart-breaking part of the matter, he could not have done so even if he would. According to the modern reading of the Constitution, the Ministry is the servant of public opinion, and public opinion has once for all determined that England is to have nothing to do with *cordon sanitaire* arrangements.

'The old remedy therefore could not be applied *because England had abdicated her former position in Europe*. This, it seems to me, is the first great lesson of the war.

'There remained, therefore, nothing for it but a trial of strength between the two big neighbours. That this trial of strength should have resulted in the consolidation of Germany, *i.e.* in the fulfilment of a natural law (which until fulfilled would have necessarily kept Europe in a state of fever and turmoil) and in the rooting up, once for all, of the pretension of France to a privileged and exceptional position in Europe, seems to me so desirable an event that I confess myself totally incapable from the political point of view to understand any one in his senses wishing the result to have been otherwise. It seems to me, in order to establish the positive proof of the beneficence of this result, sufficient to consider for one moment what would have been the result of French victory: the re-establishment of the divisions and impotence of Germany from which every European war for the last three centuries has arisen, and a new lease of Napoleonism, *i.e.* the establishment thenceforth on a tolerable firm basis by Napoléon le Petit of the ideas of Napoléon le Grand.

'I come back, therefore, to the thesis from which I started, that, *putting the emotional aspect of the war aside*, I must continue to declare that I consider its political results as beneficial.

'Here, however, I am met by the clamour of those vociferous gentlemen of the type who inform mankind that they were all in favour of Germany at the commencement of the war, but are now altogether on the side of France. I confess that this sort of language does not seem to me much more rational than to say that one believed in arithmetic in the month of July, but that one refused to admit in December that twice two make four. However, as this cry has been loud enough to be entitled to pass for the utterance of "our master"—public opinion—I suppose one must listen with respect and attention and try to get at the pennyworth of bread in the hogshead of sack.

'As far as I have been able to analyse the hysterical

utterances of these gentlemen, what they mean to say is this :—

‘ Germany is to be held accursed.

‘ 1. Because she has not yet made peace.

‘ 2. Because she insists on a territorial cession.

‘ 3. Because her manner of conducting the war is unworthy of a civilised nation.

‘ Nos. 1 and 2 seem at first inseparably connected with each other, for with the looseness and inaccuracy which characterise the “tall talk,” not of the British speakers only but of the British writers on recent political events, it is always assumed that after Sedan (*i.e.* at Ferrières) France offered peace on the basis of unlimited money payments, that this offer was met by a demand for Alsace and Lorraine (Strasburg and Metz being still in the power of the French) which demand again was met by the cry of “not an inch of soil or a stone of a fortress.” Now the facts are (I speak under correction, not having the means of verifying what I say, and relying on my memory, but on the main point I can guarantee that I am right):—

‘ 1. That the negotiation at Ferrières was not a negotiation for peace, but a negotiation for an armistice which broke down because Jules Favre refused the very moderate condition that Strasburg should surrender. I say moderate, because Bismarck did know, and Jules Favre ought to have known, that the fall of Strasburg was a question of days and hours. On being called upon to discuss this practical piece of military detail, M. Jules Favre informs us *qu’il détourna la tête pour étouffer ses sanglots*. A French fortress is not like any other fortress—it has something of the nature of a divinity—it is as if the Athenians had been asked to give up the statue of Pallas Athena !

‘ 2. That the phrase “not an inch and not a stone” occurs in Jules Favre’s circular, written *previously* to the Ferrières interview, and therefore before he could know what would be the territorial cessions demanded, and that this is pretty good evidence of the animus in which the negotiation was likely to be conducted and absolutely conclusive as to the ineradicable force of the idea that France, even at her

worst crisis, must be treated as having "an exceptional and privileged position," precluding her from being subjected to the conditions which other States have to submit to, *and which she has uniformly exacted from other States.*

'When, therefore, one "extra parliamentary utterer" after another repeats the phrase, "France was wrong at first, but Germany has placed herself in the wrong since, by not concluding peace after Sedan, and now *all* my sympathies are with France (immense cheering)," he is only, after the fashion of his tribe, talking nonsense. *Germany never had the option of making peace.* The aggressors and the conquered have refused to sue for peace. The attacked and the conquerors had no option but to go on with the war. To say that this is all very well when applied to ordinary wars, but that it falls to the ground when a civilised country like France, with a beautiful capital like Paris, is concerned, is simply to re-echo the old fallacy of "the privileged and exceptional position." What the "extra parliamentary utterer" really says is that *Germany ought after Sedan to have forced France to accept peace on French terms*—a proposition which may approve itself to persons of a certain type, but which no serious politician could discuss.

'I am, however, by no means sure that even this would have been possible. It is well to remember that Jules Favre's visit to the German headquarters was very ill received in Paris, and nearly caused a revolution. It was only on his return as an *unsuccessful* negotiator that he was restored to favour, and that the hubbub subsided. It is certain that his colleagues, or, at all events, Gambetta, disapproved of his self-imposed mission. The attitude of the persons who really had the decisive voice at that time, *i.e.* the ultra elements in the Government of National Defence supported by the revolutionary elements of the Paris population, *which had not yet been cowed by old Trochu and his Breton moblots*, was, there cannot be the slightest doubt of it, *War*—war as the means of establishing the Republic. A republican *levée de boucliers* would save France, and she who saved France, that is, the Republic, would thenceforth be supreme and unattackable. That this was the true cause

of the continuance of the war after Sedan, that it was the work of *a very few persons having a political*, as distinct from a merely *patriotic*, object in view is what I feel convinced history will some day establish.

‘ I do not require this, however, for the conclusion to which I have arrived, viz., that the blame of the continuance of the war, after Sedan, cannot be laid at the door of Germany. But the continuance of the war *necessarily implied* the siege of Paris, the bombardment of Paris, and the hunger and misery of the Parisians—all of them horrible things, but the necessary consequence of the original act of aggression of France against Germany.

‘ On the first point, therefore, the “ extra parliamentary utterer ” has not a leg to stand upon. If he was on the side of Germany in July, he has not, *as far as the continuance of the war goes*, the shadow of a right to be now on the side of France. Before proceeding to the second point, there is a phase of English opinion in connection with the first point to which I want to call attention, as it appears to me singularly dishonest and unloyal.

‘ The line of argument, if not expressed in so many words, nevertheless clearly amounts to this : Quite irrespective of what was the original cause of the war, and whether France was right or wrong in commencing it, *as a matter of honour and as a question of self-respect*, France was bound after the disaster of Sedan to endeavour to retrieve her military prestige, for to make peace after such a defeat was to accept humiliation worse than death. I have no fault to find with this argument *if it were not coupled with the most violent abuse of Germany for continuing the war*. If it is necessary in order that France may recover her prestige that she should continue to fight, surely you have no right to abuse the parties who afford her that opportunity, or to find fault with them for being successful.

‘ I now come to the second count : That Germany is to be held accursed because she insists on a territorial cession !

‘ I need hardly tell you that personally I am against the principle of cession. It runs diametrically against all my advanced view of international morality and *contrecarrer’s* the international Utopias which you know I delight to paint

upon the walls of my prison-house. But I maintain we have no right when we sit in judgment on a contemporary political event to appeal to Utopian laws, or to apply a code which, although it may have been already elaborated and accepted by a select few, has not yet had time to become the common law of mankind. It is absurd to maintain that territorial cessions, as such, have been definitely erased out of this international common law. *Wars undertaken for the purpose of conquest undoubtedly have*, and it is because the war of 1870 was really a war of this kind, and was felt to be but a link in an ascending series of such wars waged by France, that it raised such universal indignation amongst all right-minded people. A cession of territory demanded by the aggrieved party as a penalty to be paid by the unsuccessful aggressor, and on proof given that such cession is necessary to guard against a renewal of aggression, is not only not erased from the modern international code, but was solemnly placed on record in the treaty of peace with Russia in 1856. There is, moreover, a striking parallel between the principles which ruled our action on that occasion, and that which rules the action of Germany in demanding Alsace. In both cases the *desideratum* was, and is, the removal of the aggressor from the banks of a river which had before constituted his frontier, and the placing of the aggressed in full possession of both banks of the river.

'The "extra parliamentary utterer," therefore, is merely rhapsodising when he tries to prove that he is a rational being for shifting his sympathies from Germany to France because the former has announced her intention of demanding territorial "damages."

'The question of the policy or impolicy of the German demand is, of course, a perfectly different one. I consider the demand impolitic, quite irrespectively of my Utopian views. It will seriously hamper Germany in the work of her internal development by strengthening the hands of the military party, and setting up the evil example of the *par excellence* Germano-Imperial territory ruled for many years under martial law. It will be an unmixed evil for France by giving the Chauvinist a permanent platform to rally on—the recovery of the territory ceded. Being

bad for Germany and France, it will be necessarily bad for Europe, and the only people likely to be really and permanently benefited are the Alsatians, who are such a singularly disagreeable people that I cannot say I care to see them benefited.

'I have held this opinion all along, and no arguments have been able to shake it ; but I must on the other hand admit that, if it be granted that cession of territory in the abstract is as yet not sufficiently condemned by the international conscience of mankind to make the enforcement of it by a victor as such a political crime, the arguments on the German side in regard to the concrete case of Alsace and German Lorraine are so overpoweringly strong, that it requires all the strength of my belief in certain general principles to disregard them and to urge, as I have done on my German friends, the impolicy of their conduct.

'These arguments have never fairly been laid before the English public. I have carefully examined the question, and have made an excursion through Alsace and Lorraine, so that I have distinct views of my own on the subject. I may add, however, that these arguments would have no weight with persons who, like F—— H——, are bold enough to inform mankind that they absolutely refuse to Germany the right of being moved by considerations of strategy, history, or nationality.

'I now come to the last point : That Germany has forfeited our sympathies, *which are therefore necessarily transferred to France*, on account of the way in which the war has been carried on by her. Now I perfectly admit that she has waged the war pitilessly and mercilessly, and what I extremely regret to have to confess is that it was to be foreseen that, as regards the *system* of carrying on the war, such would be the case. To the military *gros bonnets* who organised the campaign, and to the military caste of which they are the high priests, the laws of war are a fifth Gospel infinitely more binding and sacred than the other four. Not to carry out these laws to the very uttermost limit, to leave a single precedent unattended to, would be to them a sacrilegious act (I, of course, wholly and entirely except the Crown Prince, who is the incarnation of the opposite

principle). Hence, that the maximum of damage which could be done to the invaded country in the way of requisitions in kind and money, according to the harshest readings of the laws of war, would be inflicted, is no more than was to be expected. On the other hand, the well-known discipline of the Prussian army and the experience of the campaign of 1866 gave one good ground to hope that the behaviour of the army, as such, would be exemplary, and that pillage and wanton destruction of private property would be unknown. Unfortunately, the German army was not composed of Prussians only, but of Southern Germans also. Now in none of the southern armies is the discipline at all on a par with that of the Prussians, and the Bavarian army has always enjoyed an unenviable reputation for pillage and devastation. There is no doubt, therefore, that from the very beginning of the war there has been pillaging on a large scale by a portion of the German troops, all of whom, be it remembered, have invariably by Frenchmen, and even by many Englishmen, been described as "Prussians."

'As regards the *bona fide* Prussians, after examining much contradictory evidence I have come to the conclusion that in some parts of France, and under some commanders, especially Manteuffel, their discipline has greatly deteriorated, and that many cases of pillage of a bad kind could be brought home to them, but that these still form the exception to the rule, and that it can be safely asserted that where the inhabitants have not fled and have made it possible for the troops to enter into orderly relations with them, their conduct has been exemplary and far above that of ordinary armies,—the requisitioning excepted, but for this they are not responsible. On one point there is a universal agreement, viz., that the discipline has never slackened in regard to the treatment of women, and amidst all the complaints daily poured into my ears by the French officers here, I have never once heard of an outrage of this kind having been committed. Taking, therefore, an average all through the German army, I come to the conclusion that, war being what it is, it cannot be said that the behaviour of the troops in the matter of acts of indiscipline



is either very much above or very much below what was to be expected.'

Arthur Russell, who, like his brother Odo and Morier, was imbued with strong pro-German sympathies, had married a French lady.<sup>1</sup> With his mother-in-law and two sisters-in-law 'imprisoned, besieged, and bombarded,' he was torn by conflicting feelings, and asked Morier, who having so many French relations himself he knew would sympathise with him, for a letter to clear up his ideas.

'I find it difficult,' he wrote, 'in the universal change that has taken place around me, to maintain the independence of my mind, and like all spectators, my thoughts are obscured by sorrow at the ill-treatment and devastation of France, of which I do not see the end. The change in England is very remarkable; the German cause has few friends left, and the massacre of French peasants, the increasing cruelty of the Germans, the destruction of French property and capital, have completely turned the sympathies of the great majority of Englishmen. . . . My question to you is this: Ought I, with the rest of England, to change my sympathies in this war, since it has ceased to be a war of defence to become a war of conquest carried on with relentless and increasing barbarity? Ought I to pray now that no Germans may escape alive into Germany again with all good people here? I have not changed outwardly yet; I still defend the German cause, though somewhat feebly, and I feel the influence of surrounding opinion waxing daily higher—that is why I have written to you.'

The following was Morier's reply:—

'January 16th, 1871.

'DEAREST ARTHUR,—Though in bed with a fearful gout attack, and so *auf dem Hund* that I feel scarce moral strength enough to wield a pen, I nevertheless hasten to reply to your letter, and tell you *how* thoroughly and completely and entirely I sympathise with you, and how especially cruel I consider the position in which you are personally placed, yet at the same time to entreat you to lay hold of

<sup>1</sup> Laura, daughter of Comte de Peyronnet.

your *Vernunft mit beiden Händen*, and not to allow yourself to have your judgment of the *Welthistorische* warped by the *accidental*, however all-absorbing and terrible that accidental may be. I believe there are moments when it is almost impossible to act up to this precept, and where human nature is almost justified in crying out "*Damn Vernunft!*" It must, for instance, have been very difficult for a reasonable person shut up at Münster under the government of the three Anabaptists to have gone on fervidly believing in the restored health which the human race would enjoy from the Reformation. And yet, unless one does make up one's mind to hold fast by the petticoats of *Frau Vernunft*, I see nothing for it but the certainty of drifting to the type of F—— H——, which appears to me to be a cross between a prize-fighter and a hysterical lady's maid. One's only chance appears to be to seize the great "unripe," and to force oneself to judge of the situation by these, irrespectively of the momentary emotion.

'In my endeavour to do this, do not think me biassed by my happening to be in Germany. Just the contrary. It has been no joke, I can assure you, for an Englishman to reside in the Vaterland, *anno* 1870, and may it never be my lot again to have to watch Titanic events from a suburb in *Crehwinkel*. All the petty and miserable sides of such a struggle are opened out before one as under a microscope: you are regaled with the sight of the *Philister* doing *Weltgeschichte*, and have to hear how it was the 2nd *Zug* of the 1st *Chevaux Légers*, under Lieutenant Müller, which at the eventful moment broke the resistance of France and decided the fate of Europe. But it is not on this side only that care has been taken that my German trees should not grow into heaven. I have had many opportunities of knowing and seeing the best sides of the French struggle. I have no less than six cousins fighting in various parts of France, and my father has sent me numerous letters from them and their wives and mothers, showing me how noble and true is the patriotism and enthusiasm and self-devotedness of the *gentlemen* of France. Moreover, my home for the last two months has had no guests in it but the French officers confined here—very charming, excellent men.

Lastly, my wife is fiercely and consistently French, and has been so from the very beginning. She hoped and believed in glorious victories as sanguinely as Lebœuf, and impatiently counted the days that would elapse before Darmstadt had a French garrison. Under these circumstances you will allow that I have quite ballast enough not wildly to cry up the German cause.

‘And yet I have no hesitation in saying now, as I said six months ago, that France, having undertaken a war for the maintenance of an exceptional and privileged position in Europe, which exceptional and privileged position required that no neighbouring nation should constitute and consolidate itself without assent asked from, and tribute paid to, France in the shape of territorial aggrandisement, it is in the interest of Europe that such a war should end in the defeat of France, and in her renunciation once and for ever of her claim to a privileged and exceptional position.

‘I am unable to see what Germany has yet done which would entitle us to say that she has gone beyond this programme, nor have I seen any sign whatever on the part of France which would lead to the supposition that she has given up one millimetre of her wildest pretensions.

‘A war *à outrance* (whose fault it is that it is a war *à outrance* is a distinct question which I will treat later) is being waged because, in reply to Germany’s declaration that a cession of territory must form one of the conditions of peace, France has replied that *she will never cede an inch of territory or the stone of a fortress, i.e.* in the reassertion by the Republic, or that which goes by that name, *in the most irrational formula*, of the claim to an exceptional and privileged position. Now it seems to me of the greatest importance, especially for us advanced Liberals who are given to living in a “*Zukunft’s* atmosphere,” to realise very soberly what is the atmosphere of the future, and what is the atmosphere of the past and the present. In the advanced Liberal code, in the international cosmogony of the future, there is, I quite admit, no room for a transfer of territory against the will of the human units settled thereon (and that as individuals we should *huldigen* this idea, and preach it as part of the political millennium we desire to

establish in the world, is what I altogether approve of). But in judging of a great international contest like the present, we have not only no right, but we are guilty of a great wrong in judging either the one side or the other by an ideal code which has never been practically established. Now to say that Germany is to be held accursed because she claims to end the war *in the way that, without exception, every European war has ended*, that is, by the transfer of territory and fortresses from the vanquished to the victor, and because she does not subscribe to a new code of international morality on the strength of the *one* precedent of the Abyssinian war, is to be guilty of this injustice. It is as if a man were had up before a judge for stealing, and the judge were to pronounce as follows: It is clear from the evidence that you have not stolen, but it is equally clear that you are no saint, and neither better nor worse than your neighbour, and I therefore condemn you to seven years' penal servitude.

'Now let me not be misunderstood. I distinctly admit that it was *impolitic* on the part of Germany to demand Alsace and Lorraine, but I cannot admit that because it shocks the conscience of Mr. F—— H—— and Mr. Bradlaugh, it is a crime. I would heartily wish that in this respect the conscience of mankind were the conscience of Mr. F—— H—— and Mr. Bradlaugh, but in exercising my office of judge, I am bound to *constater* that it is not.

'When, therefore, I am called upon to declare Germany accursed because she does not sheathe her sword and declare her readiness to make peace on the terms proposed by France, viz., the non-cession of an inch of territory or a stone of a fortress, I am called upon to declare her accursed because she refuses, after six months of successful fighting, to continue granting to France that exceptional and privileged position which I have begun by considering the great curse of Europe, and by declaring that I wished to see abrogated by this war. Now this I cannot do. People keep asking me what is Germany fighting for *now*? Has she not been constantly victorious? can she require new laurels? This seems to me mere drivelling. She is fighting now for just the same object she was fighting for

on the 3rd August, viz., *the object of making peace*. We have so completely yielded ourselves prisoners to the "phrases" with which France appears to have the power of fascinating the world, that we entirely forget that war is an operation which must in the very nature of things go on until it is put a stop to by peace. That it is the business of France to ask for peace does not seem to enter into anybody's head in England. But if France refuses to ask for peace, who is to ask for it? Will any one be good enough to tell me at what period since the breakdown of the Ferrières negotiation Germany could have addressed the Provisional Government with any chance of success had she said, I am desirous of making peace, and I am ready at once to enter into negotiation on the basis of a territorial cession? Why, the whole plan and action of the Provisional Government "*von A bis Z*" was built up with a view to render it impossible for them to answer this question in any way but by a declaration of war to the knife.

'What, then, is it that Germany is really asked to do? It is that she, the victor, shall agree to the terms of France, the vanquished, because M. Jules Favre having once *lancé* his phrase "not an inch and not a stone," that word has become God, *verbum fit Deus*, and it becomes sacrilege to humanity and civilisation and all the rest of it not to worship this God. God knows that the horrors of this war are true horrors to me—I have one way and the other seen them sufficiently close to have experienced them in the flesh as well as by hearsay, and the agony of the beautiful writhing France is almost more than I can bear to look upon; but spite of all this one must remain honest and fair. Had the Germans been either angels or superhumanly politic men, they would have forced a peace on the French almost in spite of themselves, by asking for no territory and next to nothing else, and returning across the Rhine after Sedan. The tremendous moral prestige of such an act and the total collapse of everything military in France, without any time being given to rouse the military feeling in the non-military classes, would, I believe, have been equivalent to an amount of political capital ten times more valuable than any amount of

indemnity or territory: but as Bismarck and not Daniel sat in judgment, and they did not do so (and remember we have no right to hold them accursed because they were not superhuman), then I cannot see how they can be found fault with for continuing the war till the French sue for peace.

‘In my opinion, they who are to be held accursed are two. First, the *maîtres de ballet* who possessed themselves of authority when the Empire broke down, and prepared the melodramatic *mise en scène* with which Europe was to be regaled when the curtain drew up on Republican France, and the *pose* in which poor, bleeding, mangled Paris was to show herself off to the public when the ruffians of the piece closed upon her. Second, the British gallery which, by its fanatic yells of applause, has played into the hands of these infernal dancing-masters and given them exactly what they wanted—a public before which to perform. I cannot find words to express my indignation against men, who, unless they have wholly parted with their wits, must know that England will not interfere in favour of France, and that France unaided *must* submit at last to the terms of Germany, yet find nothing better to do than to applaud the frantic efforts of the poor victim, and lash her on by their safe acclamations to renewed endeavours as futile as the last.

‘To me, the deification of a M. Gambetta, with his Hessian boots, his fur collar, his *intarissable* supply of tawdry lies, his skipplings to and fro like the *moucheron* round the *six forts chevaux*, by the *Spectator*, is a something loathsome I cannot describe. If this is British public opinion, we must be far gone on the same road to melodramatic destruction which poor France is on. I don’t think much of English public opinion or of our supposed moral weight in Europe, but I do really believe that this is an occasion on which we might have done some good, and at least refrained from doing a great harm. If instead of telling the dancing-masters that they were a set of heroes, we had told them for God’s sake to leave off their fiddlings and monkey-tricks for forty-eight hours, and try and demean themselves as statesmen having the tremendous responsibility of France’s

future on their shoulders, to put aside all tomfooleries about one inch of territory and one stone of fortifications, and to get down in black and white what was the minimum Germany would be content with, and if that minimum appeared too high to a properly constituted national assembly, then to go on with the war till a further stage of the proceedings were attained,—if we had done this we might have done some good; but as it is, the dancing-masters can well say, “See what the soberest people in the world say. They think all we do most beautiful, patriotic, and rational. Shall a Frenchman be less patriotic than an Englishman?”

‘However, my abuse of the French leaders and of their admirers will not much mend matters. I cannot hope to do more than point out where it seems to me is the gigantic injustice done to Germany, which is to accuse her of going on with the war out of *gaieté de cœur* and as if she wished and liked it, and to take no account whatever of the fact that the way to peace is barred by the *non possumus* of a set of people whom it suits our Radicals to make into heroes. Here, if ever, is the work which neutrals might cut out for themselves—but the impossibility of our doing any good is pointed out by you when you say that the House of Commons would turn out a Ministry who had advised France to make a territorial cession or to be dismembered, which is the fashionable word I see in use (as if having one’s great toe cut off were to be dismembered). Were it not for the blessed House of Commons which, on your showing, is in league with everybody else to prevent poor France having the reality of her situation brought home to her understanding, the course for an English Ministry would appear to me clear enough. Germany is completely mistress of the military situation: to suppose for one moment that the French can succeed in so organising themselves as to drive the Germans from France is insanity. The only people who fight in France are the gentlemen, and they are being rapidly killed off—800,000 men individually and corporatively filled with a sense of invincibility and steadied by it (I mean *professionally* of course) are not to be got rid of unless they choose to go; you must make them

choose to do so. Where is your lever? They desire ardently to be rid of the war, but, of course, they will only end as victors. To give up their demand for a cession of territory is in their minds equivalent to owning themselves beaten: masters of the military situation, they have no hold of the political situation, and are here utterly at sea. They don't know with whom to negotiate, on whom to act;—*mit einem Wort*—this is the side where they require aid and help.

'A neutral, or a combination of neutrals, who should assist them in getting over this difficulty would stand in the position of a person who, having a service to offer, may claim a service in return. The service I should as a neutral claim, would be that Germany should diminish her demand for territorial compensation. It is well known what it is the Germans claim—Alsace (Strasburg) and the north of Lothringen with Metz. Strasburg is the key of Germany, there is no denying that. Were the neutrals to say to Germany, give up Lorraine and Metz and consent to the dismantlement of Strasburg, and we will then endeavour to obtain France's consent to the abandonment of Alsace and the dismantlement of Metz, the situation would become *vernünftig*. As it is, we have got a beautiful maniac struggling in the grasp of a gigantic keeper with no argument at his disposal but handcuffs and strait-jackets and huge fists: she makes her white teeth meet in his brawny arms, and drives her nails into his flesh, but cannot make him let go his hold. We cannot make up our minds to knock the keeper down, partly because we are afraid, partly because we know that after all he is in the right, however brutal his mode of action may be, and so, by way of a compromise, we egg on the poor raving creature, tell her she is quite right, assure her she is not mad, and heap curses of every kind on the keeper! We say we are horrified and I believe we are, but then we take delight in horrors which have become our daily food, and my full conviction is that ninety-nine Englishmen out of a hundred would infinitely prefer another year or two of war with all its horrors, on the condition of the Germans at last getting the worst of it, though both France and



Germany were destroyed by it, to a peace concluded now which gave Germany what she desired. After all, it is but another instance of the Darwinian law. What else is to be expected of a nation whose ancestors for centuries were brought up to bull-baiting and prize-fighting? Our stand-point is that of the ring, our political judgment that of people whose Sunday reading is *Bell's Life in London*!

'But I must make an end. I have only one other point to touch; it is one I would much rather not touch, for it is a very sore one, on which it is almost impossible to speak calmly, and yet I feel I may not shirk it, viz., who is most to blame for the war being one waged *à outrance*, and having assumed the altogether ferocious and inhuman character which it undoubtedly possesses. Now I have no hesitation in stating that the guilt of giving this character to the war rests with the French, though the amount of vandalism actually committed since that character was given to it has been infinitely greater on the part of the Germans. The devil who inhabits the innermost soul of the German is brutality; the devil who inhabits the innermost soul of the Frenchman is cruelty. From the evidence I have collected since the commencement of the war, there is no doubt left in my mind that very many acts of individual cruelty preceded the outburst of systematised German brutality. The assassination and mutilation of prisoners and wounded by non-combatants dated from the very first days of the war. I doubt whether any Frenchman has been mutilated, or had his eyes gouged out, though thousands have been brutally shot, and whole villages systematically burnt, to punish individual acts.

Now I do not excuse the Germans one whit. I think that, considering the perfect discipline which characterises the Prussian army, at all events the guilt of much of the brutality falls on the officers and on headquarters, and that we have here to deal with all that is worst in Prussia, the heartlessness of militarism and utter recklessness of what the *Mitmenschen* will think. The punishment will not fail, for as you say, for generations people will point to the wreck of Paris and say, see what those vandals did. But this must not blind us to the fact that the French, having

begun a purely *political war*, at once gave to it the savage character of a *national war*. Remember the brutality of the wholesale expulsion of hundreds of thousands of innocent Germans out of France—before the war has lasted a fortnight. It was the sight of the never-ceasing trains filled with men, women, and children expelled from France, and arriving along the Rhine as beggars, in many cases their property and all but their clothes taken from them, which roused the fierce national hatred here, and the stories of the mutilations. For, till after Sedan, I can *constater* that there was no feeling whatever against France and Frenchmen; on the contrary, it was almost absurd to see the way the French prisoners were helped and made much of. I quite admit that having one's nose or ears cut off is less of a nuisance than being shot, but there is no denying that the actual sight of a mutilated being does affect one more than hearing of a dozen peasants taken with arms in their hands having been shot by court-martial; and it is the rage caused by these mutilations which, like a fire in a coal-pit, is burning steadily within the ranks of the 800,000 Germans now in France. God help her!

'I am, let me here say, excessively sceptical as to the stories that come to one from the field of battle, and I have taken the greatest pains to get at the bottom of the stories which began to be *colportés* at the railway stations and in the German newspapers, and I found a great many to be utterly false, or at all events improbable, but I am sorry to say that I did also *constater* on the highest authority from official depositions (and in one case from an eye-witness), some of the worst cases. This very morning my doctor told me he had been examining a wounded Landwehrmann, the tendons and sinews of whose wrists had been artistically cut through with a clasp-knife by a *franc-tireur pour passer le temps*: his hands were hanging to his arms absolutely useless for the rest of his life. Such is this war.

'Let me ask in conclusion this question. Supposing, instead of our having retained Calais, as we did for so long, the upshot of our wars with France had been that France had retained Kent and Essex; that the

inhabitants, whilst remaining thoroughly English in their language and habits, had yet got French in their sentiments; that the French had constantly used these two counties as a basis from which to attack us, and that by getting on the sea we made sure of protecting ourselves from future attack; do you believe under this supposition that if we were half way in the siege of Paris we should stop, or, moved by the speeches of Jacoby and his colleagues at Berlin, we should agree to any other conditions than those of getting fully the whole of English soil? Secondly, supposing we had wantonly attacked France, and half England was being ruined by French troops, London was being bombarded, and we knew we could not hope to resist, and had acknowledged that we had been guilty of a wanton, wicked, and diabolical act of aggression, should we refuse to give up the Channel Islands to France (even if they were twice as big) upon France claiming them on the ground that we had always attacked her from them, and had prepared and armed them for that purpose, and also because they were French in nationality and belonged geographically to France?

'I beg your pardon for running on thus garrulously. But I am living in a state of fever I cannot describe. I have tried hard to remain and keep fair, and it is heartbreaking to me to find so many of my friends in England going round the whole point of the compass. The great issues of history cannot be decided by the changes *our feelings* undergo in six weeks.'

The long winter months dragged on amidst scenes of misery and desolation, enhanced by an unusually rigorous season.

'We are suffering from a most terrific state of cold,' he wrote to his father on Christmas day 1870—'sixteen degrees Réaumur this morning. It is impossible to keep warm with any amount of heating, and to make the thing quite perfect, owing to want of railway rolling stock (all of which nearly is in France, or used in Germany for military transports) we are out of coals. For ten days there was not a hundredweight of coals to be got in all

Darmstadt. Some little quantity has now arrived, but we are paying two hundred per cent. more than the usual price, and this is certain to rise perhaps double or treble, so that I calculate that our firing alone will be at the rate of what the Government pays me ! . . .’

From the commencement of the rupture between France and Germany the position of the guaranteed neutral States seemed fraught with dangerous complications. Commenting later on the lessons taught by the war, Morier pointed out—

‘First, the immense use and advantage in the event of European conflagrations of neutral fireproof blocks, capable of arresting the flames, provided always that the States fulfilling this function are physically strong enough, and morally respectable enough themselves to maintain their neutrality in the hour of danger.

‘Belgium and Switzerland both showed during the war that they were worthy of the guaranteed position accorded to them, and Switzerland pre-eminently so. At a heavy cost to herself, by putting a large army on a war footing, she was able without any friction, and as a matter of course, to disarm the 80,000 men of Bourbaki’s army thrown across her frontier, and thus to fulfil, without asking any assistance and at her own expense, the task of extinguisher.

‘Secondly, the extreme danger and utter uselessness of would-be neutral fire-proof blocks, artificially constructed by treaty, and neither physically strong enough nor morally respectable enough themselves to maintain their neutrality when threatened by the actual presence of war. By her moral and physical weakness, Luxemburg was a constant source of danger both during and after the war, and her worse than complete failure to fulfil the function and duties of a *guaranteed neutral* was a proof of Lord Derby’s sagacity in opposing as he did at the time, though afterwards overruled, the special guarantee of that neutrality in 1867.

‘The moral might be formulated thus:—A guaranteed neutral fulfils its European functions as buffer in time of peace, and extinguisher in time of war, in proportion not

to the power and respectability of the guaranteeing powers, but to its intrinsic physical strength, and to the moral prestige with which it can command the respect of belligerents. A guaranteed neutral becomes a source of danger to Europe in proportion to his physical incapacity himself to maintain his neutrality, even by physical or moral prestige, and this danger is greater in proportion as the guaranteeing powers are great and powerful States, because they are forced into the position of *principals* where they should be *seconds*, and the more powerful and equally matched the principals, the greater the danger of a rupture between them.'

In the beginning of December the Prussian Circular<sup>1</sup> relating to Luxemburg, had created consternation in diplomatic circles.

*Morier to Stockmar*

'December 15th, 1870.

'I am heart-broken and in perfect despair at the state of the political horizon. I have done all I could to get us to swallow as much of the Russian leek as was possible *on the condition* of Russia coming two-thirds of the way and, in return for our easing this Oriental complication off for her, entering upon an *entente cordiale* with us on the *fonds* of the Oriental question and generally as to a *Polizei Ordnung* for Europe. In the middle of the *pourparlers*, bang! off goes this Luxemburg bomb—the exact counterpart of the Russian manifesto. A greater act of stupidity was never committed if the object is the acquisition of Luxemburg, which could have been got by honest and respectable means just as easily. But I have every reason to believe it is not an act of stupidity, but the preparation and initiative of a long-formed plan involving the restoration of Louis Napoleon with the French portion of Belgium as *Morgengabe*, and the annexation of the Flemish part to Holland, and of the Holland thus fattened to Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Of December 9, 1870, declaring that the Prussian government no longer considered itself bound by the treaties upholding the neutrality of Luxemburg. See A. Soul: *Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, vol. ii. p. 110.

' These may be all desirable results in themselves, but if they are to be *octroyés* upon Europe by the mere will of M. de Bismarck and in utter contempt of all law, justice, and international honesty, then I for one would wish to see England spend her last man and her last cartridge in opposing so damnable a *restoration* of the worst periods of modern history. I dare say we should be beaten, but we might fight long enough to sicken even Germany of war. . . . I believe that the lust of *gloire*, kindled as it is within her (Germany), will burn with a much more terrible fierceness than it ever did in the *grande nation*, even as coal burns more terribly, when once it is kindled, than straw.

*Stockmar to Morier*

'BERLIN, December 17th, 1870.

' . . . The state of the political horizon is certainly far from exhilarating. The war is no joke for us, and I have from the beginning foreseen no result from it but an armistice. The Luxemburg proceeding I consider a great blunder, because as you say, Luxemburg might have been got by other means. But is not this the way in which we have been going on for years : attempting to get by foul means and against everybody's grain, what might have been had by fair ones ? But I do not *for one moment* believe in the existence of the plan alluded to by you. The restoration of Louis Napoleon may at one time have been thought of ; I believe it is given up now, and I do not think the annexation of Holland has ever been thought of. I suppose your source was English. I have heard the same thing from an English source. I spoke to three well-informed persons about it. None of them believed it. *Two* of them were rather of opinion that the move was intended to pave the way towards the acquisition of Luxemburg as a *pis aller*, in case it should be necessary to give up Metz. You English are really too credulous !

' As for yourself, take care not to indulge too much in the pleasure of hatred and exaggeration. You spoke of the *gloire* kindled in bosoms. I have nowhere observed it. We are much too sober for that.'

*Morier to Stockmar*

'January 27th and 28th, 1871.

'As regards what you are pleased to call *my famous project*, its being revealed to be a *Bonapartist* proposal does not the least appear to me to militate against its having been entertained as one of many strings to Bismarck's bow. I believe nothing can be more certain than that Bismarck has steadily kept up *Fühlung* with Chislehurst and Wilhelmshöhe with the view of an eventual restoration, if he could not get a stable Government in France to negotiate with. Nor can I blame him for it. That in doing so he should have bethought himself of some sweetmeat, such as Belgium or part of Belgium, to enable France to swallow with *bonne grâce* so disagreeable a dose as the Man of Sedan does not appear very improbable. Its not being improbable is, however, no reason for its probability. But it so happens that I learnt from a *very good Prussian* authority (from whom I obtained other information which proved perfectly correct) as far back as early in September, that a plan had been very seriously discussed at the very commencement of the war, to the effect that in case of a brilliant victory or two, establishing the supremacy of German arms and driving back the French armies, a proposal of peace should be made to the Emperor on the basis of the cession of Alsace to Germany, and of the annexation of Belgium (with whom a quarrel should in the meantime be picked) to France. Of course, if such a plan ever existed, the tumbling to pieces of the Imperial régime at Sedan compromised it. At the risk of being branded as a *credulous Englishman* I must confess that such a plan, as the ultimate result of the war, does not appear to me one unlikely to have been entertained by Bismarck. As a question of international morality, I cannot see that it would in any way have been more incorrect than the annexation of Schleswig Holstein to the Prussian Crown, which had no hereditary rights to them, and never having been at war with them (or at all events not with Holstein), had no rights of conquest to put forward. The theory that the inhabitants of a country should be consulted before a

transfer of territory being now definitely set aside, it seems to me that all which may be fairly urged in regard to the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia might be equally urged in favour of the annexation of Belgium, or at least the Walloon portion of Belgium to France,—nationality, the advantages of belonging to a great State, etc., etc. I do not think therefore that such a plan in 1870 should especially startle one after the experiences of 1864 and 1866.

‘But my credulity goes further. I believe that Bismarck in the matter of the Benedetti treaty was not the innocent, tempted dove he represents himself to have been. I believe him to have been perfectly capable, if he had seen his way to it and if he thought he could have been backed by Germany, to have gone into partnership with Louis Napoleon for great modifications of the map of Europe, and that he would have preferred uniting Germany and getting Alsace *without a war* than with one (and here I would heartily have agreed with him). The obvious flaw in Benedetti’s draft was the absence of equivalents to Germany. If you add one additional article to the effect that France cedes Alsace to Germany, the treaty becomes a statesmanlike production of which nobody need be ashamed. Having, therefore, unexpectedly in the first week in September heard of this plan from a thoroughly good Prussian source and it appearing to have strong internal probability in its favour, it was not astonishing that when three months later (having in the meantime heard Princess Alice here, on the strength of Berlin letters, speak most approvingly of a plan she said was talked of, of placing the King of the Belgians on the throne of France with Belgium as *Morgengabe*) I heard from four or five different sources (none of them English) that this plan was entertained in order to facilitate the return of Napoleon, it should have appeared not impossible to me.

‘I remark that in your letter of 17th December, though you deny the plan for the Napoleonic restoration and the union of Holland to Germany, you say nothing of Belgium, which was after all, if I remember right, the gravamen of *my plan*. Do you not feel so sure about that? My



authority for renewed negotiations with Wilhelmshöhe and the refflorescence of the idea of restoration was Sir James Hudson, an Englishman certainly, but hardly one to be lumped with the *credulous* class. He wrote from Italy and it was clear that he was writing with a knowledge of facts, though these facts doubtless came from the Napoleonic side of the negotiations. As regards the rumours about Holland, it came through one of the most illustrious of Dutch diplomatists. Sharing, however, as I do your contempt for diplomatists, I would have placed *no kind of* credence in it (it was not much that I did do) were it not for what appeared to me the very much more trustworthy evidence which I had with reference to Belgium. It seemed to me impossible that Prussia should allow of the acquisition of Belgium by France without an equivalent in the direction of Holland. That the eyes of Prussians have, ere this, turned with longing towards the Dutch coast, is, I believe, notorious and lies in the nature of things.

'It will hardly be denied that Bismarck's answer to Chaudordy, and his late letter to Jules Favre about the *laissez-passer*, look at first sight as if he had more or less made up his mind not to treat the actual Government as if it could represent France, *und dass es nahe liegt* that if he does not do so he will go back to the *de jure* Government, and yet my own strong impression is that his tactics are to frighten France into peace, by letting her know that peace *now* means loss of Alsace and Lorraine and 200 millions, of fleets and colonies—peace later means loss of all this, *plus* gain of Louis Napoleon, and that his object is to try and make something out of the Parisian elements of the Government, and that he will give them better terms than to any one else if they will remain in power, convoke an Assembly, and urge the acceptance of these terms upon it.

'You warn me against the *pleasure of hating* and the *love of exaggeration*. You mistake me very much if you think that it is a pleasure to me to hate. On the contrary, my great snare has been too violent a desire to love. My *cultus* of Germany and everything German, and the idealism which I have thrown into it, have been the *raison d'être* of my political existence during the last twenty years. I don't

regret it, as to this *cultus* I owe, after all, the best bits of my life, your father's friendship and the intercourse and sympathy of the very few friends I have succeeded in making. But that this idealism has, on the other hand, brought very many bitter disappointments with it cannot be denied. As regards my love of exaggeration, I think I can appeal to my two *Schriften*, the pamphlet on Schleswig-Holstein and the article in the *North British*, to show that I endeavour at least to view political questions objectively and soberly.

'I was, however, certainly wrong to use the expression, *lust of gloire*, because that would imply that I supposed that the possession of absolute power in Europe would cause the Germans to become like Frenchmen. What I meant to imply was that such unparalleled successes as those which have attended the German arms, and the consequent absolute power which the German nation has acquired over Europe, will tend especially to modify the German national character, and that not necessarily for the better. Arrogance and overbearingness are the qualities likely to be developed in a Teutonic race under such conditions, not boasting or vaingloriousness. I was painfully struck in my visit to the camp at Metz in October by the extraordinary difference I witnessed in this respect between the language and *tenue* of the officers I met with there and those I had observed in the days which preceded the invasion of France. Is it love of exaggeration to fear that under such circumstances the German Empire based on universal suffrage, *i.e.* on the suffrages of the 800,000 men who have been fighting in France, and beginning life under the direction of a Lieutenant-General who has been present during the whole campaign, may have some of the faults of militarism attaching to it?

'I had not intended boring you again with a political letter, but you take me to task so sharply in your letter of the 17th December that I owed myself this *apologia pro vita mea*. I care intensely (perhaps too much) that the few friends I have should not misunderstand me. I all but quarrelled with my oldest friend, Jowett, by my strong German partisanship in this war (he being a strong French-

man), and now you, though fully admitting that Prussia "has for years past attempted to get by foul means what might have been had by fair means," which is after all, all that I find fault with, accuse me of indulging in the pleasure of hating! Pray remember, my dear fellow, that if I do not love Junkers, the Militär Cabinet, and the three-haired Lieutenant-General,<sup>1</sup> it was in your academy that I made my study of German politics. And now enough of these uninteresting personalities. . . .'

*Stockmar to Morier*

'January 31st, 1871.

'I think you are quite right in proceeding upon the assumption that Bismarck's great system is always to have many strings to his bow, and I have not the slightest doubt that at one time he was quite prepared to come to an agreement with Napoleon at the expense of Belgium. I further think it quite evident that one of the strings was an eventual Bonapartist restoration. But I do not believe any such plan to have been seriously entertained in combination with a partition or annexation of Holland and Belgium in *December*.

'My pertness with respect to your pleasure of hating and love of exaggeration has elicited a very interesting letter from you. There is nothing like abusing you. I think you have completely justified yourself *in casu concreto*. But I maintain that hatred is a delightful, though unwholesome drink, and that your great desire to love is nearly akin to the capability of hatred.'

*Morier to Stockmar*

'30th January 1871.

'It seems to me now quite plain that Bismarck will do what I thought he would (that is if France is *halbwegs* reasonable and stops hostilities and assembles a *constituante*), viz. propose better terms to such an assembly than to anybody else.

'I am quite as thoroughly opposed *in principle* now to the

<sup>1</sup> Bismarck was at that time always thus depicted in the caricatures of the day.

annexations as I was six months ago, and always on the same ground, the damage it will do to the political development of Germany. There is nothing it seems to me so incompatible with the freedom and the growth of free political habits as the holding sway over the unfree. To have established permanently (*i.e.* for perhaps ten or fifteen years to come) *Ausnahmszustände* and something which will be not unlike Vogel von Falkenstein's state of siege in the *par excellence* German Imperial Reich's *unmittelbares Land* appears to me a misfortune on account of the reaction of such a state of things on the rest of Germany. This was my feeling *before* the war began, and I expressed myself strongly in this sense when I saw the Crown Prince at Speyer on the 31st of July. But the demand having once been put forward, it is of course practically impossible to recede from it, and after such a war as that which has been waged, in which the whole manhood of France has personally and individually tasted of the bitterness of defeat and has therefore personally and individually consoled itself with the hopes of future vengeance, it seems to me, I must honestly confess, that the only consideration which Germany can think of is to get a powerful strategic frontier, which I fear does include not only Alsace but also Metz. It is very sad it should be so, but facts, whether sad or not, must be looked in the face. I still believe it might have been otherwise ordained—and that if *e.g.* the Crown Prince had been King and your father had been Bismarck, it would have been otherwise ordained. But it is no use trying to pick up spilled milk.

'I do not admit, however, your main argument that it is *Ehrensache* to take back those provinces, because this takes us to the *point d'honneur*, which *mit allem* respect is a very near relation of Madame Gloire. Do you remember those lines (Goethe's I think) ?

" Gut verloren etwas verloren,  
Muss neues gewinnen ;  
Ehre verloren viel verloren,  
Muss Ruhm gewinnen ;  
Dann werden die Leute sich anders besinnen."

'You have now *Ruhm* enough, God knows, to last you for the

rest of your lives, and it seems to me that with the winning of the *Ruhm* the *Ehrensache* is *abgemacht*, without the necessity of adding a *Gut* or rather somebody else's *Gut* thereto.'

On the 18th of January, King William had been proclaimed German Emperor at Versailles, and on 1st March 30,000 German troops entered Paris.

'The entry into Paris was a most ridiculous affair, and in fact a humiliation. But I believe it has done good service in hastening the acceptance of the preliminaries by the Bordeaux Assembly. I should not have had the courage to subject the army to such a trial. . . .'<sup>1</sup>

The preliminaries sanctioned by the Bordeaux Assembly were definitely ratified by the Peace of Frankfort on 10th May, by which France ceded to Germany the whole of Alsace with the exception of Belfort, and a fifth of Lorraine with Metz, besides an indemnity of five milliards of francs. Thus the fruits of this victorious campaign of the German armies were the unity of the nation and the security of its Western frontier.

Wearied out by hard work and the anxieties of the winter, Morier proceeded to England in the spring, where, however, he did not find himself on a bed of roses. Owing to the current of English opinion having set strongly in an anti-German direction, his friends treated him to violent scenes on the subject of his German sympathies, and, as he wrote to Sir Henry Ponsonby<sup>2</sup> :—

'You can have no conception of the sort of life a man leads who has, eleven months out of the twelve, to fight the battles of England in Germany, and for the twelfth month the battle of Germany in England. What it has been during the last year would add a chapter to Fox's *Book of Martyrs*. The anti-English violence I have had to contend against in Germany was bad enough, but nothing to the violence of Englishmen against Germany. I have quarrelled *à outrance* with some of my best friends on the subject, and the knowledge that I have been on the German side during the war has caused me to be looked upon by many persons as a kind of fiend.'

<sup>1</sup> Stockmar to Morier, 19th March 1871.

<sup>2</sup> On 22nd May 1871.

## CHAPTER XXVI

## STUTTGART AND MUNICH

THE post of Rome to which Morier had been nominated, but to which he had never proceeded, was abolished in the early part of 1871, when the Pope's temporal power came to an end. This was a bitter disappointment to him. In consequence, however, of his having for the last five years represented to the Foreign Office the anomaly of his position at Darmstadt as Secretary of Legation acting as *chargé d'affaires*, the matter was finally referred by Lord Granville to Count Brunnow, the *doyen* of the *corps diplomatique* in London, who decided that it was a position incompatible with diplomatic usage; and he was therefore moved to Stuttgart in the summer of 1871, as *chargé d'affaires en titre*, which was decided advancement, but less than he had hoped for, as his desire had been to be named Minister Resident at Baden with Darmstadt joined to it.

After a cure at Wildbad he returned to Darmstadt to say good-bye.

'I had my farewell audience of the Grand Duke, who was very gracious and observed that he regretted deeply that our Government did not allow of our accepting decorations as he would have been most desirous "de me pendre quelque chose au cou!" "J'espère, au moins, pas une corde, Monseigneur," was my reply!' <sup>1</sup>

He spent the winter of 1871 at Stuttgart, where he found his work even more strenuous than at Darmstadt, being called upon by the Foreign Office for every kind of report—Alsace-Lorraine, Constitutional development of Germany, Paupers, Old Catholics, Industrial condition of labouring

<sup>1</sup> To his father, 23rd October.

classes, etc. Both he and his wife were most graciously received by the King and Queen of Würtemberg. The latter, a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, was as regal looking as her father, to whom, as Morier was fond of relating, a French *cocotte* had once said at a masked ball, 'Tu es le Czar, et tu as le physique du métier.'

His stay in Stuttgart was not destined to be a lengthy one, for in the beginning of 1872 he was transferred to Munich as *chargé d'affaires*.

'It will be no promotion—but the post is a much more important and an infinitely more interesting one—in fact the only interesting post in Germany after Berlin. It is there the real *dénouement* of the ultimate form of German Unity must take place, and as the head centre of the ecclesiastical movement it will be additionally full of interest.'

From the first both he and his wife found Munich most congenial. They had a charming house on the outskirts of the town, in which they entertained frequently, and soon formed a circle of pleasant friends and acquaintances. Morier had brought with him many letters of recommendation from Lord Acton, than whom he could have had no better sponsor, and was consequently at once brought into contact with all who were prominent in the political and religious world.

First and foremost amongst these was Dr. Döllinger,<sup>1</sup> the great divine whose uncompromising stand against the dogma of Papal Infallibility had led in a great measure to the secession of the so-called Old Catholics from the body of the Church. The most sincere and single-minded of men, honest in his determination to make no compromise between his religion and his conscience, he had, when past seventy, an age at which men are more prone to make sacrifices than to commence revolutions, publicly testified during the Vatican Council to his convictions, and when called upon by the Archbishop of Munich to submit to the decrees of the Vatican, had categorically refused. Without any desire of forming a new sect, or any ambition to reform the Church, the one doctrine he preached and lived for

<sup>1</sup> Dom-probst Ignaz von Döllinger, b. 1799, d. 1890.

was that "Religion is Truth, and has to be held, studied, and maintained truthfully."

With his deep knowledge—he was Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the University of Munich, and the most eminent Catholic historian of the day—his position in literature, and his strong liberal opinions, it was no wonder that he and Morier, with so much in common, should from the beginning have felt strongly attracted to one another. After their very first meeting Morier described him as 'a most lovable old man,' while Döllinger's friendship soon extended to Morier's whole family, including even his father, whom he had never met, but constantly heard of from the son.

#### *Morier to his Father*

'Being very desirous for my own personal vanity to show the *old* reformer (he is only a little past seventy) <sup>1</sup> what a blessed frisky young Daddy I had and what an interest he took in the old Old Catholic apostle, I sent him your penultimate letter to me, with the extract from his lectures, your approval thereof and the "friskings about the Bureau d'Anathèmes," etc. It pleased him amazingly, and as I told him the year you were born in, he came and asked me how on earth you managed to have kept so fresh and lively and cheery a mind and so loving a heart in so fresh a body, as witnessed by your beautiful handwriting. I said I could give him a simple answer. The French, when they want to say that a man when in his cups becomes cheerful, kindly, good-humoured and benignant, say, "*Il a le vin bon*," when they wish to describe a man whose tippling makes him quarrelsome, sour, brutal, they say, "*Il a le vin mauvais*." And so I said it was with religion. Nine men in ten had their religious wine *mauvais*, one in ten had it *bon*. You were the one in ten, or rather ten thousand; from your childhood you had never seen the world through other eyes than those of a grateful God's creature, you had thus lived all your life through in the sunlight, and the ordinary corrosives of life had thus all been

<sup>1</sup> David Morier was then eighty-nine years old.



spared you. "A very, very rare case," said the old mitred Abbot. "Amen," said I.'

Munich, the centre of German Catholicism, was a point of vantage from which it was possible to watch the great struggle which had now commenced between the new German Empire, as represented by Bismarck on the one hand, and the Roman Catholicism, or rather Vaticanism, as represented by the Pope on the other; a struggle as much political as religious (afterwards known as the *Kulturkampf*), in which the Chancellor found himself confronted in the new Reichstag by the Ultramontane, Particularist, and Reactionary forces coalesced under the name of the Catholic Centre, ably led by Dr. Windthorst,<sup>1</sup> the former Hanoverian Minister of Justice.

For many years the policy of the Prussian Government had been characterised by subserviency to Ultramontane wishes. This, together with the flirtations of the Prussian Legation at Rome with the Curia, the supposed bias of Bismarck in favour of good relations with the Vatican, the resentment caused in Germany during the war by the active co-operation of Italian free-corps in the south of France, and the remissness of the Italian Government to restrain its subjects from taking part in the hostilities, had all led the Pope and his councillors to believe that much might be hoped for from the New Germany, though inaugurated under a Protestant Sovereign.

It was this, no doubt, which led to the mission of Archbishop Ledochowski to Versailles in January 1871 with the object of bringing to the King of Prussia the assurances of the exceptional love and regard which the Pope entertained for the King personally, and at the same time inquiring whether His Holiness might reckon on finding a safe and honourable asylum in Germany should the persecutions to which he was subjected in Italy become greater than he could bear. The mission was unsuccessful, Bismarck having put the Archbishop off with the answer that the question of a Papal migration to Germany was one of grave political importance which could not be

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Ludwig Windthorst, b. 1812, d. 1891; leader of the Guelph party.

decided off-hand, and upon which it would be necessary to consult the German Parliament. That there was any serious intention on the part of the Pope to quit Rome is not very likely, but the assent of the King of Prussia to this proposition, had it been obtained, would have given the Curia an important advantage in its dealings with the Italian Government.

That two such Powers as the German State and the Roman Catholic Church were likely to settle down peaceably without a previous trial of strength was not to be expected ; and Bismarck, soon recognising this fact, threw down the glove in July 1871 by abolishing the Denominational Department in the Ministry of Public Worship, an act speedily followed by the drafting of the School Inspection Law, to carry through which Dr. Falk<sup>1</sup> was named Minister of Public Worship on 22nd January 1872.

In April of this year Count Harry Arnim, who had been Prussian Minister to the Vatican, passed through Munich on his way back from Rome, when Morier had a long and interesting conversation with him. In reply to Morier stating his conviction that his (Count Arnim's) mission had all along been to offer advantageous terms to the Pope, and that Bismarck's display of parliamentary vehemence had had for its object to bring vividly home to the Papal imagination what would be the consequences of refusing the terms thus offered, Count Arnim gave him to understand that he had not been far wrong in his estimate. He had, in fact, been instructed to offer to the Pope the friendship and *alliance* of Prussia in return for tangible services to be rendered by the Papal Court to Prussia, or, what in this case was the same thing, to the German Government. Those services were to be the exercise of the Papal influence for the purpose of detaching the Clerical party in Germany from the coalition hostile to the Empire. Let the partisans of the Pope cease in Germany to make common cause with Guelphs, Particularists, and Poles ; let them in France cease to identify themselves with the party of revenge, and Prussia will once more be the friend and ally of former days. But if, on the contrary, the army of Papal officials, for such

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Adalbert Falk, b. 1827, d. 1902 ; eminent jurist.

at the time were nine-tenths of the Catholic clergy distributed throughout the length and breadth of Germany, continued to receive their orders from a body whose avowed object was the overthrow of the German Empire, then there was no alternative but that of war to the knife between Emperor and Pope. '*Service pour Service, Do ut des, Facio ut facias*. I can help you, you can help me. But not only I won't help you if you don't help me, but the very conditions of the game are such that unless you give me your active assistance you, or your agents, which comes to the same thing, are actively injuring me. There can therefore be no question of neutrality between us. It must be either avowed friendship or open enmity.'

Such, Morier gathered, were the intent and purport of the instructions Count Arnim took with him to Rome, and such was the alternative which only a fortnight before he had been charged by telegraph once more to urge with all his might upon the Vatican. Confident, however, of ultimate success, the Papal Court refused the terms offered to them, and opposed to all the arguments of the ambassador the *non possumus*, which had already blunted so many of the edged tools of diplomacy.

Morier observed to Arnim that considering who the party was that offered the terms, and at how low an ebb were the fortunes of the party to whom the terms were offered, such a choice appeared to him incredible. Arnim replied that in judging of the Court at Rome it was before all things necessary to get rid of two widespread misconceptions: the one that it was an intelligent body, the other that it was invulnerable. It was the least intelligent of existing political powers, it was highly vulnerable the moment people ceased to believe in its invulnerability. That to obtain the clearest conception of what the Court of Rome really was one had to imagine three old Fakirs who, for upwards of a quarter of a century (the Pope and Cardinal Antonelli had occupied their situations for twenty-six years, the Cardinal Vicar for twenty-seven years, a thing hitherto unknown in the Papal annals) had used the same phrases, spoken the same thoughts, mumbled the same anathemas, and who never held communion with any persons but those who came to

worship at their shrine. How could it be expected that arguments of policy could tell upon persons in their mental attitude? Morier replied that he was at a loss to understand how so negative an attitude was to be reconciled with so very positive a policy as that of a combined action against the German Empire in Germany and out of it, and he inquired in what sense he was to understand such expressions as those, that orders had been sent from Rome to the Catholic Hierarchy to act in combination with M. de Windthorst and the like.

Arnim declared that these orders and this policy did not proceed from the Roman Court itself or those persons who were its official representatives. Like that which the centre of our planet was supposed to be, the Court of Rome was a vacuum, but it was not the less a centre because of its being a vacuum. All things in the Catholic world gravitated towards it, all heat radiated from it. But the strategy and tactics of the Ultramontane party were not elaborated there, but by the Society of Jesus in concert with the Committee of Geneva, under whose auspices the *Correspondance de Genève* was conducted. The latter were the headquarters from which the actual orders and policy emanated. The Fakirs only bowed their heads in assent. When he had urged as the condition of the contract that the Roman Court should enjoin upon the partisans of the Pope to dissociate themselves from the avowed enemies of the Empire, he had been answered that to take such a step would be for the Holy Father to intervene directly in the internal politics of Germany, and how could such conduct be reconciled with his holy office? Besides, if the precedent were once established, the Holy See would be called upon to intervene in every part of the world. In Mexico, in France, in Spain, in Austria, it would be expected to step in and lend its authority to the *de facto* government. When Arnim observed that for the Pope to state publicly that he would offer up prayers for the Catholics of Germany as if they were a persecuted and ill-used race was an act of intervention, he was answered that the Holy Father prayed for all conditions of men, and there were none who would not be the better for his prayers!

The theory that Bismarck had in his hands the threads of a tangible and dangerous conspiracy was a view that Arnim did not share. The fact of the coalition between the Ultramontanes and the elements hostile to the Empire on political grounds was one known to all the world, and had found its parliamentary expression in the party known as that of the *Centre* in the Reichstag. It was against that party that Bismarck's parliamentary campaign had been directed. On Morier's remarking that he was still in the dark as to the exact origin of the change of front effected by the Prussian Government in its relations with the Papal Court, and that, being at Berlin shortly after the celebrated debate in which the party of the *Centre* had for the first time displayed its colours, he had been astonished at the apparent apathy with which the demonstration was treated in political circles, and that the sharp measures which followed in the summer, especially the elimination of the Denominational Department from the Ministry of Public Worship, had taken him very much by surprise, Arnim said that the change of front had been effected earlier than was generally supposed, though the result of that change became known only later. The alteration of policy might be considered as coinciding with the political changes which made the King of Prussia German Emperor. Up to that time the policy of the Prussian Government had been to cultivate good relations with the Papal See at almost any price. And nothing to outward appearance could be more hearty than those relations. But in reality there was a total absence of any kind of reciprocity. The good offices were altogether on the side of Prussia, and in describing the amicable disposition of the Court of Berlin in days gone by and the impolitic character of the Court of Rome, he mentioned that, after the war of 1866, the Prussian Government had been exceedingly desirous of having the Papal Nuncio accredited to Berlin and resident there instead of at Munich, but that the Curia had been afraid of thereby giving offence at Vienna and had refused. Not one single concession had ever been obtained from the Papal Court. The attitude of the Pope was that of a man who owes no man anything but to whom the whole world

is enormously in debt. Anything given to him, therefore, however valuable, was regarded but as a small instalment of that which was his due. When the King of Prussia became German Emperor the Pope believed that this state of things would continue, and that with the increased power to bestow favours the quantity of the favours bestowed would proportionately multiply. Hence the well-known amiable letter addressed by the Pope to the Emperor. The time had come, however, when the Prussian Government was determined to obtain something in return, *Service pour service*; and this, Arnim said, had been clearly intimated to the Papal Court shortly after Bismarck's return from Versailles. Very soon afterwards came the debate on the address above adverted to and the declaration of war to the Empire by the Catholic Particularist Centre.

The conflict thus initiated between the two Courts had grown in intensity ever since. The last phase was the mission from which Arnim had just returned, which could be considered as having for its object the presenting of an ultimatum which had been rejected. The last leaf of the Sibylline Books had been committed to the flames.

Arnim seemed fully to appreciate the danger, whilst dealing blows to the partisans of Papal encroachment, of wounding and irritating the great Catholic body whom it was so important to conciliate, and he agreed with Morier that the great difficulty of Bismarck's position was his being the Prime Minister of a State with Protestant traditions and the Chancellor of an Empire some of the most important elements of which, like Bavaria, had exclusively Catholic traditions.

There was one portion of this conversation which especially struck Morier. Arnim mentioned incidentally the fact that it was his conviction that M. Thiers ardently desired the presence of the Pope on French soil. The President of the Republic had, it is true, denied this to Arnim, and assured him that, in saying if the Pope came to France he would be treated with all the honours due to his exalted position, he had only used the commonplaces of international courtesy, but his surmises that this did not represent the true state of the case had been confirmed by

what he had learnt at Rome. He had there been told that M. Thiers had been most solicitous in urging upon the Pope to come to France. Morier asked him what earthly benefit, as he did not credit M. Thiers with heavenly aspirations, the French President could hope from the presence of such a guest on the soil of France. Arnim replied that Thiers was haunted by the idea of making France the centre of the Catholic universe. To transfer the cynosure of Catholic eyes from Italy, which he hated, to France; to place France before the world as the undisputed 'Defender of the Faith,' and to bask in the belief that as long as the Head of the Church was domiciled on French soil German Catholics would consider France a kind of Holy Land which it would be sacrilege to touch; such in Arnim's eyes seemed to be the idea which filled the brain of the busy little old man then ruling the destinies of the French nation.

These somewhat startling disclosures as to Bismarck having offered his alliance to the Pope (the word alliance returned several times during the conversation, during which it appeared as if the alliance with Italy were treated only as a sort of *pis aller* to which an alliance with the Pope would have been considered preferable, whilst the terms offered to the Court of Rome Bismarck must have known himself to be unacceptable) did not strike Morier as being unlikely, for as he wrote :—

'It would doubtless be more ingenuous in diplomacy if one's left hand were kept constantly informed of that which one's right was about, but this is a kind of ingenuousness which had, at all events, not hitherto characterised the diplomacy of Prince Bismarck. Apart from these considerations, however, the alliance offered, or said by Count Arnim to have been offered, by Germany to the Court of Rome was in its nature one not only not hostile to, but necessarily friendly, to Italy, and therefore one which could be offered not only without any breach of faith towards the Italian Government, but with the most considerate regard for the interests of that Government. For what were the conditions of the alliance? What was the "service" which

the Chancellor asked for in return for such services as Germany might render to Rome? It was that the Pope should join Germany in her crusade against Ultramontanism and Jesuitism and therefore *pro tanto* side with Germany against France. But what Power would gain more than Italy from a domesticated Pope, won back from the errors of Ultramontanism to a purified Catholicism, and lending the prestige of his spiritual supremacy to modern and liberal ideas?'

Morier, however, was inclined to believe that these proposals had not been intended to be taken seriously.

'What object could the Chancellor have in making a proposal which he knew beforehand would be rejected? Now to any one who has carefully studied the Imperial Chancellor's political method such an offer made at such a moment would wear the appearance of strong antecedent probability, for the one constant and unvarying feature in Prince Bismarck's mode of procedure, when dealing either with his foreign or his domestic foes, has been never to throw away the scabbard, never finally to commit himself to the arbitrament of open battle without first offering some preposterous or impossible condition of alliance to the antagonist for whose final overthrow every measure has been provided.

'The offer of Prussia's friendship and alliance to Austria made previous to the campaign of Sadowa, if Austria would not only withdraw from Germany, but remove her capital from Vienna to Pesth, is matter of history. The various offers made to France for a rectification of the map of Europe at anybody's expense except Germany's, if not so well established as the former, have still no slight amount of evidence in their favour, and if, turning from his dealings with his foreign enemies, we examine the Chancellor's tactics in regard to those who opposed his internal policy, we shall find that in the parliamentary contests which preceded the Austrian war his most vigorous onsets on the constitutional party were prefaced by negotiations with the chiefs of the Liberal opposition in which impossible terms of accommodation were proposed and rejected.



'How far this peculiarity is due to personal temperament and to a weird craving after the pleasure of acting the Sibyl's part it is impossible to say, but supposing Count Arnim's account of the offer to the Court of Rome be true there seems an obvious reason for its having been made.

'One is apt to speak too sweepingly of Germany as *the* Protestant and Liberal Power and to treat too lightly the difficulties which beset the Chancellor in dealing with German Ultramontanism. To say nothing of Southern Germany, the Catholic party constitutes one of the most powerful and formidable elements in the political future of the Prussian monarchy itself. Now, with this party it has been for generations the policy of the Berlin Cabinet to live on terms of the closest alliance, and to separate the Ultramontane leaders from the main body of this party and to find a *modus vivendi* with the latter is undoubtedly the main object of Prince Bismarck's policy. Hence the impression left upon my mind is that the overtures Count Arnim told me he was charged to make to the Vatican were framed with a view to their retrospective use with this party, and the policy which dictated his offers of friendship and alliance was to be able to say: I have done everything in my power to be on good terms with Catholicism and a Catholic Pope; it is Ultramontanism and a Pope bound hand and foot by the Jesuits who have thwarted me; they are the aggressors; I am on the defensive, and I shall in consequence act in accordance with the great principle of Prussian military tactics that the only sure defensive is an early and unexpected offensive.'

Morier was confirmed in his belief by an incident which occurred shortly afterwards, viz., the proposal to name as Ambassador to the Court of Rome Cardinal Gustav Hohenlohe, an opponent of the dogma of papal Infallibility, and a declared enemy of the Jesuits—an appointment which under no possible condition was the Pope likely to have accepted.

Finding the Conservatives, his own party, strongly opposed to his ecclesiastical policy, which was also bitterly resented by the orthodox Evangelical sections of the com-

munity, Bismarck now approached the Liberals, which led to a temporary coolness between himself and the Emperor William, who had already shown signs of distrust at the nomination of Dr. Falk as Minister of Public Worship.

'You have probably heard,' wrote Dr. Brandis<sup>1</sup> to Morier on 30th January 1872, 'what Bismarck said the other day to Roon: "I do not know what it is, I do my best to content the King, but I succeed worse every day. And nevertheless I have all the qualities to please him, and to do what he wishes. I am a Junker, I am a soldier, and wish to obey him." "Oh yes," said Roon; "you wish, but you don't."'

Roon was appointed Prussian Minister President in January 1873, when Bismarck, as the result of a ministerial crisis, resigned that office, retaining, however, the Chancellorship of the Empire and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the same month Dr. Falk laid before Parliament the famous May Laws (so-called from their being promulgated in that month) which were to be enforced by severe disciplinary measures.

*Morier to Jowett*

*'January 21st, 1873.*

'I cannot tell you whether Bismarck will be able to beat the Jesuits (though I feel pretty confident the German Empire will), but he has at last gone the right way to work, and certainly if you have not had any secret communication with him, and have not seen the bills introduced last week into the Prussian Parliament, there is a most extraordinary identity of views between you and him as to the *modus operandi*. He has gone to the very root of the evil and thrown down a challenge to the curia such as has indeed been thrown down before, but never with the same means of giving effect to it as those which Bismarck has ready to his hand. The great efforts of the Ultramontane party for the last thirty years have been directed towards getting into their hands the *secular* education of the Catholic *laity*,

<sup>1</sup> Private Secretary to the Empress Augusta, a great friend of Morier's.

the cosmopolitanising of the priesthood by getting as many theological students as possible educated at Rome in the German and other colleges there under the immediate direction of Jesuit teachers, by employing Jesuits of one country in another country, etc., and, lastly, the bringing up the secular clergy from the cradle in seminaries hermetically sealed against the world.

'Bismarck replies by a law which takes away from the Church the *secular* teaching of the clergy, insisting that candidates for orders shall receive their secular teaching at the public gymnasia, shall there pass the *Abiturienten* examination, shall thence proceed to a *German* University, and having been there three years shall pass a *State examination* in lay subjects, and then and then only receive such special theological training as the Church may appoint. From henceforth none but German-born subjects educated at public schools and public Universities in Germany shall be eligible for the priesthood, and from the day of the passing of the law no boy is to be admitted into a seminary set apart for the training of priests. That this programme must appear monstrous to English eyes as an infringement of the plainest principles of individual liberty is natural, and so I see the *Spectator* treats it. But it is in perfect accordance with those Prussian principles which have made Prussia the most powerful State of modern days. The rule that the public servant, whether the civil employé or the military officer, shall be in the van of the national culture, is the key-note of Prussian success. To what an extent this has been insisted upon in the Prussian army few people, I believe, know. That no man could be an officer who had not attained a very high minimum of culture (*i.e.* who had not passed the *Abiturienten* examination of the gymnasium or its equivalent, something as regards classics much higher than "Smalls" in my day, plus a corresponding amount of mathematical, modern language, and physical science knowledge) is generally known; but it is not known what pains were taken to encourage officers, when already in the army, to cultivate themselves up to a maximum in every branch of human culture for which they had a disposition, from dancing to a knowledge of

Sanscrit. That the Catholic ecclesiastical employé should have been the only category left out and allowed to revel in ignorance and *Unbildung* was a special favour which the curia has not been wise enough to know how to retain. There is nothing, therefore, to shock public opinion, but just the contrary. This exceptional state is to have an end. But will and can the measure succeed? This is a grave question of which more another time.

‘I agree with what you say about the Old Catholics, and it would be a great error to look upon the movement as a second Reformation. There are certain organic changes like that of arriving at the age of puberty and the like which can only take place *once* in the system, and the Reformation I take it was one of them. On the other hand, as I begin to get an insight into the religious and moral atmosphere of the Catholic masses in Germany, I am better able to appreciate the extreme importance of a resolute stand on the basis of truth (for its own sake) even within the comparatively narrow limits of ecclesiastical history, such as that made by Döllinger and his disciples. It will, for the present at least, not leave its mark on the Catholic priesthood; but taken in connection with the action of the Government it will, I believe, have a very great, though not a very immediately apparent, effect on the Catholic laity.

‘I am hard at work on a *magnum opus* in which I hope to realise in part at least what you require of me. I am writing, namely, for the Foreign Office a series of papers on the conflict between Church and State in Germany, treated from the historical point of view. You will perhaps object to this, but it is the only method which I can use. No matter what the subject is I treat, I necessarily fall into the historic method. This particular subject, however, could not be treated in any other way. The present conflict is the necessary historic result of historical antecedents, and it is utterly incomprehensible unless brought into its right historical perspective. I propose after they have served their purpose to publish them in *Fraser*, or some such monthly periodical. Döllinger enters heartily into my plans, and I have his library, his advice, and his immense personal

experience of the last forty years at my disposal. It was an opportunity not to be missed, and the going to school once more under such a pedagogue as Döllinger may be the making of me, as the great curse of my life was ceasing to study at the very moment when you had begun to teach me how to study.'

## CHAPTER XXVII

## MUNICH

HIS tour in Alsace during the war of 1870 had roused in Morier a keen interest as to the future of the annexed territories.

'There seems to me,' so he had written to Stockmar, 21st November 1871, 'to be a horrible confusion in the *staatsrechtliche* position of the new Province. I cannot see how a territory can be made an integral portion of that which is not itself integral. I mean how Alsace-Lorraine can be made Reichsland when the Reich consists of independent Sovereign States. One now perceives how thoroughly statesmanlike was your father's idea in 1848 of going back to the old nomenclature *Reichs-unmittelbar* and *Reichs-mittelbar*. It seems to me that it would be infinitely better as matters stand, to establish a *personal* union between Alsace-Lorraine as a separate duchy with the German Crown, and to govern it with a *bona fide* viceroy, my impression being that the more you develop *Particularismus* in Alsace-Lorraine the more *German* you will make them, and that the point of Alsatian *Particularismus* must *de force majeure* turn itself against France.'

Roggenbach having been entrusted with the foundation of the German University at Strasburg, and having called there as professors many old friends, made it easy for Morier to pay frequent visits to Alsace, and thus watch the progress or non-progress of the assimilation of the new Provinces.

In the autumn of 1872 the question of the option (the enforced choice of German or French military service) brought on a crisis which induced Morier to go to Strasburg to gain information at first hand. He had two long interviews with Mr. Klein, the late mayor of Strasburg, a patriotic

apothecary, who was one of the small nucleus of Alsatians who were determined to oppose French and Alsatian Chauvinism, and to set up a *modus vivendi* with the German authorities with a view to the material and intellectual development of Alsace.

'In common with *all* the Alsatians whom I talked to, he was moved to his innermost depths by the crisis of the option and its correlative—as regards such Alsatians as elect the German nationality—of military service in the German army; the iron had entered his soul, and he did not disguise that it would probably fester there, differing however in this from most of his countrymen, that it was clear he meant to get it extracted if he could, and would spare no pains to get the wound cicatrised afterwards. He repeated what he had told me on a former occasion, that it was Prince Bismarck who was personally responsible for the introduction of the German military law of universal enlistment at this early stage. There was no point in which he and the deputation which went to Berlin in May 1871 had laid so great a stress as the necessity of postponing this law for some years, but he found Prince Bismarck was not to be moved. He did not attribute this to any *mauvais vouloir* on the part of the Chancellor, but simply to a wholly incorrect political calculation and to the deductions of a false analogy. The Chancellor replied to all arguments: that Prussia had an immense experience of the results produced by wearing the Prussian uniform. Get the King's coat (*des Königs Rock*) on to a man's back, and let him wear it for three years and you have not only made a good soldier but a good citizen out of him. Such was the Chancellor's stereotyped phrase. "Yes," was Klein's reply, "but you must get the coat on first, and this is what you will not succeed in doing. If you persevere with the measure while the population is still under the excitement of the war and whilst the wounds of conquest are yet raw, you will get no conscripts in one way or the other; by legal means or illegal, they will escape into France, and you will have neither soldiers nor citizens. Let a few years elapse, allow the population to settle down to its usual occupations

under a new régime, let them get to know and appreciate the advantages of a good home administration in lieu of the former French *préfet* system, and there will be no frantic hurrying across the frontier, and you may then get your coat with all its mysterious qualities on to the Alsatian conscript's back."

' All the arguments of the deputation, however, had been in vain, and Klein did not hide from me that the failure to obtain this boon had gravely compromised his position and that of his political friends in the eyes of his countrymen. The pilgrimage to Berlin had been viewed with a very evil eye by the Chauvinists of Alsace, but had the pilgrims succeeded in bringing back a tangible result in the matter of the military conscription, the bulk of the population would have rallied round them.

' Klein complained bitterly of the obscurity and confusion into which the question of option had been allowed to get, and he blamed the French as well as the German Government for not having, at an early stage, made an authoritative and explicit declaration explanatory of their views as to the reading of the Frankfort Treaty and of the application of these views to every imaginable case. As it was, to the last moment the greatest uncertainty existed on the subject, and he knew of several instances in which the option had actually been made under a completely false impression as to its results.

' Then came another phase of the question: it was stated, on what appeared to be good authority, that no less than twelve thousand young Alsations of the military age had during the course of the last year and a half gone across the frontier without opting, and inscribed themselves at Nancy for military service in France. The Germans considered all inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine as German subjects from the day of their annexation (*i.e.* I presume from the ratification of the treaty of peace), unless they opted. But if the French authorities had connived at the inscription of these Alsations upon the registers of the French army, they can only have done so upon the hypothesis of their still being French subjects, because the French law only allows of *bona fide* French citizens being enrolled in



the *cadres* of the French army, the Légion Étrangère excepted. Here, therefore, there would be another conflict of jurisdictions, and an international question of the gravest kind.

‘Turning from the legal aspect of the question, Klein went on to look at its practical effect on the policy upon which he had set his heart, viz., the establishment of a self-contained Alsatian unit within the framework of the German Empire, and nothing could be more gloomy than the conclusions he came to. The great object of German policy, he said, ought to have been to separate Alsace-Lorraine as completely as possible from France, and to substitute for the *Gloire* of belonging to the *Grande Nation* the homely virtues which grow out of a well-administered, self-sufficing community of moderate size. The Alsatian character, which had remained German to the core, was peculiarly fitted for the development of this parochial patriotism. All Alsations, without distinction of class, looked upon themselves as something distinct from either German or French; Wälsch (Frenchmen), and Schwab (German) were to them equally foreigners, and both terms implied a certain amount of contempt and consciousness of superiority. The feeling for *France* was something perfectly apart from any sympathy for *Frenchmen*; and it was a something abstract and ideal which found a natural vent in phrases, and ejaculations, and cries, such as he had lately heard at a public meeting of *Fif la Vrance* (*Vive la France*), but which did not touch the concrete relations of daily life. But all this would be changed by the state of things created by the option and the flight from military service. There would be hardly a family in the whole annexed territory one or more members of which would not be permanently established in France, and doing military service there. Between the expatriated and those who remained at home a never-ceasing correspondence would be maintained. Gallic passions, the frenzied craving for revenge, would no longer, as hitherto, be a something external to the Alsatian population, for which it would be considered *bon ton* to sympathise, but would be brought home individually to each hearth and homestead. French

Chauvinism would, through a thousand subtle openings, be subcutaneously injected into the most vital parts of Alsatian society. In a word, no conceivable measure could have been adopted better fitted, not only to rivet the bonds which already joined Alsace-Lorraine to France, but to create new ones of flesh and blood which had never existed before. The very parochialism of the Alsatian temperament would then be made to minister to French schemes because the proverbial home-sickness of expatriated Alsations would make each Alsatian conscript in the French army urge on the hour of release, and become a centre of propaganda for the idea of recovering the lost territory. As it was, the parting words of every Alsatian who crossed the border were *Nous reviendrons*.

‘Turning to other subjects I asked him what progress was being made with the question of education, to which he replied that as regarded the public *elementary* schools (*Volkschulen*) he regretted to say that the four hours a week teaching of French which had been originally granted had, as regards the country districts, been cancelled, and that the same measure was in all probability imminent in regard to Strasburg and the other towns of Alsace. The measure would cause the greatest irritation at Strasburg as, owing to the wealth of the town, the entire cost of the elementary schools was borne by the municipality which had just voted, of their own free will, large additional sums for educational purposes, and to forbid them to use their own money to teach the language, for which they just now felt so much enthusiasm, would be considered a crying act of injustice. The reason urged by the German pedagogic authorities for the restriction was, that it was impossible to teach in an elementary school two languages well, without sacrificing the one to the other. To one whose ears have for a week been grated upon by the French and German one hears in Alsace, I confess there seems much force in the argument.

‘Klein was loud in his praise of the Upper-President Möller, and generally of the higher employés, less of the lower class of functionaries. He did not attribute *mauvais vouloir* even to them, but he accused them of great want of tact. In the lowest class of all, however, the tax-collectors,

railway officials, etc., many gross cases of corruption had been detected, but this could hardly be otherwise, at first at least, because naturally the German Governments who had been called upon to furnish contingents of employés had sent their refuse, and it would take some time to get rid of the bad elements among them.

'A propos of want of tact he gave me a glaring instance, the substitution of German names for French names in regard to the streets of Strasburg. This substitution had caused an amount of irritation out of all proportion to the importance of the measure. The streets all had both French and German names, and it would have been thought quite natural to paint the German name by the side of the French one, but the erasing of the French names had been looked upon in the light of a national insult.

'He told me that the mayors and other local authorities complained bitterly of not being treated with the courtesy to which they had been used under the French régime, and of being constantly vexed and annoyed by interference in details of local administration, but then he observed that, though it was no doubt true that the *Préfets* and *sous-préfets* under the Empire were very polite in their dealings with the mayors and local authorities, it should be remembered that they were so for political purposes. They never interfered with them in administrative matters, and allowed them to rule despotically after their own fashion, provided always that they made their communes vote correctly. The German authorities did not in any way concern themselves with politics, but did look very sharply and very honestly after the administration.'

From Strasburg Morier proceeded to Niedermorschweiler, to the château of M. Tachard from whence he wrote to his father on 9th October 1872 :—

'I am staying here for a day or two at a most charming place belonging to M. Tachard, a magnate of Upper Alsace, where I am able to study the institutions and laws of the country. There is also staying with him the correspondent of the *Times*, so that you will doubtless see in that estimable paper the cream of much that has been said over

a wood fire amidst many weeds up to the early hours of the morning.

'Yesterday I paid a most interesting visit with my host to a convent of Trappists—a very considerable concern, there being some two hundred fathers and brothers besides a nosegay of female Trappists who are kept somewhere out of sight, and, we hope, carefully separated from their mute brethren. The convent is a very old one, having one way or other been a monastery since the eleventh century. . . . The Prior, an old Westphalian gentleman of high degree, a subtle priest and refined man of the world, astute and erudite, is the Prussian head of a French order.'

Continuing his account of Alsace, Morier said :—

'M. Tachard is one of the richest and was one of the most influential proprietors of the Department du Haut Rhin. He has been a republican all his life, and waged a war *à outrance* against the Empire. He earned many well-deserved laurels during that campaign, and was at several consecutive elections returned as member for the Haut Rhin to the *Assemblée Législative*. When I talk of him as a rich proprietor it must not be supposed that he belongs to the territorial aristocracy of Alsace. Such infinitesimal remains of the latter as still survive all belong to old German families, very proud of their pedigrees and of their traditional connection with the Holy Roman Empire, but yet for the most part very French in their sympathies. They have as a rule been made much of by every successive French dynasty, and having played prominent parts in the history of a great modern monarchy, the recollections of the immediate past naturally overshadow the more remote ancestral dignities. M. Tachard is none of these, but on the contrary represents the exactly opposite pole of the social system. He is a *bourgeois*, but of the cream of the *bourgeoisie*. It is true that he owns some four thousand acres of land, which is the largest property in the whole Upper Alsace, but they are bits bought here and there as they came into the market. He also inhabits a charming old *château*, but this has also been bought with commercial

gold from the old lords of the manor, the Counts zu Rhein, whose line has since died out in Bavaria.

'As regards his antecedents and his social status he must be classed among the cotton lords of Mülhausen. But there is an important point to be noted. Most of these belong to old Alsatian families with either German or Swiss pedigrees and descend from the ancient *burgesses* of Mülhausen with a rare old history of their own, Mülhausen having for centuries maintained its independence single-handed against the Empire, without joining the Swiss Confederation, though usually in alliance with it. It was annexed by France in 1798, and has since then grown from a handful of six thousand souls, crowded together behind a triple row of fortifications, into a splendid manufacturing town of sixty thousand inhabitants. But the old names remain the same and the Dollfus, Köchlin, etc., who figured during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the annals of the city, now represent the great manufacturing firms of the district. Tachard only belongs to these on his mother's side; his father was a Frenchman and he has remained a Frenchman both in his moral and intellectual structure. To begin with, he is the only Alsatian I have come across who can speak French like a Frenchman; then he has all the mobility and restlessness of a Frenchman. He has absolutely nothing of the specific Alsatian about him, neither the slowness nor I should think the obstinacy or perseverance or the practical common-sense view of things. He has many wild projects in his hand, not in one of which I could ever perceive an inkling of any *pur sang* Alsatian. I found him even hotter and certainly much more rhetorical on the subject of option than Klein, but as his facts, and in the main his arguments, were the same it is unnecessary to repeat them.

'I paid in company with my host a visit to Mülhausen and inspected the *cité ouvrière*, a marvellous sight in its way and quite worthy of being recognised as the realised dream of a social reformer. Though in the course of my visit I saw many leading persons of the town, I was unable, owing to the excessive contradictoriness of the statements, to get any correct idea of the amount of the exodus. But

at the most moderate computation I cannot put the number at less than five thousand actual departures (including, of course, men, women, and children), out of a population of sixty thousand. In the *cité ouvrière* alone, which comprises I was told ten thousand souls, two thousand had left. Of these a great number were already the *bona fide* proprietors of their houses, and had just departed taking the door keys with them. That a large number of those that have migrated across the frontier would return, even the most Chauvinist of my informants admitted. Nevertheless, the general impression produced by the town was a very painful one, more especially in the quarter inhabited by the great millowners. In this quarter, composed mainly of luxurious villas with beautiful gardens, certainly four out of every five houses were shut up, and such of the better classes as one met were all in deep mourning.

‘I cross-questioned Tachard about the German administration and especially about the *cheville ouvrière* of that administration, the *Kreis Directoren* corresponding to the former *sous-préfets*. Tachard had no hesitation in pronouncing them to be with few exceptions thoroughly good and as a class beyond conception superior to the French *sous-préfets*. They were socially a higher class, in point of education of a superiority humiliating to a Frenchman’s feelings, with a power of work unknown in France, and given up heart and soul to the work of administration for its own sake. And here again came in the burden of the old song. They were administrative, not, as the French *sous-préfets*, political agents; and this, which the mayors, who are most of them old mayors of the Empire, hated, was so much clear gain to the country.

‘The following instance among others gives a good idea of the difference between “now” and “then.” I observed that the road by which we drove from the railway to Tachard’s house and the large township of Niedermorschweiler, a so-called *chemin vicinal*, was peculiarly good and evidently of perfectly recent construction. Whilst talking of the administration he adverted to the praise I had bestowed on the road and said that was a good case in point.

For ten years he had endeavoured to get this road, which had been constructed at his own expense, out of the French administration, whose consent was necessary. The material welfare of the township depended upon it and yet, because he had been in opposition, his application had been persistently refused. No sooner had the German administration been installed than in looking through the *cahiers* of the *sous-préfecture* they found his application with the plans, estimates, etc. He was at once called upon to state whether he was still ready to make the road, and within a week work was begun.

'As regards the administration of justice, Tachard, equally with Klein, said there could be no doubt it was admirable.

'A great deal of my conversation with Tachard turned upon the financial position of the country. According to him the gross income of what is now Alsace-Lorraine under the Empire was sixty millions of francs. Of these only twenty millions were absorbed by the administration proper of the country, and there remained forty millions to cover the quota of Alsace-Lorraine and her share in the Budget for army and navy and the miscellaneous expenses of the Empire. But the same revenue being drawn from the country since the annexation, what becomes of the surplus? and upon what principles will this surplus be disposed of? Had the taxes been at once reduced, and the military conscription been left in abeyance for some years, he had no hesitation in saying that nine-tenths of the present population would in a few months have become heart and soul reconciled to German rule.

'That the *modus vivendi* of the nucleus who are striving for an Alsace-Lorraine for the Alsace-Lorrainers implies an unexceptionally favourable financial and material position in which a taxation reduced below the level of either France or Germany, and a large surplus revenue, should furnish the oil and wine to be poured into the wounds caused by conquest, is very clear to me; and here I must recall an observation which I made during the war. For nearly a year at Darmstadt I held almost daily intercourse with French soldiers of every grade and of every part of France, either

in regard to questions of their official *solde de captivité*, or in connection with charitable donations of different kinds. I can hardly recollect an instance of grasping or over-reaching on the part of a Frenchman from the French parts of France. The cases of grasping and importunity invariably came from the Alsatian soldiery, and I came to the conclusion that *pas d'argent, pas de Suisse* was a national characteristic which extended to the Allemannic of the Vosges in common with those of the Alps.

'On one point Tachard told me that the German administration had been a brilliant success, and afforded a most striking contrast to the French. The railway tariffs had been reduced fifty per cent. (in the passenger traffic at least), and the result had been to double the amount of traffic, to the great prosperity of the country.'

From Niedermorschweiler Morier went to Colmar, and there made the acquaintance of an entirely new personage, that of Ignaz Chauffour, advocate.

'Colmar has a stamp and character of its own, wholly different from either Strasburg or Mülhausen. Strasburg has still the character of an old free city of the Holy Roman Empire plus that of a cathedral city: Mülhausen is a modern manufacturing town: Colmar represents the glory of Imperial administration. It was the *chef-lieu* of the department *du Haut Rhin*, and is now that of the *Regierungs-Bezirk* of *Ober-Elsass*. The Hôtel de la Préfecture, built at a cost of three millions of francs within the last few years, might vie with many a royal palace in the minor States of Germany. Moreover, Colmar was the seat of appeal under the French *régime*, and is now that of the upper tribunal for the whole of Alsace-Lorraine. It therefore now, as before the annexation, contains the bureaucratic aristocracy of the province.

'M. Chauffour, who for many years has been held and respected as the head of his profession, is a man of about sixty. He has for a long time ceased to plead, but in his chambers are settled, mostly *à l'amiable*, half the great legal controversies of the country. He is a dwarf with the grandest head I ever saw on a pair of human shoulders.



In all my visits to Alsace-Lorraine I have heard his name mentioned as that of the wise man whose word was law, and I determined to become personally acquainted with him.

'I found a much more serene and tranquil view of things in the study of the old advocate at Colmar than either in the chemist's back shop at Strasburg or in the *cabinet de travail* of the *château* of Niedermorschweiler. Like all other Alsations, he considered the introduction of the German military law at this early date as a capital fault, but he judged it rather in the light of a grave political mistake than, like the others, in that of a crime of *lèse humanité*. On the other hand, I found he had but little patience with the theatrical demonstrations made by his countrymen in connection with the question of option. It was clear that he believed that if the Alsations would really help themselves, they had now an opportunity of doing so which they never had before, nor if they neglected it, were ever likely to have again. The attitude of sulking, which characterised most of his countrymen, seemed profoundly to irritate him. On the question of the administration of justice his opinion would naturally be the best that could be obtained, and on this point his praise was unstinted. Alsace was now enjoying, both in regard to the civil and criminal law, an administration of justice such as she never had before possessed, and than which no country could show a better.'

From Colmar Morier returned to Strasburg, where he called on an old acquaintance, Monsieur de Clerq, the French plenipotentiary, who had negotiated the details of the Treaty of Frankfort, and on various friends, professors at the new university, but found that none of them as yet knew much about the country.

Amongst the latter, one of those he knew best was Dr. Geffcken, Professor of International Law, with whom he had been acquainted since Schleswig-Holstein days, and who, a strong Liberal and friend of the Crown Prince, had at one time been the diplomatic representative of the Hanseatic towns at Berlin. They had often been in correspondence on questions of international jurisprudence, as,

for instance, the Alabama case in which, though in no wise personally connected, Morier took a vivid interest, and which he deeply regretted to see, as he considered, so mismanaged.

'I am heart-broken on the subject,' he had written to Stockmar in May 1871, 'but *nobody* (except Lord Russell) sees the thing in the light I do. . . . It is un-understandable, heart-breaking. Hardly any one thinks or has considered the matter. To get rid of a question which *bored* them *anyhow*, seems to be the only prevailing sentiment. We have altogether lost our sense of international existence, and I fear it will never come back unless we can have some great national misfortune and disgrace, which I heartily pray may come when we have sufficient strength of reaction left in us.'

On the whole, Morier was inclined to agree with Stockmar, who stigmatised the treatment of the affair as a 'woeful monument of the sort of *olla podrida* called English policy, composed of traditions, sense, and senseless impulsiveness.'

The total lack of any foreign policy on the part of the British Cabinet, and the ever-increasing apathy of the British public in regard to international questions, were becoming daily more pronounced, and Lord Odo Russell, after a visit to England, told Morier that he had found 'there the most utter and absolute indifference to Germany, especially among statesmen and members of Parliament. Spain amused them when bombardments were announced, and Russia when Prince Alfred's marriage was made known, but otherwise continental talk bored everybody to death. There was a lingering love for France because of Paris, its plays and its restaurants, and a most decided terror of the Americans, to whom five milliards would willingly be paid for the sake of a quiet life.'<sup>1</sup>

With what deep concern this attitude had long been viewed by Morier is evidenced by the following letter to Jowett, dated a few months previously :—

<sup>1</sup> Odo Russell to Morier, 21st October 1873.

'January 21st, 1873.

'I thoroughly dislike your diagnosis of the international attitude of England, but as it is not to be helped, I suppose it's no use fretting about it. It is the curse of living in an island that foreign politics take hold of our imagination in the dreamy sort of way that all things were taken cognisance of by the Laputans. If a magician would for a minute or two lend me his wand, I would dry up the waters of the Channel with a great portion of the North Sea and the Atlantic, and I would give England a land frontier towards France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and America. We should then be forced to shake ourselves out of dreamland, and the necessities that would then press on us would, I believe, shape us into the grandest nation the world ever saw, because every day convinces me that the raw material, both moral and physical, of the Englishman is enormously superior to that of any other existing nation. We are the only truthful people in the world, the only people who are able to produce a gentleman, as an ethical being, raised in virtue of the general climatic conditions of society and not the product of a caste, the only people who are not petty and pettifogging in their international dealings, and the only people who with great self-assertion and a bull-dog kind of courage, have yet a singular amount of gentleness and tenderness. But living as we do in Laputa, with three-quarters of our real estate not situated in Laputa but down below on *terra firma*, we are in a hopelessly false position, which will most undoubtedly end by taking us to the dogs.

'This is a digression however. You say, "It seems sometimes as if it would be better to resign ourselves to what we can't help, say in the matter of Canada and of Constantinople." That this is undoubtedly what we will do is that of which I am convinced: that it is the idea in the heads of the *οἱ ἐν ἀρχῇ*, I know. I cross-questioned two representative men on this very subject, Lord Derby and the Duke of Cleveland (a shrewd and sensible man perfectly adapted to act as political barometer of the ruling classes). Both regarded Canada as lost, and as a province we should never fire a shot for. Constantinople stood on a somewhat different line, Lord Derby at least looking at the retention

of our Indian Empire as a vital question of English policy. But as to our policy in regard to Turkey in connection with India, I found an utter blank. My answer is that the existence of this temper, and the possibility of its having come into existence, is the death-knell of the empire, and an infinitely more certain sign of the actual commencement of decomposition than would be the loss of Canada and half a dozen colonies after a good fight to retain them. You might as well expect an ox to reproduce his species and lord it over a herd of bulls, as a nation to maintain an Imperial position which cultivates the virtue of resignation. England *can* maintain her empire if she *wills* to do it, but unless she wills it with all her heart and soul, she will find it difficult to keep even the Isle of Wight. This strange spectacle is now being presented to the world that at the moment when our planet is for practical purposes—by the miraculous new means of international communication, transatlantic telegraphs, transcontinental railways, etc., etc.—shrinking to the proportion of a middle-sized mediæval State (one can get quicker to India now than one could reach the north of Scotland a hundred years ago), and when the most distant nations are thereby being brought into a closer contact than were formerly the inhabitants of distant countries, England, which is equipresent in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, and omnipresent in Australia, which has more neighbours and a larger land-boundary than any nation ever had before, has convinced herself that she lives alone in a little island whose parochial concerns are all in all to her, and turns away with contempt and disgust from the affairs of a world in which she has ten times the stake of any other nation.

‘ I will not enter into a discussion of what I deem English policy ought to be, because it’s no use indulging in these air castles and I should probably shock you, as I fear that this self-same question of foreign politics is one on which we shall never agree. I will only say that I believe England, and England alone, has it in her power to prevent the renewal of the duel between France and Germany, which can only end in either the absolute crushing-out of France (the likeliest termination) or such a state of continental war

as will brutalise Europe as Germany was brutalised by the Thirty Years' War, and that this is to be effected not by the siding of England with Germany, but by the diplomatic arrangement of a coalition of neutrals whose weight, thrown into either scale, would render the taking of the offensive by the other party impossible. But, of course, if the secret wish of the English people is to see more blood and to have the excitement of assisting at the possible recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by the (unaided) efforts of the French, and if such phrases as "the balance of power" and the like are to be deemed enough to damn any foreign action of Great Britain even in such a cause as the maintenance of European peace, these arts of the statesman and politician must be laid on the shelf.

'As regards Russia and Constantinople, I shall be perfectly happy to see her there, if we secure as an equivalent for ourselves Egypt and Persia. This is quite as much part of our destiny as the possession of Constantinople is part of Russia's destiny, and we shall not, in the long run, be able to hold India without these two *points d'appui*.

'I shall not go to England this year. *Come to us at Easter.* We would take a run over to Verona (thirteen hours distance), Mantua, Venice, Ravenna, at the, for north Italy, loveliest portion of the year.'

This plan was carried out, and at Easter of this year Jowett went to Munich.

#### *Morier to his Father*

'16 April 1873.

'Induced by Jowett's presence and the beautiful weather, I undertook an "outfly," as we say in German, to beautiful Italy. . . . Our excursion was most successful, and I never enjoyed anything more. Approaching old age is not a pleasant prospect, and at every corner one feels departing glories, but this much ripe age does give one—it enables one to appreciate very differently than one did when one was young the great storehouses of the past, and in this category is there anything like Italy—beautiful Italy, beautiful in

herself, more than beautiful in her associations, more than most beautiful in the splendid relics of the past ?

‘ . . . From Verona to Venice, but here description is of no use—neither the stereotyped pictures one has all one’s life had before one, nor all one has read of the place, in the least degree can give one any idea of the charm and fascination which steals over one when one is once in the locality, gliding noiselessly in the coffin-like gondola through the watery streets. . . . Let it be once for all known, that only at Venice can the Venetian school, with its gorgeous light-filled colouring, be known and appreciated. For there you see nothing else, and you get to know what the school as a school did for colour. . . . All the while excellent talk on all matters that can possibly interest the human mind—theology, philosophy, politics, art—with one of the best thinkers of the day and one of the best talkers, so you will see that I had a week of extraordinary enjoyment, such a week as one could only get but now and then in one’s life and for which one is bound to be truly grateful, and so I am.’

In June he was informed by Lord Granville of the Queen’s desire that he should be employed on the negotiations in connection with the marriage between the Duke of Edinburgh and the Grand-Duchess Marie of Russia ; but as the marriage was very shortly afterwards settled, and the negotiations for the matrimonial treaty transferred to St. Petersburg and London, questions of diplomatic rank and locality prevented his services being used on this occasion. He therefore proceeded to Wildbad for his annual cure.

‘ Gortschakoff was there in all his glory—not indeed like an elder who had come to ogle a Susannah in her bath, but rather like an elder whom a whole bevy of Susannahs had come to ogle in *his* bath. He was exceedingly gracious to me, and I hear of his having sung my praises to various persons.’

Indeed, Prince Gortschakoff had a sincere regard for Morier, whom he spoke of as *un homme d’esprit et de cœur*, notwithstanding occasional passages of arms.

'He (Gortschakoff) was talking of his various cures at Wildbad, and said he had only once been interrupted in his yearly bathing, viz., in 1870, when the war broke out. It was then, he said, necessary *pour les apparences* that he should return to St. Petersburg, "but *notre position était déjà d'avance si parfaitement marquée qu'il n'y avait au fond rien pour moi à faire*—and," he added, turning his spectacles full upon me, "*c'était faute d'occupation quelconque que je me suis occupé de la question de la Mer Noire.*" I must, to my shame and confusion, confess that I was so utterly taken aback and had the breath so knocked out of me by the astounding impudence of this speech, that beyond muttering "*Vraiment !*" I made no answer. I felt like some highly respectable matron, used only to the best kind of evangelical society, to whom for the first time in her life some outrageous impropriety is whispered. That this feeling was reflected in the expression of my face I am certain, because Gortschakoff at once changed the conversation and outdid himself in saying pleasant things. I was inwardly cursing my own inaptitude in not quickly finding a repartee when he suddenly gave me an opportunity, which I successfully seized. He was describing a dispatch purporting to have been written by himself which some years ago made the round of the newspapers, and which had so happily mimicked his style that he had himself been taken in, and had ordered his archives to be searched for the original. "But," he said, "it was a forgery, and when the author of the forgery some years later came to St. Petersburg in a diplomatic character, I charged him with it. He excused himself by saying he had been at a deadly dull post, where he had nothing to do." Whereupon I gave a diplomatic laugh, and exclaimed, "*Ah, mon prince, n'est-ce pas inouï ce que font les gens d'esprit quand ils n'ont rien à faire.*"

'He quite understood the point of the observation, and we parted very good friends, each scoring one.'

Morier sustained a grievous loss in July by the death of one of his greatest friends, Dr. Brandis, the Empress Augusta's private secretary, who expired after a short illness at Linz, on his return from accompanying Her Majesty to Vienna.

'The gap which he makes in my life,' he tells his father, 'is not to be described, as he was the centre of all I cared for most in Germany. He never missed coming here two, or even three, times a year to see me and stay with me, and I was now to return the visit in a beautiful little cottage he had built for himself on the Rhine, and where we had arranged to have periodical meetings of all that was best and foremost in Germany.'

It had ever been an ardent wish of Brandis's to bring Morier and Bismarck together, for he considered that the two men, so dissimilar in many ways, had many points in common, and that, had they known each other better, they might have ended by understanding one another.

It was when listening to a conversation between Brandis and some friends, soon after the war, as to what the arms of the new German Empire should be, that Morier interposed with the remark, 'Why, the Lion of Judah, of course!' and when asked for his meaning, said, 'Because you fought like lions and made peace like Jews.'

Morier first heard of Brandis's death through a letter which the Empress had very considerably caused to be sent to him, and later in the autumn, learning that she was desirous of consulting him on the choice of a new secretary, he went to Baden-Baden in October to condole with Her Majesty and pay his respects to her and the Emperor, 'and was so well received and so very much made of, both by her and the Emperor, and that so demonstratively, that all the Court, and various Ministers besides, have been *aux petits soins* with me, a form of human baseness which it always amuses me to contemplate.'

He found the whole Court much agitated about the pending conflict between Church and State, and much anxiety existing in high quarters respecting its outcome; he also ascertained that there was a 'total absence of the *gaieté de cœur* which might be expected of persons who felt sure of victory.'

After a dinner to which he had been asked by their Majesties, 'the Emperor joined in a conversation which I



was having with the Grand Duke of Baden on the all-absorbing topic of the relations between Church and State in Germany, and asked me many questions about the English pilgrimages and the Sacred Heart. He observed that the pretensions of the *Curia* would soon be giving us as much *fil à retordre* as they were giving him, and he seemed well informed respecting the attitude of the Catholic Episcopacy in Ireland. The conversation lasted a long time and covered a good deal of ground, but in nothing which the Emperor said could the subtlest hair-splitter have detected the slightest appearance of dis-sentiment from the ideas which ruled the policy at present pursued by Prussia on the Church question. The Empress's views on the subject are well known. She sees things very much *en noir*, and apprehends some great catastrophe as likely to be the result of the present crisis. One observation she made especially struck me. "The Hohenzollerns," she said, "have raised themselves to what they are by making themselves the representatives of toleration. Tolerance has been the principle of their growth, the secret of their power. It is the great ethical tradition of the race. To break with the tradition now that they represent Germany, to turn their backs upon the virtues by which they have won their position now that the position is won—surely, surely this is—well! *n'en parlons plus!*"

'To turn to other matters, the Empress told me that she had been exceedingly gratified by her reception at Vienna. Ardently desirous as she had always been of a cordial union between Austria and Germany, she had felt not a little nervous about the success of her mission, well knowing the difficulties presented by the temper and the feelings of Vienna society. She reckoned it therefore one of the most gratifying events of her life to have met in the Austrian capital with a really hearty and cordial reception. I was able to tell Her Majesty, on the strength of statements made to me this summer by prominent members of Vienna society, that the homage rendered to her had been real and genuine, and had flown spontaneously, of course in great measure in return for the personal graciousness of Her Majesty, but also in acknowledgment of her well-known

detestation for war, and of the effort she had made to avert that of 1866.

'A propos of the relations between Austria and Germany, this is what the Empress told me last year with reference to the meeting of the three Emperors. She had witnessed, she said, so many meetings of crowned heads, which had led to nothing or had been almost immediately succeeded by bloody wars, that she had not looked forward with any great hopefulness to that of the three Emperors, but the success of the latter in really establishing *personal* relations of cordiality and good-will between the three brothers had been so great, that she would not deny herself the pleasure of believing that something had really been effected in the cause of European peace. She had not, she said, any particular liking for tobacco, but few things had given her greater pleasure than seeing the Emperor of Russia one day, his own stock of smoke being out, helping himself *sans gêne* out of the cigar-case of his brother of Austria !

'I found the Empress altogether under the charm of Andrassy,<sup>1</sup> whom she praised in the most unstinted terms, and described as the pink of honour, and as the type of the *preux chevalier* in his bearing, his manners, his sentiments, and his politics. It seemed to me as if she were all the time mentally comparing him with Beust ! This good impression had been produced last year at Berlin, and I asked her whether, after her visit to Vienna this year, she still remained of the same mind, which caused a fresh outburst of admiration. She emphatically declared that she felt confident that as long as Andrassy was Minister, cordial relations between Austria and Germany would be maintained.'

From other well-informed friends of his at Baden, Morier gathered that at a council held shortly before, 'the question was mooted of proceeding as regards Ledochowski<sup>2</sup> to imprisonment. A member of the council observed that if this were done, in all probability blood would be shed, to which Bismarck replied "so much the better." The King, however, had most positively refused to sanction recourse

<sup>1</sup> Count Julius Andrassy, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Archbishop of Posen.

being had to imprisonment, either in the case of Ledochowski or any other bishop, and this refusal suggested the idea of a law said to be in contemplation for *interning* bishops *outside* their dioceses, and that Bismarck was exceedingly sore and irritated at the King's refusal to let him push matters to extremities.'

Morier on the whole understood that matters had taken a much more serious turn, and that the resistance of the bishops had gone much further than had ever been expected, so that Falk's prediction that as soon as the laws were passed all would go smoothly, and all serious opposition would cease, was far from being verified.

In discussing the matter with a friend who had a strong personal antipathy against Bismarck, and who, well acquainted with the *dessous des cartes*, was reckoning up the odds against him, and chuckling at the thought that he would be beaten on this question, and thus at length break his neck, Morier observed that :

'He left out of consideration a most important fact which, account for it as you will, even in the hypothesis of a providential interposition, or of having sold himself to the devil, could not admit of a doubt and never failed to reproduce itself at the critical moment, viz., that whenever the great Chancellor gets into serious difficulty and seemed running his head straight up against a wall, a *deus ex machina* was certain to appear in the shape of some gigantic blunder committed by his adversaries (e.g. in 1866 the Austrians refusing the Paris Conference, in 1870 Gramont, after the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature, insisting on the additional promise "never to do it again," etc., etc.), which lighted his lurching ship, and restored the odds altogether in his favour.

'Two days after this conversation the correspondence between the Pope and Cæsar<sup>1</sup> appeared in the *Staats*

<sup>1</sup> A letter addressed on 7th August by Pope Pius ix. to the Emperor William, expressing the hope that he would refuse his consent to laws aiming at the destruction of Catholicism, and the conviction 'that all those who have received baptism belong in one way or another to the Pope,' to which the Emperor replied on 5th September, 'That the supposition he could disapprove of the laws of his Government was rendered untenable

*Anzeiger*, and certainly no more extraordinary confirmation of the *deus ex machina* theory could be well conceived. The effect of this astounding piece of mediæval fine writing has been prodigious, and will, I suspect, grow more and more, doing for Bismarck what he has to a great extent failed in doing for himself, viz., persuading the public conscience that all who are not with him in this conflict are necessarily against the Prussian State and the German Empire. Indeed, the note struck in the papal letter is so exactly the key-note which it was necessary for Bismarck's purposes should be struck, that one is almost tempted to think that spite his Infallibility the Roman Pontifex Maximus must be under some spell of sorcery, and that the German Prospero must have had an Ariel in the Vatican holding the papal pen ! For it cannot, I think, be doubted that the great faults in Bismarck's conduct of the conflict have been his allowing it to be seen that he was acting *ab irato*, and the consequent exaggeration which this has impressed on his language and on that of his supporters, especially in the inspired Press (the Emperor's letter itself, by the way, not being exempt from this fault); contrary to Talleyrand's diplomatic canon *de ne jamais lâcher le gros mot, gros mots* have been let loose from the very outset, the changes never having ceased to be rung on such terms as conspiracy, high treason, revolution, rebellion and the like. I have had many opportunities of observing how the note of untruthfulness which lurks in this exaggeration has damaged the cause for which the Prussian Government is fighting, not only amongst Catholics whose loyalty to the State is beyond a doubt, but likewise amongst earnest reformers who otherwise heartily approve of the policy of resistance to the Vatican. And now Pio Nono suddenly attunes his crazy instrument to the same pitch, and all the previous discord is harmonised, though it must be confessed that it is the harmony of a charivari ! Where is the exaggeration now ?

by the Constitution, which rendered his sanction to all such laws necessary ; that he had received from God the mission to uphold all laws ; and as to the assumption that all those that had been baptized belonged to the Pope, he, his ancestors, and the greater part of his people, belonged to the Evangelical Confession, which recognised no other Mediator than the Lord Jesus Christ.'

say the Bismarckian organs. Have we not all along insisted that we had to do with a Gregorian revival? In what does the animus of the Ninth Pius differ from that of Hildebrand? The pretensions are the same, the language is the same. In a word, no good fairy ever furnished a ministry with better materials for posters on the eve of a general election.' <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The elections for the Reichstag on 10th January 1874, which resulted in a large increase of the Catholic Centre party.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

## MUNICH

SINCE Lord Derby had held out to Morier the hope of eventually becoming Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, this appointment had been the goal of his ambition. That he should fill this post was, he knew, the earnest wish of Odo Russell, Lytton, and many others in the diplomatic service, who shared Lord Russell's opinion that Morier would make an admirable successor to Mr. Hammond.<sup>1</sup> It was the one post he coveted, and the only one in which he saw his way to effecting those real and permanent reforms in the Foreign Office which he knew to be so necessary.

In spite of Lytton's warning that Lord Derby, the originator of the idea, had said that 'though he had the highest opinion of Morier's abilities, and a sincere personal regard for him, and though for rare capacity and information there could not be a better Under Secretary, he feared Morier had one defect for that particular position—he was too much *in earnest*, and earnest men with ideas and great abilities were sometimes unsafe men,' Morier had serious reasons for supposing that he had a very good chance of obtaining the appointment.

When, therefore, on Mr. Hammond's retirement in October 1873, he was succeeded by Lord Tenterden, his disappointment was bitter, 'the bitterest I have ever had in my life,' he told his father, whilst to Jowett he wrote :—

'*Jacta est alea*, Hammond has resigned, and Tenterden is named in his stead, so that all my air castles have vanished, and what seemed to me the only chance of a position in which I really might have done something and left my mark, is hopelessly gone.'

<sup>1</sup> Lytton to Morier, 17th August 1870.

Jowett had done all he could to further Morier's hopes, but now that these were shattered, realising what a blow it would be, he, like a true friend, wrote and placed before him other and, as he thought, nobler ambitions.

*Jowett to Morier*

'October 14th, 1873.

'It has often occurred to me to say to you, though I am deterred by the extravagance of the words: "You could prevent a war in Europe if you devoted your whole mind to this object." But is this merely the extravagance of friendship? I am not going to quote Shakespeare about "authentic in your place and person" of "great admittance," and the like, for I am serious. (1) Four years ago — told me that you were "the first man in our profession"; (2) you are the personal friend of the Crown Prince, who will be Emperor when the crisis comes: his feelings are strongly against war, but he will want advisers to show how war may be avoided, and to fix the right notes of the situation in his mind beforehand; (3) you also know the Duc d'Aumale privately, and he will probably have a great deal of influence on French affairs during the next five years; facts about the German army, etc., communicated at the right moment, may have an effect on the minds of the nation; if not of the nation, of the leaders; (4) you are acquainted with Prince Gortschakoff, and may improve the acquaintance at odd times: there will be no war with Russia, and perhaps Russia may be satisfied; (5) the Peloponnesians will not come for five years, and the delay will give you the opportunity of gaining influence and information, especially about France and Russia. . . . If England appears to you to stand low in Europe at present, she does not stand lower than Prussia did fifteen years ago, or than she herself did at the beginning of Lord Chatham's administration.

'I daresay that you will think this wild, yet please to think of it. If you cannot succeed in preventing the greatest calamity that can befall the world, your diplomacy is nothing and your life a failure, even though you are

ambassador at Paris or Constantinople. If you can succeed, you will be one of the most eminent men in Europe. Nothing seems to me worth doing or having in foreign politics which does not prevent war. If war breaks out it is "Fold up the map of Europe," and there is an end. Any one who feels that he has this mission must be absolutely reticent; he must have a sympathy with England and with English Ministers or he will never gain an influence over them; he must make allowance for the difficulties in which a commercial country is necessarily placed; he must endeavour to influence English Ministers through the opinion of foreign ones, for they will be more willing to follow than to lead. My strong feeling is that if you are to succeed you must take men as they are, not complaining of them over-much, and then you may raise them to something better. But if you become isolated from them you are nowhere; you are no longer a statesman but a critic, you see faults everywhere and necessarily become odious to those who commit them. My Oxford experience makes me repeat this: I see so much idealism and so little effectual power.

'Having read over this letter I am almost ashamed to send it. I had it in my mind to say this to you all the time that I was at Munich. I wanted you to make the determination to avoid a continental war the motive, the religion, of your life for the next ten years; to read and study, to take care of your health, to form political friendships with this view. You may seem weak now, but time is a long lever and every year you will gain influence. You say οὐκ ἀξιῶ 'γὼ 'μαυτὸν ἰσχύειν μέγα;<sup>1</sup> but things as great have been done by persons who had not your ability or advantages of position. You would not forgive yourself if you failed in doing anything and a European war broke out. Meditate on the consequences, either of the dismemberment of France (you are half a Frenchman) which is the more probable alternative, or of the other thing which, though improbable, is not impossible. I am not getting more rational, so I shall stop.'

<sup>1</sup> Arist., *Knights*, 182.



*Morier to Jowett*

' MUNICH, November 16th, 1873.

' Your letter required an answer worthy of it that till now I have been unable to give to it, having been almost constantly booted and spurred since its receipt. . . .

' And first let me most heartily thank you for having at once *acted* on my behalf. I know how difficult it is often to do this, however intimate one may be with the οἱ ἐν ἀρχῇ, and being well initiated in such matters I am able to appreciate the proof of such friendship, not, old fellow, that I required any proofs, but the sight and still more the ring of and the touch of new gold pieces is pleasant even to him who knows he has a large balance at his banker's. Your surmise about Tenterden was quite correct. The matter I have since learnt was long since determined. I do not appear to have been in the running at all. . . . The crisis has had the advantage or disadvantage of eliciting some curious letters which I send you, with the prayer that you will at once return them; they will enable you to appreciate the sort of standing ground from which I am forced to see the situation. Lord Derby's verdict is the most curious and instructive. He knows more of me than any other Minister, because I had to work the details of my most important negotiation, the Vienna Treaty, with him in daily personal interviews and daily notes and memoranda. He has also seen long political letters which I have for years been writing to Lady Derby. Moreover he is the man who first drew the fatal trail of the Under-Secretaryship before my nose and urged me to look out for it, boasting to his wife that by doing this stroke of business he had nailed me fast to the diplomatic profession which I at one time thought of leaving. Yet he thinks me a dangerous man because I have got *ideas* and am *in earnest* about them!!! Odo's letter I send, though not immediately bearing upon the subject, because it will bring vividly before your mind the sort of hopelessness there is for us (who live abroad and, as it were, constitute the international England, the England in contact with her neighbours, who feel therefore all that we might be and are forced to contrast

it with heartsickness and teeth gnashings with what we are), to attempt to interest British beadledom in our work.

' And now to turn to the main part of your letter. It is a great responsibility, old fellow, to have a man of your calibre holding forth such views about oneself as those contained in your letter. However, as responsibility is the soul of all good work, that is all to the good. The knowledge that you held a higher opinion of me than I deserved, the fear of sinking hopelessly in my own eyes if I destroyed this good opinion, and horror at the pain I should cause you by so doing, have at many important crises of my life kept me straight and enabled me to keep my legs when the ice was slippery. I should therefore be the last to chide you for what you are pleased to call "wild talk." On the other hand, I am exceedingly anxious that you should not form an incorrect judgment as to the possibilities afforded by my career. The great ideal which you have painted as that for which I should strive is not realisable or even approachable by a *diplomatic agent*; the most cunning hand can do nothing without the guidance of the brain, and the brain unless in obedience to the great captain, the heart. But where are the brain and heart of England? The *rôle* which you assign to me, or some other discreet and learned Minister! is one which England and England only could play, it is the one I dream of for her night and day, it is the one she could start upon with absolute certainty of success to-morrow . . . and . . . it is one which to breathe to political ears in England is to stamp yourself as a useless and a dangerous man because you have ideas (*horribile dictu*) and are in earnest about them.

' It is this conviction of the hopelessness of any good being done by the individual agent abroad, and of the only hope consisting in influencing people at home, which made me so desirous of getting into the F. O. I am conscious of a certain amount of caloric within me (which *pro tanto* is force) which has taken the shape of a frantic desire to restore the international *prestige* of England, not for the good of England only, but for the good of the human race, because it so happens that England is about the only great Power which can really in pushing

forward her own ends at the same time further those of the rest of the world, and I believe that some infinitesimal quantity of this caloric, were I to be in the F. O., would communicate itself to others. However, as the hope is for the present knocked on the head, I must just continue to work on and try and fit myself to step in should an opportunity ever present itself. Only do not make yourself any illusions in regard to what can be done abroad.

‘I know that you think I am prejudiced in my judgment in respect to Lord Granville, Gladstone, and the others in whose hands our foreign policy lies, and you have given me good advice which I have carefully followed about dealing with them as if I had no such prejudice. But you do me wrong in considering my feeling a prejudice and ascribing it to intellectual impatience, and, what is more, I am not in a position to prove to you that you do me wrong. It is only that complete knowledge of a system which can be obtained by being *inside* of it which enables me to judge of the spirit in which it is worked and of the men who work it. I could tell you things for twenty-four hours at a sitting, tell you as it were all I know and yet quite fail to make you understand all the danger and all the badness which to me is as palpable as the street door. But take an analogy. Supposing the whole of Oxford were one great college of which you were a tutor and fellow, and that this college were presided over by Dr. Pusey and others wholly with a view to please the ritualistic portion of the English clergy; you being within the system would understand the thousand ways unseen by others by which, under the finest names and words, the cause of education and light was being sacrificed to that of obscurantism and priestcraft. Could you in such a case observe an attitude of placid mental objectivity towards the persons carrying on the system? Could you help your heart overflowing with bitterness and anger? You could, of course, keep on such terms with them as would appear to be most conducive to the thwarting of their aims, but could you in order to obtain influence over them tax them *in your heart* at a fancy price which your head knew to be not their real price? I have said “*could you?*” but I will add “*ought you?*”

Would you be able to confound their politics and hope some day to put a spoke in their wheel if you got rid of the fire burning within you? Would you not be putting yourself out with the fire? You appeal to yourself as a case in point and say you would have done more good if you had more *ménagé* certain people. I answer, would you have done half the great work you have done if, during the heat of the battle, you had had the placid objectivity which you have won as a reward for your victories.

‘There is one more point in your letter I wish to refer to. I believe we are very heartily agreed in the main as to what English foreign policy should be. Only I cannot formulate my policy as if it were identical with looking upon war as the *summum malum*. There are things which appear to me infinitely worse than war, worse than an unsuccessful war even. And as one of these very much worse things I consider the national habit of looking at war as the *summum malum* as the very worst. Unless a nation in its collective capacity retains the power of feeling that death and ruin are preferably a hundred-fold than life and prosperity under certain conditions, unless in a word it can, *le cas échéant*, be moved by the feeling so splendidly described in the conversation between old Talbot and young John in *Henry IV.*, it is lost, hopelessly lost. Now the way in which the Alabama negotiation (the negotiation mind you, not the principle of indemnity) and the Black Sea negotiation were carried on and acquiesced in, and even boasted of by the Liberal party in England goes far to prove that England has got into this stage of national decrepitude, and I would consider the worst war preferable to this.

‘But are you quite sure that you yourself look upon war as the *summum malum*? What would you say to a short war which restored Alsace-Lorraine to France or gave her Belgium as indemnity? Would you restore the Pope his temporalities, dismember Italy, and return Lombardy and Venetia to Austria, if by so doing you could call the dead of Solferino and Magenta to life, and clothe with flesh and blood all the wooden legs and arms that are still rattling about in France and Italy? I think I may say that you

certainly would not. No, what we must of course try to do is to prevent a European war, but what *per fas aut nefas* and at the cost of any amount of war we must prevent is a second duel between France and Germany. To prevent this I would even side with France, however in the wrong she might be.'

Not from Jowett alone, but from all his friends did he receive warm marks of sympathy on this non-fulfilment of his hopes, though some of them doubted if the post would have suited him, and wondered whether he would not have found himself in an uncongenial, not to say hostile, atmosphere, and if his mind was not too intractable to work in harmony with the heavy bureaucratic machinery into which it would have been harnessed, whilst others feared that his ambition to do good might have proved illusory.

'If you lived in England, and saw behind the scenes as I do,' wrote one whom high official position enabled as none other correctly to gauge the situation, 'you would be utterly without hope of any good being done permanently in any public office in this country so long as the present system of House of Commons government continues.

'There is no such quality as public morality; every man looks out only for his own seat, and to bring his party into power that he may have a chance of the loaves and fishes; party government is demoralising the whole country. Those who have nothing to gain or lose from public life are anxious to keep what they have got; those who have a large stake in the country feel themselves at war to the knife with those who are trying to effect reforms. And there is no Minister who has the courage to displease the House of Commons, or to allow his subordinates in any department to act without considering party interest.'

'If at the age of forty-seven one has learned nothing else, one has at least learned not to cry over spilt milk, so I shall think no more on the subject,' was the philosophic reflection with which Morier consoled himself, and a few months later, in the spring of 1874, he was able to write:—

'As regards my last year's disappointments, they are dead and buried. In contracting for the family vault

wherein to deposit them, I took care to have it made deep enough and wide enough to allow of any number of additional coffins, so that I am quite prepared for the future. Weighing loss and gain against each other, however, I am not sure that the extremely warm sympathy which my disappointment elicited from Jowett, Lady Derby, Lytton, and one or two other friends did not outweigh the black side of the account. Friends and health are, after all, the only things worth much caring for. I can never have the latter, but I do believe that no one has better friends than I have, and I am truly grateful for them.'

At this time, however, his health decidedly improved, owing in a great measure to that 'pool of gout Bethesda,' Wildbad, and once more he was able to shoot for five or six hours at a stretch, and 'to experience the unutterable delight of filling my nose with the dust of stubble fields, and my boots with the dew of pendent turnip leaves.'

He, therefore, determined to persevere in his profession, although the offer of the professorship of International Law at Oxford, conveyed to him at this time in the most flattering terms by Jowett, who, as well as Max Müller, was most anxious to have him as a brother professor, would have enabled him to leave it; though that these perpetual disappointments tended to produce in him feelings of discouragement and despondency is evident from the tone of his correspondence at this period. In urging the claims of White, then Consul at Danzig, whose promotion to Belgrade he had very much at heart, he says:—

'He is in my opinion one of the few public servants we have that is made of the wood public servants ought to be made of, viz., whose whole heart and soul is in the service, and who by a necessity of his nature gives to it his whole strength, and all that is best within him. He *is* what I *used* to be.' While he bitterly comments on 'what it is to get to middle age with that burning within one which one knows would be for the public good, yet unable to see the chance of getting within reach of the machinery to which one could apply the motive power of whose possession one is conscious. Of men with this *feu sacré* burning within them

there are very few in the public service. Indeed the public service acts in a manner directly to quench this spirit and to kill it.'

A partial reconstruction of the Gladstone Cabinet in the autumn of 1873 only proved that it was tottering to its fall, and that the prospect of a Conservative administration could not be very far distant.

'It is not so much the absence of programme,' Morier wrote in October 1873, 'as the absence of the *moral attitude* which ought to distinguish a healthy Conservative party from the go-ahead party which seems to me so full of danger for the future. The acting as a *drag* is a perfectly legitimate function for a Conservative party as long as it is in opposition, but will hardly afford a principle of life when it is in office . . . and to look forward to permanent opposition as the *raison d'être* of the Conservative party is simply to abdicate. A drag is a very excellent piece of mechanism to prevent a coach going too fast in the right direction, but is not much use in making the coach go in a different direction. Standing as I do, away from English politics, and looking at them from afar, and therefore perhaps getting at the general outline more correctly than those who live in the midst of them, I cannot but believe that the time has come when a Conservative Government that knew what it was about, would not only be very welcome, but would be more able to provide for what the country really wants, than any combination that could be scraped together out of the *débris* of the Gladstone administration.

'Only a Conservative Government could win back for us our international position. As long as Gladstone and Lord Granville are in power we must submit to rank with Denmark and Holland in the family of nations. We are now living on the prestige of what England might possibly recover in the way of self-esteem if the Tories come in, as somehow our friends abroad (such as we have left) will not give up the hope that the old Lion has some life left in him, and put the strange mania for eating dirt, which we have developed during the last few years, to the personal account of Gladstone and his Quaker friends; . . . but if a

Tory Government were to come in and not know how to restore our prestige, and go on in the footsteps of Gladstone and Manchester, then indeed it would be all up with us.

‘ Apart from the recovery of our international position, which is, of course, the point on which I feel most strongly, there are a number of important *neutral* questions to be solved, *i.e.* questions not necessarily involving a political character, though most of them have been foolishly daubed over with party paint, which it is clearly more advantageous to the country to see solved by a Conservative Government than by the class of politicians which are being turned out by the latest developments of Liberalism. I mean questions like Law Reform, Land Tenure Reform (yet that reform *must* come, and how utterly different if carried out by a really Conservative Ministry from what it would be by a John Stuart Mill-infiltrated Ministry), and State Railway Purchase. What I mean to say is, that these and a number of other questions, according as they are taken in hand in an honest spirit by patriotic and unselfish statesmen, such as we *ought* to be able to look for amongst the hereditary legislative classes, or turned out to please the readers of the *Daily Telegraph* by shallow doctrinaires and stump orators, will England regain that steadiness and self-esteem which she has in a great measure lost, and is every day more rapidly losing.

‘ It is Conservative *statesmen* that the country wants, not Conservative party leaders filling up the room of statesmen.’

And after the defeat of the Liberals at the polls in February of the following year, notwithstanding their proposal to abolish the income-tax, ‘ Gladstone’s coarse bribe to the country, like a piece of raw meat thrown to an angry cur,’ he continued :—

‘ And now we are face to face with a great Tory reaction. Disraeli will apparently find himself at the head of a *bona fide* Conservative majority. What will he do with it? What feats will he educate his party to perform? Into what waters, to use Bismarck’s famous expression, will he steer *das Narrenschiff der Zeit*? If he gets a working majority, he may be for once brought under the hallowing



influences of *bona fide* responsibility, and perhaps turn out a decent humdrum Premier after all.'

How much Morier's political convictions had been modified during the last few years is proved by the following 'confession of faith,' which he made to Mallet about this time :—

'I am just as much interested in economic subjects as I used to be, but I fear if you could read my political *intérieur* at the present day you would look upon me as a terrible renegade, though I myself believe that I could before an unbiassed jury absolutely clear myself of the charge. I believe, namely, that but for the Franco-German war (which might have been prevented by us, had we not been diseased by the *false application* of the very ideas that I for one pay homage to) there was a stream of international comity which by proper direction might have been made to take the whole human race a long way towards a better future. But that infernal war has destroyed all this for our generation at least, and a political state of things has remained as the outcome in which it seems to me of the greatest importance that we should strengthen and evoke all the Nationalism and Imperialism left within us if we are to hold our own. This confession will, I am sure, suffice to damn me in your opinion as a hopeless Chauvin, but it can't be helped. A man must go by the light within him.'

Morier's great wish was to see Lord Derby Foreign Secretary in the new Cabinet, not that in anyways he shared his views; indeed, as he himself said, he did not believe there were two men in England who held such dissimilar opinions on foreign politics.

'The foreign policy I should like to see England entering upon would be one of self-assertion, and the bold maintenance of her rank and position as one of those half a dozen forces into whose hands has been committed for good or evil the fashioning of the future destinies of mankind. I believe this to be necessary for the maintenance of her old Imperial position as the largest Continental State in the

world, and also because I am idealist enough to believe that a great international position, like a great social position, imposes duties correlative to the rights and privileges enjoyed, and that no human unit, whether an individual or a corporation or a nation, can with impunity withdraw itself from the performance of its duties, and yet continue in the enjoyment of its rights. Further, I believe that at the present juncture in the affairs of mankind, England, and England alone, would furnish a rallying point for the immense peace forces and peace interests distributed over Europe, which only require a backbone and a conscious cerebrum to enable them to impose peace on the war-breathing minority. On the other hand, no one is more absolutely convinced than I am of the impossibility of such a policy being attempted by England. It could only become possible by the sudden springing up, either in the nation or in a powerful party, of the Imperial sense in its highest and noblest form—a sense which I believe to be absolutely dead within us. Now as such a policy is absolutely out of the question, and a safe and unambitious policy is the only alternative possible, it is of cardinal importance that the very best possible hands for such a policy should be selected. Lord Derby is the only man who would at once command the confidence of the country independent of party and of foreign governments. He thoroughly knows foreign politics, and not only would the Conservative Government, as such, be at once steadied by his assuming the Foreign Office, but England's position abroad would be steadied. To take an unknown man just now, in the very dangerous and inflammable state of Europe, and when, as I believe, the fumes of success are rapidly getting into Bismarck's head, would be madness, especially with the perfectly demoralised and disorganised state into which our diplomacy has been thrown by Lord Granville's absolute inertia during the last three years.'

His satisfaction at Lord Derby's acceptance of the Foreign Secretaryship was consequently great.

His long acquaintance with the latter gave him an opening to enter into correspondence with him on two subjects

which in no wise touched his official position but which he had much at heart—the Nationalisation of Railways and the Recognition of the Inviolability of Private Property at Sea<sup>1</sup>—on both of which he held strong academical opinions differing widely from the received public opinion in England, and to which he tried hard, but unsuccessfully, to convert Lord Derby.

In March he went to Berlin in connection with an affair, the settlement of which afforded him no small gratification. It was the effecting of a compromise in the case of a lawsuit which had lasted since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the original heroine of which had been a celebrated Lady Craven, who had been the mistress of the Margrave of Bayreuth at the end of the eighteenth century, and had furnished the prototype for the heroine of Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe*. The representatives of the original claimants were Mr. and Mrs. Henry Craven;<sup>2</sup> she, the well-known authoress of *L'Histoire d'une Sœur*, and one of the most charming women of modern days. They were an old couple reduced almost to starvation who were in justice and equity owed many millions by the Bavarian Government, but who for twenty years had given up all hope of ever obtaining even a particle of their due. Morier succeeded after infinite labour in forcing the Bavarian Government to settle an annuity on them which at least allowed them to pass the last years of their lives in comfort. The Empress Augusta, a friend of Mrs. Craven, and Prince Hohenlohe<sup>3</sup> were the allies with whose assistance he obtained the desired settlement. He spent ten days in Berlin on this occasion, where, besides being constantly received by the Empress, he had long interviews with the Crown Prince and Crown Princess, and saw all his friends and acquaintances.

Shortly after his return to Munich he started off for England, stopping in Paris on the way for 'fourteen delightful days' to see his various friends and relations, and

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> *Née* Mlle. de la Ferronnays.

<sup>3</sup> Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, b. 1819, d. 1900, Bavarian Prime Minister, 1866-1870; German Ambassador in Paris, 1874; Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, 1885; German Chancellor, 1894.

when there made the acquaintance of Thiers who 'seats me down on a sofa, and keeps me there from 10.15 till 11.45. *Very interesting.* He tells me much but also pumps me much.' After six weeks in London, a cure at Wildbad, and a visit to Baden-Baden to see the Empress, he was back in Munich in July, where in September he received a visit from Gladstone.

*Morier to his Father*

'MUNICH, *September 27th*, 1874.

'I have had a most interesting time of it with Gladstone during the ten days he was with us. . . . I am on the whole confirmed in my estimate of him from this study of him at close quarters, excepting perhaps that his great brilliancy and the keenness with which he throws himself into any subject that interests him are even greater than I had believed.

'I accompanied him on Monday last to Nuremberg. . . . It is perfectly unique in its kind, a mediæval town still, as it were, fresh out of the hands of the great artists of the sixteenth century, and without a stone or a rafter removed from its place. It required a rare combination of good fortune to accomplish this, and may be thus accounted for. All its great artists—Albert Dürer the painter, Adam Kraft the sculptor, Peter Vischer the master of bronze work, etc., etc., who flourished at the close of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth were (1) citizens of Nuremberg; (2) worked for the great merchant princes of Nuremberg; (3) took to sacred subjects because it was the only recognised form of art. When Nuremberg and its citizens and patricians therefore bodily embraced the reformed religion, the wonderful churches adorned by these great artists were rather family treasure-houses mainly adorned by men who themselves followed the movement (though rather its artistic and humanitarian, than its theological side) than papistical edifices. Thus, though the churches (one excepted) are all Protestant, they remain absolutely intact, not a side altar touched, not a crucifix or saint disturbed, and with the painted glass just as it was put up on the first day.

'I have succeeded in getting Gladstone to sit for his

picture to a man I consider the greatest portrait-painter now alive, one Lenbach, and I think the picture will be a great success. It will be exhibited in London next year with one of Moltke, one of Döllinger, and one of Bismarck, and I hope will create a sensation.'

*Morier to Jowett*

'MUNICH, November 9th, 1874.

'By far the most interesting episode of last summer was a visit of ten days from Gladstone. I think I told you he was coming to stay with me. His object was to see Döllinger before the latter's appearance at Bonn. I cannot attempt to write all I should like to say of my impressions. It would be too long (and I have still a limited use of my hand), and at the best would be unsatisfactory. I must reserve my say for our Easter trip. But one thing I must give him credit for, a most extraordinary charm of intercourse. I have rarely enjoyed ten days of small talk and big talk more than those, and my wife, who you know is prejudiced against him, fully coincides in this opinion. But then he was at his very best. His health is entirely restored, he is as fresh as a hunter who has been out to grass all the summer. He had ordered that no letters should be sent out after him. He was with people who neither snubbed nor toadied him, the Scylla and Charybdis between whom I fancy he has to navigate in England. In Döllinger he found the ideal priest of his ideal Church. The weather was beautiful and he found the Museum and Treasure House of the Kings of Bavaria full of the kind of art he most cares about—the modelled jewelry of the sixteenth century! As a general verdict of his intellectual putting together, I have come to it under this similitude, that his mind resembles the fasces of a Roman lictor, a bundle of sticks (each of them fit to beat a dog with!) with no organic vegetable life binding them together, and made up promiscuously of every kind of timber—strong ash, oak saplings, and also rotten reeds—and in the middle a great axe with which he can at any moment hew to pieces any opponent who personally attacks him.'

During this autumn the trial of Count Harry Arnim on the charge of high treason caused an enormous sensation throughout Europe. When ambassador in Paris, Arnim had taken a different view from Bismarck about supporting Thiers, in itself sufficient to irritate Bismarck's impatient spirit ; but the real wound lay deeper. Arnim's idea of the true policy, the upholding of the legitimist and clerical party, was more palatable to the Emperor than Bismarck's policy which he was following against the grain. Hence Bismarck became suspicious that he was being undermined, and from that moment pursued Arnim unrelentingly, set spies upon him, and followed him up till he crushed his diplomatic career.

Morier's view was that Arnim meant to head a moderate party of Old Catholics, and to form an influential opposition in a dangerous quarter, in which he might very likely have succeeded had he not lost his head and destroyed himself by his obstinacy in refusing to give up private despatches addressed to him as ambassador in Paris by Bismarck, but which were not his private property.

Arnim passed through Munich on his way to Geneva in March 1875, and spent most of the two days that he was there in Morier's house.

' It happened to be Döllinger's eighty-seventh birthday, and the two dined with us in celebration of it. I never saw such a wreck as poor Arnim or such a contrast as he presented to himself when last I saw him, which was just three years ago here when he was on his way from Rome to take possession of his Embassy at Paris, in all the pride of feeling himself the second statesman in the Empire. We talked over all he had said to me then about the impending conflict between Germany and Rome, and I must give him the credit of having had a far truer outlook into the future and a far sounder diagnosis than the man who, with such wanton cruelty, has so pitilessly crushed him. His fault is an excessive vanity which disturbs his judgment the moment his own person comes into play. But I was astonished at the great moderation of his tone in speaking of Bismarck—especially at his telling me that

Bismarck did *bona fide* believe that there was a conspiracy against him of which he was the head, and that this was not a simulated belief—and he gave as a proof that forty-two thousand thalers (more than £6000) had been spent in following up supposed clues to such a conspiracy. Of course he considers this a mere proof of the *Grösse-Wahnsinn* under which Bismarck is undoubtedly suffering, but I must say that under the circumstances to admit such a plea is itself generous.

‘The animus of Bismarck is shown by two facts told me by Arnim’s counsel, Professor Holtzendorff (who lives here and whom he had come to see), to which he himself did not advert. The first was a document sent by Bismarck’s orders to the public prosecutor to be used in the second trial to *prove* that Arnim was a dishonourable man *whose word could not be trusted*. This document was a *procès-verbal* going back to the year 1855, when Arnim was quite a young man, of a street row in which he had tripped up a watchman and, on being taken up by the police, *had given the name of Müller*.

‘The other gives a real picture of the Prussian Foreign Office. When Arnim’s child died in Paris, he had had the furniture of the room she died in—her bed, a table and a few chairs—valued by the regular appraisers, and had had the articles themselves packed up and sent to Berlin. The furniture being Government furniture, he had sent the six hundred francs at which it had been valued to the proper department. When his conflict with the Foreign Office began, he received an official letter telling him that, as he had made away with the furniture without first having asked permission, he had committed the crime (paragraph so-and-so of the Code) of making away with Government property, and had brought himself under the penalties of the Criminal Code—that, however, the Foreign Office would abstain from prosecuting him if he at once paid eight hundred francs instead of six hundred francs, as it had been calculated that though the articles themselves were not worth more than six hundred francs it would require eight hundred to replace them !’

## CHAPTER XXIX

ARTICLES ON PRUSSIA AND THE VATICAN—ESSAY  
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PRUSSIA

THE autumn and winter of 1874-75 found Morier deeply engrossed in literary work. His long-projected plan of writing an account of the conflict between State and Church in Germany was now realised in a series of articles more political than religious, which appeared anonymously in *Macmillan's Magazine*, provoking much controversy with Archbishop (afterwards Cardinal) Manning.

'I have been writing a series of articles in *Macmillan* on Prussia and the Vatican,' he told Jowett, 'respecting which I should much like to have your opinion. There is a last article coming out in December, and then in January a tremendous rejoinder to Manning's attack on me in the current number of *Macmillan*. He does not expect this, but is preparing a general reply to my articles as soon as they are finished. I doubt, however, whether after the rejoinder I am preparing for him he will have much stomach for the general reply. . . . I have written my articles altogether off my own bat, only showing the proof sheets to Döllinger, who has only had a few unimportant inaccuracies to correct, and who has done no more than give me the occasional loan of a bull or two when I wanted my controversial cows to calve. But in the rejoinder to Manning I shall copiously use his materials, and with their assistance not only prove his bad faith, but an ignorance so enormous, that he has committed himself to statements which, according to the Decrees of the Vatican Council, actually make him incur *ipso facto* the penalties of excommunication! He little knew when he broke covert that way, what a pack of hounds I had ready to lay on. . . .



'Then I have another tough job in hand—the writing of an essay on Local Government in Prussia for a Cobden series on local government throughout the world, which I was rash enough to make the club undertake. How I shall get through both jobs I do not know.'

These articles on 'Prussia and the Vatican' (which, Lord Odo Russell was informed by a man on the staff of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, were ascribed 'to Döllinger, and translated by Lord (!) Gladstone !') created the greatest interest, and Morier received many letters on the subject.

'It is in the controversy with Manning that you come out strongest and show your full power,' was Lytton's opinion, 'nothing could be more completely triumphant. . . . You have pounded the archbishop into powder of the smallest grain. You march upon him and over him with all the elephants of Porus—admirably disciplined elephants. . . . I feel sure that as a controversial writer you might make, whenever you pleased, a great mark in political literature. First, you have the rare merit of thoroughly understanding down to the roots of it any subject you write about. Secondly, your intellectual powers are an uncommon combination of severe logical method and the lively play of imagination over the surface of acquired fact. Thirdly, you have remarkable force of expression; and fourthly, you have passion, which is always the secret of power.'

Gladstone, who had read them with avidity, described them as 'simply smashing.' Jowett, on the other hand, did not express unqualified approval.

'I rather hope that your controversial efforts are over,' he wrote, on January 5, 1875, 'for upon reflection I do not quite like them, and am doubtful whether they will do any good except in proving your energy and ability. Are not Gladstone and Döllinger really at the bottom of them? . . . There is no harm in entering a little into religious controversy. You have had great opportunities of learning, and no doubt the friendship of such a man as Döllinger is well worth having. But I would rather write about great

questions of European policy or social life. The new Catholic movement is nothing, or very little, but Bismarck is a great deal, whether the time has come for him to descend from earth or not.'

And a fortnight later again :—

' Since I wrote to you last I have invested five shillings in *Macmillan's* and read your articles. Shall I criticise them a little? They seem to me rather too fervid and not sufficiently connected; and if I were criticising one of the essays you used to read to me in old times, I should say "not impersonal enough." I quite agree with the general principles of them. Your writing has a considerable swing, but it is not a continuous swing from the beginning to the end of the article. I am delighted to hear that you have acquired regular habits of writing, for I am convinced that you may become a very distinguished writer; and in the present state of politics, when all men's minds are weak and impressionable, this is the greatest power which a politician or diplomatist can exercise. . . . Don't hurry on your essay (on the Prussian land laws); take more time if necessary, and insist on putting it last in the book. If you like to send it to me I will return it without delay, and will read it carefully. Don't give us too much of anti-quarianism. The German land tenures of to-day, not of two thousand years ago, are what concern us.'

*Morier to Jowett*

' February 23rd, 1875.

' Let me first congratulate you on being made a doctor, though I suspect it is a case of *le Médecin malgré lui*. Yet if the D.D. was not to be avoided, I suppose you would prefer getting it from Leyden in connection with a great historical commemoration to any other form. I must confess that for my own part when the telegraph brought the news I was truly pleased. After all it is no sin to be a Doctor of Divinity.

' It was exceedingly good of you with all your other work thick upon you, proposing to see my essay through the press.

But this was out of the question. I had to get it *composed* (the materials for it read up I), written and printed off as quick as pen and ink, and posts, and printer's devils could work. I only began getting up my materials on the 7th of December, and the first part was in the printer's hands by the 9th of January.

'You see, therefore, that I was compelled by the *vis major* of an obligation to disregard your advice, and to let the essay go forth into the world in an untrimmed, slovenly state. The result is that the essay itself is wretchedly bad, and its outward apparelling worse. It is so bad (and especially from *your* point of view *bad*, being almost all of it antiquities, and the scene of action being mostly round the tree from which Eve picked the apple), that I doubt very much whether I shall let you read it. I shall, however, send you a table of contents (which I am printing separately for the copies I shall distribute to various people), that you may know what the essay is about. What put it into your head that it was about the Land Tenure? It has nothing to do with Land Tenure. It is an essay on the relations between Local and Imperial government. No less a subject, Herr Doctor, than that of the *Republic* of Plato, which, by the way, I have been drinking in with a joy not to be told *since* my essay was written. You have indeed enriched the English language with *κτῆμα εἰς ἀεί*, and might well *rest* and allow us to be *thankful*. But it will do no good reading the essay itself. You cannot tell me more harm of it than I know of it already, but your giving me this opinion would discourage me, and I don't want to be discouraged. For I am convinced that the *Grundidee* of the essay is absolutely sound, and that I have *at last* got a *ποῦ στῶ*; And this is what a man requires at forty-eight, if he is to do any good in the world and leave his mark. I know very well that there is no absolute truth get-at-able in this world, but unless a man can be convinced that however true this may be in the abstract, still that in his particular case he has got hold of absolute truth by the skirts of the garment, he will just do nothing at all. Call this fanaticism, or faith, or by any other nickname you like, it is *the* force which rules mankind, it is the steam which drives the human

engine. Any tomfoolery with a given number of cubic feet of this steam urging it on will make its way, and therefore I can hope that a moderate amount of common-sense impelled by a moderate amount of this steam will make its way ; but then I cannot afford having jets of cold water let into my boilers.

I shall be profoundly indifferent to what the public (if it takes any notice of me, which it is not likely to do) says, because tread on its corns I must. The Liberals, many of whose darling tomfooleries I attack, will, of course, trample on me with their bovine hoofs, and the Conservatives are much too stupid to see that the doctrines I preach are the only ones on which a rational conservatism can be built up. Therefore I am not afraid of the public jets of cold water. But those of my friends I am afraid of. But I mean to persevere nevertheless. I mean within the next two years to work up my present essay into a big work of two volumes on which I mean to stake my literary reputation. By that time I shall be fifty. If it succeeds, why then I shall go on with literature ; if it don't, why then I won't. But I shall not allow myself to be deterred from doing this work by any amount of abuse from the public, or discouragement from my friends, because I am *persuaded*, *convinced* (very likely wrongly, but this has nothing to do with the subjective force of the *Kraft* I described above), that I am right, and the grounds of my belief shall be given to the public in the best form of which I am capable. My contention is that the only remedy for the present political chaos is a *reversion* to the *self-government* type of government as opposed to the *representative government*, that the curse of the modern age is the preaching of political rights without the corresponding political duties. (Liberté ! Egalité ! Fraternité !!) That unless the moneyed classes and the wage-earning classes are harnessed to the work of the State, according to their respective abilities, as the landed classes in a great manner still are, the State is nurturing within its bosom two dragons that will end by eating it up. That the only franchise is the old English franchise : the capacity of rendering public service. That you cannot lower your franchise too much if you exact for every corre-

sponding lowering a corresponding public duty, or, at least, a corresponding liability to public duty.

‘ Further, I contend that this principle, which was theoretically laid down by Aristotle (that every citizen ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι) in the abstract, is the ideal which was realised in the concrete by the embryo Teutonic community, that *we alone* amongst the Teutonic nations, through all the changes we underwent till 1830, remained faithful to our ancestral type, that *because* we did so we remained a free, and became a great people, and developed the only types upon which political liberty can be combined with the requirements of a great Empire. That since 1830 we have turned our backs upon the principle *through ignorance*, and, *pax vobiscum*, refusing to know anything about our own history or the great principles of which our history is the shell and rind. That this ignorance can only be dispelled by the *comparative* method, by tracing how Germans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen, starting from the same point of departure, landed at such very different points of the political compass, and by exhibiting, for instance, this curious phenomenon, that whilst we are rushing, like a herd of oxen that have trodden into a hornets’ nest, into the meshes of bureaucracy, the Germans in trying to disentangle themselves from these meshes are doing all they can to possess themselves of the forms of self-government that we are discarding.

‘ Now all of this, of course, is profoundly disagreeable to the optimism of Radical so-called thinkers ; it presupposes knowledge which they despise. It requires study which is the last thing people think of nowadays, and it necessitates a very promiscuous attack upon political hobbies of the most opposite kinds. Now all this can only be done with the impelling force of strong conviction behind one, and one’s only hope of doing it properly lies in the goodness of the literary form in which it can all be clothed. With two years before me I do not despair of doing it. If a book like Bryce’s on the Holy Roman Empire made its way, I do not see why a comparative account of the way in which through eighteen centuries the local institutions of the three great branches of the Teutonic (pure and mixed) race came

to be what they are, may not make its way. Freeman's books are, I am told, also becoming popular. Now I think that with time I shall be able to write better than Freeman, and that if he can get people to take an interest in political antiquities for their own sake, I need not despair of getting people interested in them when I show their immediate connection with everyday life.

'Of course it is a great *crux* to me that you seem so much to dislike the historical method. It is certainly opposed to the dialectical method. But then I am convinced that I have some talent for the former, absolutely none for the latter. Therefore to discourage my cultivation of that which is my trade is like telling a shoemaker he ought to make himself a good baker. I know, for instance, you disliked in my land tenure essay in the former Cobden Club series, the historical introduction on the constitution of the Mark. You told me so at the time, and I fancy in my *Prussia and the Vatican* you disliked my beginning with the Peace at Westphalia. Well, that introduction of mine on the constitution of the Mark, was much the most valuable thing in my essay on land tenure. The unconscious comparison which it afforded with the actual land system in India, described in Campbell's essay on Indian tenure in the same volume, turned out to be a very valuable contribution to the *Wissenschaft* on the subject to a man of the calibre of Maine. Well, in their way these were results. Again, in that same essay I called attention to facts connected with mediæval agriculture in England of the greatest importance and interest, which led to a translation into English of a hitherto unknown German book. Yet all this portion of my work you disapproved of. Again, in my papers on *Prussia and the Vatican*, the two first (Treaties of Westphalia and Prussian *Landrecht*) were those which most struck people occupying themselves seriously with the subject. However, whether my method is right or wrong *I cannot adopt another*. I myself have no other means of getting at the knowledge of any subject except embryologically, and I believe that if I have a special literary qualification (which I do not at all say I have), it consists in cracking historical nutshells and

extracting principles and philosophical ideas out of them.

‘The only way I see of satisfying your demands and my own instincts will be, in the work I am preparing, to keep the antiquities in a loose-box of their own, which need not be inspected except by amateurs. My notion is this, to divide it into three parts. The first part would contain a historical sketch answering to Part I. of my present essay, but much more detailed, of the relations between local and central government in Germany, France, and England. The second part would contain this history of *opinions* on the subject. The third part would contain an examination of British legislation on all the points connected with local government since 1830 examined in the light of my doctrine, and would sketch the reforms I propose.

‘I was much obliged for the criticism on *Prussia and the Vatican*. I quite agree as to the disjointedness—but except after immense practice this is, I think, almost inseparable from writing in a magazine from month to month, and without the possibility of reviewing your work as a whole. I shall never attempt this again. I don’t quite understand what you mean by saying I am not sufficiently *impersonal* (unless this applies to the controversial letter with Manning, which was intentionally personal). If it means that my personal bias appears with a certain amount of passion, then I should say that this and the *swing* which you approve of are more or less one and the same thing. Then I do not see how the swing could be kept up equably through whole articles, three-quarters of which were devoted to describing historical details. What I tried to do was to interest the reader by showing him vividly the principles at stake, so that he should have interest enough to read attentively the dry details I had to offer him. And this, I fear, is what my method dooms me to. I want Englishmen to know *facts*, the antecedent facts to the phenomena with which they are trying to deal, and on which they are pretending to have opinions without really knowing anything about them. Now these phenomena cannot be apprehended, rationally or otherwise, than in one of two contexts—either as links in a chain of ideas, *i.e.* a philosophical or meta-

physical context—or as links in a chain of historical development, *i.e.* a historical context. Out of the self-consciousness of time-serving and *Times*-writing Philistines they cannot be rationally evolved. But historical facts about organic laws and the like are very difficult things to make swing. Such merit as my articles on *Prussia and the Vatican* possess, is not in their form, but in their matter. As regards the latter, I believe that the description of the Falk Laws themselves in the fourth article has merit. At least Döllinger after reading it, gave it unstinted praise (of which he is not lavish), and I believe against his own former judgment (for we disagreed on many points) came to the conclusion that my judgment, though severe, was inattackably just, and that no account approaching mine in fairness or in correctly seizing the principles of the legislation and the faults in those principles had appeared in Germany. Now, to modify the opinions of a man of Döllinger's historical calibre, and to put into a new light a subject with which he is intimately acquainted and has unceasingly been occupying himself for three years (and with the inception of which he certainly had to do) was a proof to me of a certain power of judging facts objectively, and I confess it is this appreciation of the *material* portion of my work by experts which gives me a certain confidence about my future performances in the historical arena. It is not by any means seldom that I succeed in putting things before Döllinger in a new light, though, of course, it is he who furnishes me with the materials from which I form my judgment on ecclesiastical questions. But I will write nothing without first reading up the original sources. This learning how to have recourse to the *Quellen* themselves is the enormous benefit I have derived from Döllinger. You probably fancy that I have merely parrot-like repeated what he has crammed me with, but this is not so, *e.g.*, my account of the Council of Constance is entirely my own, done from 'Actenstücke,' and one of the great arguments was my own discovery.

'Again, my essay on Local Government has had to be written absolutely alone and without the possibility from sheer want of time of consulting any of the professors here



(though there are two who would have been invaluable to me), but on giving the proof sheets to read to Professor Holtzendorff (the great historical jurist who lately defended Arnim) he only detected one mistake, and was so struck with my treatment, that he has begged me to write an article on the administrative laws of Great Britain for the new edition of his *Rechtslexikon*.

'I tell you all these things at the risk of appearing immoderately given to blowing my own trumpet, because I do not want you to think that I am merely reproducing undigested scraps of German *Wissenschaft* to a public unable to judge whether they are valuable or valueless, and because I want you to know that in definitely settling down to historical politics I have fair grounds for thinking that my decision is a sound one. Indeed, the mere amount of historical getting-up and honest reading required between August and February, to write my four articles on Prussia and the Vatican, my letter to Manning, and my essay in the Cobden Club series, is a fair proof of my talents, whatever they may be, lying in the historical direction.

'And now enough of all this egotism which I have inundated you with, because you have by your twenty-seven years of never-ceasing indulgence to me given me the right to talk to you about myself. It is pleasant to feel that we both grow more idealist as we grow older. I feel the *Drang* more than ever, but at the same time feel, as I never did before, the necessity of harnessing this *Drang* to some *real* piece of lasting work. I wish I had felt this before. The misfortune is that in proportion as I feel this idealism more puissant within me, the rest of the world seems more and more to be losing it—to be sinking more and more into a ghastly grossness. I believe if we live ten years more, we shall be the only idealists left in the world.

'I have no intention of going to England this year. I could not do so without seeing the officials, and I am so absolutely disgusted with them both in their public and private capacity that I do not wish to risk telling them to their face what I think of them.

'And now, good-bye, old fellow. You cannot complain

of the shortness of this letter. You might complain of the hardness of the writing, but I cannot afford like you to keep a private secretary. Why should a dictated letter be less valuable than one written *ipsa manu*? I am no seller of autographs, and your secretary's handwriting is much more legible than yours! *Semper tuus.*

'P.S.—If in spite of my warning you should, unexpectedly coming across the C.C. volume, read my essay, please do not be frightened, or rather disgusted, at the hard words, but read it carefully through from beginning to end, for only in that way will you be able to see what I am driving at. Bad as the essay is, it has at least this merit, that *one idea* pervades it from the beginning to the end, but it must be read carefully to seize this idea and apprehend its continuity. If from malice prepense you wish to read it, then wait till I send you a copy with the mistakes taken out and the table of contents.'

*Morier to Jowett*

'March 24th, 1875.

'I think I told you in my last letter that I had been reading your *Republic*, and how great a joy it had been to me. There are one or two points which I think you might have made, besides all the excellent ones with which your observations are filled, *e.g.*, there is the very remarkable analogy between the military orders of the Middle Ages (the Knights Templars, the German Orders, etc., etc.), and the military caste in the *Republic*—men living apart in houses separated from the rest of the community, bound by vows of poverty, and with such goods as they have, held in common—living an abstemious and ascetic life, and held up by the one idea of furnishing the most efficient kind of fighting material for an ideal commonwealth. Surely there never was so remarkable an instance of a lay prophecy as that contained in the *Republic*. That the military orders very soon broke loose from their ideal, of course does not injure the prophecy. The idea and *raison d'être* of the Knights Templars fits in so exactly with Plato's that they might have been copied

literally, all but the wives. This analogy must have struck somebody before, but I do not remember ever having seen it, and I cannot but think that you should use it in your next edition. By the way, Döllinger tells me that the latest investigations have entirely whitewashed the Templars from the charges brought against them by Philip le Bel.

‘Then again I think you, being a *doctor ecclesiae*, and standing high up above the dust and turmoil of the lay arena, can very well afford to dare the anger of the Fourth Estate, and castigate it where it deserves castigation. Now the account of the way the Sophists sophise, not so much from *malice prepense*, or from a belief in their sophistries, as from the venal impulse of pandering to the taste of the public by, as it were, precipitating into intellectual crystals the base motives and accommodations by which the Philistine multitude rule their lives and ordain their conduct, the Sophist, as the sounding-board which gives back to the vulgar in a most distinct and articulate manner the tones of its own voice and of what it is pleased to call its thoughts, is so exactly what the Press is nowadays, that I do not think you are justified in omitting to call attention to this analogy. The two or three pages in which the process is described might be applied word for word to *The Times*.

‘Then there is another point, but on this I feel more hesitation in talking, because I know nothing of the subject, metaphysics, as you know, being a *terra incognita* to me, and likely to remain such. I hardly know how to set about saying what I have to say, and shall probably end by writing nonsense, but I cannot help fancying there is a spark of sense somewhere in the notion, if I could only disentangle it. Plato seems to be suffering from a kind of metaphysical nightmare caused by the as yet imperfect assimilation of mathematics into the general body of human knowledge. He sees in mathematics a tremendous force by which his imagination is spell-bound, and which he credits with all manner of supernatural powers. It is a kind of fetish to him. In the world of thought it is not unlike what in the world of nature volcanoes and earthquakes and the like appear to intelligent savages, or better still the apparent movement of the sun and the stars, a divine immeasurable

power full of unknown capacities. He is ready to crown it as the Sovereign Lord over all knowledge and science, and asks impossibilities at its hands as from a God. Well, is it altogether nonsense to say that Darwinism, or rather positive science generally, is playing the same trick to philosophy in the present day? That metaphysicians, or would-be metaphysicians, *i.e.* the class of minds who naturally take to pondering over the why and wherefore of things in general, are, as it were, spell-bound, have their imagination unduly affected by the brilliant rummagings into the depths of physical origin which characterise the latest efforts of physical science? That they are putting up altars to an unknown God whom they credit with all manner of supernatural powers, and from whom they ask all manner of impossible absurdities? Is it nonsense to see in an unduly excited imagination the main cause of this distortion of perspective, of this mistaking of a part for the whole? Is it not true that any very sudden development of human knowledge in any one direction affects the human imagination generally with something analogous to religious ardour, and *pro tanto* affects philosophy, *i.e.* the endeavour to get a view of knowledge as a whole, injuriously, by disturbing the equilibrium of knowledge? I dare say all this is nonsense, only whilst I was reading the *Republic* I chanced to read (for the purpose of going to sleep at night) in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* various speculations of German speculators on the latest results of Darwinism, and it seemed to me as if they were suffering from a positivist nightmare in the kind of way Plato seems to have suffered from a mathematical nightmare.

‘And now to finish up, I have to my great delight discovered a false spelling based on a false etymology!! You spell our old friend the giraffe of the Jardin des Plantes as if he were some monster cross between a camel and a leopard, viz., camel-leopard (*sic*!!) instead of a parded or spotted camel (as a leopard is a parded or spotted lion), *i.e.* *camelopard*.

‘But, alas, this is just the only speck I have been able to detect, and I have looked uncommonly sharp.’

*Jowett to Morier**'March 30th, 1875.*

'Thank you for your two long letters, which were very interesting to me. I am delighted that you have taken to writing, and think that you will succeed in it. When we meet I should like very much to talk over with you the plan of your work; but in writing at a distance one is very liable to be misunderstood, and any criticism may do more harm than good. Do not attempt in politics to make bricks without straw, or imagine that you can call back the English political world of half a century ago. Is not the beginning of politics to take things as they are, holding up ideals at a distance, but not confounding them with the possibilities of actual life? But I am afraid that I shall be clipping your wings if I take away from you any part of the enthusiasm which impels you to write. I quite agree with you in thinking that a book is worth a hundred articles. . . . I most entirely agree with you in your notion of the effect of new discoveries in knowledge, although Plato was not so mad about mathematics as you suppose. . . . Why are you so exasperated against all Ministers and Ministries? I am afraid that you will never get on if you do not assume a more Christian temper. I think as you get older that life is too short to allow a person to indulge all his aversions, and therefore I am disposed to be very charitable, even to Gladstone and Forster, whom I regard as having ruined the Liberal party.'

*Morier to Jowett**'April 10th, 1875.*

'I sent off my essay to you last week, and I hope you have got it by this time. I cannot expect you to have the patience to read it through; but if you read it at all, pray do not omit to read from the bottom of the eighty-sixth page to the end. I think you will see I am not attempting to make bricks without straw. Indeed, my object is just the reverse. I want to show that not only straw is required to make bricks, which seems to me the notion of most political reformers of the present day, but that there is a certain ingredient

called clay which is equally necessary, and I want to show further that this clay is to be got out of the concrete past, and not out of an abstract *a priori* future. However, as you justly remark, it is no use trying to discuss questions of method and the like in letters, as it is impossible to say all one has to say or to make sure of being understood, and therefore I do earnestly hope that you will manage to come out to us this summer. I shall certainly try to run with you to Florence, or, if you come late enough, to Rome, October being an excellent month for the latter. But this must not prevent your coming to stay quietly with us for a fortnight or three weeks. You nowhere reposed so thoroughly, or picked up more than here. "There is a fellow named Buckle," who has written a history of English civilisation, the Tupper of political history, and who is to me in this respect what Herbert Spencer seems to be to you in metaphysics. These potentialised Philistines are very irritating and insulting, but sooner or later the Davids are found, whose pebbles from the brooks smite them down. Is Green's book on Hume a book I could understand, or would it require that I should get up Hegel first, which I won't do. I feel that for the work I have taken in hand it is necessary for me to have some idea of what the English thinkers of the last two centuries thought, and I do not want to get this up from second-rate sources if I can help it. Is there any further good account of Bentham, and for a man who cannot read all Bentham's works, which are those to which he ought to give the preference? J. S. Mill is the man I feel instinctively called upon to attack, and I suspect he has his roots in Bentham.

'Why do I feel so exasperated against Ministries? For the very simple reason that I have to work under their orders. It is very easy for you who live at Oxford and Malvern with a work *of your own* to do, which no Ministry can interfere with, to be "very charitable"! I should like to see how long your charity would last if you were put into State harness, and had to fret your heart out in the hands of an incompetent coachman who, instead of looking which way he had to drive, was for ever listening to what some nervous old woman was screaming out from within the body

of the coach. It is hard that you will not let me vent my spleen when I write to you. Do you suppose I write in the same tone to Lord Derby? As to a Christian spirit making one "get on," that is not my experience of the world. It has always seemed to me on the contrary, that it was the vicious-tempered who got on best. It is those who inspire fear on whom honours are showered. But in my opinion a man should neither *try* to inspire love nor fear. He should love and hate freely according to the nature that is within him, doing his best that his loves and hatreds be according to right reason and not founded on caprice.'

To many beside Jowett he sent copies of the essay, although fully aware that 'it would not be to the taste of the public, still less of Cobden Clubites. But I think it good for people now and then to have a chance of knowing how they came to be what they are, and why they ought to be what they are not. Also to know what they mean by the words *self-government*, *bureaucratic government*, and the like. Also a few general principles are not bad, even if they go dead against the grain of received Liberal doctrinairism.'

<sup>1</sup>

In sending one to Mr. Goschen, he wrote :—

'That I had every intention to provide something practical, and which even you, with your already vast knowledge, might have found serviceable, you will see by the footnote to the first page. But the task was simply impossible. Even *le bon Dieu* took six days (which we are now told represents six millions of billions of years) to produce a very imperfect kosmos out of a very tolerable chaos, and I can most solemnly declare that the chaos of local government actually existing in Germany is much more chaotic than the one dealt with at the creation.

'Unable, therefore, to produce anything useful in the concrete, I turned at the last moment to the abstract side of the question. The result is a very crude and half-digested attempt to put out, or rather lead up to, some ideas which I have long been ruminating over, and which, of course, I consider excellent ideas and those alone capable of leading

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Mallet

to political salvation, and on that account likely to be universally rejected! If you read the essay (which after reading the table of contents I doubt your doing) you will perhaps see the direction I am driving in, and which, with many fig-leaves, is more or less indicated in pages 86 to the end.

' Stated concisely, I want to put the accent of self-government not, as is universally done in England nowadays, on the *right* of electing representatives to do our local work for us and of protecting us against the State, but on the *duty* of our doing our local work ourselves as public or State work, and not private and corporation work. Unless we can educate the cream of our democracy by harnessing them to the public service, I consider we are gone coons; centrifugal forces of society will become too strong for the centrifugal action of the State, and we must in that case either go to pieces or there must be a violent reaction forcing us into the strait-jacket of bureaucracy pure and simple. I would be much obliged if you would give the second copy to Bagehot. I admire his writings more than anybody's, the more so as they form such a delicious contrast to the only mode I can find of attacking a subject! '

And to Mallet on the same subject:—

' If I had had a month more it might at least have been a useful essay to those that have ears to hear. At least I feel sure I have hit a nail which requires to be driven home, and which no one has hitherto cared to hit:—the necessity of going back to the principle of obligatory local service as *public* service which the Crown forces the individuals to undertake as a *duty* correlative to the *rights* which he enjoys as the member of a strong and free State. I want the rich *fainéants* yoked to the public local service whether they will or not. I want the wage-earning classes to be told they have no *rights*, political or otherwise, unless as equivalents for public duties, however humble. The only franchise that can for one moment be defended on rational political principles is the franchise of liability to do the work of the community as perfectly distinct from the right of *talking* about the public work of the community. All



this will, of course, be scoffed at as Utopian. But I mean to say it nevertheless. I have only just hinted at these heterodoxies, and as fortunately the essay itself is simply unreadable in its present form, no one will find them out. . . .'

This essay, only intended as a sketch for a great work on self-government which he hoped some day to bring out, entirely failed to produce any effect in England, though abroad it met with great success. Holtzendorff, the celebrated professor of jurisprudence and editor of the *Encyclopædia of Law* bearing his name, asked permission to have it translated into German and published, when it was warmly commended by Gneist,<sup>1</sup> and elicited great approval from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Bismarck's own organ, and many other journals of high literary standing. But what gratified him most of all was being in consequence elected a member of the Royal Academy of Munich, which in the matter of academies ranked next to that of Berlin. Its former President had been the great chemist Liebig; the President at that time was Döllinger; and Morier's proposer, Professor Roth, was one of the first German authorities on mediæval history and the ground covered in the essay, so that a testimony of this kind to the soundness of his views and the correctness of his historical knowledge was indeed an immense satisfaction. The only other foreigner elected that year was Lord Acton.

Many years later this essay evoked intense enthusiasm amongst the Republicans in Spain, who translated it into Spanish: whilst in Russia, strangely enough, it was taken up by Pobedonostzeff, the great Proctor of the Holy Synod, the modern Torquemada, and greatest reactionary force in the Russian Empire, who caused a Russian version of it to be published.

<sup>1</sup> Heinrich Rudolf Friedrich von Gneist, eminent jurist and writer on constitutional subjects. One of the leaders of the National Liberal party.

## CHAPTER XXX

## THE WAR SCARE OF 1875

IN the beginning of the year 1874 the political situation in Germany presented in many ways an ominous resemblance to that of the opening month of 1870. As then, rumours of an impending conflict once more filled the air, and a very decided war current again troubled the surface of public opinion. Newspapers wrote as if a fresh campaign against France was imminent, whilst military men began speaking openly and confidently of the ensuing spring as the time when the German armies would once more cross the western marches of the empire.

That this war-note should have been first sounded by the inspired Press of Berlin made it patent to any one acquainted with the Press methods and the manufacture of public opinion, as practised in the new Empire, that this feeling was highly artificial and, so to speak, made to order.

'It therefore becomes a matter of no small interest,' noted Morier in February 1874, 'what the motive is which causes this unexpected blast upon the war-trumpet.

'Prince Bismarck's great successes hitherto have been the result of a happy mixture of policy and passion; the two so blended that the passion has always been made to minister to the policy, furnishing the motive power and the impelling force, but never assuming the command or sitting at the helm. Now many thoughtful observers are of opinion that this relation is changed, that unbounded success has disturbed the equilibrium which only an iron will, steadied by the chances of miscarriage, had before maintained, and that the Chancellor's policy is rapidly becoming the handmaid of his passion. Consequently this is the cause assigned for the disquieting phenomena of the last few weeks. The increasing resistance of the Clerical party

to the high-handed measures dealt out to them, the consummate skill with which the leaders of this party know how personally to exasperate their all-powerful enemy, are considered by these persons as sufficient to account for the threat of war, and even, if Europe does not put in her veto, to bring about war. The Gordian knot, they say, has been purposely so entangled that there is no remedy left but the sword. The talisman with which the Chancellor performs his miracles, as Lanfrey says of Napoleon I., is the army. The time has come to use the talisman.

‘For my own part I am inclined to take a different view of the matter.

‘I believe that an adequate cause exists for one of those sensational demonstrations to which the experience of the last few years has unfortunately accustomed us, and this cause has not that I am aware been as yet adverted to, nay, more, has been carefully and designedly kept in the background and left unnoticed.

‘The present situation offers a striking analogy to that presented at the commencement of the eventful year 1870.

‘Then the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, as now the Chancellor of the German Empire, had to meet Parliament with a measure to which he attached a cardinal importance, but with respect to which he had the strongest misgivings that it would not pass in the shape he wished.

‘The measure I allude to is the military constitution of Germany. It seems strange at this time of day, and in the presence of the results obtained during the last few years by the Prussian and German armies, that there should still be an open question in connection with the army; yet so it is, and as regards the great constitutional principle involved in the military constitution, this question is exactly where M. de Bismarck found it when he first took office as Prussian Minister in 1862.

‘The constitutional principle involved in the military constitution is so overlaid, when treated in the German Press and Parliament, with technical details, that it is important to seize its true features in all their simplicity.

‘I just now described the army as Prince Bismarck’s talisman. The principle at stake really is in whose keeping

this talisman shall be placed, in that of the German nation or in that of the German executive. Differing on many questions, Prince Bismarck and the military party have always shown an eager unanimity on this head. To secure the possession of the talisman for the executive, to withdraw from the representatives of the nation the right of voting the blood-tax of the nation, whether in men or money, is an object which as Prussian Minister, as North German Chancellor, and as Imperial Chancellor, M. de Bismarck, Count Bismarck, and Prince Bismarck, has pursued with equal determination, but as yet without success. A fixed sum per head of the men under arms, and a fixed number of men on the peace establishment which involves, as a necessary consequence, the number of men liable to be called out in case of war, determined once for all by a *law*, *i.e.* by a statute which can only be altered by the will of the sovereign, and not by an annual or other periodical vote of the legislature—such is the *rocher de bronze* on which the Chancellor has determined to found the future destinies of the Imperial Crown of Germany.

‘ The Gordian knot of the Prussian conflict on this question was cut through by the Austrian War in 1866.

‘ When, in 1867, the Parliament of the North German Confederation met, Count Bismarck thought that he would have to deal with an assembly so attuned to military glory, and so flushed with recent victories, that he would find no difficulty in passing his pet scheme. Yet, spite the overwhelming ascendancy he possessed over that assembly, and the notorious desire of the majority to act in a spirit of conciliation, he failed in his attempt. The Parliament voted the men and money, but refused to bind the hands of its successor.

‘ The new Parliament was to meet in the summer of 1870. I was enabled to inform Lord Clarendon in April that Count Bismarck was wholly preoccupied with the probable fate which awaited his military constitution in the new Parliament. That assembly seemed likely to meet under very different auspices from those under which its predecessor had met. A general spirit of resistance to the laws had manifested itself throughout the country, and many other

circumstances combined to promise a stormy session. The consolidation of Germany had not progressed as had been expected, and the hoped-for unity seemed as far off as ever.

' Count Bismarck felt, and he said so himself to the person from whom I derived my information, that it would be impossible for him to inaugurate in the North German Confederation a conflict such as that which he had kept up for four years with the Prussian chamber. It was equally impossible for him to run the risk of being beaten on the military question. It would therefore be necessary to try some bold stroke which should fill the public imagination and impress upon Parliament the necessity of not thwarting any of the schemes of the Government. Accordingly, some most remarkable projects, and amongst them the absurdly wild one of a military occupation of Bavaria and Würtemberg on the plea of saving the sovereigns of these kingdoms from an imaginary revolution, occupied the attention of the North German Chancellor. How far the subtle schemes connected with Lothar Bucher's secret mission to Spain in April, by which French vanity was led to overleap itself into the fatal declaration of war of the famous 18th July, were, or were not, connected with the necessities under which Count Bismarck then felt himself of bringing about a foreign complication, is a matter with which future historians will have to occupy themselves. Suffice it to say that the Gordian knot of the military question, as connected with the North German Confederation, was cut through by the French War of 1870.

' The Parliament which came to a close last year was the first Parliament of United Germany. For various reasons the military law was not brought before it until the last year of its existence, and then without any serious intention of the measure being passed. It was almost immediately withdrawn with a view to its reappearance in the new Parliament, but even this was not done without some very angry bickering and very unmistakable signs of temper on the part of the Imperial Chancellor. The Parliament about to assemble is, *par excellence*, the Parliament to deal definitely with the question.

'Now with this history of the military law before us it seems difficult not to come to the conclusion that the late policy of Prince Bismarck has been influenced by the same motives as those which operated so strongly on former occasions. It seems to me, at least, not improbable that the violence and exaggeration thrown into the ecclesiastical conflict, and the efforts made to stigmatise the party of the Centre as a public enemy, and, as it were, to proclaim them political outlaws, have, at least, partly had for their object to prevent a coalition between the Clerical Centre and the Fortschritt's (Progressive) party against the proposed law—these two parties being the most deeply pledged against the principles of the military constitution—as also to concentrate public attention on the ecclesiastical to the exclusion of the military question. Still less does it appear to me open to doubt that the official rattling of swords and braying of trumpets, by which quiet peace-loving folk in this country are at present being so much discomfited, are intended to break the anticipated resistance to measures which all military authorities with one consent, and with the exaggeration characteristic of professional criticism, declare to be essential to the safety of the country.

'It is impossible for me to believe that Prince Bismarck can at the present moment be seriously contemplating an offensive war against France, despite the declaration of one of his inspired organs that France should be attacked before she had completed the reorganisation of her field artillery; but it is quite certain that he is endeavouring to saturate public opinion in Germany, that war is an eventuality which may arise from one day to another.

'When in the yard the watch-dogs bark and strain at their chains, it may be presumed that the owner of the house will look to the priming of his blunderbuss. In the new German Empire the watch-dogs of the Press bark and strain at their chains at the word of command.'

The attitude which, according to Morier, England ought to assume in the face of a conflict between Germany and France he set forth in a memorandum in which he made imaginary friends express his own opinions.

*'April 1, 1874.*

' There are some few men left in Germany with political heads on their shoulders, who still refuse to bow the knee to the chauvinist Baal enthroned at Berlin.

' I chanced a short time ago to come across some of these men, old friends of mine of twenty years standing, who, when I first came to Germany, were filled with bright views of a future in which free and united Germany, in alliance with England, should impose peace on Europe, and inaugurate a golden age of international security, of good-will amongst nations, free trade, and general loving-kindness.

' We had not met since the great events which have in so marvellous a manner brought about the fulfilment of their prophecy that Germany would in our own lifetime become united, and be in a position to impose her will upon her neighbours, and we therefore had much occasion to moralise on the irony of fortune which grants to men what they earnestly pray for, but usually in such a way as to render the gift useless or worse than useless. The united Germany was there, but the young Empire, instead of coming naturally into the world, "was from its mother's womb untimely ripped," bore upon its body stains and scars of "blood and iron," and instead of inaugurating an era of peace, exhibited to mankind "the grappling vigour and rough frown of war."

' It is not, however, on these moralisings that I wish to dwell, but on the observations which fell from them in connection with England's present position in Europe, and especially with the advent of Mr. Disraeli's Cabinet to power. May be that these observations contain an old-world view of things which to modern political ears, in England at least, would probably sound but as the tinkling of some barbarous cymbal; but as they represent a very definite body of continental opinion, they may be not altogether unworthy of attention.

' I found then, that, though without exception belonging to the Liberal shade of politics, my friends considered the late change of ministry in England to be in the highest degree, to use an old-fashioned expression, providential.

On inquiring exactly what they meant, I was answered that the change occurring as it did, at the very critical juncture when the aggressive character of Prince Bismarck's policy was beginning to unveil itself before Europe, it was a providential coincidence that the exact kind of antidote to the poison should have been revealed simultaneously with the appearance in the European body-politic of the first symptom of poisoning.

' To understand the exact train of thought leading to this conclusion, I must give some idea of the point of view from which such men scan the political horizon of Europe.

' International politics, according to this view, ought to be a game of chess, and not one of broken pates and bloody crowns. Exceptional cases might occur like the congenital malformation caused by Austria's presence in Italy, or the dualism of Austria and Prussia in Germany, which could only be remedied by the rough surgery of war. But apart from these, all other questions ought to be capable of solution by moves upon the chessboard. Reckless as were some of the present players, they yet all knew the conditions of the game, and were for instance well aware that a king with two castles was no match for a king with two castles and a queen.

' Now the great curse of European politics at the present day was that though the *peace-lovers* were in a large majority, the *peace-makers* were in a minority. England was the chief offender. What was the use of her Platonic affection for peace if she could never summon up courage to give some solid proof of her love? By her voluntary withdrawal from the chessboard she had deprived the party of international order of their best piece. If there were one verdict respecting which it was certain that posterity would agree, it was this, that England, without commissioning one ship or adding one man to her forces, might have prevented the war of 1870. One word whispered in the ear of Napoleon at the moment when, as every one knows, a straw would have turned the balance, and the scale containing war would have kicked the beam. But because it was not spoken, Napoleon could not retract, for this again is a condition of the game. A king with two castles cannot, if



opposed to a king with two castles, throw up the game, but let the pawn of one adversary make a queen, and then the other *can in all honour* withdraw. A real friend of France would have told her, as such things can be told in the privacy of international intercourse, that a declaration of war on the flimsy pretext of the Ems episode, would find England, and with England a European coalition, arrayed against her, and had this been said, all Bismarck's craftily contrived schemes would have fallen to the ground.

'The war of 1870 was not to remove a congenital malformation, but a match between two champion players, a political duel between two rivals fighting for European preponderance. It was one which all those acquainted with the *dessous des cartes* knew neither duellist would have undertaken had he had to face the chances of a coalition. It is a favourite saying of Prince Bismarck's that he lost five years of his political life by the foolish belief that England was still a great power.

'This *lâche* of England in refusing to face the purely hypothetical case of belligerency at the initiation of the war did not, however, by any means exhaust the indictment of my garrulous friends. They had still more fault to find with our action as a neutral.

'Granted that a duel between two of the great European Powers was unavoidable, the character of that duel was determined by the neutral great Powers whose position ought to involve the office of seconds.

'But for a neutral to exercise *any* influence, his neutrality must be of a kind which shall always allow of the possible perspective of his becoming a belligerent. He must be a piece on the chessboard, not off the chessboard.

'In the days of real duelling, the second stood by the principals with their swords drawn ready at any moment to enforce the rules of fair play with hard blows. To initiate neutral offices by first crying out from all the house-tops that under no circumstances will you be induced to interfere, is to doom those offices beforehand to sterility. Such had been our attitude during the French war. We took an ostentatiously active part as neutrals, and determined to a great extent the action of other neutrals, yet we no less

ostentatiously proclaimed our determination under no circumstances to make good our words.

' Never in the records of history was there a moment when the action of neutrals was so imperatively called for as at the great crisis of Sedan. Then, if ever, was the moment when, if England's love of peace had been more than mere lip service, she ought to have waked up to the consciousness of the part which a great and powerful neutral was called upon to play. France, prostrate and bleeding as she was, would have belied all her past had she yielded to her solitary foe until the last dregs of the bitter cup were drained. Germany, on the other hand, could not make peace alone, and the national sentiment forced her to make demands which only the possibility of seeing fresh combatants appear in the field could have made her desist from. England as an armed neutral, that especial bugbear of the Manchester politicians, mediating with authority, would, therefore, have been a welcome apparition both to French and Germans, and terms of peace could and would have been found far other than those which have poisoned the blood of Europe for generations to come. No serious German politician, so my friends assured me (and the assurance must be taken for what it is worth), but did not at the time yearn to see England play this part, and thus save Germany from the fatal difficulties of her excess of victory. Instead thereof, the England of the Chathams and the Pitts had been content to act the part of a letter-carrier between the belligerents, with what success the world has seen.

' Such, then, is the indictment drawn up by German non-chauvinist Liberals, not so much against the late Government as against the prevalent tone of public opinion in England during the last few years, and their present gratitude to Providence rests mainly on the belief that the late change of ministry means a reaction of public opinion in the sense of a return to the consciousness of what England owes to herself and others as a great Power rich with the inheritance of great traditions.

' The frequent allusions to foreign politics made in his electioneering speeches by Mr. Disraeli, the cheers with which these were received, above all, the golden definition

with which the present Premier has once for all rescued the Queen's foreign affairs from the limbo to which they had been consigned by the shop-keeping class of English politicians, when he described them as England's *home* affairs in *foreign* parts, have induced the belief that the accession of H.M.'s present Ministers will go far to restore the desired equilibrium between the forces of war and the forces of peace, and this brings me to the specially providential coincidence alluded to at the beginning.

'If, observed my friends, Germany had, at the accession of Mr. Disraeli's Ministry, been less strong and France less weak, and the danger of war had come from France, the result would have been a combination extremely disadvantageous for a *rentrée en scène* upon the European stage on the part of a Tory Government. It would have been next to impossible for them to address themselves strongly to France in regard to an undertaking which would have seemed so natural in the eyes of an Englishman as a war of double or quits.

'The quarter from whence the danger threatens being Germany, makes the voice of warning from a Tory Ministry the most natural thing in the world, and England's voice now successfully uplifted against the peace-breaker as, if raised, it must necessarily be, will give her later on, when France has grown strong, the right to speak with similar effect to her.

'It will readily be understood how irritating many of these observations must have been to one who like myself has the honour of being a member of the Cobden Club. Nevertheless, I thought it best not to enter into argument with my friends, but to obtain their views as fully as I could. I contented myself, therefore, with urging upon them to communicate their ideas to Mr. Richards and other influential members of the House of Commons.'

In the course of the summer the rumours of war gradually died away, though the ecclesiastical conflict continued to rage with unabated vigour; the loudly expressed sympathy of the French bishops for their persecuted brethren, and that of Ultramontane governments like Belgium for the German

Catholic party adding fuel to the flame of Prince Bismarck's wrath, while the failure of his efforts to unite the Powers in an international crusade against the Vatican only served still more to exasperate his imperious temperament.

In the spring of 1875, on his return from one of his frequent trips to Alsace, Morier received the following letter from Dr. Geffcken :—

‘STRASBURG, *March 27th*, 1875.

‘ . . . When Bismarck was aware that all his efforts to internationalise his ecclesiastical policy were fruitless, he was for a short time wavering and thinking of throwing Falk overboard and making his peace with the Catholics. It was just at that time before Easter that I talked with a man who sees him much, and who asked me, when I pressed upon him the folly of the present proceedings, how to get out of this *impasse*? I answered this question by a long *exposé* in which I showed that this would be possible without *reculade*, and added three sketches of laws by means of which the matter might be settled. After a month, there came a short answer: “My good intentions were duly appreciated, but gaping wounds could not be healed with sticking-plaster.” The conciliatory phase had passed away, and the Chancellor had resolved to extricate himself from the present complication at home by foreign action; there is to be a great *coup*, and Belgium is the object. I do not say that he is positively bent upon war, because he would be obliged to create a situation where Germany seemed to be the attacked party, and this is not easy, because the cabinets are cautioned, and there is neither a blind French nor a blind Austrian camarilla pushing to war, but he is resolved to annihilate Belgium, which he declares to be the central Government of the political Catholicism, and the heart of coalitional conspiracies. He would easily consent to a partition of that country between Holland and France, and would disinterest the latter so that the French might definitely accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. He speaks contemptuously of England, because it would not be able to give effective military assistance to Belgium. He despises the present Government, but says he would be glad to see Gladstone in power since his Vaticanism. He

fears nothing from Austria ; all his efforts are concentrated on Russia : that was the object of Radowitz's mission,<sup>1</sup> and he will move heaven and earth to win over Gortschakoff and the Emperor during their visit to Berlin. He will tell them that now is the moment for their Eastern plans, and that England, absorbed by the Belgian affair, is unable to oppose an effectual resistance. But he wants to act this summer. Andrassy might be overthrown, the Bavarian elections turn out unfavourable, the Emperor Alexander might die, but above all, supposing that France should refuse the bargain, the French army is not yet organised, whilst it would be much more advanced in a few years. On the contrary, the German army is now as effective as it can possibly be, having its new guns and rifles, so that the chances of a conflict could only become less favourable by waiting. The execution of this plan began with the publication of the Note to Belgium ; the article of the *Post* followed ; then came the second Note. The *Cologne Gazette* declares already that the same century which saw Belgium rise might see it disappear. Bismarck will try to raise the question to the degree of a real conflict.

' I do not know whether your Government is aware how very grave the situation is. I think the Belgian Government is not, for else it would not commit the imprudence of celebrating Dechamps,<sup>2</sup> which is water upon Bismarck's mill.

' You see we may have a pretty hot summer, but we must see what forces can be opposed to this *fou furieux* who wants to stake Germany's future on his blind policy. There is first the Emperor himself, who at his age does not like to risk in a new war what he has won. Bismarck's game is, of course, to push him slowly into a position where war becomes inevitable, and everything should be done to prevent that. Might not your Queen write to him and tell him plainly what Bismarck aims at, and that England can never abandon Belgium ? I cannot conceive the quietist language of your Ministers. But the most important thing is to prevent an understanding of Bismarck's with Russia ; I can scarcely think that Gortschakoff, who disapproves of Bismarck's

<sup>1</sup> To St. Petersburg, in February 1875.

<sup>2</sup> Adolphe Dechamps, b. 1807, Belgian statesman, leader of the Catholic party, d. 1875.

ecclesiastical policy, and has steadily declined to embark in it, can offer the hand to an enterprise which, if it succeeded, would leave Bismarck master in Europe.'

A strong article published in the *Cologne Gazette* on 5th April on the increase of French armaments, followed three days later by a yet more violent one on the same subject in the *Berlin Post*, terminating with the question 'Is war in sight?' together with the abandonment of the Emperor's visit to the King of Italy, produced an enormous sensation throughout Europe, and seemed to confirm the worst apprehensions. Firmly persuaded of the imminence of the peril, Morier now resolved to strain every nerve to try and avert such a catastrophe as another European war. He therefore lost no time in writing strongly and urgently to his Government, pointing out the extreme gravity of the situation; warnings which, owing to the fortuitous circumstance of Lord Derby, whose perfect confidence he possessed, happening to be Foreign Secretary at the time, did not on this occasion, as heretofore, fall upon deaf ears. At the same time, he exerted all his influence in another direction.

The Crown Prince and Princess of Germany passed through Munich on 13th April on their way to Italy, and invited him to breakfast with them at the railway station, which gave him an opportunity of having a long conversation with the Crown Prince.

'The Crown Prince asked me if I had read the article in *The Times* of Saturday on the Belgian question—an article which pointed out in moderate but unequivocal language the risk which Germany would run if she interfered with the internal liberties of her neighbours. I said that I had done so, and the Crown Prince observed that he thought it a very good and opportune article. I replied that it fully deserved the attention which he had bestowed upon it, because it expressed the feeling of general disgust which was daily more and more gaining ground in regard to the action of the German Government. It was not too much to describe the feeling at Munich during the last three or four days as one of panic—the sudden abandonment of the Emperor's journey to Italy, followed by the announce-

ment that the Crown Prince was to go instead of the Emperor, a plan which again was at the last moment abandoned, coupled with the war-blast in the *Post*, and its only partial disavowal in the strictly official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, had fairly taken everybody's breath away, and people were on all sides feverishly asking what next. The Crown Prince said that the same state of alarm prevailed at Berlin, and that, knowing as he did the pacific intentions of the Government, he was at a loss to account for all this hubbub, or to understand the motives which had been at work in these newspaper demonstrations. Prince Bismarck, he added, distinctly denied having instigated the article in the *Post*, to which I observed that the article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* was not only hardly less alarming, but in some respects more so, because by white-marking Austria and Italy, and leaving the form of German Government exclusively fixed regarding France, it seemed like a return to the policy of the *vae victis*! which, on the occasion of the celebrated jet of cold water, had so profoundly moved Europe. The Crown Prince observed that there was no doubt about the enormous armaments in France or about the fact that they were of a nature to place her in a state of immediate readiness for war rather than made in the sense of gradually developing her military power. I replied that this seemed to me perfectly compatible with a sense of providing for her present safety, and in itself no proof that she contemplated an immediate war of revenge, which all those who best knew France declared every statesman and every party felt war for the present impossible. I reminded him of the language of the German Press only fourteen months ago, and of the language admitted to have been officially held by Germany. In every inspired paper the doctrine was preached that France must be attacked before her preparations were completed, and the jet of cold water was nearly the same, they said, in more diplomatic language. I had spent a fortnight in Paris shortly after this episode, and had seen men of all parties with some of whom I was on intimate terms, and from whom, therefore, I obtained statements which I know to be true, and the conviction at which I have arrived was that the

sense of the absolute powerlessness of France in the event of Germany's carrying out her threats was the predominant idea amongst all classes of the initiated. That after such a warning, and after such a further warning as the law lately passed for the organisation of the Landsturm, the first idea of a Government should be to be armed at once against a *coup de main*, seemed to me so clear as hardly to require explanation. If one neighbour took to plying the other with jets of cold water, the least the other could do was to provide himself with a macintosh.

'I then observed to the Crown Prince that it seemed to me as if Germany was hardly conscious of her own strength, or realised the habits which the very strong should impose upon themselves. There was no doubt that at the present, with the tremendous force concentrated in the German army, and the immense prestige of her victories, Germany was on the Continent a giant surrounded by pigmies, Russia, of course, excepted. It was the business of a giant to be good-natured and tractable, above all not to have nervous fits like those of the *Post* and the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine*; a hysterical giant was a terrible neighbour to a company of pigmies. The Crown Prince entirely agreed with me in the immense mischief caused by the Chauvinist wire-pullers of the Press who made a trade of building up mole-hills into mountains. As regarded the history of the Emperor's visit to Italy he told me that the question had for weeks been agitated, and the plans altered and realtered, but the final decision, I gathered, certainly was taken in consequence of Prince Bismarck saying that unless he could come back with a treaty in his pocket (by which I inferred was meant a treaty in the matter of the Pope), he would expose himself to appearing to have gone on a fool's errand, and that there was at present no prospect of concluding such a treaty. As regards the Prince's own journey, the facts were these. He was determined not to be made the instrument of personal discourtesy to the Pope, and he therefore resolved not to meet the King at Rome, as in that case his not paying a visit to the Pope would be a marked act of discourtesy, whilst paying such a visit was impossible under existing circumstances. He telegraphed



to this effect privately to the Crown Prince of Italy, and his telegram was answered officially by the Italian Government to the effect that the King would not receive him anywhere but at Rome. I think I could perceive that this had created some soreness.

'I then asked the Crown Prince whether, considering the very reassuring nature of his observations to me, I might confidentially make use of them. My French colleague, M. Lefebvre de Béhaine, whom the Crown Prince had known for many years at Berlin, was a perfectly loyal and entirely discreet person, and I thought that considering the really dangerous nature of the prevailing panic, and the absurdity of the rumours in the air, a really useful service would be performed if I could tell him confidentially, for communication to his Government, that the impression left on the mind of a person with whom the Crown Prince had conversed in passing through Munich was of a distinctly reassuring kind. The Crown Prince gladly and emphatically assented to my proposal. I accordingly spoke confidentially to M. de Lefebvre in that sense.'<sup>1</sup>

At this interview the Crown Prince told Morier that he was going to hurry back from Italy in order to be present in Berlin during the visit of the Emperor of Russia, on account of the necessity of showing at that particular moment on what good terms Germany was with her one ally, Russia.

Stockmar wrote in very much the same sense as Geflicken, and being 'accurate and cautious to an excess, a minimiser and not a maximiser,' his words carried even greater weight than those of the latter, who continued to urge Morier to spare no efforts in the cause of peace, telling him that he was sure that Bismarck had not yet given up his game. On 4th May he wrote that Belgium would for the moment be thrown into the background, and that the great question for Bismarck was to convince the Emperor Alexander and Gortschakoff that France was planning a great *coup*, and that he maintained that the French had increased their active army by more than 140,000 men.

<sup>1</sup> See *Dernières années de l'Ambassade en Allemagne de M. de Gontaut-Biron*, p. 84.

'If he succeeds in winning over the Russians,' he continued, 'he will act immediately, and ask categorically in Paris, what signify the hastened armaments? I am convinced that all this is a sham, and that Bismarck puts all this forward because he wants an outlet from his internal difficulties; but it is nevertheless a given theme, and he has won over not only Moltke, but, I am afraid, also the Crown Prince, who is expressly coming back from Italy for the interview, and if Bismarck succeeds, will return to Italy and establish a conformity of action between the Roman Cabinet and the northern Powers.

'I think now you have to concentrate your efforts on two points: firstly, to counteract those of Bismarck in convincing the Russians that France does not want war, but that Bismarck wants it as an outlet. . . . Gortschakoff, I am assured, wants peace, and is jealous of Bismarck's position, which would become omnipotent if he succeeded in crushing France a second time and partitioning Belgium.'

This, Geffcken went on to point out, might be accomplished through Lord Derby's approaching Count Schouvaloff,<sup>1</sup> who enjoyed the absolute confidence of the Emperor Alexander ('he is his heart, whilst Gortschakoff is only his head'), and who 'an intelligent and honest man, sincerely wishes that Europe should be at rest, and is convinced that Russia and England must unite their efforts to that effect.'

Secondly, Geffcken pressed Morier to see the Crown Prince, 'and convince him that Bismarck is leading him into a snare; you must do everything to see him on his way from Italy to Berlin. When he returns thence it may be too late.'

Morier accordingly went to Innsbruck on 8th May to meet the Crown Prince on his return journey, and travelled back with him to Munich, thereby obtaining a four hours' uninterrupted conversation with him alone.

'The Crown Prince began by asking me to give him my impressions of the state of the ecclesiastical conflict. He thanked me for having sent him a copy of the article by an Italian statesman in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which he had

<sup>1</sup> Count Peter Schouvaloff, Russian Ambassador in London.

not previously seen, and had been much struck by it, and considered that the arguments it contained were irrefutable. I said that the central argument of that article, viz., the impossibility of affixing political responsibility for the exercise of spiritual power applied to the entire conflict, and that the not recognising this important principle seemed to me to be the cause of all the errors into which the German Cabinet had of late fallen. It lay at the root of their attempt to internationalise the conflict, as well as in their attempt to coerce Belgium. There could be no doubt that the former attempt had considerably alarmed the parties concerned. The state of things existing in Prussia was not of a kind to tempt other nations to follow her example, and the impression produced upon Europe by Prince Bismarck's internationalising policy reminded one of the old fable of the fox that had lost his tail, with one important difference, however. In the received version the fox collected his brother foxes to an academic discussion on the abstract advantages of taillessness, but he took the greatest precautions to hide his own misfortune from the sight of his audience. In the present case the mutilated stump was cynically brandished in the face of the company, and mutilation was insisted on upon the plea of international comity. The Crown Prince was anxious to learn whether I could propose a feasible way out of the present deadlock. I replied that the conflict having become a personal one between two such obstinate and hard-headed individuals as Pope Pio and Prince Bismarck, I could see no end of it until one or the other was removed from the scene. He asked me how I thought the death of the Pope would end the conflict unless the next Pope could clear himself from Jesuit influences and break with the traditions of his predecessor. Minghetti had told him that in all probability the next conclave would elect some broken-down old cardinal whose business it would be to tide over the next few years, leaving all things *in statu quo*. I replied that it was not from the new Pope that I expected change, but that it was the opportunity which the death of Pio ix. would give to Germany of altering her course, and steering in the direction of peace, and I urged upon the Crown Prince the imperative necessity,

should this fortunate circumstance occur, of not letting it go by unused.

'The Crown Prince then made a very curious remark : he said that though the conflict pained him, and the violence which had been used against the bishops appeared to him a grievous mistake, yet there was one sense in which he could not but look upon the intensifying of the conflict as advantageous to himself, and he added that this was the light in which Prince Bismarck invariably argued in favour of each repeated blow aimed at the hierarchy. It was, namely, the extreme desirableness of the conflict being brought one way or another to a definitive close during his father's lifetime so that he might not inherit it, and have smooth waters to begin his reign in. I said that this would be a good argument if the intensifying of the conflict were synonymous with the bringing it nearer to its close ; but that as I believed the reverse, and that every new blow only made the compromise more difficult, I could hardly admit its validity. The Prince then asked me to give him an *exposé* of my views upon the Falk Laws, which I did in great detail. He was very desirous to know Döllinger's views on the subject. I told him that as to the main principles of the laws we entirely agreed, but that when they first came out I warned him, knowing the temper of the Prussian bureaucracy, that the manner of their execution would bring about an irreconcilable conflict, debase public opinion, and degrade the Liberal party by infecting them with the lust of persecution and intolerance. The great protesting prelate had not at the time shared my way of thinking. He had refused either to credit the Prussian bureaucracy with the innate love of persecution which I knew them to possess, or his own brother prelates with the constancy which they have since displayed ; he thought a little vexation would do them good, and made a curious quotation from the Vulgate text of Ecclesiastes : "*Vexatio dabit intellectum.*" He had, however, since, entirely come round to my view, and considered that the systematic imprisonment of the bishops, and the petty cruelties carried out in detail, had destroyed all hope of carrying out the principles of the legislation to a satisfactory conclusion, and when I went to Berlin last year

he begged me to take an opportunity of stating that such were his views to Radowitz and other of his friends.

'The conversation then changed to the Prince's doings in Italy. He told me that his visit to the King at Naples had been entirely of his own devising, and I inferred that his object was one solely of political courtesy, having for its object to do away with the soreness which had been caused by the postponement of the Emperor's visit and his own refusal to go to Rome. The only thing of interest which he told me of his conversations with the King was the latter's extreme rage at his son-in-law, Prince Napoleon. . . . Nevertheless he had put a veto upon their intended separation. The Prince wished the Princess to go to Paris to open a salon for all the communards, which she absolutely refused to do, and his whole aim now was to found a Red Empire and to crush the Imperial Prince.

'The conversation next turned to the question of all-absorbing interest—that of peace or war. I told the Prince that I had availed myself of his permission to pour oil upon the waters, and that for ten days after he had passed through Munich there had been undoubtedly a complete lull. Within the last few days, however, I had received, from quarters exceptionally well-informed, intelligence of the most alarming kind, and I proceeded to give him the substance of the various letters I had received. But I added that the fears I described were not confined to these persons I could prove by a letter I had received that morning from Henry Reeve, who described the extreme state of anxiety prevalent in diplomatic circles in London, which letter I proceeded to read to him. He seemed very much perturbed at my view of the gravity of the danger, and the impression made upon me was that during his stay in Italy he had not been kept informed of any of the later phases of Prince Bismarck's political "Night Thoughts." There was a good deal of desultory talk on both sides as to the possible combinations under which a war could be brought about. Every word he said proved to me how hateful the notion of war was to him; but he returned again and again to the immense and sudden preparations which were undoubtedly being made in France, which I met with the same arguments that

I had done before, only much more fully. I said that I had gone to France myself last year, shortly after the jet of cold water, solely for the purpose of finding out the truth. I had exceptional opportunities of doing so, as some of my nearest relations were Frenchmen in high military and naval positions, and I was also on intimate terms with personages belonging to all parties, in every one of whom I found the same feeling predominant: a sense of abject helplessness and of impotence *vis-à-vis* of Germany. Whatever faults Frenchmen might have, it could not be doubted that they understood politics, and that they knew about military affairs. In regard to the first they found themselves since the jet of cold water face to face with the monstrous doctrine, announced with all the cynicism of which Prince Bismarck was so great a master, that where there was a presumption that a *casus belli* might arise when a State had grown strong enough to risk war, that State might be attacked by the overwhelming forces of its neighbour to prevent the *casus belli* from arising. This, I said, was the result which Prince Bismarck had obtained by his jet of cold water. Every Frenchman felt that he must spend his last farthing to place the country in a state to resist any sudden *coup de main*, consequently the armaments might be all they were described to be by the German military authorities. I maintained that it was the mere craze of a diseased imagination to consider them as otherwise than defensive.

‘ Secondly, as regards their knowledge of military matters, what Germans did not seem to me to appreciate was the professional knowledge which enabled all ranks in France to understand fully to what extent they had been beaten.

‘ The Prince then said that the worst of the situation was that his dear, good friend Moltke, whom he considered the highest military genius in existence, was absolutely destitute of political ideas; that such arguments as I had used would be wholly lost upon him, and that having made up his mind that France was not sufficiently beaten, and that she was recovering more rapidly than could have been supposed, [he] did not cease from urging the necessity of a fresh war. If that is so, I said, then the whole extent of the danger becomes

clearly manifest. Bismarck wants a war to get out of his internal difficulties, Moltke and the military party require it on scientific principles. The combination is a most alarming one, and nothing can help us but the Emperor and Your Imperial Highness.

‘I then appealed to him in the strongest terms I could, and reminded him of the conversations I had had with him: one in 1868, after his visit to Italy, in which he recounted to me a conversation he had had with Prince Napoleon which had ended in their solemnly pledging themselves to each other to do all in their power to prevent a war between France and Germany, as such a war would throw back the civilisation of Europe for a century; and again, one I had at Speyer in 1870, the day before he crossed the French frontier, in which he had said that he believed that if the Germans were successful they would annex Alsace, and that he dreaded such a result as being certain to poison the relations between France and Germany for generations to come. I reminded him that he had taken every opportunity to accentuate his love of peace, and that Europe in consequence looked upon him personally as their only barrier against the growing Chauvinism of Germany. In a word I used the advantage which my fifteen years’ intimacy with the Crown Prince, and the frequent occasions on which he had stated his views to me, gave me, to point out the disastrous consequences to Germany, and consequently to his own future, which would result from the practical application of the doctrines of the jet of cold water. And from the way in which my appeal was met, I am firmly persuaded that whatever plans of a warlike sort may have been brewing at Berlin, the Crown Prince is wholly strange to them.

‘Geffcken thinks he has reason to believe that Moltke and the Crown Prince had been won over. It is plain that the former has, equally plain to me that the latter has not, though it is certain the French armaments have been studiously represented to him in the most alarming light of which they are capable. It may naturally be objected that if he was initiated into the secret, it would not be likely that he would initiate me—which is quite true—but then knowing

him as well as I do, I am certain that if such had been the case he would never have allowed me to take him on to the ground that I did, but would have taken care to change the conversation long before I got to it. I am convinced therefore, not only that he knows nothing of the plot, if there is one, but that he will use his best exertions in favour of peace should it really be threatened. He urged, it is true, that both the Emperor and himself were powerless before Bismarck, but I urged in reply that this might be so where the whole nation were clearly on the side of Bismarck, which would certainly not be the case in an aggressive war against France. We then exchanged a few words about Belgium. The Crown Prince said that the Ultramontane intrigues carried on thence were almost past bearing. I observed that I did not doubt this for a moment. But still it would not do not to bear them. Few things to some thin-skinned persons exceeded the irritation caused by a flea-bite, yet it was impossible to conceive the irritation intensified to such an extent as would justify the shooting the man who owned the dog who owned the fleas.'

On his return home from Innsbruck, Morier found awaiting him *The Times* of 6th May, containing the well-known article,<sup>1</sup> which was to cause a panic from one end of Europe to the other. It came so opportunely to clench his arguments and to prove that he had not been indulging in personal fancies, that he at once forwarded it to the Crown Prince with the following letter <sup>2</sup> :—

'SIR,—On returning home last night I found *The Times* of Thursday, which had arrived during my absence. It contains a remarkable letter from Paris, and a remarkable leading article, both of them upon the subject upon which I ventured to speak to Your Imperial Highness in the train yesterday; and as they confirm in a truly extraordinary manner the anxiety which I described to Your Imperial Highness as prevalent amongst well-informed persons more or less behind the scenes, I take the liberty of enclosing them

<sup>1</sup> Article by Blowitz the well-known Paris *Times* correspondent, calling attention to the danger and imminence of war.

<sup>2</sup> From the original draft.



in case they should have escaped the attention of Your Imperial Highness.

'The point of special importance appears to me to be that this note of alarm, now apparently sounded from Paris, is one which has reached me at least three weeks ago from purely German sources of Berlin, and therefore that the alarm caused in France is merely the smoke of a fire kindled in Germany, whatever the purpose and object may be, instead of being a *French scare*, as described by *The Times*, or a mere result of diseased French imagination, the alarm is directly caused by some official person or persons in Berlin, who either know that there is an intention on the part of Germany to attack France on the simple ground that she is now comparatively weak, or who for some ultimate object desire that this idea should get about. In either case we stand face to face with a fact of such portentous and calamitous importance to the future of Europe, and I may say of human civilisation generally that I confess that my heart sinks within me when I contemplate it, and that I recall at least twenty times a day Your Imperial Highness's golden words to me in 1868, that a war between France and Germany would be throwing civilisation back for an entire century, and that you would use all your efforts to prevent so dire a calamity. I never dreamt then that if the catastrophe did take place the danger to civilisation would, within three years after conclusion of peace, be directly traceable to Germany's having learnt and exaggerated the besetting vice of the people she had conquered. For there is no denying that the malady under which Europe is at present suffering is caused by German Chauvinism, a new and far more formidable type of the disease than the French, because instead of being spasmodical and undisciplined, it is methodical, calculating, cold-blooded and self-contained.

'As yet the perception of this fact is only beginning to break upon the consciousness of Europe, so persistently have the friends of Germany, and as Your Imperial Highness well knows, myself amongst the number, argued and insisted that the unity of Germany once established, Europe would have Chauvinism crushed out of it, or at least a

lasting bulwark erected against its further encroachment. But if any open and public act should take place which should officially placard this Chauvinism in the face of Europe; should the doctrine of the jet of cold water, such as is openly preached in the organs of the Press Bureau, the doctrine namely, that prospective and hypothetical and abstract danger, as distinct from any immediate, palpable, real, and concrete danger, is a sufficient reason for the stronger neighbour attacking the weaker, and for establishing a *casus belli*; should such a doctrine, I say, embody itself in any tangible and official act, such as a summons to disarm addressed to France at the present moment, then I in my turn venture to prophesy that neither in Your Imperial Highness's life-time nor mine will Germany recover the stain which such a return to unalloyed *Faustrecht* will impress upon her humanity.

'An individual may, under the dæmonic impulse of super-human cynicism, laugh to scorn the opinion and conscience of contemporary mankind, and still more of posterity. I can conceive an Attila chuckling even on the brink of the grave at the thought of living in the memory of future generations as a *Gottes Geissel* (Scourge of God); but a nation cannot afford to enjoy the luxury of cynicism, cannot risk to place itself outside the pale of the opinions of mankind, because a nation never dies, and the conscience of mankind never dies, and when the orgies of successful force have spent their strength, the day comes when it has to live not with its own recollections, but with those which mankind have preserved of it. It was the living, not the dead Cain that was branded as the murderer of his brother.

'We have all been brought up in a concentrated hatred of the memory of the first Napoleon, and of the evils which his military omnipotence inflicted upon Europe, but I venture to say that if Germany were now to attack and crush France upon any pretext whatever, an even greater degree of hatred would gather round her name in the history of the future. For in regard to Napoleon there was a certain chaotic state of Europe, a stream of revolutionary forces let loose, the drunkenness of an entire nation intoxicated with *gloire*, which though they do not extenuate his conduct,

yet allow of palliatives being found by those who desire to seek them. But none of these circumstances exist in the present case. Nobody credits Germans with the madness of *gloire*, for no nation has so persistently preached against this vice. The action of Germany, therefore, in the case supposed, would be stamped with a pedantic ferocity, a scientific cynicism, an academic cruelty, which history would never forget, and mankind would take a long time to forgive. To plunge Europe into a new war to rectify mistakes of calculation made in the negotiations for the late peace and to satisfy the scientific conscience of military professors would be an outrage upon the international humanity of mankind, the like of which history has never seen. All this holds good whatever the amount of the French armaments at the present day may be. They are doubtless foolishly exaggerated (though whatever they may be they cannot add such a reserve of strength to the French army as the Landsturm grants added to the German army), but they are the armaments of *despair*, the armaments of a people *qui a la mort dans l'âme*, they are in a word the direct result of the policy of the jet of cold water, of France having been told by Germany in so many words that she would choose her own time for attacking, and not wait till the latter had finished her preparations. I never understood this more clearly than I did after my conversation with Your Imperial Highness, because it explained to me what a well-informed Frenchman said to me some time ago. I was arguing against the absurdity of France pushing on her armaments instead of giving a gradual military education to the people, to which he replied : " These armaments are the last resource of a drowning man. *We know* that the military authorities of Germany, not excepting the highest Prussian authority, do not cease from urging the necessity of a new war to correct the shortcomings of the last, and have laid it down as an unanswerable axiom that a new war with us is necessary before we have regained our normal condition, and we know that aims of this kind always shape themselves in Prussia into blood and iron, and once started, are always worked out to their bitter consequences. We must, therefore, be ready against a *coup de*

*main*. We know that no preparation we can make can secure us victory, but we must at least be able to die with dignity."

'I am not talking at random when I say that the prevalent feeling in every Frenchman connected with affairs, of whatever party he may be, is one of the most intense sense of helplessness and impotence. I was some weeks in France solely to come to a right conclusion on the subject. I had exceptional means of knowing, because some of my nearest relations are Frenchmen, men holding high places in the army and navy, whose perfect honour and veracity I can absolutely depend upon, and I saw not them only but men of all parties, and I was more astonished than I can tell at the depths of discouragement I everywhere stumbled upon. They were exaggerated in this as in everything else. That any one acquainted with the real facts can believe that France has ideas of offensive war, and is taking her measures in any other than a defensive sense, seems to me simply incredible.

'Hence the real danger to peace lies: Firstly, in the doctrine of the military professors who declare *a priori*, that a war is necessary on abstract principles of science. Secondly, the possible necessities of some statesmen who see in a foreign war the only way of getting out of internal difficulties.

'How are these difficulties to be met? I have thought all night of nothing else, and I have come to the conclusion that the line of action to take by those who have the interests of peace thoroughly at heart, would be to accept the reputed armaments of France as something to be guarded against, and not to attempt to argue against the fact of these armaments or their supposed meaning. But, on the other hand, to protest strongly against the disastrous measure of calling France directly to account for them, which would be tantamount to war and would inaugurate a new principle in international relations against which the whole world would lift up its voice, and to propose instead a fresh accentuation of the *Drei-Kaiser Bündnis* in the sense of a league solely for the maintenance of European peace.

'This would satisfy the conscience of those who really

believed there was danger in the French armaments, and would effectually *contre-carrier* the plans of those who wish war for their own ulterior purposes.

'I have to crave Your Imperial Highness's indulgence and pardon for having ventured to write thus at length to you, but Your Imperial Highness knows how deeply I have the cause of Germany at heart, how deep is the interest I have taken now for eighteen years in all that appertains to Your Imperial Highness and to Her Imperial Highness, the Crown Princess, and you will therefore understand how entirely I am preoccupied with the present crisis, for if the Chauvinism I have described should really succeed in coming *zum Durchbruch*, whether it were crowned with immediate success or not, I should consider the future of Germany blighted for at the least the whole of our respective life-times.'

From the manner in which they parted, Morier could not but feel that he had made a very strong impression upon the Crown Prince. 'He knows I tell him the truth, and he thoroughly trusts me. His last words to me were, "Remember, I keep all you write to me amongst my most secret and my most precious archives. You cannot write too much to me."'

As to the prevailing impression that the Crown Prince was now under Bismarck's influence, Morier considered that 'he had been got round to Bismarck's premises that France was getting dangerous and Belgium insupportable, but I am convinced that he never was got round to the conclusion that therefore the former must be attacked and the latter extinguished. The Crown Prince may any day, and must in a comparatively short time, become, as German Emperor, the most important person in Europe. Whether Bismarck lives or dies, the fate of Germany, and with it the fortunes of Europe must, as far as they depend on one man, be directly affected by the purchase Bismarck gets over him.'

To compass this end Morier was convinced that 'the means used by Bismarck had been to flatter the Crown Prince with the belief that he would do all in his power to



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carry out his views with regard to the ultimate internal organisation of Germany. What these views exactly are, and whether they have shaped themselves into a definite form, I cannot tell, but my own conviction is that even if he has never said so to himself in so many words, they all tend in the direction of a change from the status of President of a Confederation, which, under the title of Emperor, the head-man of Germany really is, to that of a *bona-fide* Sovereign. Unless my diagnosis is altogether wrong, that which is real gall and bitterness to him is the feeling that these Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, etc., who have to dance to Bismarck's fiddle, are, as regards himself, his present superiors and his future peers.

He certainly does not love Bismarck, nor has he forgiven all the *couleuvres* which the great man has made him and the Crown Princess swallow, and in the main he distrusts him, but I nevertheless believe that on the whole he is inclined to be led by him. It is clear that Bismarck is using all his immense gifts of cajolery to get round him and the Crown Princess, and that as far as *seeing* things goes, he sees them to a great extent through the spectacles Bismarck has fastened on his nose: further, that Bismarck takes good care not to let him even guess where he is driving to, but that each several step he takes he represents to him as forced to take in the interests of his future position. This came out curiously in his statement that, much as he disapproved of the Church conflict, he was glad of its being hastened on by more and more violent steps in order that it should be over before he came to the throne! Under these circumstances, perhaps, it could hardly be otherwise. He feels himself absolutely alone, with no one to lean upon or to trust. He has no confidence in himself, and is getting more or less in the demoralised state all people get into who wait for dead men's shoes. He feels the hour is coming nearer and nearer when he will have to step into those shoes and take a line of his own, and he is flattered by the assiduous attentions of the great man, though he knows he is but clay in his hands.

'This is the shadow side of the picture. The bright side consists in his honest horror of war, in his disgust at



the Chauvinism which he sees rampant about him, and in his hearty readiness to see things in their right light when they are put before him.'

Very shortly after the despatch of his letter, Morier had the gratification of receiving a most reassuring answer direct from the Crown Prince, Lord Derby at the same time informing him that though the crisis had been real and serious, he thought that unless matters went unexpectedly wrong, the danger was over.

'Peace is secured,' wrote Geffcken on 15th May, 'already since his return from Wiesbaden the Emperor (William) spoke decidedly in the sense of peace; there must have been strong influences to bring him to the positive declaration that he would not hear of war. But the most important was that England and Russia arrived at an understanding there should be no war; Lord Derby and Schouvaloff have both acted with a decisiveness which left no room for a doubt that every attempt to separate them would fail. As soon as Bismarck saw this, he felt obliged to give in, and the world was startled by the article in the *Nord-deutsche*, that it was all the fault of the Press, if any uneasiness about war had prevailed.'

In a subsequent<sup>1</sup> letter Geffcken gave Morier further details about development of the crisis.

'The Grand Duchess of Baden,' he told him, 'directed in Wiesbaden the attention of the Emperor to the war noise of the Press. He was very angry about it, and came back to Berlin resolved to put a stop to it. The next day Schouvaloff arrived and dined alone with their Majesties. He told them frankly that he thought the situation was very critical, *et qu'il avait trouvé le monde politique et financier à Berlin dans un véritable émoi*. The Emperor looked exceedingly grave and the next morning summoned a council of Ministers, which he very rarely does, and told them that he was very dissatisfied with the warlike rumours propagated by the Press, that there was not the slightest real foundation for the noise, and that he was firmly resolved to maintain

<sup>1</sup> 24th May.

peace. He spoke so decisively that Bismarck at once saw nothing remained but to submit, so he at once wheeled round and told the Emperor the war rumours were brought up by the Bourse and the Ultramontanes. The Emperor at first received this explanation with diffidence, but finally has been persuaded by Bismarck that it was so, and Bismarck succeeded likewise in making the Emperor Alexander believe this fable. He had even the audacity to maintain it in conversation with Gortschakoff, who feigned to accept it, but told him plainly that Europe would not suffer an unjust aggression of Germany against France, and that it was not in the interests of Russia to see the position of France as a great power more lowered. . . . In fact the Russians found nothing to do on their arrival, because the Emperor William said at once that there was no question of war, but as this was not known, Gortschakoff availed himself of the opportunity to proclaim himself as the peacemaker.'

This information corroborated what the Crown Prince had told Morier on 13th May in a conversation of which the latter made the following notes :—

1. 'H.I.H. thanked me very warmly for my letter and its enclosures, and said they had been very welcome.

2. 'The Emperor William on his return to Berlin from Wiesbaden had been quite as much astonished at the war fever as he himself would have been, had he not had his previous conversation with me. He asked Bismarck what it all meant. Bismarck said it was Moltke. Emperor much displeased with Moltke. Bismarck very abusive of Moltke. By common consent Moltke should on this occasion be made the scapegoat.

3. 'Bismarck had assured him that though the original source of the mischief was Moltke's *idée fixe* of renewing the war, which he could not keep to himself, the really efficient cause of all the hubbub was Bourse speculations of Decazes, and that he had positive evidence that *The Times* had been bribed by a large sum to admit the French correspondent's letters, which had been dictated by Decazes for the purpose of an operation *à la baisse*, of which he and

Count H. were to share the profits. To which I observed (1) that it was well known that it did not pay *The Times* to take bribes; (2) that, as I had heard a fortnight previously, direct from Berlin, the same version as that of *The Times* (N.B. with the same three arch-conspirators named, viz., H.I.H., Bismarck, and Moltke), this story appeared to me a little too loosely got up.

4. 'The Crown Prince observed that he did not believe there had ever been two Emperors more truthful than his father and the Emperor Alexander, and there could be no doubt that no two men were more determined on peace than they were. It seemed, therefore, passing strange that the air should persistently remain thick with war rumours. To which I replied it might possibly be accounted for by the fact that no two Emperors had ever before been supplemented by two Chancellors more inordinately given to . . . occasionally disguising their thoughts (I may possibly have expressed myself more concisely).

5. 'The first thing the Emperor Alexander told the Crown Prince on seeing him, was that he had just received a telegram from Schouvaloff saying that nothing could be more satisfactory than the attitude of H.M. Government.

6. 'The Emperor had also told him that there was nothing in the relations between Russia and Great Britain which ought to cause disquiet. Russia had no wish to do anything which could interfere with our Indian Empire, and desired the maintenance of a strictly neutral zone. Even if the question of Merv had to be mooted, there was nothing to prevent the finding of a *modus vivendi*.

7. 'H.I.H. believed that nothing immediate would be done in regard to Belgium, and that no violent measures were in contemplation; but neither on the other hand did he think that the question would be allowed to go to sleep. He thought the intention was to oust the present Ultramontane Ministry, and endeavour to get it replaced by a Liberal one—which he thought a mistake—as in many ways he thought an Ultramontane one more easily dealt with than a Liberal one. I adduced many excellent arguments to prove how sound was this conviction.'

Peace was assured. For once Bismarck had been completely defeated, and nothing remained to him but to make good his retreat. Having, to the Emperor William, put all the blame upon Moltke, and persuaded the Crown Prince that the origin of the scare was a Bourse speculation, he now deplored to Lord Odo Russell<sup>1</sup> that the Berlin Press was in the hands of the Jesuits, and that he had no control over it! And when the latter was instructed strongly to support the Russian peace demonstration in the Wilhelmstrasse, received him most kindly and gratefully.

'Good offices, support, sympathy in his efforts to keep the peace, was just what he longed for; our demonstrations against French armaments most welcome to him, and so he was happy at last to see Russia and England united in peace to Germany. But,' so Lord Odo<sup>2</sup> warned Morier, 'behind our backs Bismarck raves like a maniac, and swears he will take his revenge.'

No sooner had, thirteen years later, the grave closed over the Emperor Frederick than the bitter attacks upon Morier, then Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who was accused in a virulent Press campaign of having furnished Marshal Bazaine with information as to the movements of the German armies in 1870, and the imprisonment and trial of Geffcken, on the charge of high treason, for publishing the Emperor Frederick's diary—a charge he was acquitted of by the Leipzig Tribunal—proved how well aware the Iron Chancellor had been all the while of the identity of those by whom his plans had been foiled, and that he had neither forgiven nor forgotten.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Odo Russell to Morier, 15th May 1875.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix B.

## CHAPTER XXXI

## CONCLUSION

ONE of the most notable features of the crisis from which Europe had just triumphantly emerged had been the persistent attempts on the part of the German Government to sow distrust between England and Russia. Constant warnings from Bismarck had reached the British Cabinet as to the alleged feeling of hostility to England which existed in the minds of the Russian Government, though nothing from Russia in any ways confirmed this view; the language there held was most friendly, and it was thought at St. Petersburg that the strongest anti-English influences at work were those which proceeded from Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

'As regards Bismarck's possible motives,' so Morier had written in April 1875, 'in endeavouring to raise our suspicions, there is undoubtedly a great deal in the theory of his never allowing any two Governments to be on friendly terms if he can help it, but I think this is not so incompatible with a more definite and distinct motive in the present case.

'We must never forget that not only Bismarck (though of course it applies to him in the most intensified form), but the whole of what might be described as the *Schola Theologiæ* of Prussian politicians never cease from working out political combinations and problems only soluble in the last instance by "blood and iron." That this perpetual occupation should result in the formation of certain theories about the proper solution of the problems, is only natural. We all know the way in which cliques of chess-players get absorbed in this or that theory of attacking or defending a gambit. Now, from the various indications I have had, I am strongly inclined to believe that in the great problem

<sup>1</sup> Lord Derby to Morier, 19th April 1875.

of Germany's relations to Russia a theory of this kind has gradually worn a groove for itself.

' That we, with our dislike for new combinations and our tenacity for old traditions, should think an Anglo-Russian alliance an improbable combination, is quite natural, but I do not think it would appear in this light to Bismarck, for he would naturally credit us with being likely to follow what he himself would consider, under given circumstances, to be the right policy. I think, he says to himself, when the Eastern crash comes, England will have to take some supreme resolution in order to maintain her hold upon India. Under these circumstances the *maintenance of her communications* will be the object before which all others will pale into insignificance ; in other words, the securing of an exclusive control over Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the valley of the Euphrates. The Powers whose opposition she must fear in her efforts to compass this end are France and Russia —France because of her pretensions to make a French lake of the Mediterranean ; Russia because of her rivalry with us in the Far East. Will England try to gain her object by beating down these Powers *vi et armis* or by co-operating with them ? It lies in the nature of things that this is a question which the *Schola* must constantly be asking and hypothetically answering. Supposing the crash comes under the form in which it has since the French war presented itself to the German imagination, viz., that of a coalition between France and Russia, France to recover Alsace-Lorraine, Russia to get on to the Lower Danube and secure Constantinople, England will have a choice of policies forced upon her, from which, with the best will in the world, she will be unable to withdraw herself: *either* to make common cause with Germany and Austria (under this hypothesis supposed to be allies) in order to prevent Russia from getting to Constantinople, and to break the power of France to such a degree as to prevent her from interfering with our taking possession of Egypt, *or* to sell her benevolent neutrality, if not her active co-operation, to France and Russia, in return for *carte blanche* to do as she lists in the matter of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the valley of the Euphrates.

'What plan would she be the most likely to follow? To join with Germany and Austria would involve war with France in every portion of the European seas; war with Russia in Turkey and Asia—the most expensive war we could possibly engage in, the one most hateful to the English imagination as certain to revive all the old buried hatreds between us and the only neighbour we know anything about and have got in a sort of a way to care for—France. The other alternative would imply an armed neutrality or at most a summer cruise in the Baltic and Adriatic. We cannot get at Germany and Germany cannot get at us, and therefore it lies in the nature of things that in a coalition of this kind we should have to leave the others to fight it out, and that our neutrality alone would be a sufficiently valuable consideration—indeed an invaluable consideration as regards France, whose maritime position we could, as a belligerent, absolutely destroy in six weeks.

'Having got thus far, the hypothetical chess-player would ask: but how about abandoning Turkey to her fate after having for so many generations maintained the integrity of Turkey as a cardinal point of our policy? I take it that it is in the answering of this question that such overwhelming evidence in favour of giving up this protection of Turkey would crop up, that the certainty of our choosing the alternative of going with France and Russia against Germany would irresistibly establish itself. For of course, my chess-player is wholly uninfluenced by such things as traditions, treaty rights, obligations, consistency, and what not. He is a "*Real Politiker*" (the favourite epithet applied to Bismarck), a *realist* politician, guided by and dealing with raw facts without any trimmings, or condiments or sentiments. Moreover, he never carries on his studies otherwise than with an open map before him, and with careful statistical synopses of the military forces really available by the various pieces on the chess-board within easy reach. Looking at the map, which would be one carefully coloured so as to show how far southward Russia reached seventy years ago, fifty years ago, twenty years ago, and now, despising to notice such minor distinc-

tions as Asia and Europe, and with one daring sweep tracing a politico-strategical line from Downing Street and Woolwich to the extreme eastern point of Turkestan, the conclusion our friend would come to would be that as long as Russia's progress southward was barred by the Caucasus, and the heads of her advancing columns did not reach beyond Orenburg, Constantinople represented a *tête de pont* furnishing the key of the line of England's defence political and strategical against Russia. England's extreme right front (India) was covered by impassable distances, whilst on her extreme left flank (the Baltic) her fleet was mistress of the situation. Turkey occupied the centre, and the maintenance of her integrity formed the political key of this centre. Constantinople was the *tête de pont* which formed the strategical key. But a *tête de pont* becomes useless the moment the line which it defends is crossed either above or below, the position turned and a lodgment effected in its rear, and this is what has now taken place. With the heads of Russia's advancing columns in China, our right flank is immediately threatened; with the Attrek as her frontier she has effected a lodgment in the rear of the *tête de pont*, and the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey has ceased to have a *raison d'être*. What we are now immediately concerned with, is to ease off the pressure on our right flank, and to secure our communications between it and our centre and left, *i.e.* between India and the basis of our maritime operations in European waters. If by abandoning a *tête de pont* which is no longer any use to us, we can draw away the Russians from our right flank and permanently establish the safety of our communications along our whole line, and if we can do this by means of an armed neutrality which will not require more than an additional twopence in the pound income-tax, whereas the alternative course would be a bloody war for the maintenance of a useless position, it is difficult to suppose that we shall hesitate about our choice.

'All this, of course, is merely imaginary, a mere "Shandean hypothesis," but I have so often talked with the class of persons I am describing, that I would wager that some such combinations have often entered their



thoughts and, by inextricably mixing up together *political* with *military* strategy, I have faithfully imitated one of their favourite formulas; indeed it is hardly too much to say that their political combinations almost invariably, and as if by instinct, shape themselves into military combinations.

'But I now come to something tangible and real. I had a long and very interesting conversation about Russia with Schweinitz just before he was named Ambassador at Vienna and just after he had left St. Petersburg, where he was for several years military attaché. He is a very able man, and a typical representative of the *Schola*. A keen, hungry, lean-flanked politician, with ever busy brains of the politico-military problem-solving kind. He had been sent to Russia to study it *à fond* from the politico-military point of view as a preparation to going to Vienna as Ambassador. He had thoroughly learnt the language, and I do believe that there was nothing, from the different kinds of arrows used by the Circassian tribes to the poems of Puschkine, which he had not mastered in all its details. He had either taken to Russia with him or brought back a very strong anti-Russian feeling. The point I want to come to is an expression casually dropped when we were discussing the general relations between Russia and the rest of the world, and which made a profound impression on me at the time. It was this: of course it must be to the interest of Germany that Russia should spread out Asia-ways, should get further and further away to the East and nearer and nearer to you, that your relations to each other should get more and more complicated, and both your position and hers in Asia more and more critical. Russia's military resources are great but by no means illimitable—very much the reverse. *She cannot burn her candle both at the European and the Asiatic end*. Every increase of barometrical pressure on her left Asiatic flank, implies a corresponding diminution of pressure on her centre and right flank, *i.e.* a relief to Europe generally and to us in particular.

'Now, coming as this observation did from one of the most illustrious of the *Schola*, at that time a particular pet

of Bismarck's (I do not know on what terms they are at present), and who had been specially set to study the Russian question, I think it does give one a possible clue to Prussian policy at present, and might account in a natural manner for Bismarck's desire to stimulate our suspicion of Russia. In a word, I think it is not improbable that it may have become an axiom of the *Schola* that the more Asiatic Russia can be made, the worse the terms she can be placed on with England, the better for Germany.

'To return to Schweinitz. In reply to his observations I remarked that if his theory were correct its converse held good, and that if it were for the advantage of Germany and continental Europe that matters should be kept in a state of chronic crisis between us and Russia in India, it would be clearly good for us that this chronic crisis should be shifted to Europe and Russia be enticed to Constantinople. To which he replied : of course it would, and it is therefore clearly a dispensation of Providence in our favour that John Bull never tries new combinations but sticks to old traditions, and that the integrity of Turkey has, in despite of rhyme or reason, remained an article of his political faith. And this remark of his fits in with one made to me on another occasion by another doctor of the *Schola*. It has always puzzled us, he said, that England should object to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia. Once there, she overlaps Europe, whose permanent business it then becomes to keep her in order ; but this is not all ; she will be forced to endeavour, at least, to become a Maritime Power, which she can never succeed in becoming. *Every ship she builds and launches in the Mediterranean is a hostage given to you for her good behaviour in the East.* Her establishment on the Bosphorus is a pledge of tractableness and reasonable conduct in Asia, because she will have become get-at-able by you. *If a dog and a fish have a quarrel to settle, the fish must pray God that the dog should come into the water.'*

In the following June, Morier was at Wildbad taking the waters, when the Russian Chancellor arrived there for his annual cure

'20th June 1875.

'Gortschakoff arrived here last week, and I have had two long conversations with him since his arrival. He has given me a detailed account of his doings at Berlin, but all this is now *de l'histoire ancienne*, with the exception of one or two points that were not known to me before. One was the very strong manner in which he accentuated the loyalty of Andrassy. He said that it would not have escaped my notice that the official Press at Berlin was making a great deal of capital out of the supposed refusal of Andrassy to take part in the remonstrances addressed to Berlin, and was representing Austria as having dissociated herself from the Russo-English good offices. But he said, *il n'en est rien*. This is a mere stratagem of the Prussian official Press. Nothing, on the contrary, could exceed the loyalty of Andrassy. From the first period of the scare there had been a perfectly frank interchange of ideas between the Russian and Austrian Cabinets, and an *entente cordiale* to act in common. Austria had naturally been anxious not to move outside the sphere marked out by the Three Emperors Alliance, or to appear to distrust her powerful next-door neighbour, but she was quite as much alive to the situation as the rest of Europe. Placing absolute confidence in the action of the Emperor Alexander at Berlin, there was no need for her to take any extraordinary step on her own behalf. In fact, he seemed to wish it to be understood that he had, as it were, within the Three Emperors Alliance, held Austria's full powers as well as Russia's. He has, on two or three occasions, returned to the praises of Andrassy, and is as enthusiastic about him as the Empress Augusta was when she described him to me three years ago. Indeed, he gave me the highest testimonial which it was in his power to give, by finding points of resemblance between him and himself. *Sous bien des rapports il me ressemble. Il a la même fierté, la même franchise, la même loyauté!* It is clear that in the "happy family" of the three Kaisers, each of the "mutual friends" is endeavouring to convince the public that he has an exclusive monopoly of the affections of No. 3.

' What struck me most in our first conversation was the struggle between the natural man, anxious not to hide his light under a bushel and to obtain all the credit due to a great political success, and the diplomatic man, who had evidently arranged in certain stereotyped phrases his version of the Berlin episode, so as to keep the good relations between Russia and Prussia on its legs, and cover up the importance of the scare—in a word, to use modern theological phraseology and to borrow Newman's favourite expression, the struggle between the maximiser and the minimiser. It was not difficult for me, however, to get him more and more into the former strain. When in the latter, it was always Bismarck that he pretended to cover, throwing the blame on the military sword-rattlers. To break through this, I casually alluded to an expression which I knew had been used by Radowitz to Gontaut-Biron,<sup>1</sup> that on philanthropic, moral, and religious grounds, it was the duty of Germany to attack France.<sup>2</sup> He started up and said, "*Comment savez-vous donc cela ?*" I said, "*J'ai de très bonnes sources d'information et je peux garantir l'authenticité de cette phrase originale et remarquable.*" He replied, "*Et bien, puisque vous en savez autant, je vous raconterai une histoire qui vous intéressera.*" Gontaut's account of the conversation containing this phrase had been sent in a most confidential report to St. Petersburg, and Gortschakoff had asked permission to show it confidentially to the Emperor, promising not to keep a copy of it !! When he was talking to Bismarck at Berlin, and the latter threw the whole blame of the scare upon the fire-eating soldiery, Gortschakoff replied, "But, after all, a very different calibre of man from *les petits lieutenants* have held precisely similar language," and then he cited the celebrated phrase. Bismarck swore that this was absolutely *controuvé*, that Radowitz had reported to him his conversation *ipsissimis verbis*, and that no such phrase could ever have found a place in it. The day before he left, Bismarck

<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador at Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> For conversation between M. de Radowitz and M. de Gontaut see *Dernières années de l'Ambassade en Allemagne de M. de Gontaut-Biron*, p. 93.

brought him a long memorandum by Radowitz of this conversation (clearly written *ad hoc*), in which not only the phrase was not to be found, but no frame into which it could possibly have fitted. Bismarck urged him to give the memorandum to the Emperor Alexander, but Gortschakoff replied, "*Pourquoi donc, l'incident est vidé, à quoi bon y revenir ?*" and refused to do so. He expressed at the same time his perfect belief in the correctness of M. de Gontaut's report, saying he was far too loyal to play a trick of this kind. After this *éclaircissement*, Gortschakoff gave up his little game of stereotyped phrases in honour of Bismarck, and we spent some agreeable half-hours in analysing that great statesman's character. In one of Geffcken's letters reference was made to the extreme irritation of Bismarck with Gontaut-Biron, and I have no doubt that it owes its origin to this incident. Gortschakoff could not have intimated more clearly that he preferred Gontaut's word to Bismarck's. My French colleague, Lefebvre, had told me his Government was most anxious to know exactly what Russia meant by telling France to be upon her guard about Ultramontanism. So I asked him the question point-blank. He replied that what he meant was this: France could now feel certain that war would not be declared to her *sur un prétexte*, but that matters would look more grave if France afforded anything that might be construed into more than a pretext. Now the ecclesiastical conflict was so serious a matter in Germany that any real assistance given to Ultramontanism might be so construed. He had, therefore, advised France to abstain absolutely from associating herself officially with Ultramontanism—*de ne pas s'associer gouvernementalement à l'Ultramontanisme*.

'In regard to the endeavours of Prussia to make us distrust Russia, he volunteered in the course of conversation, and without my having drawn him on in that direction, to say that Prussia never ceased to call attention to Anglo-Russian relations in the East as being *très tendues*, to which he had always replied that nothing could be better than our relations, and that he knew nothing of their being *tendues*. This gave me an opportunity of observing that I believed

it was a dogma of Prussian policy that the worse Anglo-Russian relations could be made to be in Asia, the better for Germany, and without mentioning names, I gave him, as coming from an eminent Prussian statesman, the substance of what Schweinitz had revealed to me. This was clearly no new view to him, though he seemed amused at the *naïveté* of this confession having been made to an English diplomatist. He only said, "*C'est une ficelle si facile à voir qu'on ne s'y laisse pas prendre.*" I tried hard to draw him into something which should throw light upon Radowitz's mission to St. Petersburg last winter, having now got corroborative evidence that that mission had for its object to exchange liberty of action in the East against liberty of action in France, but I failed to do so. But what he said of Prussia's desire to keep us at loggerheads was so far an indirect confirmation of some distinct step having lately been taken in that direction.

'As I am profoundly ignorant of the details of our relations in the East, I was loth to adventure myself on that ground, but I thought I could do a good stroke of business by bringing him and Mallet, who came to spend some days with me here, together. I therefore began by telling him all about Mallet, describing him as the friend of Cobden and, *par excellence*, the man of economical ideas whose policy, being based on the material development of the human race in general, and of India in particular, and on the growth of international good relations and co-operation, made him the most determined opponent of such chauvinist elements as could not but to a certain extent exist amongst the traditions of a great corporation like the Indian Service, which had won its empire by the sword, and had to maintain it by the sword. I added that the mere fact of such a man having been selected for the very important post of Permanent Secretary of the India Office, and enjoying the full confidence of successive Ministers of India, afforded a proof of the pacific sentiments which animated the permanent policy of the central Government as regards India. Mallet had two long conversations with him, and produced a very favourable impression.

'As regards his observations to me about our Indian relations, and he returned to them over and over again and seemed anxious to talk about them, they were couched in such stereotyped and recurrent phrases that I do not doubt that he has repeated them a hundred times to other English agents. Nothing could be more satisfactory than his present relations with Her Majesty's Government. When Lord Derby spoke about India, his words might have issued from his own lips. It was only the subordinate agents whose language differed. These must be kept down with a high hand *de part et d'autre*. Generals in outlying posts wanted crosses and thought to get them by pushing beyond the lines marked out for them. They must be made to understand that they would get more crosses by obeying orders, and so on *ad infinitum*.

'In my counter-observations I endeavoured to put out clearly before him the task imposed upon our respective Governments of keeping their subordinates in order was a similar one, yet the conditions under which this task had to be fulfilled were very different. *We* were on the defensive. No person, however superficially acquainted with the facts of the case, but knew that we neither had nor could have the intension of extending our Indian Empire northwards. Not only was it not our intention to do so, but there was no impelling force driving us northward such as it might be argued was driving the Russians southwards. No amount of ingenuity, therefore, could give to our position the air or appearance of menace. Moreover, to any one acquainted with the conditions of the problems which we had to solve in India, it was well known that we required peace and tranquillity, for we could not develop the resources of India without a chronic surplus, and the financial basis required for a chronic surplus was the best guarantee Russia could have that ours never could be a *politique d'aventures*. If, therefore, Russia was really bent on merely rounding off her Empire and finding satisfactory limits and frontiers, *si elle n'était qu'en train de s'arrondir*, with a total absence of all ulterior objects and the full determination to co-operate with us in the great work of civilising Asia, she could reckon with certainty on our

friendship. *But*, there was the rub. The difficulty lay in bringing home this conviction to the minds not only of the Foreign Ministers and the Secretary for India, but of impressing it first on the minds of the Russian people, then on that of the British people, and lastly, and not leastly, on that of the Indian people. There was no use denying that there were two aspects under which our Central Asian relations presented themselves—one as a question *d'arrondissement* and the establishment of definite frontiers, another according to which India appeared as a Belle Hélène, England as Menelaus the lawful husband, Russia as a youthful Paris hovering about in the distance. (This was a malicious allusion to a poem of Puschkine on Gortschakoff published in an article called *Les deux Chanceliers* in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in which the poet hopes his friend the future Chancellor will be through life accompanied by Cupid, and may even after death cross the Styx in Charon's boat with his head reposing on the breast of the beautiful Helen.) I felt convinced that neither he nor the Emperor Alexander ever dreamt of India under this form, and that as long as they were alive we had not to fear the development of this idea; but I could not feel equally certain that such thoughts were not at work in the ardent imagination of a young Empire like Russia which, though counting twice as many inhabitants as any other European State, had hardly yet passed its teens. It was not to be wondered at, therefore, that the thought should in a much more vivid manner occupy the attention of the Indian Menelaus and of the Belle Hélène herself. He must consequently see that if the good relations he seemed so much to desire were to be established, the *sine qua non* condition was that this notion should be effectively stamped out. Our task was a far more difficult one than the Russian. The Russians in Central Asia were mere offshoots from the great central Russian trunk, and if they fell back they fell back on a compact mass of eighty million Russians. We had two hundred and fifty millions of fermenting Indians to fall back upon, and not only our English public opinion but the public opinion of this two hundred and fifty millions had in consequence to be taken into consideration. The Russians



were under the immediate control of the central Government: we had a double Government, and though, of course, the two acted in harmony and the Indian was subject to the central, still there was necessarily a different temper of opinion in the great dependency and in the home country. It belonged to the *métier* of a Menelaus to be suspicious and given to mistrust. He knew enough of the East to know what the panics of the Bazzars were, and if to this Oriental peculiarity was added the entirely new phase in Oriental life of a native Press, thought by many persons to enjoy an excessive degree of licence, he would realise some of the difficulties with which one had to contend in keeping everything square. In a word, I endeavoured to draw a picture of which the moral, if pictures have morals, was that the onus of establishing a good character lay with Russia rather than with us, and that, as far as mistrust was excusable, there was a more *prima facie* ground of mistrust on the part of Englishmen in India than on that of Russians at Chiva. He, of course, replied that there was not a single Russian idiot enough to look upon India as an object of conquest, and that for his part it was quite another sort of Belle Hélène on whose bosom he would wish to recline. He, of course, did not mean to deny that, if unfortunately we were at strife in Europe, the neighbourhood of Russia to our Indian population would not be a fair matter of anxiety to us, though even in such a case the idea of conquest was one that no sane Russian would entertain, but this should merely make us more desirous to be friends both in Europe and Asia. For his own part he did not for a moment doubt that by perfect frankness on both sides such as now so happily existed, the best relations could be established. The most peremptory orders had been sent to maintain the *status quo* and he had no doubt they would be faithfully executed. It would be an everlasting shame to both Governments if, with so grand an object as that of the joint civilisation of India, we should fail in attaining it by mutual jealousies.

‘What struck me as a curious fact was that he did not seem to be aware that we derived no revenue from India, and that when talking of the finance of India I adverted to the

fact, he asked : What earthly good do you then derive from India? I explained that the good we derived was this, that by rescuing from anarchy two-tenths of the human race and giving them the blessings of law and civilisation, we thereby enormously increased the productive powers and economised the productive forces of the world. Of course, having more commerce than other nations we profited by this more directly than other nations, but the benefit was one conferred upon the whole world. Being apparently wholly destitute of economic ideas, he did not seem quite to follow this, but I thought it useful to disillusionise him of the thought that India ever could be turned into a milch cow.'

'June 26th.

'I have had long daily talks and daily walks with Gortschakoff. It would be endless to attempt to place on record the substance of all these conversations, and I do not think I could add anything material on the two points touched upon previously, viz., the Berlin episode and our Indian relations. But I have, of course, had considerable opportunities of receiving general impressions and forming some kind of judgment on the man. On the most important point on which I desired to form an opinion, viz., how far the present strong profession of the Russian Government that they wished to be well with us, and that they desire that collisions and irritation on our Asiatic frontiers should be avoided are to be trusted, I am inclined to think that they are to be trusted, always of course within reasonable limits. My diagnosis is the following. The springs of action in the Chancellor appear to me to be vanity tempered with patriotism. He is one of the vainest of the bigger statesmen, Beust always excepted, with whom I have ever had to deal. But his vanity is of a far more masculine character than Beust's and is not, like the latter's, of the dancing-master's type, being transfused with a great deal of genuine patriotism. He does honestly, I believe, care above all things in the world to *rehausser* the position and prestige of Russia in the world. *Ego et Russia mea* are the gods on whose altars he does not cease to burn incense. To have rescued Russia, buried and mutilated by the Peace of Paris,

from the hands of Nesselrode and restored to her her maritime liberty, and with it a good deal of her former position, is the *fait accompli* which he had till now considered would suffice to hand down his name with glory to posterity. But he was quite aware that this would only be possible by a good deal more of truckling to Germany than I suspect in his heart of hearts he liked. To have quite unexpectedly by the astounding bungling of Bismarck been placed in a position which not only allowed him to show absolute independence of Germany, but almost enabled him, for the moment at least, to claim the old ante-Crimean position of Nicholas, of Protector of the European Peace, is a piece of luck which he is far too practised a player on the political bourse not to know is unlikely again to fall to the lot of a Foreign Minister seventy-seven years old. To keep what he has got, to do nothing which would endanger the capital he has stored up, keenly to enjoy his success is, I believe, his sole preoccupation. Though he does not say so, I am quite convinced that he knows better than anybody that Bismarck will have his *revanche* if he gives him a chance, and that a quarrel with us would be Bismarck's opportunity. That no crisis of this kind shall happen during his lifetime is what I cannot but believe will now be the main object of his policy, and that he will allow no *politique d'aventures* to jeopardise the garnered fruits of a political career which his vanity makes him look upon as the greatest ever accomplished by a Russian statesman is what I believe we can with safety reckon upon. His seventy-seven years and his vanitous tenderness for his own reputation are our best guarantees.'

On Morier's return to Munich after the termination of his cure, a bad chill caught at Sigmaringen during a visit he had paid the Prince of Hohenzollern, developed into peritonitis, 'which for the first time in my life made me know what illness was—placing me within the shadow of the great gates, with the full expectation from one moment to another that I should see them begin to move on their hinges. Where do they lead to? It is not a pleasant experience to have gone through. . . .'

For weeks and weeks and months and months he was hopelessly and completely prostrated, morally and physically, and incapable of exertion of any sort. 'I am *downer* than I have ever been in my life,' he wrote to Mallet on 18th October. 'It would be a real pleasure to you to see what a diabolically pessimist view I take of the world, and not the world only, but of the things above it, and the things below it, and the waters beneath it.'

This state of despondency was to last some time.

'Though I feel for you,' wrote Jowett,<sup>1</sup> 'I cannot quite take *au sérieux* what you say under such depressing circumstances. Be cheerful, sir, and look for better days. You have lost four, and may perhaps lose six months of your life, but you will be as well as ever again, and as able to work some day.

'I know that I have not suffered as much in my whole life as you have in the last six months, and therefore I have no right to moralise to you; but I am really anxious that you should keep up your spirits because it is so important for your recovery. You fat fellows, like Falstaff, "dwindle and pine away" the moment "bad humours are run upon you."'

Not before Christmas, though, was his health sufficiently restored to enable him once more to resume his ordinary mode of life, when his diary again notes 'eight mile walks with Döllinger,' and the study of Roman Law which he had taken up under Professor Holtzendorff, and to which he now devoted three and four hours a day.

But his time in Germany was drawing to a close, for during a short stay in England, whither he had been summoned early in February by the serious illness of his father, Lord Derby offered him the post of Lisbon,<sup>2</sup> which Lord Lytton's appointment as Viceroy of India had just rendered vacant.

'You will be glad to hear,' he writes to Jowett, 'that I have got my promotion, and that in a very honourable and flattering manner. I am named successor to Lytton at

<sup>1</sup> Jowett to Morier, 28th October 1875.

<sup>2</sup> On 14th February 1876.

Lisbon. It is a first-class mission, and to jump straight from a *chargé d'affaires*-ship to a first-class mission is in itself outside the routine of promotion, and the fact that the post is one peculiarly coveted from its pleasantness, the beauty of the climate, and its being in Europe makes it altogether very agreeable to me.'

In March he returned to Munich, paying a flying visit to Paris on the way, where 'Decazes gave me a very warm reception, and a very cold dinner,' and he spent 'a very pleasant evening<sup>1</sup> at Thiers' at an important and interesting moment whilst the ministerial crisis was going on, and it was thought that Casimir Périer would have it all his own way with the Marshal (MacMahon). When I first arrived, about 10.30 P.M., Madame Thiers told me it was all settled, and that the Marshal would be forced to accept his ultimatum. Pothuau and some of the other would-be Ministers were there, and political cookery of the old *salon* kind was actively going on. Later on, towards twelve o'clock, Casimir Périer himself arrived, and after much confabulation with Thiers in the corner, it became known that the whole combination had *raté*. After every one had left, Thiers kept me all to himself till past two in the morning! He is simply marvellous. His flow of short, epigrammatic sentences unceasing, and as I never interrupt him and listen with keen relish, he has got it into his head, though I don't believe he knows the sound of my voice, that I am a man of extraordinary *esprit*, and goes about proclaiming this! and descanting on my powers of conversation.

'His admiration of Bismarck, whom he regards as a Prussian Thiers who has been more favoured by circumstances than the French original, is greater than ever.'

Morier's remaining weeks in Germany were taken up by hurried good-bye visits to Berlin and Darmstadt, and leave-takings from the many who during his long sojourn in their midst had learnt to love and appreciate him.

'The Empress (Augusta) was much grieved at your leaving Germany,' Lord Odo Russell told Morier,<sup>2</sup> 'and

<sup>1</sup> 4th March 1876.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Odo Russell to Morier, 20th February.

the Crown Princess nearly wept and said it was too sad losing "such a friend."

'How much we shall miss you,' the latter wrote.<sup>1</sup> 'What can poor devoted Anglo-Germans do without you?'

His friends, however, thought that his absence would be but for a season, and that he would soon, as Lord Odo Russell predicted, 'get back to his old hunting-ground, *Wo die deutsche Zunge klingt und Bismarck in der Wilhelmstrasse Lieder singt.*'<sup>2</sup>

But it was not to be. When Morier left Germany in the spring of 1876, it was never to return again to the sphere of activity where for twenty-three years he had laboured so unremittingly and zealously, with such devotion and self-sacrifice, and alas! so much in vain.

<sup>1</sup> The Crown Princess to Morier, 22nd February.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Odo Russell to Morier, 20th February.



## APPENDIX A

### CORRESPONDENCE ON THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA IN TIME OF WAR

*Dr. Geffcken to Morier*

‘STRASBURG, *June 2nd*, 1874.

‘PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF has kindly communicated to me the draft of a Convention on the Rights of Belligerents, to be discussed in an International Conference at Brussels. The Chancellor having asked my opinion on the subject, I stated that I thought the idea excellent, but that, according to my views, the “*Projet de Convention*” must undergo many changes. At his request I have detailed my objections and my wishes in a memorandum which I have just transmitted to him.

‘But I want to direct your attention to one point of the question. Article 39 of the “*Projet*” maintains the Convention of Geneva, to which, however, additions were made in the following articles. I told Prince Gortschakoff that this inevitably would lead to confusion. The misfortune of the Geneva Convention had been that no jurists well acquainted with International Law had taken part in framing it. This was the cause of its being very imperfectly drawn up, and from the loose wording of some of its stipulations many of those difficulties arose which we had witnessed in the Franco-German War; it would therefore be necessary to insert in the treaty the whole Geneva Convention remodelled and cleared of all vague expressions. The Chancellor admitted this; I then observed that the additional Convention to that of Geneva also spoke of maritime warfare, maritime hospitals, etc. He objected to have any maritime question drawn into the debates of the Conference, because that would call forth other questions on which it would be impossible to agree.

‘Now I cannot admit this unconditionally, as I would certainly do it if any Government would ask to state also



the rights of belligerents, if you discuss those of land warfare. The stumbling-block which was before the Chancellor's eyes was, of course, the question of the immunity of private property at sea in time of war, but is it really invincible? I think not, whilst I am decidedly of opinion that the question itself is irrepressible. You will recollect, I have always maintained that the inviolability of private property at sea must be advantageous to England, whilst the Paris Declaration was a half measure which deprived her of her old supremacy without giving her security for her trade. Allow me now to examine this a little closer.

'Up to 1854 the English principle was perfectly intelligible; it was that which had first been sanctioned by the *Consolato del Mare*, and according to which the quality of the merchandise was decisive; the enemy's property was taken, the neutral property was respected wherever the one or the other was found. This principle is unexceptional, as long as you admit that the enemy's private property may be taken at all as legitimate means of maritime warfare.

'It was the Dutch who first by special treaties introduced another maxim, namely, that the flag covers the cargo. It was of the greatest importance for a commercial Republic, such as the United Netherland Provinces, to maintain the liberty of the neutral carrying trade during the wars of the great Powers, and the Dutch could easily afford to make the concession that if the enemy's goods in neutral bottoms were respected, the belligerents should be entitled to confiscate neutral goods on board of hostile ships. These two maxims were admitted in a series of international conventions, amongst others in those between England and Holland in 1674, England and Portugal in 1654, England and France in 1677, France and Spain in 1659, etc. But these rules were only conventional, they were never accepted as a general principle, and, in fact, they could not, because there is no principle in them. The *Consolato del Mare* and England made the capture dependent on the quality of the merchandise; the above-quoted treaties on the quality of the flag under which the goods were shipped; this may be convenient because the nationality of the ship

is more easily to be ascertained than the quality of the different goods of a ship's cargo, but there is no logical reason to be found for thus reversing the principle of the Consolato; it was simply done in the interests of the neutral carrying trade.

'England maintained her principle practically during the gigantic conflict with the French Revolution and Napoleon, and theoretically till the Crimean War. The doctrine of the immunity of private property at sea in time of war was first sanctioned in the treaty between Prussia and the United States, concluded by Frederick the Great and Franklin in 1785, Article 23. It was established by a resolution of the Legislative Assembly of France (30th May 1792), acknowledged by Napoleon in the Berlin Decree of 21st November 1806, and a Note addressed to the United States Minister in Paris of 22nd August 1809: 'Les bâtimens de commerce ennemis appartenant à des particuliers doivent être respectés.'

'In the war with Spain, 1823, the French Government issued a Royal Ordinance that no Spanish vessels other than of war should be taken; but this concession did not include the exemption of private property from seizure by the French navy; when therefore the French Ambassador in London, Vte. de Marcellus, requested the British Government to forbid English subjects to fit out privateers against French commerce, and not to permit Spanish privateers to enter British ports, Mr. Canning in his reply (26th April 1823) agreed to the first part of the French request, but refused to accede to the second part, because the navies of the two belligerents were not equal, and if Spain fought to make up the superiority of the French navy, England would act partially should she raise objections to such a proceeding. "*A fair equality*," added Mr. Canning, "*could only be established, if France also exempted the private property of Spanish subjects from seizures by her public armed vessels.*"

'In the same year, Mr. Rush, the American Minister in London, was instructed to enter into negotiations for the abolition of private maritime warfare; the project of a treaty which he presented (28th July) established that

no privateering should be permitted, nor should private property be liable to seizure on the ocean, except in case of contraband ; but the American Government made at the same time as a condition *sine qua non*, the abandonment of the right maintained by England to search for and to impress English sailors on board of neutral vessels, and England was at that time not prepared to enter upon this demand.

'The Crimean War introduced the following principles confirmed by the Paris Declaration of 10th April 1856 :—

- ' 1. The abolition of privateering.
- ' 2. The neutral flag over enemy's goods.
- ' 3. Neutral goods are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
- ' (2 and 3 with the exception of contraband.)

'The United States, which like all other States had been invited to give their adhesion to this Declaration, replied (Note of Mr. Marcy, 28th July 1856) that America, not choosing to burden herself with a large naval establishment, could not surrender the right to employ privateers, without the respective Powers going one step further, and declaring the inviolability of all private property at sea in time of war. The President therefore proposed to add to the first proposition in the declaration the following words : "And that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband."

'This proposition at first met with a very favourable reception ; Count Walewski declared himself quite ready to conclude a convention upon these principles, if England consented ; Russia, Prussia, Austria, Portugal, the Netherlands cordially approved of the American proposal. Nor was the impression in England unfavourable. Already two months before Mr. Marcy wrote his despatch, in a debate of the House of Lords on the Paris Declaration, in which Earl Clarendon was censured for having given up the old English principles, the late Lord Derby stated "that the necessary consequence of the Paris Declaration must lead

to the exemption of all private property at sea from seizure, and to allowing all merchant vessels in time of war to continue their journey without molestation by men-of-war." A few months afterwards (7th November 1856) the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, made a speech in Liverpool, in which he expressed the hope "that these relaxations of former doctrines, which have since been ratified by formal engagements, may perhaps be still further extended, and that in the course of time those principles of war which are applied to hostilities by land may be extended, without exception, to hostilities by sea, and that private property may no longer be the object of aggression on either side." If these favourable dispositions have not been acted upon, the fault principally lay in the personal views of the American Minister in London, who was violently against Mr. Marcy's amendment, because, in his own opinion, the United States should never, and under no condition whatever, surrender the right to fit out privateers; he therefore positively refused to second his Parisian colleague Mr. Mason's endeavours to come to an understanding with the great maritime Powers. Very likely Mr. Dallas, a young Southern man, may have anticipated the conflict of 1860, and may have forgotten that privateers would be the only resource of the South. Soon afterwards Buchanan was elected President, and his Secretary of State Cass did not wish to accomplish a measure which would have produced a great name to his predecessor with whom it originated; the matter was suffered to drop. In the meantime Lord Palmerston's opinions had undergone a change; in July 1857, Mr. Lindsay, the well-known great shipowner, moved in the House of Commons for copies of the correspondence that might have passed on Mr. Marcy's proposition, and expressed his opinion "that the Paris Declaration was untenable, that in time of war the entire carrying trade of England would be transferred to neutral bottoms, and that the premium to marine insurances on English ships not under envoy would be increased ten per cent." Lord Palmerston refused the production of the papers asked for, on the ground that a change had taken place in the views of the United States Government, and confessed that he

himself did no more view the subject in the same light as it appeared to him in Liverpool eight months ago.

'In this state of suspense the negotiation remained, but soon afterwards the Italian War (1859) showed that Mr. Lindsay had been right; England took no part in it, but the fear that she might be involved in it was so strong, that many of the first English merchants were instructed by their foreign correspondents not to charter on any account English ships for the conveyance of their goods; for the Paris Declaration would not have protected British ships as soon as England would have become a belligerent Power, and the mere fear of such an event acted so powerfully as to give preference to American ships, because the United States were considered as sure to remain neutral. The heavy losses which were incurred in consequence by the British shipowners whose ships had been lying idle, induced the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to make a strong representation to Mr. Milner Gibson, the President of the Board of Trade, 19th January 1860, in which it was said: "The Paris Declaration had conferred full protection on merchandise afloat, but by some strange inconsistency had withheld this protection from the *ships* engaged in its transport. It was to correct this anomaly that the United States had proposed their amendment, which was a necessary complement of what had been done for the protection of private property. England's interest was to give her most strenuous support to this, for as the greatest commercial and shipowning country in the world, she must suffer more than any other by a custom which exposes property on the sea to seizure. It has been argued that it would be wise in this country to submit to this loss in order to maintain her naval superiority, which would enable her to inflict still greater losses on any other power, but it is easy to show that this opinion is utterly without foundation. The only great maritime Powers with whom we can be involved in war are France and America. In a war with France her whole mercantile navy would be compelled to be idle in port, but her oversea commerce instead of being annihilated as in former wars with this country would, in virtue of the Declaration of Paris, be carried on in neutral

bottoms. On the other hand, the commerce of England, which is double that of France, would enjoy the same immunity under neutral flags ; but her mercantile tonnage, which is five times as great, would be still liable to capture. Our ocean steamers, our ships engaged in colonial and other long trade voyages, would be thrown out of employment, for it would be impossible to seal up the steam cruisers of France in her ports, and the premium on valuable goods in English bottoms would therefore be enormous. That part of our shipping which would thus at once be doomed to compulsory inactivity would be greater in value than the whole tonnage of France, and the remainder would yet be subject to great disadvantages, and be replaced by neutrals. The ultimate result would be, that if the war was of any duration our whole carrying trade would be conducted in neutral bottoms, manned by the very sailors who, if the proposed change would be adopted, would have continued to sail under the British flag.

“ ‘In the event of a war with the United States the ocean would swarm with steam privateers, and the premium of insurance on goods in belligerent bottoms would be so enormous that the commerce of both countries would be limited to that small portion of it which could be carried on in neutral vessels. The consequent distress, destitution, and disaffection, especially in the manufacturing districts, would be such as to appal the boldest advocate of destroying merchant shipping on the high seas.

“ ‘It would appear then that the liability of ships to capture would inflict greater injury on England than on any other maritime Power in time of war, and, in time of peace, it places our shipping under serious disadvantages, on even the mere rumour of misunderstandings with other countries. During the recent war in Italy the premium against war risk alone on English ships and their cargoes from the West Indies was not less than two per cent., and in consequence American shipping obtained decidedly higher freights.”

‘I have quoted at length from this address, because it seems to me that the arguments are unanswerable. The select committee on merchant shipping of 1860, amongst

the members of which were Mr. Cardwell, Mr. Th. Baring, Mr. Bentinck, Mr. Gibson, reported in favour of the same principle: "Your committee cannot close this brief comment without expressing the hope that the time has come when all private property, not contraband of war, should be exempt from capture at sea."

'England and France even acted upon this principle, when in the war with China they proclaimed not only the immunities of the Paris Declaration, but further, that all private property on the sea belonging to Chinese subjects should be considered inviolable. Austria, Prussia, Italy did the same in 1866, Germany in 1870, although France did not grant the reciprocity, and unfortunately she did not adhere to the principle in 1871.

'As to England and America, the Civil War threw the whole affair into confusion, England could of course not accept the accession of the United States to the Declaration of Paris under the condition that she was to treat the privateers of the South as pirates; but if previous to the separation England had acceded to Mr. Marcy's amendment there would have been no Alabama, the South being bound to the treaties of the former Republic, the terrible havoc which these privateers caused among the American mercantile marine would have been avoided, the angry discussions which ended by the Geneva award of five millions indemnity would not have taken place. Has all this not been a heavy lesson to the true interests of England in this question? If I maintain she should use every effort to get the principle acknowledged, that private property should enjoy immunity on sea in time of war, I do not follow a speculative line of argument. I perfectly know that the reason so often alleged, viz., the protection of private property on land, does not hold good, because such property is very often not respected; and I readily admit that, as it is the object of all to compel the enemy to make peace, it would be as legitimate to ruin its trade as to kill its soldiers. But I maintain that the means which can be employed are unable to accomplish the end. The Paris Declaration, which no British Minister could repudiate (as Lord Napier on his first public appearance

as English Minister in Washington said in a public address) exempts from seizure the goods of a nation at war in neutral vessels. The commerce, therefore, of a nation at war, the import of commodities into, and the export of commodities by her, may be carried on just as it used to be in time of peace, *provided it is not carried in her own ships*. The whole trade therefore going on just as it was accustomed to do previous to the war, excepting in the case of blockaded ports, commerce is no longer a vulnerable point, England has already agreed that what is most important in trade should incur no danger in war. The only person really injured will be the shipowner of the belligerent country, his ship may be captured, and those merchants of his own country who have been so ill-advised as to send their goods by his ship will be injured likewise ; but shipowners being a small class, these are not evils which will compel a nation to make peace. But nobody will deny that all harm which is inflicted during war, and which does not tend to produce peace, ought to be avoided.

‘England, it is true, has by far the largest fleet, but it would be fully occupied in the case of a Franco-Russian alliance ; and whilst France and Russia have few colonies, the English fleet’s task would be to protect a vast colonial empire and a mercantile navy scattered over all the seas. England besides draws immense provisions from all parts of the world, its own soil being unable to produce food enough for the inhabitants ; if these provisions could only be practically cut off, it would produce the greatest calamities in the labouring classes.

‘There is a last danger in the present state for Great Britain. America has not yet renounced the right of fitting out privateers, but even those nations who did so might replace the privateers by hiring swift private cruisers, and giving them a government commission. This can only be avoided by the general adoption of the immunity of private property on sea in time of war. It has been said that the United States advanced this principle only because they knew that England would not adopt it, but this argument is refuted by the treaty they have concluded with Italy, 26th February 1871, which sanctions the in-



violability of private property at sea in case of war; the States could not refuse the same principle to any other nation.

'I conclude, therefore, that the present state is untenable, because in case of war only the shipowners suffer, and in that respect England is the most vulnerable power, for she has the largest mercantile navy. Her naval power would be frittered away by protecting her merchant ships, while it ought to be concentrated for effective blockades of hostile ports, and great decisive blows against the enemy's fleet or fortresses. I think it therefore in the evident interest of England to take the initiative for establishing as a general principle the immunity of private property at sea in time of war, contraband excepted, and I think that steps to realise this should be taken in proper time, for you know best, that when a conflict is threatening there is no time for such measures. The conference of Brussels seems to offer the proper opportunity for introducing this question, and I may confidently say of solving it, for as soon as England consents there would be scarcely any other country which would oppose it.'

*Morier to Geffcken*

'WILDBAD, June 16th, 1874.

'I AM exceedingly obliged to you for your most valuable letters. You are well aware that I have always been of opinion that after binding ourselves by the Declaration of Paris, it was little less than suicide on our part not to carry it out to its logical consequences by declaring all private property at sea inviolable, irrespective of the character of the ship in which it was conveyed, and that I was never able to comprehend how it was that we did not snap at the offer made to us from so unexpected and improbable a quarter as the U.S. As matters now stand we are in the peculiar position of having twice the fighting power balanced by probably not less than six or seven times the amount of the vulnerability of any other maritime State; by the proposed alteration in maritime law, it is true, that *commercially speaking* all parties will become equally invulner-

able, but the manner in which this general invulnerability would affect the various maritime Powers would be very unequal, and, in my opinion, altogether to our advantage; for we should obtain the double benefit of getting rid of more vulnerability than any one else, whilst adding to our fighting power in a far larger proportion than anyone else, the amount of force required for the purpose of defending our commerce (and which would otherwise become available for offensive purposes) being proportionate not to the amount of fighting to be got through, which remains a fixed quantity, but to the extent of our commerce, and therefore bearing a very much larger ratio to our actual offensive apparatus than that borne by the navies of other powers, who, with the possibility of the same amount of offensive work on their hands, have six times less commerce to look after.

'There is a story told of a very large man who had to fight a duel with a very small one, and who, when on the ground, remonstrated against the unfairness of the impending combat. The small man, therefore, with a piece of chalk, drew a very small circle on the waistcoat of the big man, and proposed by way of settling the difficulty that no shots taking effect outside the circle should count. The big man observed that if, Achilles-like, he could be rendered invulnerable, all but the small circle, the proposal was one which would meet with his hearty approval, but that otherwise for practical purposes matters would remain much as they were before.

'Now it seems to me that if the proposed change were made in the law, England would be very much in the position of the big man after the proposed process of invulnerability had taken effect, with the additional advantage that to the little man's single-panelled horse-pistol she would oppose a six-chambered revolver. As matters now stand, England is in the original position of the big man, with the six-chamber revolver, it is true, but with an invisible enemy before her, and all her vital parts exposed to the horse-pistol.

'In a word the advantages to us appear to me so absurdly obvious, that I have always supposed there must be some

profound secret of state mysteriously kept from the vulgar view, which prevented our acceding to what all the rest of the world, for less obvious reasons, seemed so ardently to desire. I confess that after reading your admirable letter, I am more than ever at a loss to discover what that mystery can be, and I cannot therefore resist the temptation of communicating it confidentially to my Government. I must, however, observe that Gortschakoff is perfectly right in refraining from mooted the question at the impending Congress at Brussels. Were he to do so, I am convinced it would be giving the death-blow to the question as regards England for many years to come. Not that I have the slightest inkling of what the views of H.M. present Ministers may be on the subject. But I am convinced that public opinion in England at present is not in a fit state to tackle an important international question of this kind. To be called upon suddenly and out of the clean water just as Parliament is breaking up, and M.P.'s and newspaper editors are about to proceed to the moors and the Alps, to occupy oneself with a serious matter of this kind, would be resented as a kind of insult, and looked upon as an *Ueberrumpelung*, which would set up the British Lion's back and close his ears to all argument. Moreover, there is at present on the part of the public in England a want of caring for international questions, and, I must add, an ignorance in regard to them, combined with a definite will not to be enlightened, which is truly appalling; *e.g.*, to those that have ears to hear and eyes to see, the Alabama business and the five millions you are good enough to allude to are as clearly the Nemesis which followed upon our refusal to entertain the Marcy proposal, as being burnt is the Nemesis which follows tumbling into the fire; yet I cannot recollect any writer or speaker during all those weary negotiations and debates ever taking the trouble of pointing this out to the British Philistine. If, therefore, you have the question at heart, do not in any way urge Gortschakoff to take action in the matter, but wait for the turn of the tide. I agree with you that the question is an irrepressible one. In the meantime I am very grateful to you for having given me the opportunity of placing the views we both share before eyes

competent to judge of them, and that in a far better manner than I could have done to myself.'

*Morier to Lord Derby*

*'July 1st, 1874.*

'It was with considerable diffidence that I ventured to send you my correspondence with Geficken on the question of private property at sea. But there was a kind of external necessity for my doing so, which made it impossible for me to resist the temptation of placing my own views on the subject before you. It seemed, namely, possible that Geficken would be sent as German plenipotentiary to the Brussels Conference, and I did not know whether he might not be tempted to agitate the question there. I thought it my duty therefore to warn you of what might possibly be in the wind, and at the same time to place on record that as far as I was concerned, everything had been done to keep the matter on its present shelf. I could not allude to the question of Geficken's possible mission to Brussels in my public despatches, as it was told me in the very strictest confidence. It is Gortschakoff who wanted him to be appointed, and who is working in that direction subterranously; but he is a *persona ingrata* to Bismarck, and I doubt very much whether the appointment will be made. In the meantime, whatever happens, we are perfectly sheltered against any unexpected move in the matter, as in reply to my letter to Geficken I have had an answer from him, after he had again seen Gortschakoff, in which he not only fully admits that Gortschakoff and I are right, and that it would be in the highest degree inopportune to moot the question now, but also completely endorses my view that the only chance of a satisfactory solution depends on the initiation of England.

'Thus much in the way of extenuating circumstances for my despatch and its lengthy enclosures. As regards the question itself, I must confess to such a strong feeling in regard to it, that at some time or other I must have broken loose and had my say. Indeed, periodically, for the last two years, I have been on the point of inflicting upon you

a huge letter on the subject, and have only been prevented by such few remnants of modesty as have survived a diplomatic career of twenty years. The fact of the matter is, that if a question appears to you in the same sort of light as the proposition that twice two make four, and yet other persons whom you consider much wiser than yourself held an altogether different opinion, you can have no rest until in some form or other you have obtained the verdict of a perfectly unprejudiced and unbiassed umpire. There is no one whose judgment in this capacity I would sooner submit to than yours, and inasmuch as, if your verdict were given in my favour, there is no one who would be more favourably circumstanced than yourself to give effect to my views, I cannot resist appealing to your judgment seat.

'Starting from the point of view that I am right, and that those who desire to maintain the right of capturing private property at sea are wrong, I attribute their blindness mainly to the following causes.

'1. The force of routine and the dislike to pension off an old principle that has done good service in its day, and to put up a new one in its stead. In a word, the *quieta non movere* platitude.

'2. The want of *political imagination*, which so often prevents us from realising in the concrete, and as living realities, the great organic changes that are taking place around us by the mere force of things.

'3. The fact that the question of the inviolability of private property at sea has always been brought forward before the public in a humanitarian, philanthropic, cosmopolitan, and *esprit de siècle* garb, *i.e.* in the mummery peculiarly hateful, and rightly so, to every well-constituted mind.

'Under the first head what people do not see is that the old principle was once for all pensioned off without the slightest hope of its ever being again introduced to active service by the Declaration of Paris. I have not got Mill's apology for the right of capture before me, but as far as I recollect it, he entirely ignored this fact. The moment that neutral property in belligerent bottoms and belligerent property in neutral bottoms was made inviolable, the

principle which enabled an all-powerful maritime country such as we were at the time of the Continental blockade, to stop the commercial intercourse of the world, and thus to wield a measure of irresistible force was done away with never to return. Of the *principle* itself nothing remained ; what is left of the old *system* consists of special disabilities directed against the merchant *ships* of belligerents, disabilities which on the face of them must strike a country in proportion to the extent of its mercantile navy. For offensive purposes against commerce the hundred arms of our naval Briareus are bound, whilst he is continually weighted as before with the task of defending our merchant fleet. (As regards the *quieta non movere*, the negotiations connected with the Alabama questions and their result will hardly be regarded as consistent with a period of *otium cum dignitate*. Yet the whole of the Alabama complication would have been avoided by our assent to the Marcy proposition.)

‘ The late Lord Derby’s words quoted in Geffcken’s letter seem to me conclusive on the matter. The change made in the existing law by the Paris Declaration *must* lead to the *total* enfranchisement of private property at sea, and we cannot hope alone to withstand the concurrent opinion of the world on the subject. What was not seen through, what is, I believe, not seen by many now, is the fact that once you admit that the Paris Declaration is irrevocable, the letting it run out to its logical conclusion is infinitely more to our advantage than it can be to any one else’s.

‘ Under the second head I would collect all the vast changes which have taken place in the world since our last great maritime wars, and which, even if the Declaration of Paris were not binding, would render the kind of universal supremacy we maintained during the period of the universal blockade impossible. Take only such facts as the invention of steamships and the quantity of energies which were in consequence let loose upon our ubiquitous commerce ; or again, the settlement of the entire coasts and harbours of the United States on the Atlantic and the Pacific, or the development of free trade, or the fact of our having formerly been self-supporting in the matter of food, whereas

now we depend for our daily bread on commerce. This last fact is adverted to in Geflicken's letter, but sufficient prominence is not given to it. It is all very well to say that the ordinary commerce of the world, and therefore our food supply, could in virtue of the Declaration of Paris go on as before, only in neutral bottoms. I suspect on the contrary, that considering the immense proportion which our mercantile tonnage bears to that of the rest of the world, the mere fact of its withdrawal from the seas, or its exposure to war risks of an altogether unprecedented kind, in case we had a big war on our hands, would suffice at once to raise the price of the necessities of life to such an extent as might altogether paralyse the efforts of the boldest War Minister.

'I come lastly to the prejudice engendered by the belief that the proposed change is the child of humanitarianism or *XIXième siècle*, and it is here that I conceive the full strength of my position lies. I want the subject looked at and judged solely by the advantages or disadvantages which the adoption of the principle would procure for or inflict upon our maritime power, *i.e.* on our *international position*, and it is the conviction that the latter would be ameliorated a hundredfold were we once to recover the liberty of international action and international speech which, I maintain, the adoption of the change would give us, which makes me so ardently desire it. I put aside for the present all the advantages which we should derive in war by being able to concentrate our forces on blockading and naval battles, whilst our merchantmen roamed the seas in safety, and I think merely of the troubled times in which we live and of our position in the European Areopagus.

'As matters now stand, the mere passing apprehension that we may be involved in war at once depreciates the value of all British property on board British ships in every part of the world, by raising the rate of insurance. What the amount of that property is I don't know, but suppose it to be fifty millions, and the rate of insurance rise two per cent., this is a clear loss of one million, which may be caused overnight by the writing of a single strong despatch. A British Minister might feel absolutely and completely

certain on a given occasion that, by taking up a really firm attitude, and using the sort of language which English Ministers at one time did not shrink from, he might crush out a war which else might devastate Europe and roll back the stream of civilisation for generations to come ; and yet his tongue might well cleave to the roof of his mouth when he reflected that this great ideal gain would have to be paid for by the immediate disbursement of millions out of the pockets of the British nation. This is an abstract argument which I had often used as necessarily deducible from the state of things created by the Declaration of Paris. I never knew that the case had actually occurred till Geffcken's letter pointed out that during the Italian War the momentary belief that we might be forced to take part in it had for a time paralysed our merchant shipping, and filled the port of Liverpool with freightless merchantmen.

'Lastly, it seems to me that this is a measure which no Government could carry out so well or so effectually as the present one. The Liberal party are committed to the blessed three rules and to the principle of a maximum of injuries to private property at sea during war time, with a maximum of damages to be paid by neutrals on the conclusion of peace. They cannot bring the measure forward, for, even if they had the will, the country would not trust them, and suspect that this was a fresh humiliation inflicted on the British Lion as a burnt-offering to the spirit of the age. But coming from a Conservative Court the country would feel that a measure vouched for by your name and those of Disraeli, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Carnarvon, could not contain anything contrary to Imperial interests. It would not do perhaps to tell the whole truth, and to show that the real object of the measure was to treble the efficiency of our fleet, and to enable us once more to hold up our heads when we speak with our enemy in the gate, because this might awake the suspicions of the other contracting parties ; but the country already trusting the Imperial instincts of the Government would require very few words to assure them that all was right. The vast popularity of the measure in such places as Liverpool, and generally throughout the mercantile community, is also a consideration not to be



lightly passed over. Indeed, from a mere party point of view, the measure seems to me to have great attractions. To do a great stroke of Imperial business under the guise of homage paid to parochial interests, and under the modest clothing of a mercantile sheep to feel my wolf's claws growing, and my wolf's teeth sharpening, would have an irresistible charm for me, were I a Tory.

' In your late speech at the Merchant Taylors, to my inexpressible joy and delight, you told Europe that the present Government considered the maintenance of the peace of the world as a concern only second in importance to that of maintaining the peace of England. You thus formally repudiated the Manchester doctrine of England's international outlawry, or standing outside of the European peace. We have therefore, thank God, returned to what our Anglo-Saxon forefathers would have called the *Frid-bork* or *frank-pledge* (*pacis plegium*) of the European community. But to carry out the simile we find ourselves standing in the European "folk-mote" as having given security, whose value is absurdly in excess of that given by our peers. Could a new policy be better initiated than by recovering these pledges, and thus putting ourselves on a footing of equality with our neighbours? '

## APPENDIX B

A FRAGMENT FROM MUSÄUS<sup>1</sup>

A MANUSCRIPT volume of popular tales by Musäus in the handwriting of the great master has been lately discovered in the Royal Library at Stuttgart. They are in a fragmentary state, but possess great interest as being apparently jotted down exactly as they were collected from the old wives amongst the charcoal-burners in the Black Forest. They are to be published shortly, but in the meanwhile we are able to give the following fragment as a specimen :—

‘ Once upon a time there lived in Germany a great Kaiser, and his name was Wilhelm. He had been a very glorious Kaiser in his day, and had conquered all his enemies, and united under his sceptre the savage tribes which dwelt between the Baltic and the Danube. And his days were long in the land, and in his old age he craved for rest and wished to live at peace with all his neighbours. But his life was made a burden to him by two giants whom he had employed in all his undertakings, the one to contrive his wars for him, the other to carry them out, and who now would neither rest nor be thankful; and also by certain tribes of Philistines to whom he had given a refuge in his empire, and who had there multiplied exceedingly. For Kaiser Wilhelm reigned in the days that Saul, the son of Kish, made war upon the Philistines, and smote them and dispersed them, and thus they spread over the earth, and owing to their great fertility the world was soon well-nigh filled with them.

‘ Now of the two giants the one was Zornebock, the Pomeranian Wizard, a terrible man to look upon, seven feet high, with no hair on his head, and with a mighty voice with which, in short cyclopean sentences, he was ever telling the world all he thought, and all he didn’t think. For in

<sup>1</sup> Written by Morier in 1875.

this he was mighty cunning, that he ever spake the truth when others would have done the reverse, and he ever did the reverse when others would have spoken the truth. So all men were deceived. And his great art consisted in the manufacture of mare's-nests, in which he was indeed unrivalled. And he collected all the Philistines in the land, and trained them to climb after the mare's-nests, and when he had thus well trained and drilled them he sent them out a'nesting after real nests, and after this fashion got he all his neighbours' eggs. But as he grew older he took to indulging in strong tobacco and strong drinks, huge draughts of mead and ale and wines from Burgundy, and also in salted and pickled meats, a taste he had in common with other celebrated giants, for like them he had ever by him "*bonne munition de jambons de Mayence et de Bayonne force langues de bœuf fumées, abondance d'andouilles en la saison, renforts de boulangers, provision de saucisse,*"<sup>1</sup> and above all great store of lampreys. And so his digestion got bad and his nerves got worse, and he would get into great frenzies of rage, during which he believed in his own mare's-nests, and really fancied that the Grand Duchess of Gerolstein was the scarlet lady, and that the Pope was General Bum-Bum, and that the German bishops were regiments of cuirassiers.

The other giant was of a very different type. He had come in his youth from Laputa, and was gifted with the extraordinary genius of that people for mathematics, and also shared in their peculiar habit of allowing themselves to be wholly engrossed by their self-inflicted problems. He was well-versed in seven languages, and in all of them remained obstinately silent. Kaiser Wilhelm employed him at first to solve military problems, and soon he had filled many acres of buildings with plans and sections and commentaries and ideal descriptions of every conceivable campaign between every conceivable combination of enemies and allies throughout the entire inhabited globe. When the great wars came, however, it was found that unlike his Laputan ancestors, he was as great in practice as in theory, and could move and concentrate millions of men by means

<sup>1</sup> Vide *La vie de Gargantua et de Pantagruel*, par F. Rabelais, chap. 3.

of his compasses and his quadrants and his diagrams, just as if they had been little leaden figures on his *Kriegspiel*. So Kaiser Wilhelm was much pleased with him, and allowed him to surround himself with a staff of Laputans, who soon engrossed into their hands all the military affairs of the empire. But the worst of the Laputan giant and his Laputan staff was that they exactly answered to the description given of the Laputans by that great traveller, Mr. Samuel Gulliver, for "although they were dexterous enough upon a piece of paper, in the management of the rule, the pencil and the divider" (and it must be allowed also in the management of troops actually in the field), "yet in the common actions and behaviour of life a more clumsy, awkward, and unhandy set of people, nor so slow and perplexed in their conceptions upon all other subjects except those of mathematics and war, could not be found. They were very bad reasoners, and vehemently given to opposition, unless when they happened to be of the right opinion, which was seldom the case."<sup>1</sup> . . . "But what was altogether unaccountable was their strong disposition towards news and politics, perpetually inquiring into public affairs, giving their judgments in matters of State, and passionately disputing every inch of a party opinion. . . . Now this same disposition can be found amongst most mathematicians . . . and may perhaps spring from a common infirmity of human nature, inclining men to be most curious and conceited in matters where they have least concern, and for which they are least adapted by study or nature."<sup>2</sup> . . . And this Laputan staff was under continual disquietudes, never enjoying a minute's peace of mind from causes which very little affected the rest of mortals, for if they learnt, for instance, that in some foreign army additional boots had been provided for the cavalry, or new buttons were to be sewn on to the gaiters of the infantry, they would at once perceive that their calculations, which were all in decimals, would be rendered void and of none effect, and so they would clamour for war before the boots could be delivered by the bootmakers, or the buttons be sewn on.

<sup>1</sup> Vide *Gulliver's Travels*, Part III., Voyage to Laputa, Balinbarbo, etc., chap. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*.

' And so it came to pass that when Kaiser Wilhelm wanted rest and desired to be at peace with all men he was much vexed with his two giants. For Zornebock was always coming with his mare's-nests and swearing that they were real mare's-nests, full of real mare's-eggs, which would in no time at all be hatched and the empire be overrun with great Centaurs, who would eat up Kaiser Wilhelm and all his dynasty. And the Laputan giant was always coming with his calculations and his algebraical formulas to prove that if war were not declared within 36 hours, 35 minutes, and  $22\frac{1}{2}$  seconds the German army in less than 3596 years would only retain an excess of two and a half pairs of boots and twelve buttons over the army of its most warlike neighbour. And Kaiser Wilhelm would listen to neither of them. And Zornebock waxed very wrath with his Kaiser, and contracted with St. Patrick, the Irish saint, for all the reptiles he was engaged in driving out of Ireland, and Zornebock got these reptiles over in a new kind of patent box called a "Press Bureau." And he sent them in amongst the Philistines, and whenever a Philistine was bitten by a reptile, he straightway shouted out "Long live Zornebock! Let us go and look for mare's-nests, and have a good war!" And the Laputan giant in his silent, untalkative manner became likewise very disagreeable and unmanageable, and got out his big drum and beat on it with all his might all day long, frightening all the old women in the street.

' So Kaiser Wilhelm lost patience, and swore that if they did not leave him in peace he would send for the great Bogie Bear from Russia, who would soon call them to order. Now the Bogie Bear from Russia in former days, and before Kaiser Wilhelm came to the throne, had really kept order in Germany, and when the Germans were unruly, Kaiser Wilhelm's ancestors used to call to the Bogie Bear, who would give a great grunt, and all the naughty Germans would be hushed. But Kaiser Wilhelm had stopped all this, and had all along been master in his own house, and never allowed the Bogie Bear to interfere, though he remained on the best of terms with him. But now that the giants got too much for him in his old age, he saw there was

no help for it, and so one fine morning the great Bogie Bear from Russia came by express train straight from the North Pole, and between him and Kaiser Wilhelm matters were soon set straight, but not without much wrangling on the part of the giants. For Zornebock swore it was the Laputan giant with his big drum, and the Laputan giant swore it was Zornebock with his mare's-nests, but at last all was arranged, and everybody kissed everybody else, except Zornebock, who had remained sulky all through and had refused even to go to the station to kiss the Bogie Bear's paw.

Now the Bogie Bear, who was the best-natured of bogies and of bears, thought no more about it, and was only glad that his good uncle Wilhelm should have peace and quiet restored in his house. But he had as his Minister a very cunning old fox who sent round circulars to all the world, saying that things had now got back to where they were before Wilhelm was Kaiser, that the Bogie Bear alone could now maintain order in Germany or peace in Europe, and that all men were henceforward to look upon him as the Supreme Judge and Arbiter of European affairs. And this did much vex Zornebock, who retired in dudgeon to his Pomeranian castle, to his strong tobacco, and strong drinks, and his pickled lampreys. And the old fox went to bathe his gouty limbs at some hot springs in the Black Forest. And there he was met by two very smart vixens, one from Paris and the other . . .

Here, unfortunately, the manuscript suddenly breaks off, which is the more to be regretted, as the scene lies in the Black Forest, *i.e.* in the very country where the legend has been preserved, and had Musäus therefore continued his jottings we might very likely have had a real tradition of all that took place between the old Russian fox and his smart vixens.

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